JUDGMENT Sudhendu Nath Mallick, J. This Revisional Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioner judgment-'debtor against the order dated 27.7.93 passed by the Additional District Judge, First Court, Nadia in Civil Revision case No. 1 of 1992 under s. 115A of the Civil Procedure Code thereby affirming the order No. 175 dated 14.12.91 passed by the learned Munsif Kalyani in Misc. case No. 69 of 1991 under s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code arising out of Title Execution case No. 17 of 1987 pending in the said Court. 2. The matter has been heard on a preliminary point of maintainability of the instant Revisional Application itself taken by Sri S. P. Roychowdhury learned Advocate appearing for the OP decree-holder. Both Sri Bhaskar Bhattacharyya appearing for the petitioner and Sri S.P. Roychowdhury appearing for the OP have submitted that the preliminary objection taken by Sri Roychowdhury against the maintainability of the Revisional Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India may be decided before the application is heard on merits. As such the matter has been heard only on the question of maintainability keeping the merits of the application to be considered later on. 3. The first contention of Sri Roychowdhury is that in view of the provision of s. 115A(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, a District Court while exercising all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code must be treated as a Court of co-ordinate or parallel jurisdiction and as such the order passed by the District Court while exercising its Revisional powers under s. 115A cannot be challenged before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The second contention of Sri Roychowdhury is that even if it is assumed that a District Court for the purpose of s. 115A of the Code is subordinate to the High Court and the High Court and the District Court are not co-ordinate Courts with parallel jurisdiction under s. 115 and under s. 115A respectively, second application by way of Revision is barred under the provisions of sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 115A of the Code. In order to appreciate the contentions of Sri Roychowdhury it would be necessary to quote below the relevant provisions of s. 115A of the Code :- "115A. (3) and (4) of s. 115A of the Code. In order to appreciate the contentions of Sri Roychowdhury it would be necessary to quote below the relevant provisions of s. 115A of the Code :- "115A. District Court's powers of revision. (1) A District Court may exercise all or any of the power which may be exercised by the High Court under s. 115. (2) Where any proceeding by way of revision is commenced before a District Court in pursuance of the provisions of sub-s. (1), the provisions of s. 115 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceeding and references in the said section to the High Court shall be construed as references to the District Court. (3) Where any proceeding for revision is commenced before the District Court, the decision of the District Court on such proceeding shall be final and, no further proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained by the High Court or any other Court. (4) If. any application for revision has been made by any party either to, the High Court under s. 115 or to the District Court under this section no further application by the same party shall be entertained by the other of them. (5) A court of an Additional Judge shall have and may exercise all the powers of a District Court under this section in respect of any proceeding which may be transferred to it by or under any general or special order of the District Court". 4. While referring to the above provisions contained in sub-ss. (2), (3), (4) & (5) of s. 115A, Sri Roychowdhury has emphatically submitted that while exercising its powers under s. 115A, a District Court or for that matter an Additional Judge functions with all the powers of a High Court exercising its powers under s. 115 of the Code. According to Sri Roychowdhury, in view of the above legal provisions contained in s. 115A, a District Court or an Additional District Judge exercising all the powers of a District Court are at par with the High Court and as such High Court cannot exercise revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of an order passed by the District Court or the Additional District Judge under s. 115A of the Code. It has been submitted by Sri Roychowdhury that if the High Court and the District Court exercise same or parallel powers on the basis of statutory provisions then the District Court by legal implications cannot be said to be subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of the High Court's superintending powers under; Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Sri Roychowdhury has elucidated his point by submitting that an order passed by a Single Bench of this High Court under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be challenged before a Division Blench or a superior Bench of the said High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in view of the simple reason that the Single Bench is not subordinate to the Division Bench. Similarly, according to Sri Roychowdhury, when the District Court exercises parallel powers or similar powers of a High Court under s. USA of the Code, the order passed by the District Court cannot be challenged before the High Court under Article 227. In this contention he has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1970 SC page 1 (Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar, vs. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat). But the point which has been decided in the aforesaid case by the Supreme Court, in my opinion, does not give any assistance to the contention of Sri Roychowdhury. In the aforesaid case the only question for decision was whether the High Court could interfere under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution with the order of the Appellate Court when a petition for revision under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the same order had been previously dismissed by a Single Judge of that Court. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative. It has been observed there as follows :- "Even on the assumption that the order of the appellate Court had not merged in the order which disposed of the revision petition, a writ petition, a writ petition ought not to be entertained, by the High Court when the petitioner had already chosen the remedy under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the subordinate Court. The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the Court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decision". 5. Sri Roychowdhury in support of his contention has also referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1979 SC p. 381 and AIR 1980 SC p. 892. Coming to the decision of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1980 page 892 in my opinion, the same does not help Sri Roychowdhury to bring whom his point. The point in the aforesaid reported case is whether it is open to the High Court to exercise revisional order of the District Court under s. 115. It has been held there as follows : "In determining whether the legislature intended a further revision petition to the High Court, regard must be had to the principle that the construction given to a statute should be such as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it. It seems to us that to recognize a revisional power in the High Court over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would plaintly defeat the object of the legislative scheme. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction-to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court-would be frustrated. The scheme would, in large measure, lose its meaning". 6. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court is silent about the maintainability of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order passed in revision by a District Court or an Additional District Judge under s. 11SA of the Code. Sri Roychowdhury has also referred to a Single Blench decision of this High Court reported in 1989 (II) CHN page 338 (Paltu Dutta vs. Smt. Nibedita Roy). Sri Roychowdhury has also referred to a Single Blench decision of this High Court reported in 1989 (II) CHN page 338 (Paltu Dutta vs. Smt. Nibedita Roy). In the aforesaid case A.K. Nandi, J. has elaborately dealt with the question whether the High Court can exercise its superintending powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of an order passed in revision by a District Court or an Additional District Judge under s. 11SA of the Civil Procedure Code with reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1970 SC page 1 and AIR 1979 SC page 381 which has been relied upon by Sri Roychowdhury. In the aforesaid reported case in 1989 (II) CHN 338 A. K. Nandi, J. has also considered many other decisions of the Supreme Court, our High Court and other High Courts relevant to the point. 7. Before going deep into the question whether an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would lie against an order passed by the District Court or the Additional District Judge passed under s.115A of the Civil Procedure Code it would be helpful to consider whether the District Court while exercising its powers under s. 115A is subordinate to the High Court or not. It is necessary to decide whether High Court and the District Court while exercising its powers under s. 115A are Courts of co-ordinate and parallel jurisdiction being of the same entity so as to prevent the High Court from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. To this question raised by Sri Roychowdhury the answer given by Sri Bhattacharyya appearing for the petitioner are sufficient to settle the issue. Sri Bhattacharyya has referred to s. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code which deals with subordination of Courts. Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code provides as follows: "For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Code or a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court". 8. Sri Bjhattacharyya has submitted that by the insertion and operation of s. 115A of the Civil Procedure Code under West Bengal Amendment Act 14 of 1988, s. 3 of the Code has not been repealed or superseded with any notwithstanding clause. 8. Sri Bjhattacharyya has submitted that by the insertion and operation of s. 115A of the Civil Procedure Code under West Bengal Amendment Act 14 of 1988, s. 3 of the Code has not been repealed or superseded with any notwithstanding clause. Section 3 is not subject to the provisions of s. 115A which has been inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure by a State amendment. From the Amendment Act it does not also appear to be the intention of the State Legislature that s. 115A would override the provisions of s. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code and that a District Court while exercising its powers under s. 115A would in fact, become a part of the High Court of the State. Sri Roychowdhury has, however, submitted that in view of the State amendment, s. 3 should be deemed to have been amended for the purpose of s. 115A of the Code as according Sri Roychowdhury the entire Civil Procedure Code stands amended under the West Bengal Amendment Act 14 of 1988. He has referred to the introduction clause of the State amendment where it has been said that the said Act was to amend the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in its application to West Bengal and it was expedient to amend the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in its application to West Bengal for the purpose and in the manner stated therein. Sri Roychowdhury has also referred to s. 2 of the Amendment Act wherein it has been stated that "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall in its application to West Bengal, be amended for the purpose and in the manner hereinafter provided" it is difficult to agree with Sri Roychowdhury just for the above words used in the Amendment Act the entire Civil Procedure Code including s. 3 should be deemed to have been amended. The Amendment Act was for a limited purpose, only to insert s. 115A. No other provisions of the Code were amended. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that the entire Code of Civil Procedure has been amended by the aforesaid amendment or that s. 3 has also been amended so as to take away the subordination of the District Court to the High Court as provided under s. 3 and to equate the District Court to a High Court. Such a position 'is a conceptual and statutory absurdity if the spirit and the provisions of the entire Civil Procedure Code are taken into consideration. Sri Bhattacharyya has rightly submitted that the District Court is subordinate to the High Court under s. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code and what has been given under s. 115A to a District Court is concurrent powers as exercised by the High Court under s. 115 of the Code. It has been rightly submitted by Sri Bhattacharyya that by exercising concurrent powers under a statute, District Court does not become High Court or High Court does not become District Court. Sri Bhattacharyya has referred to very many statutes under the provisions of which a High Court and a District Court exercise concurrent powers. He has referred to Ss. 299 and 300 of the Indian Succession Act where the High Court and the District Court exercise concurrent powers. He has also referred to s. 24 of the Civil Procedure Code where the High Court and the District Court have concurrent powers in the matter of transfer and withdrawal of Civil Suits, appeal, proceedings etc. from one subordinate Court to another. Instances of exercise of concurrent powers by the High Court and the District Court can also be found in Ss. 397, 437 and 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In view of the above provisions there cannot be any scope of doubt that the District Court while exercising its power under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code is subordinate to the High Court under s. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code and by exercise of concurrent powers a District Court does not become High Court or a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction so as to take away the constitutional powers of a High Court of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 9. Now the question is whether against an order passed by a District Court under s. 115A of the Civil Procedure Code affirming or setting aside an order passed by Trial Court can be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. According to Sri Roychowdhury, provisions of sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 115A debar such an application. 9. Now the question is whether against an order passed by a District Court under s. 115A of the Civil Procedure Code affirming or setting aside an order passed by Trial Court can be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. According to Sri Roychowdhury, provisions of sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 115A debar such an application. Sri Roychowdhury has further submitted that under the Appellate Side Rules of our High Court an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India 'is treated as a revisional application. If it is revisional application, then according to Sri Roychowdhury, such second revisional application is definitely barred by the provisions of sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 115A. But the above contention of Sri Roychowdhury does not appear to be reasonable. Under our Appellate Side Rules such application may be treated as a revisional application but in other High Courts the procedure may be different. Just because an application under Article 227 is treated as revisional application under the Appellate Side Rules of our High Court it cannot be said such an application is barred under provisions of sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 115A. Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India a High Court has a constitutional power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals through out the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be taken away or barred by any legislation short of constitutional amendment (Chandra Shekhar vs. Sivaraman, AIR 1979 SC page 1 para 13). It is also settled by our Supreme Court that such power cannot be barred by providing that the decision of an inferior tribunal shall be final [State of Gujarat vs. Vakhat Singhji, AIR 1968 SC page 1481 at page 1488, Aniyoth vs. Minister of Rehabilz1tatz'on, (1962) 1 SCR page 505]. In Paltu Dutta's case [1989 (II) CHN p. 338] the legal propositions and consequences following from Ss. 115 and 115A of the Code have been carefully considered by A. K. Nandi, J. with reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court and our High Court and other High Courts in this regard. In that case also similar objections regarding the maintainability of the application under Article 227 of the Constitution in similar circumstances were raised and were negative. In that case also similar objections regarding the maintainability of the application under Article 227 of the Constitution in similar circumstances were raised and were negative. While referring to Supreme Court's decision in Shankar Ramchandra's case reported in AIR 1970 SC page 1 it has been rightly observed by A. K. Nandi, J., that the decision is no authority to the proposition that a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is not maintainable to challenge the order of the Additional District Judge in revision or as a matter of that the order of the Munsif. In the aforesaid Single Bench case it has been held that exercise of concurrent powers can by no means be construed as an exercise of delegated power and that while referring to Supreme Court decisions in Keshabananda's case reported in AIR 1973 SC p. 146] and in Umarjikeshao Mesram's case reported in AIR 1986 SC page 1272 it has been further held that no legislation and far less a State legislation can forfeit, limit, curtain enlarge, abridge the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It has been settled by our Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases that a law made by an appropriate legislature can amend another law enacted by it but it cannot amend or affect to provisions of the Constitution, and as Articles 226, 227 and 228 are not made to subject any law made by Parliament or State Legislature the powers conferred by these three Articles cannot be limited abridged or taken away by any Legislature. This can be done only by amending the Constitution. In Paltu Dutta's (supra) case it has been unambiguously held by our High Court that in view of the above legal position the provisions under s. 115A(3) of the Code cannot affect the superintending powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Sri Roychowdhury has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1979 SC page 381 in order to substantiate his contention that a revisional order cannot be subjected to further revision by the High Court once a party has preferred a revision and lost and for that purpose Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked. Sri Roychowdhury has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1979 SC page 381 in order to substantiate his contention that a revisional order cannot be subjected to further revision by the High Court once a party has preferred a revision and lost and for that purpose Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked. In that case Supreme Court has clarified that where the Criminal Procedure Code itself bans the exercise of revisional powers of the High Court it would indeed require from exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. In that case the Sessions Judge refused to interfere with the order of the Magistrate and the High Court's jurisdiction was invoked to avoid the order of the Magistrate and not that of the Session's Judge. In that position the Supreme Court held that the bar of Section 397(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code was, therefore, effectively attracted and the bar could not be circumvented by the subterfuge of treating the revisional application as directed against the Session Judge's order. The Supreme Court held that the revisional application before the High Court could not be treated as an application directed against the order of the Session's Judge instead of as one directed against the order of the Magistrate because what could not be done directly could not be allowed to be done indirectly as that would be violation of the statute. But in that case also the Supreme Court did not decide whether an application under Article 227 would lie if it was preferred against the very order of the Session's Judge passed in revision. It was, however, observed by the Supreme Court keeping in view of the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution that the power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 could only be exercised sparingly, to keep the subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct the mere errors. 10. In order to consider the provisions of sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 115A of the Civil Procedure Code it would be necessary to keep in mind the scope and provision of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Article 227 has not been incorporated in our Constitution without any meaningful purpose. 10. In order to consider the provisions of sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 115A of the Civil Procedure Code it would be necessary to keep in mind the scope and provision of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Article 227 has not been incorporated in our Constitution without any meaningful purpose. Where the cause of Justice is seriously jeopardised in any Court or Tribunal subordinate to a High Court the exercise of powers under Article 227 may become a constitutional obligation on the part of the High Court concerned. Under Article 227, High Court in exercise its powers of superintendence can proceed suo motu and pass necessary orders in the interest of Justice. This power is infinitely wide and unfettered. It is well settled in law that under Article 227 the High Court in order to keep all Courts and Tribunals under its territorial jurisdiction "within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner" will interfere in cases of erroneous assumption or excess of jurisdiction, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of law apparent on the face of the record, violation of the principles of natural justice, fraud on the part of the prosecutor, arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority or discretion, perverse finding, as for example where it is based on no material whatsoever, deciding contrary to the law laid down by the High Court or refusal to comply with the decisions of the High Court, a patent or flagrant error in procedure, order resulting in manifest injustice etc. This power is, however, to be exercised by the High Court most sparingly and in deserving cases within the above parameters. In this context it has been held in Paltu Dutta's case (supra) by our High Court that this power is derived directly from the Constitution which is the fountain source and parent of all laws and statute in the Republic. In this context it has been held in Paltu Dutta's case (supra) by our High Court that this power is derived directly from the Constitution which is the fountain source and parent of all laws and statute in the Republic. It has been aptly observed by A. K. Nandi, J., in the aforesaid case which may be quoted below : "To hold that the impugned order of the Additional District Judge cannot be interfered with under Art. 227 of the Constitution on the ground that a second revision is being sought for in the guise of exercise of power of superintendence is to conclude that the revisional order of the District Court is not open to scrutiny by the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, the subordinate revisional court is immune from the superintending jurisdiction of the High Court. It is a very hard nut to swallow. In Umarji's case (supra) the Supreme Court laid down that under Article 227 however what comes up before the High Court is the order or judgment of a subordinate court or tribunal for the purpose of ascertaining whether in giving such judgment or order that subordinate court or tribunal has acted within its authority or according to law. So it cannot be said that the revisional order of a subordinate court under s. 115A of the Code cannot be subjected to the superintending jurisdiction of the High Court." 11. In this context it has been rightly explained by A. K. Nandi, J., as follows : "The State legislature did not desire a second revision as is reflected from the provision in s. 115A of the Code. Therefore, High Court will not surely act as a second court of revision while exercising power of superintendence. It will only interfere in the case of manifestly gross injustice, abuse of the process of the court of similar other extraordinary situation. Once remedy under s. 115A is exhausted High Court will interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution only in rarest of rare case." 12. I must respectfully agree with this view expressed by the learned Judge. If on the pretext of the bar imposed under sub-ss. Once remedy under s. 115A is exhausted High Court will interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution only in rarest of rare case." 12. I must respectfully agree with this view expressed by the learned Judge. If on the pretext of the bar imposed under sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s.115A of the Code, the High Court refuses to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 in respect of a revisional order passed by the District Court arising out of an order passed by the Trial Court that would be violating the Constitutional obligation imposed under Article 227 and would mean abdication of its lawful authority over the subordinate Courts. Such a situation means judicial anarch and no Court can or should invoke such a situation. What has been challenged in the instant application is not the order passed by the Trial Court but the order passed by the District Court in revision under s. 115A of the Civil Procedure Code. The prohibition is in respect of a second revision arising out of the selfsame order which has been challenged in revision before the District Court under s. 115A. In this application under Article 227 the petitioner cannot challenge the order passed by the Trial Court which has already been tested in the District Court under s. 115A but he can very well challenge the order passed by the District Court under Article 227 on grounds of gross injustice, abuse of the process of the Court and similar other grounds which I have already noted in earlier paragraph. Accordingly, I hold that the instant revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution against the impugned order passed by the Additional District Judge, First Court in Civil Revision case No. 1 of 1992 is quite maintainable in law. The objections taken by Sri Roychowdhury are overruled in view of the reasons given above. The revisional application be listed for hearing on merits before the appropriate Bench. The matter should not be treated as heard in part. Objection to maintainability overruled.