Research › Browse › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

1995 DIGILAW 205 (CAL)

Bidhan Hatua v. State of West Bengal

1995-06-23

SATYABRATA SINHA

body1995
JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– The petitioner in this application has inter alia, prayed for the following reliefs :–– (a) A. writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to act in accordance with law and consider the prayer afresh for grant of permit in respect of the route Calcutta to Gopigunj via Kolaghat in the light of the Supreme Court decision passed in case of (1) Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 443 ; (b) Further writ of Mandamus commanding the respondents including the respondent No. 3 to consider the matter and grant temporary permit on the route in question in accordance with the provisions of Sections 68 and 87 of the Motor Vehicles Act pending grant of permanent permit in question. 2. The fact of the matter which lies in a very narrow compass is that on or about 16.5.92. The Regional Transport Authority, Howrah and Midnapore adopted a joint resolution in the meeting for granting several route permits covering both the regions on reciprocal basis including the route Howrah Rly. Station to Gopigunj via Kolaghat at the ratio of 1:1. Pursuant to the said reciprocal agreement permits were granted from both the regions. The petitioner filed an application before the Regional Transport Authority, Howrah, for grant of permit on the route Gopigunj to Howrah Railway Station on 14.4.94; but the said application was rejected on the ground that there exists a ban order issued by the State Transport Authority bearing Memo No. 1577-STA in terms of its letter dated 13.4.94 which is contained in annexure 'E' to the writ application. The petitioner thereafter filed an application for grant of a permit before the State Transport Authority. 3. As the said application was not considered, a writ application was filed and Samaresh Banerjea, J. by an order dated 1.2.95, directed the State Transport Authority to consider the said application within eight weeks from the date of communication thereof. The matter was heard on 22.2.95 in the office of the State Transport Authority. The petitioner also filed a written submission. However, by an order dated 18.5.95, the said application has been rejected, inter alia, on the ground that since the route covers two regions, the petitioner may make application before the competent Regional Transport Authority. 4. Mr. The matter was heard on 22.2.95 in the office of the State Transport Authority. The petitioner also filed a written submission. However, by an order dated 18.5.95, the said application has been rejected, inter alia, on the ground that since the route covers two regions, the petitioner may make application before the competent Regional Transport Authority. 4. Mr. Sanat Kumar Roy, Learned Advocate for the petitioner, raised a question in this application. The Learned Counsel submits that provisions of Section 69 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot have any application in a case where there exists reciprocal agreement. My attention has further been drawn to Clause (b) of Sub-section 3 of Section 68 of the said Act in terms whereof the State Transport Authority is entitled to perform the duties of Regional Transport Authority and for other reasons mentioned therein. In the instant case, the ban order has been imposed by the State Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Authority being an authority sub-ordinate to the State Transport Authority, therefore, would not be in a position to consider the petitioner's application for grant of permanent Stage Carriage Permit for the route Gopigunj to Howrah Railway Station via Kolaghat. 5. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the State Transport Authority also should consider the matter itself without referring back the matter to the Regional Transport Authority concerned inasmuch as, as noticed hereinbefore, the petitioner had earlier applied before the Regional Transport Authority, Howrah and his application has been rejected only on the ground that a ban order has been imposed for grant of such permit by the State Transport Authority. In any event, as it is well-known that administrative discipline requires that a subordinate authority is bound by a direction made by a higher authority. In that view of the matter, the Regional Transport Authority in all possibilities, would reject the petitioner's application only on the ground of existence of such a ban order. It is only the State Transport Authority itself in this situation, which could pass an appropriate order upon taking into consideration its own letter dated 18th April, 1994. In (2) K. Pamanna v. The Slate Transport and Appellate Tribunal, A. P., Hyderabad & Ors. It is only the State Transport Authority itself in this situation, which could pass an appropriate order upon taking into consideration its own letter dated 18th April, 1994. In (2) K. Pamanna v. The Slate Transport and Appellate Tribunal, A. P., Hyderabad & Ors. reported in AIR 1992 AP 368 , the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held as follows :–– "Before considering the other aspects, we feel it necessary to set at rest all doubts as to the hierarchical nature of the two Tribunals. There is absolutely no legal basis for the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the S.P.S.R.T.C. that STA and RTA are two independent bodies exercising separate powers and functions unrelated to each other. In the hierarchical set up under the Act, the RTA is a sub-ordinate authority with limited territorial jurisdiction, where as the STA is a higher authority exercising the jurisdiction over the whole of the State. Interpreting Sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 44 of the Act the Supreme Court in (3) State of Rajasthan v. Noor Mohemmed, AIR 1973 SC 2729 set at rest all lingering doubts in this regard ; "It is clear from the above provisions that the State Transport Authority is a superior authority with jurisdiction over the whole of the State while the Regional Transport Authorities is sub-ordinate to it with its jurisdiction generally confined to the region for which it is appointed. It is also clear from Sub-section (3) Clause (b) that the State Transport Authority can perform the duties and functions of the Regional Transport Authority under certain circumstances". It is also clear from Sub-section (3) Clause (b) that the State Transport Authority can perform the duties and functions of the Regional Transport Authority under certain circumstances". Section 43 which deals with the power of the State Government to control Road Transport empowers the State Government to issue directions to the STA in respect of the four matters specified therein viz., (i) Fixing or fares and freights for stage carriages, contract carriages and public carriers; (ii) Restrictions regarding long distance goods traffic generally or of specified classes of goods by private or public carriers; (iii) Grant of permits for alternative routes or areas to persons affected because of the operation of provisions of Section 68(F); and (iv) Any other matter which appears to be necessary and expedient to the Government for giving effect to any agreement entered into with the Central Government or any other State Government or the Government of any other country relating to the regulations of motor transport. From the aforesaid provisions the inference follows that in regard to the matter specified clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of the second limb of Sub-section (1) of Section 43, the STA has implied powers. When a Statute confers power on Government to issue directions to a body in certain matters, it is plain that in regard to those matters the body is competent to exercise jurisdiction and the power is curtailed only to the extent comprehended by the directions issued by the Government". In (4) Sher Singh v. Stare Transport Authority, Gwalior and others reported in AIR 1969 MP 92 , the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that :–– "We now revert to Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 44 which we have reproduced earlier. It is first argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that these sub-sections cannot be utilised for depriving a Regional Transport Authority of its jurisdiction to grant permits. Such a broad statement is plainly wrong. A look at Sub-section (3)(b) will show that in case of a route which is common to two or more regions, the State Transport Authority may, if it thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority, perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority. Such a broad statement is plainly wrong. A look at Sub-section (3)(b) will show that in case of a route which is common to two or more regions, the State Transport Authority may, if it thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority, perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority. If the State Transport Authority decides to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority for an inter-regional route it can certainly issue directions under sub-section (4) to the Regional Transport Authorities concerned not to exercise that duty. Otherwise the object of taking over the duties of the Regional Transport Authorities by the State Transport Authority will not be served. Sub-sections (3)(b) and (4) therefore clearly authorise the State Transport Authority to perform the function of granting permits on an inter-regional route and to deprive the Regional Transport Authority of their jurisdiction to that extent". 6. Having regard to the aforementioned decisions and keeping in view the power of the State Transport Authority as conferred on it under Section 68(3)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, I am of the opinion that the State Transport Authority itself could have disposed of the petitioner's application for grant of inter-region permit both temporary and permanent. For the reasons aforementioned, this application is allowed. The order dated 22.5.95 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the State Transport Authority for a fresh decision in accordance with law at an early date and preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of this order. There will be no order as to costs.