ARUN KUMAR DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) BY this Revisional Application under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Code) the two accused petitioners Raghubir Saran Jain and Ashok Kr. Jain (hereinafter referred to as petitioners) have prayed the Court for quashing of the relevant proceedings, being G. R. Case No. 3574 of 1991, arising oat of case Reference No. CBI/scb/rc- 12/98 dated 26/09/1989, now pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 12th Court at Calcutta, including the Order dated 9/11/1991 passed herein by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, (hereinafter referred to as Magistrate) for the reasons stated and on the grounds made oat therein. During the hearing of the application the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Dilip Kr. Datta, had, however, urged the lone ground that it was incompetent for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance of the alleged offence by his im pugned Order dated 9/11/1991, only on the basis of the charge-sheet, in the absence of the documents required to be furnished to the Court under Sub-Section (5) of S. 173 of the Code, as he did. ( 2 ) THE petitioners, along with others, have been prosecuted for having allegedly committed offence punishable under Ss. 400/468/47. Indian Penal Code on the allegations made in the F. I. R. alleging, inter alia, that in a number of cases, some importers have submitted guarantees from Federal Bank Ltd. for release of imported goods as per orders of the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta. Since the cases are pending before the Court, the Bank Guarantees are required to be kept valid for realisation of Govern ment dues. It has been alleged that since a large number of Bank Guarantees were submitted to Cus toms Authorities, officials of Federal Bank Ltd. made enquiries about issuance of a large number of Bank Guarantees from the Bank. On verification, they could conclusively say that 45 Bank Guarant ees have been used, and those Bank Guarantees were under purported signatures of Bank Officials. Out of 45 Bank Guarantees, M/s. Cosmo Steel (P) Ltd. submitted 44 forged Bank Guarantees. On verification, they could conclusively say that 45 Bank Guarant ees have been used, and those Bank Guarantees were under purported signatures of Bank Officials. Out of 45 Bank Guarantees, M/s. Cosmo Steel (P) Ltd. submitted 44 forged Bank Guarantees. ( 3 ) THE Investigating Agency after completion of investigation had submitted charm-sheet against the accused persons named therein, including the present two petitioners, which was received by the learned Magistrate on 4-10-91, who had taken cognizance of the alleged offence under seeing the F. I. R. , containing 27 sheets, which was perused earlier, by passing the impugned order dated 9/11/1991. There is nothing in the orders dated 4-10-91 and 9-11-91 recorded by the learned Magistrate to indicate that the documents referred to in Sub-Section (5) of S. 173 of the Code were forwarded to the Court, along with the chare-sheet/police report (under S. 173 (2) of the Code), which were looked into by him for taking cognizance of the alleged offence. It would, per contra, clearly appear from paragraphs 11 and 14 of the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed on behalf of the Opposite Party No. 2 to the Supplementary Affidavit filed by the petitioners that the charge-sheet was placed before the learned Mag istrate, who, on perusal of the same, was satisfied and took cognizance of the alleged offence; and that the document (under S. 173 (5) of the Code) were not placed along with the charge-sheet, which were kept by the Officer for preparation of copies of statements and documents to furnish the same to the accused terms of the provisions of S. 173 (3) of the Code. Admittedly, therefore, the Police Report/charge-sheet under S. 173 (2) of the Code was not accompanied by the documents required to be for warded to the Magistrate under S. 173 (5) of the Code. The question which would at once emerge for consideration is; whether the learned Magistrate was justified in taking cognizance of the alleged offence in the absence of the documents under S. 173 (5) of the Code. In order to answer the said question let us examine the relevant provisions of the Code is that context. The question which would at once emerge for consideration is; whether the learned Magistrate was justified in taking cognizance of the alleged offence in the absence of the documents under S. 173 (5) of the Code. In order to answer the said question let us examine the relevant provisions of the Code is that context. ( 4 ) SECTION 173 (2) provides that on completion of investigation the police officer investigating into a cognizable offence shall submit a report in the form prescribed by the State Government and stating therein (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed, and, if so, by whom; (c) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; and (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under S. 170. Sub-section (5) of S. 173 makes it obligatory upon the police officer to forward along with the report all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely and the statements recorded under S. 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as witnesses at the trial. ( 5 ) THE Supreme Court in Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar, 1980 Cri LJ 227 : ( AIR 1980 SC 506 ) has observed that on the introduction of S. 173 in its form in the Code the police officer investigating into a cognizable offence is under a statutory obligation to submit along with his report under S. 173 (2) documents purporting to furnish evidence collected in the course of the investigation and the statements of the witnesses, and the Court before proceeding into the case is under a duty to inquire whether the accused has been furnished with copies of all rel evant documents received under S. 173 by the Court, and the entire complexion of what should normally be styled as report submitted under S. 173 (2) of the Code has undergone a change. The Supreme Court has held therein that the report, as envisaged by S. 173 (2), has to be accompanied as required by S. 173 (5) by all the documents and statements of the witnesses therein mentioned. The Supreme Court has held therein that the report, as envisaged by S. 173 (2), has to be accompanied as required by S. 173 (5) by all the documents and statements of the witnesses therein mentioned. One cannot divorce the details which the report must contain as required by S. 173 (2) from its accompaniment which are required to be submitted under S. 173 (5 ). The whole of it is submitted as a report to the Court. It follows that the Court can look at the report in prescribed from, along with the accompaniments, for taking cognizance of the offence. The Supreme Court having thus held that Police Report under S. 173 (2) and its accompaniments under S. 173 (5) of the Code submitted to the Court, the whole of it being a report submitted to the Court, the part of it, i. e. , a report under S. 173 (2) minus the accompaniments under S. 173 (5), cannot clearly be held to be a Police Report. ( 6 ) FOLLOWING the above decision of the Supreme Court, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Matchumari China Venkatarreddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1994 Cri LJ 257 has also observed that "it is made so clear from the above verdict of the Supreme Court which is still holding the field and which is the law of the land under Art. 141 of the Constitution of India that police report (charge-sheet) is one accom panied by the copies thereof to be served on the accused, and that mere filing of a police report under S. 173 (2), Cr. P. C. without its accompaniments under S. 173 (5), Cr. P. C. is not a police report at all. " The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid decision has thus held, inter-alia, as follows :- (1) That the police report (charge-sheet) under S. 173 (2), Cr. P. C. is not complete unless it is accompanied by the material papers (statements etc.), as contemplates under S. 173 (5), Cr. P. C. (b) That judicial act commences when the police report (charge-sheet) is filed in complete form, both complying with the provisions contained under Ss. 173 (2) and 173 (5), Cr. P. C. and its is taken on the file of the court and perused by the Court for taking a decision under S. 190 (1), Cr. P. C. (b) That judicial act commences when the police report (charge-sheet) is filed in complete form, both complying with the provisions contained under Ss. 173 (2) and 173 (5), Cr. P. C. and its is taken on the file of the court and perused by the Court for taking a decision under S. 190 (1), Cr. P. C. ( 7 ) A learned single Judge of our Court in Satyanarain Pal v. State of West Bengal (1992) 96 Cal WN 606 has also held that since the documents and statements (under S. 173 (5) of the Code) are parts of the police report they are to he placed, along with such report before the Magistrate/judge at the time of taking cognizance by them, and the learned Magistrate/judge before taking cognizance must look into the said report and also into the documents and statements. A similar view has also been re cently taken by another learned single Judge of our Court in his Judgment and Order dated 5/05/1995 in Criminal Revision Case No. 26 of 1995, the record of which had been requisitioned during the hearing at the instance of the petitioners. There is nothing to depart from the aforesaid views taken by the aforesaid two learned Judges of our Court on the aforesaid point following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Satya Narain Musadi and others v. State of Bihar. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocate for the Opposite Party No. 2. Mr. Amit Talukdar, on the other hand, had referred me to Paragraph 44 of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Md. Khalid etc. , etc. , 1995 C Cr LR (SC) 52 : (1995 AIR SCW 559) to state the meaning of "taking cogni zance". The Supreme Court has observed therein that S. 190 of the Code talks of cognizance of offences by Magistrates. ""this expression has not been defined in the Code. In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceeding against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word "cognizance" indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceeding against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word "cognizance" indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condi tion precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and non of persons. " ( 9 ) THE learned Advocate had also referred to Paragraph 25 of the said decision wherein the Su preme Court has observed that when a police report is filed cognizance is almost automatic. In fact, in A. C. Aggarwal, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi v. Master Ram Kali, AIR 1968 SC 1 : (1968 Cri LJ 82) the Court held when S. 190 (1) (b) of the Code uses the words "may take cognizance" it means must take cognizance, and that it has no discretion in the matter. In law, no reasons need be given for taking cognizance under S. 193. But in order to enable a Magistrate to take cognizance on a Police Report under S. 173 (2) of the Code, the same has to be a complete report thereunder accompanied by the accompaniments under Sub-Section (5) of S. 173 of the Code so that he (Magistrate) may apply his judicial mind for the purpose after looking to the Police Report and the materials filed therewith in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sharad Chandra Vinayak Dongre, AIR 1995 SC 231 . It will also be pertinent to refer to the decision of Rajasthan High Court in State v. Pukhia, AIR 1963 Raj 48 : (1963 (1) Cri LJ 318), followed in Re : Raju Thevan, AIR 1966 Mad 349 : (1966 Cri LJ 1141), and State of Bihar v. Sakaldip Singh, AIR 1966 Pat 473 : (1967 Cri LJ 111), that the term taking "cognizance" means a judicial action permitted by the Code taken with a view to eventual prosecution preliminary to the commencement of the enquiry or trial. It has been held by the supreme Court in H. S. Bains v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1883 : that a Magistrate after receipt of Police Report under S. 173 of the Code may as well decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceed ing further, and drop action, or he may take cogni zance of the offence under S. 190 (1) (b) of the Code on the basis of the Police Report. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in State of Maharashtra v. Sharad Ch. Vinayak Dongre has further observed that the purpose of the submission of the police report with the details is to enable the Magistrate to satisfy himself, whether on the basis of the report and the material filed along with the police report a case for taking cognizance has been made out or not. After applying his mind to the police report and the material submitted there with, if the Magistrate is satisfied that cognizance of the offence is required to be taken, he shall proceed further in accordance with the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 190 (1) (b), Cr. P. C. provides that a Magistrate has the power to take cognizance upon a police report of such facts as are provided therein on being satisfied that the case is a fit one for taking cognizance of the offence. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, a Magistrate may or may not take cognizance of an offence upon a police report and the materials filed therewith on due application of his judicial mind. ( 10 ) THE learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 2 had also referred to paragraph 10 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar, 1980 Cri LJ 227 : ( AIR 1980 SC 506 ) wherein it has been observed that "if the report with sufficient particularity and clarity specifies the contravention of the law which is the alleged offence, it would be sufficient compliance with S. 11. The details which would he necessary to be proved to bring home the guilt to the accused would emerge at a later stage, when after notice to the accused a charge is framed against him and further in the course of the trial. The details which would he necessary to be proved to bring home the guilt to the accused would emerge at a later stage, when after notice to the accused a charge is framed against him and further in the course of the trial. They would all be matters of evidence; and S. 11 does not require the report to be or to contain the evidence in support of the charge, its function being merely to afford a basis for enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the case. ( 11 ) BASING on the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court, the learned Advocate for the Opposite Party No. 2 sought to submit that the Learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was not unjustified in taking cognizance of the alleged offence on the basis of the police report submitted in the relevant case under S. 173 (2) of the Code. But to that I would at once note with a minute of dissent that the afore said observation had been made by the Supreme Court with reference to a report under S. 11 of the Essential Commodities Act. 1955, which report is not required to be accompanied by any document as required in the case of a Police Report under S. 173 (5) of the Code. The question of looking at documents in connection with a report under S. 11 of the Essential Commodities Act could not conceivably arise as such. ( 12 ) IN view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Satya Narain Musadi, a police report under S. 173 (2), unaccompanied by the documents under S. 173 (5) of the Code, cannot be said to be a Police Report in the eye of law, being an incomplete report, as already indicated above. A Magistrate would be incompetent to take cogni zance of an offence on such a Police Report as he would not be in a position to look to the documents, which are required to be accompanied by it, for the purpose of taking cognizance. As already noted above, the Police Report submitted in the relevant case before the learned Magistrate, admittedly was not accompanied by the documents under S. 173 (5) of the Code. The learned Chief Metropolitan Mag istrate, Calcutta, was not, therefore, justified in taking cognizance of the alleged offence on the basis of such incomplete report. As already noted above, the Police Report submitted in the relevant case before the learned Magistrate, admittedly was not accompanied by the documents under S. 173 (5) of the Code. The learned Chief Metropolitan Mag istrate, Calcutta, was not, therefore, justified in taking cognizance of the alleged offence on the basis of such incomplete report. The cognizance taken by him by his impugned order dated 9/11/1991, cannot be said to be according to law, and is liable to be quashed. ( 13 ) IN the result, the impugned order passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, dated 9/11/1991 be hereby set aside. Let the matter be sent back to him for consideration as to whether cognizance of the alleged offence should be taken by him or not upon due application of his judicial mind (sic) on the basis of the relevant Police Report under S. 173 (2), Cr. P. C. and accompaniments under Sub-section (5) of S. 173 of the Code, in the light of the discussions above, and disposal of the relevant case according to law. ( 14 ) THE Investigating Agency is also directed to submit all relevant documents/papers, as contem plated under Sub-Section (5) of S. 173 of the Code before the learned Magistrate, if not already submit ted, so as to enable the latter to act in terms of this Order. ( 15 ) SINCE the matter has already been long delayed in view of the present proceedings before this Court, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magis trate, Calcutta, shall take up the matter for the aforesaid purpose, as early as possible, preferably within 3 weeks from the receipt of the lower court record and the copy of this order. The Investigating Agency shall also submit all relevant documents/papers under S. 173 (5) of the Code before the learned Magistrate, if not already submitted, within the aforesaid period for enabling the latter to comply with this order. If the learned Magistrate takes cog nizance of the alleged offence, he shall also take effective steps for expeditious trial and disposal of the case. ( 16 ) THE Revisional application be, accordingly, disposed of. Interim Stay, if any, stands vacated. ( 17 ) LET a copy of this order, as also the lower court records, go down to the court below forthwith. Order accordingly.