Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. 1. The first of the Writ Petitions is for issue of a mandamus directing the State Government to impose strict conditions for obtaining licence for the use of amplifiers and loud speakers under Section 41 and/or Section 71-A of the Madras City Police Act, 1888 and Section 10 of the Madras Towns Nuisance Act, 1889 and to ensure that the licencees do not violate the conditions thus imposed, resulting in damage to public health or cause annoyance to the public. In the second petition, which is filed by the same person, the prayer is for issue of mandamus directing the State Government and the Director General of Police (Law and Order) to issue appropriate orders imposing a total ban on the usage of horn type of loud speakers, amplifiers and air horns by automobiles. The third writ petition is by a Trust called Consumer Action Group represented by its trustee, for issue of a mandamus directing the State Government, the Police Authorities and the Secretary, Transport Department, to implement a proper system of regulations of loud speakers and air horns and other noise pollution activities on the basis of the instructions and Page guidelines to be laid down by this Court. 2. The petitioners have described in detail in their affidavits the serious health hazard and disturbance to public order and tranquillity caused by the uncontrolled noise pollution prevailing in the State. The grievance of the petitioners is more because of the failure of the authorities concerned to enforce the relevant rules and implement effectively the conditions subject to which licences are issued for use of loud speakers and amplifiers. Though particular instances of glaring violations are set out in the affidavits, it is not necessary for us to consider them in detail, as none of the persons who are responsible for such alleged violations is before the Court. In the first writ petition initially the State Government was the only respondent, but later the Consumer Action Group, who is the petitioner in the third writ petition, was impleaded as second respondent by order dated 17-9-1994 in W.M.P. No. 19719 of 1985, while the Commissioner of Police, Madras, was impleaded as the third respondent by order dated 7-10-1994 in W.M.P. No. 18261 of 1985. 3. 3. On 7-10-1994, one of us sitting singly, passed an order in W.M.P. No. 18209 of 1985 directing the respondents to strictly enforce the conditions set out in the Annexure to G.O.Ms. No. 3485, dated 29-12-1977 till the disposal of the writ petition. The said conditions were extracted in the order. It was also observed that any violations of the conditions could be brought to the notice of the concerned authorities by any citizen of the country. On the same day, by another order, the matter was directed to be placed before the Honble the Chief Justice for constituting a Division Bench to hear the Writ Petitions as they involve a very important question concerning the entire State of Tamil Nadu with regard to the use of loud speakers and air horns. Thereafter, on the orders of the Honble the Chief Justice, the matter has come up before us. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the relevant provisions of law prevailing in this State and also the judgments of the Courts in this country as well as in England and U.S.A. In so far as loud speakers are concerned, there are two enactments governing the use of the same. The Madras City Police Act, 1888 applies to the City of Madras. Section 41 thereof empowers the Commissioner or subject to his orders, any Police officer above the rank of head constable, to regulate assemblies, meetings and processions in public places, etc. Sub-Section (1) enables him to license and regulate or prohibit the use of music or of sound amplifiers in any area. Sub-Section (8) makes the Section inapplicable to any assembly or meeting of a purely religious character held in a recognized place of worship, any assembly or meeting gathered together purely for the purpose of taking part in sports, any procession on the occasion of any wedding, funeral or similar domestic occurrence, or of any religious ceremony, or to any public meeting held under any statutory or other express legal authority, or public meeting convened by the Sheriff, or to any public meetings or class of public meetings exempted for that purpose by the State Government by general or special order. 5. 5. Section 71-A of the Act which prevents unauthorised use of sound amplifiers in any area, is in the following terms:— “(1) Whoever plays any music or uses any sound amplifier except at such times and in such area and subject to such conditions as shall, from time to time, be allowed by the Commissioner or subject to his orders, any police officer above the rank of a Head-Constable, shall be liable on conviction to fine not exceeding five hundred rupees or imprisonment which may extend to three months. (2) Any Police officer referred to in sub-section (1) may, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, seize any sound amplifier used in contravention of the terms and conditions of a licence granted under sub-section (1) and the Court trying an offence under this section may also direct the forfeiture of any sound amplifier so seized.” 6. Similar provision is made for Towns outside the City of Madras in the Tamil nadu Towns Nuisances Act, 1889. Previously, Section 3(10) thereof provided that user of any sound amplifier except at such times and places and subject to such conditions as shall, from time to time, be allowed by an officer of the Police Department not below the rank of a District Superintendent of Police as an offence and whoever in any public place commits the said offence shall be liable on conviction to fine not exceeding fifty rupees or to imprisonment of either description not exceeding eight days. By an amendment of 1951, the words “not below the rank of District Superintendent of Police” were substituted by the words “not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police”. By Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1975, sub-Section (10) of Section 3 was omitted and Section 3-A was inserted. That Section is in the following terms:— “3.A. (1) Whoever plays any music or uses any sound amplifier except at such times and in such area and subject to such conditions as shall, from time to time, be allowed by an officer of the Police Department not below the rank of an Inspector of Police shall be liable on conviction to fine not exceeding five hundred rupees or to imprisonment which, may extend to three months. (2) Any Police Officer referred to in sub-Section (1) may, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, seize any sound amplifier used in contravention of the terms and conditions of a licence granted under Sub-Section (1) and the Court trying an offence under this Section may also direct the forfeiture of any sound amplifier so seized.” 7. Thus, the above statutory provisions empower the Police Officials referred to therein to impose conditions from time to time, for the user of sound amplifier. The State Government has been, however, issuing orders under the said provisions from time to time prescribing conditions for grant of licences and permissions for the use of loud speakers. G.O.Ms. No. 1643, dated 1st July, 1969, G.O.Ms. No. 1023, dated 4.4.72 and G.O.Ms. No. 849 dated 15-5-1975 are some of the orders of the Government. It is not necessary to set out the contents thereof as a comprehensive Government Order was passed in G.O.Ms. No. 3485, dated 29-12-1977. It is necessary to extract the same in full as hereunder:— “Copy of G.O.Ms. No. 3485, dt. 29.12.1977 for Home Department addressed to the Inspector General of Police, Madras-4. Abstract Acts-Madras City Police Act, 1883 and Madras Towns Nuisances Act-Use of loud speaker-Conditions of licence-Revised. READ. (1) G.O.Ms. No. 1643, Home dt. 1.7.1969. (2) G.O.Ms. No. 849, Home dt. 15.5.1975. (3) From the Inspector General of Police Rc. No. 107264/Acts- 4/76 dt. 4.6.1976. ORDER: Licences for the use of sound amplifiers in public and private places issued under Section 71-A of the Madras City Police Act are at present governed by the conditions laid down in the Government Order first read above. The Inspector General of Police has proposed that the existing conditions may be revised and a fresh list of conditions laid down to put an end to the persistent complaints received on the use of loudspeaker. The Government have examined in detail the suggestion of the Inspector General of Police. They have decided that grant of licences for the use of loudspeaker will be subject to the conditions appended to this order. (True copy) Annexure (Conditions for grant of loudspeaker licence) (1) Amplifiers can be used only between 9 AM to 10.30 PM and for 3 hours at a time. The duration of 3 hours is relaxable under special circumstances. They have decided that grant of licences for the use of loudspeaker will be subject to the conditions appended to this order. (True copy) Annexure (Conditions for grant of loudspeaker licence) (1) Amplifiers can be used only between 9 AM to 10.30 PM and for 3 hours at a time. The duration of 3 hours is relaxable under special circumstances. (2) No extension speaker should be put up outside the premises for Which the licence is issued. Relaxable in the case of temples, churches and mosque on some occasions. (3) Only Box type speaker should be used. (4) The volume should be such low that it is not heard outside the premises. (5) If any misuse is noticed licence will be cancelled. (6) The installation of loudspeakers and mike sets tor which the licence is issued should be done only by an electrical contractor having at least a valid “B” Contractors licence issued by the Electrical Licensing Board of the State and operated only by a person haying a wiremen competency certificate issued by the Electrical licensing Board. Non compliance of the condition is not only punishable under the Madras City Police Act but also under the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 for violation of Rule 36 thereof. (7) No sound amplifier shall face and no person shall use a sound amplifier, within (prescribe the limits) of hospital, place, of worship or an educational institution and (any other public institution which is in that locality and which may be mentioned here). (8) Any Police Officer on duty above the rank of Head Constable may require any party to stop using or remove any sound amplifier the using of which, may be a nuisance or cause obstruction and it shall be stopped or removed as the case may be immediately. (9) Any Police Officer on duty above the rank of Head Constable may seize any sound amplifier or other instrument used in amplifying which has been or appears to have been used in contravention of any of the conditions stipulated. (10) Loudspeakers should not be allowed to be installed on towers and temple walls, churches and mosques, so as to nice the surrounding streets and areas, should be installed within the precincts and turned inwards so that the music is audible only within the precincts of the temple/church/mosque. (10) Loudspeakers should not be allowed to be installed on towers and temple walls, churches and mosques, so as to nice the surrounding streets and areas, should be installed within the precincts and turned inwards so that the music is audible only within the precincts of the temple/church/mosque. Exemption will be given during the month of Ramzan when the calls of the Muazzine for prayers is traditionally made from the mosque tower.” 8. By G.O.Ms. No. 2579 dated 15th October, 1982, the Government reiterated that the earlier order should be scrupulously followed in all cases of grant of loudspeaker licence and especially so in the grant of licence in communal or religious tension prone areas. The Commissioner of Police, Madras City and all the Superintendents of Police in the Districts were requested to observe and follow scrupulously the orders issued by the Government and they were requested also to issue necessary instructions to their subordinate officers and men impressing on them the need for following the Government Order. The Government also warned the officials that any lapse in that regard will be viewed seriously by the Government and the Commissioner of Police, Madras and Superintendents of Police in the Districts were requested to take stern and severe disciplinary action against the officers and men under their control for any lapse in that regard. An amendment to G.O.Ms. No. 3485 was effected by Government letter (Ms) No. 3039, Home (Police. IV) dated 15-6-1989 from the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Home Department to the Director General of Police, Madras. By that amendment, a proviso is added to condition No. (3) in the Annexure to G.O.Ms. No. 3485 whereby cone type of loudspeakers are also permitted to be used in the case of public meeting and public conferences. 9. With reference to air horns used in motor vehicles, the relevant statutory provisions are found in the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 and the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Rule 119 of the Central Rules is in the following terms:— “119. Horns.- (1) Every motor vehicle shall be fitted with an electric horn or other device conforming to the specifications of the Bureau of Indian Standards for use by the driver of the vehicle and capable of giving audible and sufficient warning of the approach or position of the vehicle. Horns.- (1) Every motor vehicle shall be fitted with an electric horn or other device conforming to the specifications of the Bureau of Indian Standards for use by the driver of the vehicle and capable of giving audible and sufficient warning of the approach or position of the vehicle. (2) No motor vehicle shall be fitted with any multitoned horn giving a succession of different notes or with any other sound-producing device giving an unduly harsh, shrill, loud or alarming noise. (3) Nothing contained in sub-rule (2) shall prevent the use on vehicles used as ambulance or for fire fighting or salvage purposes or on vehicles used by police officers or officers of Motor Vehicles Department in the course of their duties, of such sound signals as may be approved by the registering authority in whose jurisdiction such vehicles are kept.” Rules 402 and 403 of the State Rules read thus:— “402. No driver of motor vehicle shall sound the horn or other device for giving audible warning, with which the motor vehicles is equipped, or shall cause or allow any other person to do so to an extent beyond that which is reasonably necessary to ensure safety. 403. The Commissioner of Police in the City of Madras and elsewhere the Superintendent of Police may by notification in the Official Gazette and by the erection in suitable place of traffic sign No. 7 as set forth in Part A of the Schedule to the Act, prohibit the use of any horn, or other device on a motor vehicle for giving suitable warning within such locality and during such hours as may be specified in the notification: Provided that when the Commissioner of Police or the Superintendent of Police, as the case may be, prohibits the use of any horn, or other device for giving audible warning during certain specified nouns, he shall cause a suitable notice in English and setting forth the hours within which such use is so prohibited to be affixed below the traffic sign.” 10. The petitioner in W.P. No. 20444 of 1992 has brought to our notice an order of this Court dated 28-4-1988 made in W.M.P. No. 7421 of 1988 in W.P. No. 5048 of 1988 granting and interim injunction restraining all the State Government Transport Corporations and other Transport companies under the control of the State Government from using air horns and other high sounding horns and not to exceed the speed limit prescribed by the Government within the Madras-Chingleput and other city limits till the disposal of the writ petition. At the time when W.P. No. 20444 of 1992 was admitted, an interim direction was given in W.M.P. Nos. 29430 and 29431 of 1992 to the respondents to effectively implement G.O.Ms. No. 3485 and set up a responsive system for attending to complaints from the members of the public and to ensure that air horns and other excessively loud/shrill horns are not used in the cities and towns of Tamil nadu by the public and private vehicles including State Transport and State carriers till the disposal of the Writ Petition. The State Government has not chosen to file any counter affidavit in W P. No. 20444 of 1992 though counter affidavits have been filed in the other two writ petitions. 11. As stated already, the case of the petitioners is that the statutory rules and the Government Orders issued thereunder are not obeyed in any manner by any of the users of sound amplifiers or loudspeakers and air horns. Their prayer is in effect that the Court should frame guidelines and issue directions so that the concerned authorities will enforce the rules and conditions and stop ignoring and blatant violations of the same. There is no doubt whatever that the conditions imposed by the authorities or supposed to have been imposed by the authorities under G.O.Ms. No. 3485 are observed only in breach. The way in which loudspeakers and sound amplifiers are being used indiscriminately gives rise to a legitimate doubt whether the authorities have distributed freely licences to the users thereof without attaching any condition whatever. There are some materials on record to show that the authorities are not very keen in implementing the conditions stipulated in the Government Orders referred to earlier. In G.O.Ms. There are some materials on record to show that the authorities are not very keen in implementing the conditions stipulated in the Government Orders referred to earlier. In G.O.Ms. No. 1643 dated 1st July, 1969, use of loudspeakers for public meetings, cultural or ‘Kalai Nighzhchigal” and conferences was permeated upto 10 PM in residential areas and upto 11 PM in the non-residential areas. But, the Commissioner of Police reported to the Government that in most of the meetings in which loudspeakers were used, the people did not adhere to the time limit prescribed and almost all political parties were violating the restrictions, it was, therefore, proposed by the Commissioner that the time limit may be extended by one hour respectively and the Inspector General of Police endorsed the said proposal. The Government accepted the same and passed G.O.Ms. No. 1045 dated 9-5-1979 permitting use of loudspeakers for public meetings etc., upto 11 PM in residential areas and 12 mid-night in non-residential areas. We are anguished to see that the authorities, instead of enforcing the regulations, seek a change of the same to bring it in accord with the unlawful violations totally unmindful of the interests of the larger public. Under Article 47 of the Constitution of India, the raising of the standard of living of the people and the improvement of public health are among the primary duties of the State. It is unfortunate that the State Government is oblivious to the Directive P rinciples enlisted in the Constitution. Apart from that, judicial notice can be taken by the Court of what is happening in this State. In fact, this Court has often been the victim of noise pollution, if we can put it mildly, to such an extent that it would be practically impossible to hear the arguments of counsel. For example, on the 30th ultimo, which is supposed to be ‘Sarvodaya Day’ or ‘Martyrs’ Day, when the whole nation is supposed to pay homage to its Father, the authorities concerned had permi tted public agitation by bank employees on the public road abutting the High Court compound, who were using loudspeakers and sound amplifiers without any restriction for over five hours continuously during the Court working hours. We were somewhat surprised, if not shocked, that the concerned authorities were not aware of a notification issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, New Delhi, in G.S.R. 1063(E) dated 26th December, 1989 in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 6 and 25 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 prescribing ambient air quality standards in respect of noise with regard to different categories of areas classified as Industrial area, Commercial area, Residential area and Silence zone. “Silence Zone” is defined therein as “areas upto 100 metres around such premises as hospitals, educational institutions and courts ”. underlining ours. The Silence Zones are to be declared by the Competent Authority and no use of vehicular horns, loudspeakers and bursting of crackers shall be done in those Zones. It was a case not merely of a violation of statutory rules but a flagrant violation of human rights on a day supposed to have been reserved for paying homage to a respecter of human rights. 12. We have placed the above incident on record only to point out that the grievances of the petitioners are fully justified in that the authorities concerned are turning or made to turn by the higher powers a Nelsons eye to the violations of rules and, regulations in these matters. The petitioners have placed before us sufficient literature as to how noise pollution is a grave danger to the society. A copy of an article which appeared in the August 1982 Issue of ‘Science Today’ and a copy of the ICMR Bulletin’ of July 1979 containing a Study on Noise Pollution in South India are placed before us it is not necessary to refer to them in detail. Suffice it to point out that noise pollution will lead to serious nervous disorders, emotional tension leading to high blood-pressure, cardiovascular diseases, increase in cholesterol level resulting in heart attacks and strokes and even damage to foetus. 13. Now we shall briefly refer to the case law cited at the bar. In Rajni Kant v. State (AIR 1958 Allahabad 360), the Court held that use of mechanical instruments like loudspeakers and amplifiers is not covered by the guarantee of freedom of speech and expression and, therefore, a bye-law of a Municipality which required permission of the Executive Officer for using a loudspeaker did not infringe Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In Rajni Kant v. State (AIR 1958 Allahabad 360), the Court held that use of mechanical instruments like loudspeakers and amplifiers is not covered by the guarantee of freedom of speech and expression and, therefore, a bye-law of a Municipality which required permission of the Executive Officer for using a loudspeaker did not infringe Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Reference was made to the judgments of the United States Supreme Court in Saia v. People of the State of New York {(1948) 92 Law Ed. 1547} and Kovaes v. Cooper {(1949) 93 Law Ed. 513}. 14. In Indulal v. State (AIR 1963 Gujarat 259) the petitioner challenged inter alia the constitutionality of clause (r), sub-clause (iii) of subsection (1) of Section 33 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 and the Rules made thereunder in as much as it provided that the Commissioner and District Magistrate in areas under their respective charges or any part thereof, may make, alter or rescind rules or orders licensing, controlling or, in order to prevent obstruction, inconvenience, annoyance, risk, danger or damage of the residents or passengers in the vicinity prohibiting the using of a loudspeaker in or near any public place. Thus, the rule conferred the powers of licensing, controlling and prohibiting. The validity to the rule was challenged mainly on the ground that it violated the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It was argued that the fundamental right included the right to propagate ones views by and through all available means, including the means of a loudspeaker. It was contended that the impugned part of the Section, rules and the order contained a total prohibition to exercise the said fundamental right. Though the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition upholding the validity of the rule on the ground that there was no total prohibition on the exercise of the right and that there were sufficient guidelines to be followed by the authorities, observed that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution included not merely the right to propagate ones views but also co mprehended the right to circulate those views to as large an audience as one can possible reach. The Bench said that if a journalist can avail himself of the mechanism of his Press for reaching a wider circle of audience, there was no reason why a person, who had at his disposal a more modest instrument like the microphone, should not avail himself of that instrument. The Bench observed, “If the mechanical appliances and instruments other than the press can help the citizen in reaching a wider circle of audience than the limits of his voice can permit, there does not appear to be any good reason why the citizen should not be permitted to avail himself of them”. The Bench proceeded to refer to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras ( AIR 1950 SC 124 ), Virendra v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1957 SC 896 ), Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India ( AIR 1960 SC 554 ) and Sakal Papers (P)Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1962SC 305). After stating that in one of those cases the question of user of loudspeakers, amplifiers and other means of expression directly arose for decision, the Bench said, “there cannot be any distinction between the right to circulate a newspaper and the right to circulate ones views by means of loudspeakers and amplifiers”. With respect, we are unable to agree with the said view expressed by the Bench. Circulation of newspapers is entirely different from speaking through a loudspeaker and amplifier. In the case of former, a person who does not want to read the newspaper can easily avoid reading the same. But, in the case of loudspeaker, even if one does not want to listen to the speech, the noise will reach him and compulsorily enter the ears, unless he plugs the ear holes with cotton or other artificial aids. While in the case of former, there is no invasion of the rights of anybody who is not willing to learn the views of the newspaper, in the latter case an unwilling person is compelled to tolerate the noise of the blaring sound of the loudspeaker. The two devices cannot be equated with each other and placed on the same pedestal. 15. The two devices cannot be equated with each other and placed on the same pedestal. 15. In D. Anantha Prabhu v. District Collector, Ernakulam (AIR 1975 Kerala 117) the District Collector granted permission to the petitioner to use the Durbar Hall Ground in the city of Ernakulam for conducting the Annual Day Celebrations of the Rashtriya Sevak Sangh subject to three conditions, the first of which was that “mike, loud speaker etc., should not be used at any time”. Challenging the validity of the said condition, the petitioner filed the writ petition. The Court allowed the same and struck down the said condition holding that it amounted to infringement of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression as it stood across the person who spoke or expressed and the persons to whom he spoke or expressed effectively imposing restraints on communication between them which is the essence of the freedom of speech and expression and without which that freedom was futile and meaningless. The ban on use of mike, loudspeaker etc., was held to be an unreasonable restriction. The Court, however, recognised that the State should regulate the use of loudspeaker or mechanical or other contrivances to amplify the sound. The Court referred to English and American authorities. 16. In Rahib Mukejee v. State (AIR 1985 Calcutta 222), a public interest writ petition was filed for protection against the nuisance and noise pollution created with impunity by the transport operators by indiscriminate installation and use of electric and artificially generated air horns, which caused unduly rash, shrill, loud and alarming noise. A mandamus was sought to command the authorities to enforce the provisions of Rule 114 of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940. The Court held that Rule 114(d) of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules contained a mandatory provision that no transport vehicle can be fitted with any other form of horn excepting a bulb horn. The Court pointed out that the transport authorities were under a statutory obligation and duty under Section 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to punish the person who contravened the provisions of Rule 114(d) of the Rules and issued appropriate directions to enforce the said rule. 17. The Court pointed out that the transport authorities were under a statutory obligation and duty under Section 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to punish the person who contravened the provisions of Rule 114(d) of the Rules and issued appropriate directions to enforce the said rule. 17. In P.A. Jacob v. The Superintendent of Police, Kottayam and another (PAR 1993 Kerala 1) a learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court dissented from the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in Indulals case (AIR 1963 Gujarat 259). The learned Judge also referred to D. Anantha Prabhus case (AIR 1975 Kerala 117) and said that the Court did not consider the question whether a fundamental right was involved in the matter of using of loudspeaker and assumed that there was a fundamental right and proceeded to consider the reasonableness of a restriction imposed. The learned Judge held that use of loudspeaker may be incidental to the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution, but it is not a matter of right or part of the right. Afte r referring to various Indian, English and American authorities, the learned Judge said:— “(17). A person can decline to read a publication, or switch off a radio or television set. But, he cannot prevent the sound from a loudspeaker reaching him. He could be forced to hear what he wished not to hear. That will be an invasion of his right to be let alone, to hear what he wants to hear, or not to hear what he does not wish to hear. One may put his mind or hearing to his own uses, but not that of another. No one has a right to trespass on the mind or ear of another and commit auricular or visu al aggression. Limits, must be drawn for liberties, lest they turn into licence, and the antithesis of liberty in its true sense. (19). Professions of rights, distanced from realities of life, would make liberties, unreal. The liberties of some, could prove to be the end of the liberties of others. The loquacious may silence the meek. The State must protect the mute, the unorganised and inarticulate, against onslaught of enthusiasm of the vocal or the vociferous. It is no use saying hosannas to freedom, unless such freedom is real. The liberties of some, could prove to be the end of the liberties of others. The loquacious may silence the meek. The State must protect the mute, the unorganised and inarticulate, against onslaught of enthusiasm of the vocal or the vociferous. It is no use saying hosannas to freedom, unless such freedom is real. Real they will be, only if there is an ordered society, order to liberty, is what oxygen to life is. There is no basis to think that freedom and order are not compatible. They are complementary. Liberty will be lost in excess of anarchy, if there is no order. Regulation and suppression are not the same in purpose or result. Time it is to think, whether undisguised assertions of rights by some, have not imperiled rights of others. If one were to recognise right to protest by blocking roads and railways, it is recognition of a right, to deny rights of the peaceful citizens. Acorns of today, will grow into oaks of tomorrow. (22). A loud speaker is a mechanical device, and it has no mind or thought process in it. Recognition of the right of speech or expression is recognition accorded to human personality, and not to a mechanical device. One may put his faculties to reasonable uses. But, he cannot put his machines to any use he likes. He cannot use his machines to injure others. Intervention with a machine, is not intervention with, or invasion of a human faculty or right, no mechanical device can be upgraded to a human faculty. A computer or a robot cannot be conceded the rights under Article 19 (though they may be useful to man to express on his faculties). No more, a loud speaker. The use of a loud speaker may be incidental to the exercise of the right. But, its use is not a matter of right, or part of the right. I am in no way, not in the least way, narrowing down free speech, nor, attempting to cabin, confine and crib a cherished right, while holding that mechanical aid is not a complement of human faculty, or its us e the extension of a constitutional right. But, its use is not a matter of right, or part of the right. I am in no way, not in the least way, narrowing down free speech, nor, attempting to cabin, confine and crib a cherished right, while holding that mechanical aid is not a complement of human faculty, or its us e the extension of a constitutional right. But, I consider that any measure of cosmetic surgery on the face of an aggressive act of aural aggression or trespass on the mind of another, will not make it resemble a right.” The learned Judge then referred to the evils caused by exposure to high noise and said that compulsory exposure of unwilling persons to dangerous and disastrous levels of noise, would amount to a clear infringement of their constitutional guarantee of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, which comprehends right to a safe environment, including safe air quality, safe from noise. The learned Judge has, however, cautioned that use of loudspeaker cannot be arbitrarily denied only because a fundamental right is not involved. On the facts of the case, the learned Judge held that the cancellation of permission granted initially for use of loudspeaker was arbitrary and unjustifiable. 18. With respect, we agree with the view expressed by the Kerala High Court in P.A. Jacobs case (AIR 1993 Kerala 1). 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to a passage in Weirs “A Case Book on Tort”, 7th Edn., page 416. The author has extracted a part of the dissenting judgment rendered by Pollock, C.B., in Bamford v. Turnley (31 Law Journal Queens Bench 286). It was an action for damages from smoke and smell arising from the burning of bricks in the brick-works. The relevant part of the passage reads thus:— “Most certainly in my judgment it cannot be laid down as a legal proposition or doctrine, that anything which, under any circumstances, lessens the comfort or endangers the health or safety of a neighbour, must necessarily be an actional nuisance. That may be a nuisance in Grosvenor Square which would be none in Smith field Market, that may be a nuisance at midday which would not be so at midnight, that may be a nuisance which is permanent and continual which would be no nuisance if temporary or occasio nal only. That may be a nuisance in Grosvenor Square which would be none in Smith field Market, that may be a nuisance at midday which would not be so at midnight, that may be a nuisance which is permanent and continual which would be no nuisance if temporary or occasio nal only. A clock striking the hour, or a bell ringing for some domestic purpose, may be a nuisance, if unreasonably loud and discordant, of which the jury alone must judge; but although not unreasonably loud, if the owner, from some whim or caprice, made the clock strike the hour every 10 minutes, or the bell ring continually, I think a jury would be justified in considering it to be a very great nuisance, in general, a kitchen chimney, suitable to the establishment to which it belonged could not be deemed a nuisance, but if built in an inconvenient place or manner, or purpose to annoy the neigbours, it might, I think, very properly be treated as one. The compromises that belong to social life, and upon which the peace and comfort of it mainly depend, furnish an indefinite number of examples where some apparent natural right is invaded, or some enjoyment abridged, to provide for the more general convenience or necessities of the whole community; and I think the more the details of the question are ex amined the more clearly it will appear that all the law can do is to lay down some general and vague proposition which will be no guide to the jury in each particular case that may come before them.” 20. Our attention was also drawn to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Regina v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Ex parte Blackburn {(1968) 2 Q.B. 118), Regina v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Ex parte Blackburn and another {(1973) 1 Q.B. 241) and Attorney-General v. Independent Broadcasting Authority {(1973) 1 Q.B. 629). In our opinion, it is not necessary to refer to those decisions in detail. 21. Reference was made to by learned counsel to the decision in Arthur Francis v. Chief of Police {(1973) Appeal Cases 761), wherein the Privy Council held that the control of loudspeakers at public meetings by Section 5 of Public Meetings and Processions Act 1969 was not contrary to Section 10 of the St. 21. Reference was made to by learned counsel to the decision in Arthur Francis v. Chief of Police {(1973) Appeal Cases 761), wherein the Privy Council held that the control of loudspeakers at public meetings by Section 5 of Public Meetings and Processions Act 1969 was not contrary to Section 10 of the St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla Constitution Order, 1967, for public order required that the public, who did not wish to hear the speaker, be protected from any excessive noise, it was also held that a wrongful refusal of permission to use a loudspeaker at a public meeting (for instance if the refusal is inspired by political partiality) would be an unjustified and therefore unconstitutional interference with freedom of communication. The Privy Council has referred to some of the judgments of the Supreme Court of India and also the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Indulals case (AIR 1963 Gujarat 259). After discussing the question in detail, the Judicial Committee said:— “some regulation of the use of loudspeakers is required in order that citizens who do not wish to hear what is said may be protected against “aural aggression” if that might reach unbearable intensity.” 22. Learned counsel places reliance also on some of the passages in the judgments of U.S. Supreme Court in Bernard Carey v. Roy Brown (447 US 455) and Frisby v. Schultz (487 US 474). In the former case, the Court held that the States interest is protecting the well-being, tranquillity and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilised society. In the latter case, the Court emphasised on the importance of right of privacy and said that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and the government may protect the said freedom. The Court observed that there simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener.” 23. In all the cases referred to above, both in this country and outside, except in Rabin Mukherjees case (AIR 1985 Calcutta 222), the question arose on the validity of a restriction imposed on the use of loudspeakers or exercise of right of speech. In none of those cases, the Court was approached for the purpose of compelling the State to enforce statutory rules and other regulations framed by it. In none of those cases, the Court was approached for the purpose of compelling the State to enforce statutory rules and other regulations framed by it. We have already seen in this case that there are sufficient statutory rules and Government Orders regulating use of loudspeakers or sound amplifiers and prohibiting the use of horns emitting excessive sound in vehicles. There is, therefore, no necessity for us to set put any guidelines in that regard. In our opinion, the conditions set out in the Annexure to G.O.Ms. No. 3485 are sufficient to protect the interests of the public as against the health hazards caused by the use of loudspeakers and sound amplifiers. So also rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act governing the use of horns in the vehicles are more than sufficient to prevent noise pollusion. The only question to be considered by Us is the method by which the authorities could be directed to enforce strictly) and implement fully the aforesaid rules and conditions. 24. We are of the view that it is necessary in the interests of justice to issue the following directions to the Government:— (1) The Government shall give wide publicity to G.O.Ms. No. 3485 dated 29-12-1977. The said G.O. along with its Annexure shall be published in two English Dailies and two Tamil Dailies having circulation throughout the State within a period of four weeks from this date. (2) The conditions set out in the Annexure to G.O.Ms. No. 3485 shall be set out in full in the form of application for licence or permission to use loudspeaker or sound amplifier for any purpose. (3) Such conditions shall also be set out in the licence or permission granted by the authorities. (4) Both in the Form of Application and in the Licence or Permission, it should be set out clearly that any violation of any of the conditions prescribed will be viewed seriously and appropriate action will be taken against the person who violates the same. (5) A separate cell has to be set up in the office of the Commissioner of Police in the City of Madras and in the Office of the Superintendent of Police in each District, to receive complaints against violation of the conditions. (5) A separate cell has to be set up in the office of the Commissioner of Police in the City of Madras and in the Office of the Superintendent of Police in each District, to receive complaints against violation of the conditions. Such calls shall have telephone connections and the telephone numbers shall be notified with due publicity so that any citizen who comes across violation of the conditions may contact the concerned cell and lodge a complaint. It shall notified that any person may give a complaint regarding any such violation. The complaints, in whatever manner they are received, shall be entered in a register maintained for that purpose. Action must be taken immediately by the concerned authorities against the persons who violate the conditions and the same must be entered in the register. 25. With regard to the use of the air horns, the Commissioner of Police in the City of madras and the Superintendent of Police in each District shall act in accordance with Rule 403 of the Tamil nadu Motor Vehicles Rules and enforce strict compliance of Rule 119 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules and Rule 402 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules. The said authorities shall notify that action will be taken under Section 53, 54, 177, 179 or 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the persons who violate Rule 119 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules and Rule 402 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules. Any person may bring to the notice of the concerned Police Official any violation of the said rules and on receipt of such information, the concerned police official must take action against the violators in accordance with the rules referred to above. 26. These writ petitions are ordered accordingly with the above directions.