Pantigongpou v. Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong — 1995 DIGILAW 217 (GAU)

H. K. Sema, J--In this Civil Rule, the petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 13.5.85 (Annexure A/2) and the order dated 25.2.88 (Annexure A/ 6) passed by the respondent No. 1. 2. We have heard Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. HNK Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No.2 as well as Mr. L. Shyam Kishoie Singh, learned Government Advocate for the respondents 1,3, 4 and 5. 3. The facts leading to the filing of the present petition may be summarily recited. The petitioner was Khullakpa (Chief) of Taoshang Village. The office of the Khullakpa of the hill village is hereditary. By virtue of the petitioner being Khullakpa, he became the Ex-officio Chairman of the village under sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Manipur (Village Authority in Hill Areas) Act, 1956 (hereinafter the Act), in election of the members of the Village Authorities held sometime on 1.12.1983 in terms of the provisions of section 7 of the Act. In the said election other members of the Village Authorities were also elected as members including the respondent No.2. The first meeting of the Village Authority was held sometime in the beginning of 1984. The term of office of the elected members under section 6 of the Act is for a period of 3 (three) years from the date appointed for its first meeting. Therefore, the term of the office of the other elected members was to expire sometime in 1987. The petitioner was, however, informed that by the impugned order dated 13.5.85 the first respondent has passed an order approving the election of the 2nd respondent as Chairman of Taoshang Village Authority on the ground that the petitioner, Khullakpa of the Village is unwilling to act as a Chairman of the Village Authority due to old age. On enquiry the petitioner came to know that the SDO/Nungba had submitted a report to the respondent No. 1 on the basis of a concocted report of the SDO Khoupum stating, inter alia, that the petitioner tendered his resignation from the Chairmanship of Taoshang Village and Village Authority nominated the respondent No.2 as the Chairman in place of the petitioner. On enquiry the petitioner came to know that the SDO/Nungba had submitted a report to the respondent No. 1 on the basis of a concocted report of the SDO Khoupum stating, inter alia, that the petitioner tendered his resignation from the Chairmanship of Taoshang Village and Village Authority nominated the respondent No.2 as the Chairman in place of the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent No.2 in collusion with other elected members practised fraud upon the petitioner by obtaining the signature of the petitioner on some piece of paper by misrepresentation of facts that they were filing a representation to the SDO/Nungba for holding fresh election as required by the provision of the Act and Rules made thereunder. The petitioner being an unsophisticated tribal put his signature bonafide without knowing the contents. However, later on it came to reveal that the same was used as the petitioner agreeing to resign from his office as Ex-officio Chairman and nomination of the respondent No.2 as Chairman of the Village Authority. On coming to know of this fact, the petitioner filed a representation before the learned Deputy Commissioner (respondent No. 1). The respondent No. 1, thereafter, registered a complaint as No.DC/TML/15/1/86. The learned Deputy Commissioner by its order dated 20.10.87 was of the opinion that the declaration of the respondent No.2 as Chief of Taoshang Village was in contravention of the existing Act. By the aforesaid order, the learned Deputy Commissioner also directed the respondent No.2 to prove the legitimacy of his claim as Chairman by producing material evidence within thirty days, failing which the complaint of the petitioner will be made absolute. It may be pertinent to mention herein that in his complaint petition, the petitioner claimed that by virtue of the being the Khullakpa, became the Ex-officio Chairman under sub-section (4) section 3 of the Act. We shall be dealing with this provision at the appropriate time. However, by another order dated 25.2.88 (Annexure A/6) the learned Deputy Commissioner was of the opinion that he is not competent to set aside the order passed by his predecessor and status quo will be maintained until and unless the order is revoked/quashed by the civil Court. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned orders this writ petition has been preferred. 4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned orders this writ petition has been preferred. 4. The impugned order dated 13.5.85 (Annexure A/2) has been assailed on the ground that the State Government/Deputy Commissioner has no authority to remove the petitioner from the post of Ex-officio Chairman who has been appointed in terms of sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act by virtue of his being a Khullakpa of Village. The impugned order dated 25.2.88 (Annexure A/6) has been assailed on the ground that the impugned order has been passed at the dictate of the superior officer and thereby influenced by extraneous consideration and therefore it is not sustainable in law. 5. Precisely the important question that posed for determination are these : (a) Whether the State Government or the DC can remove Ex-officio Chairman who has been appointed under sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act by virtue of his being a Khullakpa (Chief) of the Village; (b) Whether the order dated 25.2.88 passed by the learned DC has been passed pursuant to a letter dated 3.11.87 (Annexure A/7 of the additional affidavit) written by Minister of State, Tribal Development and District Council, Manipur, addressed to the respondent No.l. 6. Point 'a' : It is the specific case of the petitioner that the Deputy Commissioner or the State has no authority to remove Ex-officio Chairman from his post as he has been appointed as such under sub-section (4) of section 3 by virtue of his being a Khullakpa. It also been submitted by Mr. A. Nilamani Singh that Khullakpaship is a hereditary and according to customs and usages of the village, such Khullakpa can be only removed in certain exigency by the villagers or he may abdicate or relinquish his office in favour of his heir designate when he is incapable of performing the duties and function of the Khullakpa cum-Ex-officio Chairman. 7. The Manipur Village Authority in Hill areas Act, 1956 was enacted by the Parliament to consolidate and amend the law relating to the constitution and function of Village Authorities in the hill areas of Manipur. Section 3 of the Act deals with the constitution of a village authorities and provides that every village having 20 or more tax paying houses shall have a Village Authority. Sub-section (2), (3) of section 3 deal with the election of the members of the Village Authority. Section 3 of the Act deals with the constitution of a village authorities and provides that every village having 20 or more tax paying houses shall have a Village Authority. Sub-section (2), (3) of section 3 deal with the election of the members of the Village Authority. Sub-section (4) of section 3 deals with the election of the Chairman of the Village Authority. Sub-section (4) of the section 3 has an important bearing for the proper adjudication of the case in hand and it is extracted : “(4) Whether there is a Chief or Khullakpa in a Village, he shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the Village Authority of that village; and where there is no such Chief or Khullakpa in the village, the Chairman of the Village Authority of that village shall be elected by the members of the village authority from among themselves.” (underline is ours) 8. There is no dispute that the Khillakpa is hereditary. The term 'hereditary' is some sort of a legal and fictitious constitution of the personality of the dead man. The right which the dead man can no longer own or exercise in propria person and obligation of which he can no longer fulfil, he owns, exercises and fulfils in the person of a living substitute. Therefore, the legal personality of a man survives his natural personality. 9. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner was appointed as Ex-officio Chairman in 1983 in terms of sub-section (4) of section 3, by virtue of his being a Khullakpa. A quick perusal of the relevant provision of the Act, we are of the view that there is no provision for either by resignation or by removal of the Ex-officio Chairman who has been appointed in terms of sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act. In this connection, we may refer to section 6, section 8 and section 9 of the Act. Section 6 of the Act deals with the terms of office of the members of the Village Authority and provides that the terms of office of the members of the Village Authority shall be 3 (three) years from the date appointed for the first meeting. Section 8 provides for removal of members of Village Authority by the Deputy Commissioner for the offences enumerated in (a) to (e). Section 8 provides for removal of members of Village Authority by the Deputy Commissioner for the offences enumerated in (a) to (e). Section 9 deals with the resignation of members and provides that a member of the Village Authority may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Chairman. From the relevant provision, as recited above, all the provisions are relating to elected members of the Village Authority. There is no provision for removal or tendering resignation by Ex-officio Chairman who has been appointed under sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, by virtue of he being Khullakpa. Necessary corollary is that once a person is appointed as Ex-officio Chairman in terms of sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, by virtue of he being Khullakpa, he cannot be removed or tendered resignation. He can only abdicate or relinquish his office in favour of heir designate when he becomes incapable of performing his duties and function of the Khullakpa. Of course, this is subject to removal of the Khullakpa from the office of the villagers for certain exigency, such as personal disqualification incurred by him. Except for the aforesaid exigency, a Khullakpa being hereditary cannot be removed by the State Govt or by the DC either from Khullakpship or from the Ex-officio Chairmanship appointed by virtue of his being a Khullakpa in terms of sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act. 10. Point 'b': It is contended by Mr. A. Nilamani Singh that the impugned order dated 25.2.88 (Annexure A/6) has been influenced by a letter dated 3rd November, 1987 written by Minister of State for Tribal Development and District Council, Manipur and as such the impugned order has been passed on the dictates of the superior officer and prejudice and bias has been caused to the petitioner resulting in serious miscarriage of justice. It is, however, submitted by Mr. HNK Singh that although the letter dated 3rd November, 1987 has been addressed to the respondent No. 1, the respondent No. 1 has passed its judicious order without being influenced by the letter. To apprecite the problem the letter dated 3.11.87 is extracted : “Dear Shri Lawkaunga, Please recall that one Shri Pantigongpou lodged a complaint to you against he Chairman of Shri Soihem, the present Chairman of Taoshang Village Authority. To apprecite the problem the letter dated 3.11.87 is extracted : “Dear Shri Lawkaunga, Please recall that one Shri Pantigongpou lodged a complaint to you against he Chairman of Shri Soihem, the present Chairman of Taoshang Village Authority. Shri Soihem is a duly elected Chairman who enjoys the full confidence and backing of the Taoshang Vill. On the other hand Shri Pantigongpou is no longer a villager of Taoshang. Any disturbance of the present position is likely to create a law and order problem. In view of the facts stated above, I would request you to please maintain status quo in respect of the Chairmanship of Taoshang Village and let Shri Soihem be Chairman of Taoshang Village Authority undisturbed, in public interest, (underline is ours) With regards. Shri PC Lawmkunga, Your sincerely Deputy Commissioner (Tamenglong), Sd/- 3.11.87 Govt of Manipur.” (Gaikhanoam) 11. It is contended by Mr. A. Nilamani Singh that the DC is performing a quasi-judicial and judicial function and if he is allowed to be influenced by a authority above him and if the judicial orders are passed at the dictates of superior authorities, the order is nullity, because in such a situation it would amount to abdication and surrender of his power and it would not be the authority's discretion, but someone else. 12. Admittedly, the power exercised by the learned DC is quasi-judicial power and judicial power and therefore the learned Deputy Commissioner must act independently and impartially and uninfluenced by any extraneous consideration. It cannot be said that the DC acted independently if his judgment is controlled by the direction given by others. In this connection, Mr. Nilamani Singh has referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of UP & others vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & others reported in (1989) 2 SCC 505 wherein it was pointed by the Apex Court in paragraph 55 of its judgment which runs as under : “55. It is true that in exercise of powers of revoking or cancelling the permission is akin to and partkes of a quasi-judicial complection and that in exercising of the former power the authority must bring to bear an unbiased mind, consider impartially the objections raised by the aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with the principles of natural justice. It is true that in exercise of powers of revoking or cancelling the permission is akin to and partkes of a quasi-judicial complection and that in exercising of the former power the authority must bring to bear an unbiased mind, consider impartially the objections raised by the aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with the principles of natural justice. The authority cannot permit its decision to be influenced by the dictation of others as this would amount to abdication and surrender of its discretion. It would then not be the authority's discretion that is exercised, but someone else's. If an authority “hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires.” Such an interference by a person or body extraneous to the power would plainly be contrary to the nature of the power conferred upon the authority.” 13. It has been strenuously urged by Mr. HNK Singh that the letter dated 3.11.87 has no impact on the mind of the respondent No.l while passing the impugned order dated 25.2.88. We are, however, unable to accept this contention of Mr. HNK Singh for more than one reasons, firstly, the same respondent No.l has passed an order dated 20.10.87 declaring that the impugned order dated 13.5.85 has been passed in contravention of the existing Act, meaning thereby in contravention of sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act. However, by the impugned order dated 25.2.88 he has taken completely on a different stand. The operative portion of the impugned order dated 25.2.88 passed by the DC runs as under: “... Under these circumstances the Deputy Commissioner after closely examining the case and herein both the parties hereby order that the status quo will be maintained until and unless this order is revoked/quashed by the higher civil Court or any other Court which has jurisdiction to hear it.” (underline is ours) 14. From the contents of the letter dated 3.11.87 and operative portion of the order as quoted above, would clearly show that the words, 'status quo' has been mentioned in both. Therefore, it clearly appears that the impugned order dated 25.2.88 has been passed under the influence and dictates of the letter dated 3.11.87. To say the least, such practice of the high public authority has to be deprecated. We put it on records that no authority, however, high placed can control the decision of a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. Therefore, it clearly appears that the impugned order dated 25.2.88 has been passed under the influence and dictates of the letter dated 3.11.87. To say the least, such practice of the high public authority has to be deprecated. We put it on records that no authority, however, high placed can control the decision of a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. 15. It is now well settled principle of law that justice must not only be done, but must also appears to be done. The test is not whether, in fact bias has affected the judgment, the test always is whether a litigant would reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a Judge might have operated against him in the final decision of the Judge. In the instant case, from the fact as narrated above, the petitioner had, even otherwise, definitely a reasonable apprehension that the respondent No. 1 had acted bias against the petitioner in view of the letter dated 3.11.87 as quoted above. 16. Mr. HNK Singh has strenuously urged that the dispute raised in this petition is purely a dispute of civil nature and it can only be resolved by a civil Court and not by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is, in our view, not sustainable in view of the fact that the impugned order dated 25.2.88 has been passed on the dictates of the letter dated 3.11.87 being bias, malafide and cannot stand the test of the law. 17. For the aforestated reasons, the impugned order dated 13.5.85 (Annexure A/2) and the impugned order dated 25.2.88 (Annexure A/6) are hereby quashed and set aside. Accordingly this petition is allowed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are allowed to bear their own costs. 18. Mr. L. Shyamkishore Singh produced a copy of the Extraordinary notification dated 11.2.93 to say that now election of the members of the Village Authority Taoshang Village has been held on 24.8.92 and the respondent No.2 has been elected as Chairman. In this view, we are of the opinion that despite of the quashing of the impugned orders, the term of the respondent No.2, elected as a Chairman of Taoshang Village in the election held on 24.8.92 should be allowed to complete. In this view, we are of the opinion that despite of the quashing of the impugned orders, the term of the respondent No.2, elected as a Chairman of Taoshang Village in the election held on 24.8.92 should be allowed to complete. It is, however, made clear that after completion of his terms of three years from the date appointed for the first meeting, the respondent No.2 shall automatically vacate his office as a Chairman of Taoshang Village. The terms of the Chairman of the respondent No.2 shall under no circumstances be extended beyond three years. We, further, make it clear that on expiry of the term of three years of Chairmanship of the respondent No.2, the petitioner shall automatically become Ex-officio Chairman and shall take over as such in terms of sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act. With the aforesaid direction, this petition is allowed. No costs.