D.N. Baruah, J.: This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 18th January, 1993 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No.364 of 1992 partly allowing the writ petition by striking down a part of section 3 of the Act regarding the retirement from service on completion of 33 years' service without however granting any further consequential relief. 2. The appellants' case in this writ appeal may be stated as follows: Appellant Nos. 1,2,3 and 4 are the petitioner Nos. 1,2,3 and 4 respectively in the Civil Rule No.364 of 1992. The 1st appellant is a Confederation of All Nagaland State Service Employees Association of which appellant Nos.2,3 and 4 are the President, Vice President and the General Secretary respectively of appellant No. 1. The 1st appellant represents about 56,000 Government employees of the State of Nagaland. The 1st appellant is a confederation of various employees association as mentioned in para 1 of the writ petition. 3. In the year 1987 an Act known as 'the Nagaland Hills Tuensang Areas Act, 1957' was enacted by the Parliament by which certain changes were brought about regarding administration of the area although at that time Naga Hills was within Assam. Thereafter by a memorandum of understanding it was recommended that in case of civil servants of Naga Hills Tuensang Area, the pay structure applicable to civil servants of Assam would be applicable; the condition of service, however, would be those of Central Government employees. Thus all service conditions including the age of superannuation of civil servant of Naga Hills Tuensang Areas were being governed by the Central Fundamental Rules and Subsidiary Rules. By an Act known as the State of Nagaland Act, 1%2 a new State of Nagaland was created. TJiis Act came into force on 1.12.63. Though the new State was created, as per section 23 of the said Act the existing laws continued. 4. The Government of Nagaland did not formulate Fundamental Rules or Subsidiary Rules regarding condition of service of civil servants and continued to follow the Central Fundamental Rules and Subsidiary Rules. Not much amendment or modification to the Fundamental Rules and Subsidiary Rules had been made by the legislature of the State of Nagaland. 5. The Government of Nagaland by Memo dated 12.12.66 also adopted the principle governing the extension of re-employment of persons beyond the age of 58 years. Not much amendment or modification to the Fundamental Rules and Subsidiary Rules had been made by the legislature of the State of Nagaland. 5. The Government of Nagaland by Memo dated 12.12.66 also adopted the principle governing the extension of re-employment of persons beyond the age of 58 years. However, by yet another Office Memo dated 1.4.70 the age of superannuation was reduced from 58 years to 55 years. According to the appellants the Central Fundamental Rules and Subsidiary Rules had been in force in Nagaland. The matter regarding the age of superannuation was thereafter examined by the Second Central Pay Commission and Chapter XXXVII of the report of the Second Central Pay Commission, 1959 was referred to. Later the issue regarding the age of superannuation was also considered by the Third Central Pay Commission. The said Commission, after considering the same in details came to the conclusion that there had been improvement in the expectency of life. The said Pay Commission further felt that reduction of the age of superannuation no doubt, created a substantial number of vacancies, but then, the retired persons were required to take up re-employment on their retirement because of high cost of living. Petitioners further stated that the problem of unemployment in Nagaland was not at all acute. In fact some posts in outlying areas had been lying vacant and therefore, it was necessary to maintain the age of superannuation at the age of 58 and accordingly the employees represented to the Government of Nagaland for consideration. Government, though gave full assurance, ultimately did not do anything in that regard. Situated thus, a writ application was filed in the Kohima Bench of this Court being Civil Rule No.96 (K) 1989. This Court issued Rule. 6. Thereafter the Government raised the age of superannuation from 55 to 58 by a notification dated 20.1.90. Yet another notification dated 17th March, 1990 was issued by the Government for raising the age of superannuation of all the State Government employees other than the Grade IV employees. While the matter regarding raising the age of superannuation was under active consideration, the Government was pressurised not to raise the age of superannuation. In spite of that the Government decided to raise the age of superannuation. Thereafter the Government of Nagaland constituted an official committee vide notification dated 16.10.90 on the subject of age of superannuation. While the matter regarding raising the age of superannuation was under active consideration, the Government was pressurised not to raise the age of superannuation. In spite of that the Government decided to raise the age of superannuation. Thereafter the Government of Nagaland constituted an official committee vide notification dated 16.10.90 on the subject of age of superannuation. The committee submitted its report before the Cabinet which after considering it decided that the age of superannuation of all the categories of State Government employees including Grade IV would be 58 years arid would be restricted to a maximum period of service of 33 years whichever was earlier. However, the age of superannuation was once again reduced to 57 years or 33 years of service whichever was earlier. According to the petitioner it was due to the pressure from outside. The 1st appellant immediately reacted to the same and adopted a resolution on 9.12.90. According to the appellants the action of the respondents was apparently illegal, arbitrary and not in the public interest, Government, according to the appellants, acted under pressure of some organisations. The decision of reducing the age of superannuation was not real decision but a purported one. A writ application was moved before this Court being Civil Rule No.2343 of 1990. While the matter was pending a Bill was introduced for making an Act known as the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Bill, 1991. Thereafter a memorandum dated 18.6.91 was issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms enclosing a copy of the Ordinance under the caption Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Ordinance, 1991. On receipt of the same the appellants immediately submitted representation-before the appropriate authorities of the Government to cancel or to withdraw the said Ordinance. However, there was no response. 7. In the meantime an Ordinance was published in the Nagaland Gazette on 18.6.91 and the same was forwarded to different authorities for necessary action. The petitioners therefore approached this Court by filing a writ application (Civil Rule No.3354 of 1991) assailing inter alia the validity of the Ordinance and the order contained in the Memo dated 26.6.91 and 28.6.91. While the Civil Rule was pending the Nagaland Legislative Assembly passed the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Bill, 1991 and accordingly the aforesaid the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991 was enacted giving retrospective effect from 18.6.91. While the Civil Rule was pending the Nagaland Legislative Assembly passed the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Bill, 1991 and accordingly the aforesaid the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991 was enacted giving retrospective effect from 18.6.91. The petitioners' confederation thereafter filed the present Civil Rule No.364 of 1992 incorporating the development that took place after filing of the Civil Rule No.3354 of 1991. In view of the finding of the Civil Rule No.364 of 1992 earlier Civil Rule No.3354 of 1991 was closed. The Civil Rule was disposed of by the learned Single Judge by judgment dated 18.1.93 holding inter alia that the classification on the basis of 33 years of service for the purpose of retirement was unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and struck down the part of section 3 of the Act dealing with retirement of service on completion of 33 years. The learned Single Judge, however, did not grant any consequential relief or reinstate the employees retired on the basis of the said Rule. Learned Single Judge also refused monetary benefit. 8. After promulgation of the Ordinance and after the enactment of the Act about 2,000 Government employees were to retire from service on the basis of the impugned provisions of the Ordinance/Act till the judgment was passed. However, no appointment was made. The appellant have challenged the judgment of the learned Single Judge urging that the reduction of age to 57 years and denying the consequential relief to those employees who were made to retire on the basis of the said Rule, were illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. According to the appellants the employment policy of the Government should be informed by reasons or structured on real, reasonable, rational, relevant and intelligible consideration inasmuch as there was no justifiable reason for reduction of the age of superannuation to 57 years. There was no material whatsoever with the Government to justify the reduction of age of superannuation to 57 years. The learned Single Judge having held the criteria of 33 years of qualifying service for retirement as illegal and unconstitutional, the employees retired from time to time on the basis of such criteria till the delivery of the judgment in the Civil Rule, ought to have granted consequential relief. Therefore, the learned Single Judge erred in law in not granting the consequential benefit. 9. Therefore, the learned Single Judge erred in law in not granting the consequential benefit. 9. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned Single Judge upholding the reduction of age from 58 to 57 and refusing to grant any consequential relief even after holding that the criteria of superannuation on the completion of 33 years of service was ultra-vires, the appellants have filed this appeal before this Court. Now the points fall for determination are as follows: (a) Whether the reduction of age of 58 to 57 is justified ? (b) Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in refusing to grant consequential relief after having held that the criteria for attaining superannuation on completion of 33 years of service even though some employees might not have completed the age of superannuation, that is 57 years? The learned Single Judge while approving the reduction of age of superannuation from 58 to 57 had observed thus: "6. The question which arises for consideration is whether fixing of retirement age at 57 is arbitrary or irrational. In K. Nagaraj vs. State of AP, AIR 1985 SC 551 , the Supreme Court observed: "There are precedents within our country itself for fixing die retirement age, at 55 or for reduction it from 58 to 55. Either the one or the other or these two stages is regarded generally as acceptable, depending upon the employment policy of the c Government of the day." In View of the above quoted passage, fixing of retirement age at 57 is permissible depending upon the employment policy. The Bill indicates that the object of the Act is to provide more employment opportunity the younger section of the society. Therefore, there is reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act and at the same time the fixing of the age of retirement at 57 is not an unreasonable low level so as to make it arbitrary or irrational. For these reasons, fixing of age of retirement at 57 is not arbitrary nor irrational nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution." 10. In K. Nagaraj vs. State of AP, AIR 1985 SC 551 , the Supreme Court had dealt with a similar matter regarding reduction of age of superannuation. In the said case the Supreme Court observed that reduction of the age of superannuation deprive an employee from the right to livelihood. In K. Nagaraj vs. State of AP, AIR 1985 SC 551 , the Supreme Court had dealt with a similar matter regarding reduction of age of superannuation. In the said case the Supreme Court observed that reduction of the age of superannuation deprive an employee from the right to livelihood. The Supreme Court further held that if the rule can be deemed to have deprived a person of his livelihood it would be impermissible to provide for an age of retirement at all. The Supreme Court in the said case further observed that it was well settled that the service rules could be as much amended, under the proviso to Article 309 and that the power to amend these rules carried with it the power to amend them restrospectively. The power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 is of a legislative character and to be distinguished from an ordinary rule making power. The learned Single Judge following the decision of K. Nagaraj vs. State of AP, (supra) held that fixing the age of superannuation at 57 was permissible depending upon the policy. The learned Single Judge further indicated that the object of the Act was to provide more employment opportunity to the younger section of the society. Therefore, there was reasonable in relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act and at the same time the fixing of the age of retirement at 57 was not an unreasonably low level so as to make it arbitrary or irrational. For these reason, fixing of age of retirement at 57 was neither arbitrary nor irrational nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We are in full agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the reduction of age from 58 to 57 was in order. 11. The next point is whether the learned Single Judge was justified in refusing to grant consequential relief. While deciding that point the learned Single Judge observed thus : "It is not known whether how many of the Government servants who had retired are working elsewhere or how many of them are willing to be reinstated. It is also not known whether vacancies occurred due to their retirement had/have been filled up on regular basis or an ad hoc basis or officiating basis. Some of the civil servants might have attained the age of 57. It is also not known whether vacancies occurred due to their retirement had/have been filled up on regular basis or an ad hoc basis or officiating basis. Some of the civil servants might have attained the age of 57. The principles of 'no work no pay' may also be attracted, if those officers who had retired are reinstated or reinducted. In Virendra M; Kumar vs. Abinash Chandra, (1990) 3 SCC 472 , the Supreme Court has held that the respondents have not actually worked in the said post, and therefore, on the principles of 'no work no pay' they would not be entitled to higher salary. In Purulu Ramkrishnaiah vs. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 541 , the Supreme Court has held that back wages for the period for which a person did not work in the promotional post was not payable. Under these circumstances, there shall be complications if any consequential or further relief is granted. That apart, relief under Article 226 is a discretionary one. In KK Kochunni vs. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725 , the Supreme Court has held that a declaratory relief can be granted under Article 226 of the Constitution without granting any further relief. I, therefore, decline to grant any consequential or further relief other than striking down that part of section 3 regarding the retirement on completion of 33 years' service." 12. The learned Single Judge refused to grant consequential relief by applying the principles of 'no work no pay'. Besides the learned Single Judge refused to grant consequential relief for reinstatement and back wages for the period during which some of the employees had been compelled to remain out of job. The refusal to grant such consequential relief was on the ground that there would be complication if such relief was granted. Besides learned Single Judge held that a declaratory relief could be granted under Article 226 of the Constitution without granting any further relief. While refusing to grant consequential relief as stated above the learned Single Judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Virendra Kumar vs. Abinash Chandra, (1990) 3 SCC 472 and also Puru Ramkrishnaiah vs. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 541 . While refusing to grant consequential relief as stated above the learned Single Judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Virendra Kumar vs. Abinash Chandra, (1990) 3 SCC 472 and also Puru Ramkrishnaiah vs. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 541 . In Purulu Ramkrishnaiah vs. Union of India (supra) the Supreme Court observed as follows : "It is now not disputed mat the appellant of this appeal have in pursuance of the order of this Court dated February 2,1981 have been given a back date promotion to the post of Chargeman II synchronising with the dates of completion of their two years of service as Supervisor 'A'. The grievance of the petitioners, however, is that this promotion tantamount to implementation of the order of this Court dated February 2, 1981 only on paper inasmuch as they have not been granted the difference of back wages and promotion to higher posts on the basis of their back date promotion as Chargeman II." In Virendra Kumar (supra) the Supreme Court considered about the entitlement of the payment of emoluments of higher post with restrospecitive effect on account of deemed promotion of earlier date. In the said decision the Supreme Court discouraged the quota and rota rule and observed that this rule was both inequitable and irrational. The Supreme Court observed that there was neither equity for justice in favour of the respondents to award emoluments of higher a posts with retrospective effect. Supreme Court in the said case was of the opinion that the decision given by the Supreme Court in PS Mahal vs. Union of India (1984) 4 SCC 545 was not applicable in the said case. In our opinion these two decisions are not applicable in the present case. In both the decisions the employees though entitled to did not discharge the duties of promotional post. Therefore, the question of giving back wages on deemed appointed did not arise in this case. In the present case those employees who were compelled to retire on completion of 33 years of service, were working in their respective posts. They were compelled to retire prior to attaining of the age of 57 years. Therefore, the question of giving back wages on deemed appointed did not arise in this case. In the present case those employees who were compelled to retire on completion of 33 years of service, were working in their respective posts. They were compelled to retire prior to attaining of the age of 57 years. On the basis of the introduction of the rule those employees were to go on superannuation on completion of 33 years of service irrespective of the fact whether he or they had attained the age of 57 years. This rule having been strucked down as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 the petitioners were entitled to remain in service till they attained the age of 57 years. As there was no basis of throwing those persons out of employment, as per the rule of 33 years of service which later on was declared ultra vires, the employees were entitled to be reinstated and also entitled to get the back wages and other benefits which they would have been otherwise entitled to, but for the rule of 33 years of service. We also feel that the employees who were compelled to go on retirement on invalid rule did not go on retirement, on their own volition. Therefore, those employees cannot be put at par with the employees who were not promoted. In view of the above, in our opinion, they should not be denied all the consequential benefits. It is true that an application under Article 226 is a discretionary relief and in appropriate cases the application can be disposed of giving mere declaration without giving any consequential relief. In the present case, however, we find that the employees who were compelled to go on retirement on a rule which was later on declared ultra vires are entitled to get all the consequential relief. Such relief cannot be denied merely on the ground that there may arise some complications. On the basis of the said rule the employees are entitled to be reinstated till their attaining the age of superannuation and they shall be entitled to get their pay and other allowances which they would have received. Those employees who have already attained the age of superannuation will be entitled to get pecuniary benefits like pay and other allowances which they would have entitled to. 13. Those employees who have already attained the age of superannuation will be entitled to get pecuniary benefits like pay and other allowances which they would have entitled to. 13. In the result we do not find any material to interfere with the decision of the learned Single Judge upholding the reduction of the age from 58 to 57. Accordingly, the appeal in mat respect in dismissed. However, we respectfully disagree with the learned Single Judge so far the refusal to grant the consequential relief. In the facts and circumstances of the case the employees who were compelled to go on retirement on the basis of 33 years of service rules are entitled to be reinstated. We agree that such reinstatement may disturb whole administration inasmuch as certain things have already been settled which should not be unsettled by reinstating them; but that does not mean that they should be refused other consequential relief. They shall be entitled to get their salary and other allowances and all other consequential benefits which they would have entitled to. Those employees who have already attained the age of superannuation by lapse of time they shall also be entitled to-get all pecuniary benefits such as pay and other allowances for the period from date of their superannuation till the date when they attained the age of 57 and also pecuniary benefit. Accordingly, we allow the appeal in that respect. All the employees of the petitioners' confederation are entitled to get all pecuniary benefits as indicated above. It shall be given within a period of three months from today. However, we make it clear that those officers who were made to retire on having completed 33 years of service without attaining the age of 57 years, and gainfully employed somewhere, shall not be entitled to get the pecuniary benefit to the extent they receive from other employer. 14. State shalUn such cases, be at liberty to make enquiry in that respect. 15. On the facts and circumatances of the entire case, parties shall bear their own costs.