Judgment R.M.Prasad, J. 1. In the present writ application the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order passed on Ist November, 1994, vide Annexure-9, whereby he has been placed under suspension for the second time on the same ground. 2. Mr. Sudhir Kumar Katriar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has contended that earlier also the petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated 5th June, 1991, as contained in Annexure-4, on account of the pendency of Vigilance Case No. 2/91 against him. The said order of suspension was revoked on 8th January. 1993 by an order passed by the Government, as contained in Annexure 7. Thereafter the impugned order of suspension has been passed on the same ground on which the petitioner was placed under suspension on 5.6.1991. 3. A counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents has been filed in which it is stated that earlier the petitioner was placed under suspension on institution of the vigilance case against him. In paragraph 8 of the said counter-affidavit it is submitted that after the receipt of Memo No. 002 dated 12.9.1994 from the Inspector General of Police-cum-Special Secretary, Cabinet (Vigilance) Department indicating that there was sufficient material implicating the petitioner in the vigilance case and further seeking necessary sanction for prosecution of the petitioner, the petitioner was placed under suspension on Ist November, 1994, vide impugned order. 4. Learned Government Pleader No. IX has submitted that the order of suspension of the petitioner was revoked because of the delay in investigation of the vigilance case but on receipt of the aforementioned memo from the Inspector General of Police-cum-Spccial Secretary, Cabinet (Vigilance) Department and on submission of the charge-sheet against him on the basis of the sufficient evidence collected during investigation, the petitioner has again been placed under suspension. 5. I do not find any substance, in the submission of the learned Government Pleader. There is nothing to indicate in the order dated 8th January, 1993, contained in Annexure 7, that the order of suspension of the petitioner was revoked because of the delay in the investigation of the vigilance case. The said order of revocation simply states that the suspension of the petitioner is being revoked from the date of issue of the said order. 6. The said order of revocation simply states that the suspension of the petitioner is being revoked from the date of issue of the said order. 6. It is well settled that action of the respondents is to be judged by the reasons stated while making the order and suplementary reasons in the shape of affidavits and/or submissions are to be excluded. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. V/s. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors. -- held, as follows:- The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, gets validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1932 S.C. 16 Public orders, publicity made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older: A Caveat. 7 An order of suspension, in my opinion, is not to be lightly passed against an employee for it cannot be ignored that the suspension brings to bear, on an employee consequences far more serious in nature than several of the penalties prescribed under the rules. It has disastrous impact on the fair name and good reputation that may have been earned and built up by him in the course of many years of service. It is, therefore imperative that utmost caution and circumspection must be exercised in passing orders of suspension. 8. It has disastrous impact on the fair name and good reputation that may have been earned and built up by him in the course of many years of service. It is, therefore imperative that utmost caution and circumspection must be exercised in passing orders of suspension. 8. Learned Government Pleader No. IX has not been able to refer to any rule empowering the Government to place a Government servant under suspension for the second time merely on the ground of submission of the charge-sheet in a criminal/vigilance case against him. 9. Thus, in my opinion, in the absence of any statutory rule, merely because charge-sheet has been submitted, the competent authority will not get power to ipso facto pass an order of suspension in a mechanical and routine manner. It is mandatory for the competent authority to apply his mind and come to a definite conclusion that it was not desirable to keep the delinquent officer in service in the interest of purity and probity of administration or his continuing in service would render any investigation/trial/ departmental proceeding against him difficult or embarrassing. In the instant case no such ground has been mentioned in the impugned order placing the petitioner under suspension for the second time. In this case the competent authority revoked the order of suspension passed earlier without any condition, but now the petitioner has been put under suspension only on the plea that the charge-sheet has been submitted against him in the criminal case. In my opinion, it is not sufficient for the exercise of the power to place an employee under suspension for the second time after the exercise of the power of revocation of suspension by the competent authority inasmuch as such exercise of power will amount to review of the earlier order which unless is provided under the rules cannot be exercised. It is well settled that the administrative authority does not have inherent power of review. The Supreme Court in the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. V/s. Pradyumnsinghji -- held as follows: ...It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. V/s. Pradyumnsinghji -- held as follows: ...It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order. 10. Moreover, as it is well settled that the suspension is not a punishment then to place a Government servant under suspension for the second time merely on account of submission of charge-sheet would amount to imposing punishment upon him before trial, as I have already held that it certainly has impact on the fair name and good reputation which might have been earned and built up by him in the course of many years of service. 11. Accordingly, the order of suspension, as contained in Annexure-8, is quashed and the writ application is allowed but without costs.