S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THE G. S. R. T. C. and its Divisional Controller are the petitionersdefendants before this Court in this C. R. A. preferred under Sec. 115 C. P. Code. The respondent-plaintiff instituted Reg. Civil Suit No. 239 of 1991 before the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.), Junagadh inter alia contending that he was running restaurant at the premises allotted to him as he was the highest bidder and his licence had Appeal No. 228 of 1993 of reversing the order passed by the Civil Judge (J. D.), Junagadh refusing to grant interim injunction in R. C. S. No. 239 of 1991. expired on 17-3-1990. The respondent-plaintiff also applied for temporary injunction and the trial Court initially granted order of maintenance of status quo. However, since the licence had come to end, it appears that the petitioner-Corporation has taken over the possession of the restaurant. ( 2 ) AFTER hearing the parties and taking into consideration the pleadings of the parties the 2nd Jt. Civil Judge (J. D.), Junagadh by his judgment and order dated 21-9-1993 rejected the application of the respondent-plaintiff for injunction inter alia holding that on expiry of the period of licence the respondent-plaintiff has no right to occupy the restaurant of the ownership of the petitioner-Corporation. It is not at all disputed before this Court that the possession of the restaurant at the ST depot at Junagadh is taken over by the petitioner-Corporation during the pendency of the suit in the trial Court. ( 3 ) IT appears that thereafter the respondent (original plaintiff) preferred Civil misc. Appeal No. 228 of 1993 in the Court of Extra Asst. Judge, Junagadh who by the impugned judgment and order dated 15-12-1993 allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed below Exh. 5 by the trial Court. He also issued mandatory injunction to the petitioner-Corporation to restore the possession of the disputed premises to the plaintiff forthwith and he further directed that if at all the petitioner- corporation wanted to have the possession of the disputed premises from the respondent-plaintiff they may initiate proceedings under the provisions of Gujarat public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the Extra Asst. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the Extra Asst. Judge at Junagadh the Corporation has preferred this CRA under Sec. 115 C. P. Code and Y. B. Bhatt, J. has while issuing Rule, after hearing the learned Advocates for the parties stayed the operation and implementation of the judgment and order of the Extra Asst. Judge, dated 1-12-1993. The resultant effect is that the petitioner- corporation was under no obligation to restore the possession of the disputed premises to the respondent-plaintiff forthwith nor were they required to initiate the proceedings for taking over the possession of the premises under the provisions of gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. ( 5 ) MR. S. N. Shelat, learned Advocate for petitioners has submitted before this court that once the possession of the suit premises is taken over by the petitioner- corporation albeit without following the procedure prescribed by the Gujarat Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act the respondent-plaintiff has no other remedy and the petitioner-Corporation cannot be directed to restore the possession. He further submitted that thereafter subsequent development has taken place and the petitioner-Corporation has invited tenders by public notice for giving on licence the aforesaid restaurant at Junagadh ST Depot. He submitted that after receiving tenders from the bidders the tender of the highest bidder, i. e. , one bhuvaneshkumar Pandey is accepted and he is already put into possession of the canteen and he is already running the canteen. It is, therefore, not possible for the petitioners to comply with the judgment and order of the Extra Asst. Judge, Junagadh. In order to make good his submission he has relied upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Premji Ratansey Shhah v. Union of India, reported in JT 1994 (6) SC 585. While dealing with Sec. 41 (j) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 the Apex Court made certain pertinent observations. Before the Supreme Court the petitioners were the unsuccessful plaintiffs who failed to obtain declaration and injunction against the defendants. In the facts of that case it was found by the Courts that defendant Nos. While dealing with Sec. 41 (j) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 the Apex Court made certain pertinent observations. Before the Supreme Court the petitioners were the unsuccessful plaintiffs who failed to obtain declaration and injunction against the defendants. In the facts of that case it was found by the Courts that defendant Nos. 3 and 4 were claiming right/interest under agreement to sell from the original owners of the land in question and suit of the plaintiff for declaration as well as injunction claiming to be the successor-in-title of the said defendants was denied by the single Judge speaking on the original side of the Bombay High Court. The appeal to the Division Bench of the same Court also failed. It appears that the land in dispute was sought to be acquired by notification under Sec. 4 of the Land acquisition Act which was published on 4-5-1959. The enquiry under Sec. 5 (A) was dispensed with. Notification under Sec. 6 thereafter followed. However, thereafter, another notification under Sec. 4 was issued on 28-5-1959 to acquire 13 acres, 33 gunthas of land of S. No. 228. When the possession was handed over to the Railways on 24-5-1960 it was found that they had got possession of excess land of 12 acres and 12 gunthas out of S. No. 103a. Therefore, 3rd notification under Sec. 4 (1) was published on July 13, 1965 and after enquiry under Sec. 5, sec. 6 notification was issued. For the lands covered in the first two notifications, award was made on 30th July, 1966 and for the lands covered under the 3rd notification an award was made on 26-5-1968. The said award had become final. It is thereafter that defendant Nos. 3 and 4 entered into an agreement of sale with original plaintiffs on 21-1-1973 coupled with power of attorney and they rightly delivered the possession of the land to the extent of 12 acres, 12 gunthas. In fact, as per record possession was already taken over by the Railways. It was in this fact situation, that the Apex Court was called upon to decide as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to injunction as against the original owners. In fact, as per record possession was already taken over by the Railways. It was in this fact situation, that the Apex Court was called upon to decide as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to injunction as against the original owners. In this connection the apex Court observed as under :"it is seen that in a suit as originally framed they sought for a declaration that the award made in respect of the land was void, inoperative and does not bind the petitioners. But that relief has been given up. Thereby, the title of the land of the railways have not been questioned. With award made under Sec. 30, the vendors of the petitioners got themselves bound by the above award under Sec. 12 of the Act. It is also seen that the two awards had become final and possession was delivered to the Railways by the Land Acquisition Officer on February 24, 1960. Thus, the defendant Nos. 3 and 4 had not ghost of right, title or interest in the lands acquired from the original owner Maibai. The said sale is a void sale and the petitioners, therefore, cannot derive any interest under the agreement of sale to resist the possession of the lawful owner nor could the declaration sought for be given. The question, therefore, is whether an injunction can be issued against the true owner. Issuance of an order of injunction is absolutely a discretionary and equitable relief. In a given set of facts, injunction may be given to protect the possession of the owner or person in lawful possession. It is not mandatory that for mere asking such relief should be given. Injunction is a personal right under Sec. 41 (j) of the Specific Relief act, 1963, the plaintiff must have personal interest in the matter. The interest or right not shown to be in existence, cannot be protected by injunction. It is equally settled law that injunction would not be issued against the true owner. Therefore, the Courts below have rightly rejected the relief of declaration and injunction in favour of the petitioners who have no interest in the property. Even assuming that they had any possession, their possession is wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession, as against the owner. Even assuming that they had any possession, their possession is wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession, as against the owner. Pretext of dispute of identity of the land should not be an excuse to claim injunction against true owner. " ( 6 ) BASED on the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court it was submitted by Mr. S. N. Shelat, learned Advocate for petitioner-Corporation that on expiry of the period of licence granted to the respondent-plaintiff, he was a mere trespasser on the premises of the Corporation. He further submitted that under the provisions of Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court with respect to eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises is barred. Once such jurisdiction is barred, the Civil Court was not justified in entertaining the suit and in granting injunction. Even it is ultimately found in such suit that the possession was illegally taken over from the trespasser by the petitioner-Corporation, in his submission, under ordinary Law of Tort remedy of the trespasser is to seek damages and he cannot insist for restoration of possession as against the true owner. Lastly, he submitted that in view of subsequent development the respondent-plaintiff will have no right now to get back the possession as the rights and interests are already created in favour of the third party after inviting tenders from the public at large. ( 7 ) ON the other hand, Miss Sejal Mandavia relied upon the decision of the supreme Court in the case of Krishna Ram Mahhale v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, reported in AIR 1989 SC 2097 to submit that when licensee is dispossessed by the licensor unlawfully before the expiry of period of licence the decree for recovery of possession can be passed in favour of licensee notwithstanding that period of licence had expired long back during the pendency of legal proceedings. In my opinion, the aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court will have no application to the fact situation obtaining before this Court because in the fact situation obtaining before this Court admittedly the licence of the respondent-plaintiff has expired and therefore, he can be described to be a person in unauthorised occupation of the restaurant. In my opinion, the aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court will have no application to the fact situation obtaining before this Court because in the fact situation obtaining before this Court admittedly the licence of the respondent-plaintiff has expired and therefore, he can be described to be a person in unauthorised occupation of the restaurant. He has no right to stick to the possession of the said premises and was undoubtedly liable to be evicted after following the procedure prescribed by the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. As against the true owner, namely, the G. S. R. T. C. he did not have any better right and though the Corporation ought to have followed the procedure prescribed by law and this court does not approve of the manner in which the possession of restaurant was taken over, at this stage of proceedings, mandatory order of restoration of possession in favour of respondent-plaintiff cannot be granted more particularly when the rights and interests of the third party, namely, Bhuvaneshkumar Pandey have intervened, who has participated in the public enquiry like public tender and his bid being the highest he has been awarded the contract to run the restaurant and who is now already in possession. ( 8 ) IN view of the aforesaid, the present C. R. A. shall have to be allowed and the judgment and order of the learned Extra Asst. Judge, Junagadh in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 228 of 1993 shall have to be quashed and set aside and same is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly. No costs. .