Judgment :- Radhakrishnan, J. Appellant was the opposite party in a claim made before a Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation ('Commissioner' for short). An application was filed under S.22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short 'the Act') by the respondents who are the wile, children and mother of the deceased Sadanandan, who died in an accident occurred on 14-12-1990. Deceased Sadanandan was a workman under the appellant. While discharging his duties as tapper, he fell down from a coconut tree and sustained serious injuries resulting in his death on the spot. Deceased was aged 36,years at the lime of the accident, and he was earning a monthly income of Rs. 2,700/-.According to the applicants, the accident arose out of and during the course of his employment, and hence they are entitled to compensation under the relevant provisions of the Act. Appellant did not dispute the occurrence, and also did not dispute the wages drawn by the workman. However, he contended that the coconut tree from which the workman fell down was never entrusted to him for tapping. He tapped the said tree on his own volition. It was further contended that he is not liable for any compensation. 2. On the side of the applicants, the wife of the deceased was examined as A.W.I. Two other witnesses AWs. 2 and 3 were also examined. Appellant, was examined as OPW.1. 3. After considering the entire evidence, the Commissioner came to the conclusion that the accident occurred during the course of employment, and that the applicants are entitled to get compensation of Rs. 77,856- from the appellant. Aggrieved by the said finding, he has come up in appeal. 4. We heard learned counsel for the appellant. The main contention raised by the counsel was that the coconut tree was never entrusted to the workman for tapping by the appellant or by the Excise Department. Reliance is placed on Ext. Dl certificate to prove Hi at the workman was granted permit and licence for tapping seven other trees belonging to certain land owners, which does not include the tree from which the workman fell down. Reliance is placed on Ext. Dl certificate to prove Hi at the workman was granted permit and licence for tapping seven other trees belonging to certain land owners, which does not include the tree from which the workman fell down. Learned counsel relied on various provisions of the Tree Tax Rules, especially Rules 13 and 19, and contended that whenever the Assistant Excise Comissioner issues a licence he may grant a written permission to the licensee to draw toddy from the trees applied for before they are actually marked. The tree from which the workman fell down and died is not a tree which has been ear-marked for tapping by the Excise Department. Therefore, there is no legal obligation on the part of the appellant to pay compensation to the victim or the legal representatives of the deceased even if the deceased was a workman of the appellant. 5. Learned counsel also contended that the question as to whether the accident arose, out of and in the course of employment is a substantial question of law, and it has to be considered by this Court under S.30 of the Act. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on the ruling reported in K.Saraswathi v. S. Narayanaswami, 1985 ACJ 38. Learned counsel relied on para..14 of the judgment, and contended that the question whether the deceased met with his death in the course of his employment is a substantial question of law within the meaning of S.30 of the Act. 6. We have considered the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant. AW 2 has clearly stated in his evidence that the accident occurred while the workman was climbing down the tree which belonged to AW 2 and that too after tapping the said tree and collecting toddy from it. AW 2 also said that the deceased was tapping the tree for the appellant. She further said that while the deceased fell down 'supervisor' of the appellant was present at the spot. She stated that the charges for tapping were given to her by Udayabhanu and Sadanandan. She pointed out the presence of the contractor at the place. AW 3, Udayabhanu, who is an employee of the appellant, has staled that the tree was being lapped for Ravindran, and that he was the supervisor. The Commissioner found that the accident arose out of and during the course of employment. She pointed out the presence of the contractor at the place. AW 3, Udayabhanu, who is an employee of the appellant, has staled that the tree was being lapped for Ravindran, and that he was the supervisor. The Commissioner found that the accident arose out of and during the course of employment. There arc sufficient materials in the case to arrive at that finding. The said finding is purely a question of fact. 7. In Saraswathi's case, the Madras High Court upheld the finding of the Commissioner that the death occurred not during the course of employment. The said decision is inapplicable to the facts of this case. 8. The first proviso to S.30(1) states that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved. The said proviso has been incorporated into the Section with the object that the workers shall not be dragged into un-ending litigation in the highest forums. A learned Fudge of this Court had occasion to consider the scope of the first proviso to S.30(1) in N.P. Lalan v. V.A. John, 972 KLJ 252. In the said decision, Krishna Iyer, J., as he then was observed as follows: "The Act relates to workers and the entire purpose of the statute is to see that the weaker section of the community, namely, the working class, is not caught in. the meshes of litigation which involves a protracted course of appeal. That is why the statute creates a special tribunal and provides only for a restricted appeal. The benignant object of saving the worker from long and expensive litigation would be defeated if a loose interpretation were to be given to the proviso under S.30 and all kinds of appeals, merely because there is some point which has the look of law, are admitted. A highly restrictive meaning has to be imported because of the very legislative purpose and the class of litigation covered, even apart from the drastic expression used in the proviso. In this context, Part IV of the Indian Constitution serves as a perspective while construing the Workmen's Compensation Act. May be that pre-constitution statutes were interpreted in a particular way by courts on certain assumptions of the States' functions at that time. In this context, Part IV of the Indian Constitution serves as a perspective while construing the Workmen's Compensation Act. May be that pre-constitution statutes were interpreted in a particular way by courts on certain assumptions of the States' functions at that time. Today, it is absolutely plain that the Directive Principles of State Policy, though not enforceable by a Court, are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country, and must inform the judicial mind when interpreting statutes calculated to promote the welfare of the working class. In fact, Art.42 enjoins upon the State to make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and Art.43 compel the State to endeavour to secure by suitable legislation, to all workers conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life. Indeed, the spirit of Part IV of the Constitution must colour the semantic exercises of the judiciary when applying the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. If that be the approach to be made, the argument that the proviso to S.30 has been interpreted liberally in the pre-constitution days is no significance. The same words with socio-economic developments in society, acquire a new emphasis in lime with the changed conditions. It is clear therefore, that the dynamics of legal interpretations based on social changes which have taken place in the nations life and goals demand that the proviso to S.30 should be so construed as to inhibit appeals at the instance of employers even if there be some questions of law or gross errors of fact, unless very substantial legal issues arise." 9. The questions as to whether or not the workman was at the time of the accident employed by the employer and whether or not the accident resulting in injury took place during the course of employment are all questions of fact on which no appeal lies under S.30 of the Act. It clearly restricts the right of appeal to substantial question of law. Where on a particular point, there is evidence for and against, and a finding is recorded by the Commissioner, on taking a particular view of the evidence, it cannot be questioned howsoever erroneous, as no question of law can be said to have arisen in such cases. It clearly restricts the right of appeal to substantial question of law. Where on a particular point, there is evidence for and against, and a finding is recorded by the Commissioner, on taking a particular view of the evidence, it cannot be questioned howsoever erroneous, as no question of law can be said to have arisen in such cases. Only in cases where the Commissioner has clearly misdirected himself on a question of law or a finding is recorded without any evidence whatsoever, or a perverse finding is reached which no reasonable man would reach, it can be said that a question of law has arises which the court may consider it to be a substantial one. In the instant case, the question as to whether the workman died in an accident which is arising out of and in the course of employment is supported by evidence, and so found by the Commissioner, is purely a question of fact. There is no substantial question of law involved in the present appeal to be interfered with under S.30 of the Act. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the said finding. The appeal is therefore dismissed in limine.