D. G. KARIA, J. ( 1 ) BY this acquittal appeal under Sec. 378 of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973, the State has challenged the order of acquittal dated 8/01/1988 whereby the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Santrampur, ordered to acquit the respondent for the offence punishable under Sec. 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) SHORTLY stated the prosecution case is that the respondent-accused was married with deceased Jashiben, who was the daughter of P. W. 2 Hathibhai Motibhai, before about 4 years since the date of occurrence on 24/07/1987. It was alleged that the accused-husband treated the deceased Jashiben with cruelty driving her to commit suicide. As a result of cruelty, the prosecution case proceeds, the deceased Jashi committed suicide by burning herself at about 8-00 a. m. on 24/07/1987. It was alleged that the deceased Jashi being subjected to cruelty, was driven to commit suicide and thereby the accused was charged with the offence punishable under Sec. 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. ( 3 ) EARLIER, a complaint was lodged that the house in which the deceased Jashi was there, was put on fire as a result of which the deceased Jashi sustained burn injuries, ultimately resulting in her death. The deceased Jashi was brought to the hospital at Santrampur in a tractor where she was declared to have died by P. W. 1 Dr. G. K. Devra. After investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet against the respondent-accused for the aforesaid offence. The charge on the aforesaid facts was framed at Exh. 4 to which the accused pleaded not guilty. ( 4 ) THE learned Magistrate, having recorded the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and having examined the material placed before him, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and ordered to acquit the accused person for the offence under Sec. 498-A as aforesaid. It is against this order of acquittal that the State has preferred the present appeal. ( 5 ) MR. K. P. Rawal, learned A. P. P. has taken me through the relevant evidence of the prosecution witnesses and judgment under appeal. Mr. It is against this order of acquittal that the State has preferred the present appeal. ( 5 ) MR. K. P. Rawal, learned A. P. P. has taken me through the relevant evidence of the prosecution witnesses and judgment under appeal. Mr. Rawal having referred to and relied upon the evidence of the prosecution witness, particularly P. W. 3 nathiben Hathibhai and P. W. 4 Hemtabhai Motibhai contended that the prosecution proves the wilful conduct on the part of the accused which amounted to cruelty driving the deceased Jashiben to commit suicide. On perusal of the evidence of these witnesses and the medical evidence on record, I am unable to accept this contention of the learned A. P. P. Mr. Rawal. ( 6 ) P. W. 1 Dr. G. K. Devra has deposed at Exh. 6 that on 24/07/1987 he was Medical Officer in Government hospital at Simalia and the dead body of the deceased Jashiben was brought at about 2-00 p. m. on that day. He performed the post-mortem and found secondary burns over head. He found second degree burns on face and neck. He also found second degree burns in front and back side of the body. There were third degree burns on the thigh of the deceased Jashiben to the extent of 80 per cent and there were also 80 per cent burns on both upper limbs. In the opinion of the Doctor, the cause of death of the deceased was on account of shock following extensive burns. In the cross-examination, he has admitted that if a person having sustained burn injuries, runs helter-skelter, the burn injuries would be spread all over body of such person and in a village, if a woman while cooking with wood is likely to sustain burn injuries, as was received by the deceased Jashi. ( 7 ) P. W. 2 Hathibhai Motibhai, father of the deceased Jashiben deposed at Exh. 8 that the accused having consumed alcohol, caused death of the deceased. He was not know, however, as to how he killed her. She was burnt alive. He knew about it only when post-mortem was performed. He also gathered that the house was put on fire wherein the deceased Jashiben sustained burn injuries and died. In the crossexamination, p. W. 2 Hathibhai has admitted that the relationship between his daughter - deceased Jashi and his son-in-law was good. She was burnt alive. He knew about it only when post-mortem was performed. He also gathered that the house was put on fire wherein the deceased Jashiben sustained burn injuries and died. In the crossexamination, p. W. 2 Hathibhai has admitted that the relationship between his daughter - deceased Jashi and his son-in-law was good. He also stated that it was true that the deceased Jashi sustained burn injuries while cooking and the house was also put on fire. Similarly, P. W. 3 Nathiben Motibhai, mother of the deceased Jashi has given inconsistent version stating in her cross-examination that the deceased Jashi did not tell anything about ill-treatment to her. P. W. 4 Hemtabhai Motibhai is the uncle of the deceased Jashi and he has deposed at Exh. 11 that the deceased Jashi used to often come to his place as she was adopted by him and told her about her feuds with the accused. He also deposed about the ill-treatment by the accused after consuming liquor. He knew about the death of Jashi after three days when he went to village Bhatiya where the deceased and the accused were residing. He found that the house of the accused and the deceased Jashi was also burnt. In the crossexamination, p. W. 4 has stated that he had no occasion to visit the house of the deceased Jashi after her marriage. There was no dispute about dowry. Before her death, Jashi never told him anything about beating or ill-treatment. He gathered from village people that the deceased Jashi died accidently and the house was also burnt. In view of this evidence on record, I agree with the reasonings and findings given by the learned Magistrate that on account of inconsistencies in the evidence, it cannot be concluded that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused treated the deceased with such a cruelty as to drive her to commit suicide. ( 8 ) THE panchnama of the scene of occurrence at Exh. 20 also reads that the house was also put on fire on the day of the incident. Thus, having regard to the overall evidence on record, it is evident that the deceased Jashi died because of burns accidently. At this stage, if we refer to the statement of the accused recorded under sec. 20 also reads that the house was also put on fire on the day of the incident. Thus, having regard to the overall evidence on record, it is evident that the deceased Jashi died because of burns accidently. At this stage, if we refer to the statement of the accused recorded under sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he stated to be innocent. He further stated that he did not cause any physical or mental cruelty to the deceased. He had good relations with the deceased Jashi and before about one and a half month, she had given birth to a male child. While cooking, the deceased Jashi received burn injuries in his absence. He was also very much shocked on account of death of his wife and he was innocent and he was falsely implicated. There is no reason to disbelieve this statement under Sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 9 ) IT was next contended by Mr. Rawal, learned A. P. P. that in view of the provisions of Sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act, a presumption as to abetment of suicide by the deceased Jashi would arise against the accused as she committed suicide within the period of seven years of her marriage. It is not in dispute that the tragic incident took place within about four years since the deceased jashis marriage with the accused. Mr. Rawal thus relied upon the provisions of sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act and submitted that the burden was on the accused to show that the death was not on account of cruelty by the accused and that burden was not discharged by the accused and as such, the impugned order of acquittal is vitiated. Firstly, the prosecution has not proved beyond all reasonable doubt to show that the death was on account of cruelty and as such, to my mind, no such presumption as is contemplated in Sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act would arise against the accused. A bare reading of Sec. 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act would lead to any unrebuttable presumption that in case of suicide by the wife within seven years of the marriage, the husband or his relatives would be guilty of the offence under Sec. 306 or 498-A of the indian Penal Code. A bare reading of Sec. 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act would lead to any unrebuttable presumption that in case of suicide by the wife within seven years of the marriage, the husband or his relatives would be guilty of the offence under Sec. 306 or 498-A of the indian Penal Code. The scope of Sec. 498-A cannot be enlarged by referring to Sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act. I am of the view that the provisions of sec. 113-A cannot be said to create any new offence nor do they create any substantive right. It is merely a matter of procedure of evidence. Therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case read with further statement of the accused under Sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it cannot be concluded that the prosecution has proved its case about cruelty by the accused, beyond all reasonable doubt, to the deceased Jashiben and therefore, it was the accused to substantiate that he was not guilty of the alleged cruelty. In this case, I am fortified by the following observations of the Supreme Court made in para 14 of the decision in the case of State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal Anr. , AIR 1994 SC 1418 . "14. We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a criminal trial, however, intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of Sec. 498-A, i. P. C. and Sec. 113a of Indian Evidence Act. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of Sec. 498-A, i. P. C. and Sec. 113a of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the Courts conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity of the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether the charges made against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidences adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. Lord. Denning in Bater v. Bater, 1950 (2) All ER 458 at page 459 has observed that the doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subject-matter. " ( 10 ) IN view of the above position of law relating to Sec. 113a of the Evidence act, I do not find any merit in the submission of the learned A. P. P. Mr. Rawal that the accused failed to discharge his burden on him under Sec. 113-A of the evidence Act. ( 11 ) IT may be noticed in this case that the incident has taken place at about 8-00 a. m. on 24/07/1987. The F. I. R. came to be lodged at 10-00 a. m. on 28/07/1987. Thus, the complaint is after about four days. There is no satisfactory explanation of delay in lodging the F. I. R. There is no dying declaration or suicidal note. There is no letter or any other material to show that during subsistence of marriage, the accused beat or caused cruelty to the deceased. There is no complaint either by the father or uncle who is said to have adopted the deceased Jashiben. No neighbours residing nearby the burnt house of the deceased Jashi and the accused have also been examined. All these circumstances speak about the fact that the prosecution has not been able to bring home the guilt of the accused. There is no complaint either by the father or uncle who is said to have adopted the deceased Jashiben. No neighbours residing nearby the burnt house of the deceased Jashi and the accused have also been examined. All these circumstances speak about the fact that the prosecution has not been able to bring home the guilt of the accused. ( 12 ) IT is now settled position of law about powers of the High Court as regards interference with the order of acquittal under Sec. 378 of the Code of Criminal procedure. Keeping in mind the principles about entertaining an acquittal appeal, that great weight should be attached to the view taken by the trial Court who had an advantage of hearing witnesses and observing their demeanour and that in an appeal from acquittal, presumption of innocence of the accused continues alive upto the end of the acquittal and is further strengthened by the order of appeal. The interference with an order of acquittal can be justified only when it is done for compelling reasons when it is shown that the order of acquittal is perverse and having regard to the evidence on record, no reasonable person would have taken such a view. Nothing of that sort has been shown in the present case. ( 13 ) IN the above premises, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. .