JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner who is a Judicial Officer has challenged an order of his reversion from the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate to the post of Munisiff and Judicial Magistrate. The petitioner was given a charge-sheet on dated July 23, 1985 in respect of interpolation and tampering of records relating to a type and shorthand test for the selection of Stenographer Gr. held in Jodhpur District. Charge No.1 was in respect of dishonest manipulation of result of the type and shorthand test in order to favour some candidates and Charge No. 2 was in respect of being a party to illegal and irregular acts which were unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and thereby failing to maintain absolute devotion to duty and dignity of office. 2. On an enquiry, the petitioner was exonerated of Charge No. 1 but was held guilty on Charge No. 2. The Disciplinary Authority proposed a punishment of removal from service and therefore, the matter came up before the Full Court. The Full Court decided not to impose penalty of removal from service but imposed penalty of reduction in rank. The petitioner again preferred an appeal which was placed before the Full Court which was also rejected by the Full Court on December 18, 1989 as not maintainable. 3. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that at the enquiry reasonable opportunity to defend himself was not afforded to the petitioner inasmuch as relevant documents were not shown to the petitioner request for examining of hand writing expert was declined, assistance of a lawyer was not allowed to him and speaking order was not passed by the Full Court. It was contended that the petitioner was not given access to the records which were material for the purpose of enquiry. It was also contended that the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner to which he had filed a detailed reply. It was necessary for the Fill Court to give good and sufficient reasons under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification-Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958. Some decisions of this Court were also cited in support of the aforesaid contentions. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 5. It was necessary for the Fill Court to give good and sufficient reasons under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification-Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958. Some decisions of this Court were also cited in support of the aforesaid contentions. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 5. It is clear from the record that entire material on the basis of which the enquiry proceeded was accessible to the petitioner, expert evidence was also allowed to be laid to the extent it was deemed desirable and practicable in the circumstances. So far as the assistance of a lawyer is concerned, the petitioner himself being a Judicial Officer, no prejudice can be said to have caused to him by refusal to permit him to engage a lawyer. In any case if such assistance is not allowed, it cannot be said that in the circumstances of the case, the enquiry was vitiated. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nripendra Nath Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of West Bengal, AIR 1961 Calcutta 1. Relying on observations in paragraph 53 to paragraph 57 of that decision, it was argued that only because the petitioner who was a Judicial Officer his request for being represented at the disciplinary enquiry by a lawyer cannot be turned down. A closer scrutiny of the facts of that case shows that as many as 30 prosecution witnesses, 13 defence witnesses and 2 court witnesses were examined by the Tribunal and the enquiry was going on before an Officer of the I.C.S. It is in these circumstances that the Court took the view that denying opportunity to engage a lawyer to represent him was not reasonable. 7. A Division Bench decision of this Court in S.K. Dutt sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 1990(1) R.L.R. 1 was also pressed into service on this point. That was a case of an Officer belonging to Administrative Service who was pitted against an Officer of a status and training of a Public Prosecutor as the presenting officer on behalf of the Department. In these circumstances, the Division Bench took the view that opportunity to be represented by a legal practitioner should have been given to the delinquent officer. 8. In the present case, the facts were not complicated. In these circumstances, the Division Bench took the view that opportunity to be represented by a legal practitioner should have been given to the delinquent officer. 8. In the present case, the facts were not complicated. The role of the petitioner in holding the typing test and whether the record relating to the typing test being held on a particular date was tampered or not, was the question. The Presenting Officer and the petitioner were on the same footing and were Judicial Officers. 9. The decisions of the Supreme Court in H.S. Sarin v. Union of India and others, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1686 and Krishna Chandra Tandon v. The Union of India, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1589 are more on the point. We do not therefore, find any force in the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that it was unreasonable in the circumstances to deny the opportunity to be represented by a professional lawyer to the petitioner at the domestic enquiry. 10. It was also contended with reference to Rules 14, 16(8) and 16(10) of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short 'the Rules' hereinafter) that penalties under the Rules could be imposed for good and sufficient reasons and therefore, it was necessary that speaking order is passed by the Disciplinary Authority disclosing good and sufficient reasons for imposition of penalty. It was contended that Rule 16(8) of the Rules provided that the record of the inquiry shall include also the oral evidence taken in the course of the inquiry, the documentary evidence considered in the course of the enquiry and report setting out the findings on each charge and the reasons therefor. Rule 16(9) of the Rules provides that the Disciplinary Authority shall if it is not the Inquiring Authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge. It was, therefore, contended that in the present case the Disciplinary Authority was the Full Court and therefore, it was necessary for the Full Court to consider the oral and documentary evidence adduced in the enquiry and to record its findings on each charge. It was, therefore, contended that in the present case the Disciplinary Authority was the Full Court and therefore, it was necessary for the Full Court to consider the oral and documentary evidence adduced in the enquiry and to record its findings on each charge. It was further contended that under Rule 16(10) of the Rules, if the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on the charges is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in classes (iv) to (vii) of Rule 14 of the Rules, should be imposed, it shall furnish to the Government servant a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority and where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority a statement of its findings. It was therefore, argued that it was incumbent on the Full Court to record its own findings after considering the oral and documentary evidence and other record of the enquiry and to furnish such findings to the delinquent officer. 11. Decision of Single Bench of this Court in Phool Chand v. The State of Rajasthan and others, W.L.N. (U.C.) 311, was cited for the proposition that the Disciplinary Authority has to record reasons for rejeeting submissions made by the delinquent officer. In Paragraph 6 of the decision, it has been laid down that the Disciplinary Authority is under a duty to make an objective examination of the submissions made in the representation submitted by the Government servant in reply to the show cause notice and this would imply that the Disciplinary Authority must record its reasons for rejecting the said submissions. 12. In Hari Narain v. Union of India and others, 1980, W.L.N. (U.C.) 546 another Single Bench decision of this Court, in Paragraphs 28 and 29, it was observed that it is the duty of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority to have considered grounds raised by the delinquent officer and to record findings thereon with reasons for the conclusions. However, in Paragraph - 20 of this decision, it was also held that when the Disciplinary Authority agrees with the finding reachd by the Inquring Authority, it is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to record reasons for agreement with the findings of the Inquiring Authority. 13. Another Single Bench decision of this Court in Kripal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1979, W.L.N. 715 was cited on the point. 13. Another Single Bench decision of this Court in Kripal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1979, W.L.N. 715 was cited on the point. This was a case of an appellate order and it was held in the circumstances that it was not a speaking order as it contained no reasons in support of the conclusion reached by the appellate authority. The order on review application was also held to be invalid being a non-speaking order. 14. In B.D. Gupta v. State of Haryana, 1972 S.L.R. 845, it was held that show cause notice stating that reply submitted to charges and allegations by the delinquent officer was unsatisfactory could not be said to be a speaking show cause notice and was a vague notice. 15. Another Single Bench decision of this Court in Hemendra Kumar v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1991(2) R.L.R. 98 was cited on the point. In Paragraph - 17 of this decision it was held that Rule 16(9) of the Rules was mandatory and it was necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to give his own findings on the charges after scrutinising the inquiry report. 16. In another Single Bench decision of this Court in Narain Singh Ranawat v. State of Rajasthan and another, 1992(1), R.L.R. 558, it was reiterated the order of penalty must be speaking order and points raised in the representation must be considered and good and sufficient reasons must be recorded and communicated to the delinquent employee. 17. In Bagda Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1993(4) SCT 146(SC) : 1992(2) R.L.R. 579 another Single Bench decision of this Court held that if the Disciplinary Authority does not discuss, examine and scan the evidence objectively, the finding cannot be said to be based on record and can be said to be perverse. 18. The decision of the Supreme Court in Nand Kishore Prasad v. The State of Bihar and others, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 1277 was also cited for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings before domestic tribunal are of a quasi-judicial character, therefore the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is that the tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence which with some degree of definiteness points to the guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him. Suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic inquiries. Suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic inquiries. It was also observed in this decision that the order removing delinquent from service should be self contained speaking order and not a cryptic one. 19. In the case before us the learned Single Judge who acted as Inquiring Authority was also the Disciplinary Authority for the purpose of imposing the penalty which was ultimately imposed. It is only because after reaching the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty on Charge No. 2, the learned Single Judge conducting the enquiry on behalf of the Full Court considered that a penalty of removal from service was necessary to be imposed in the case that he had to refer it to the Full Court as in the Resolution of the Full Court penalty of removal or dismissal from service could be decided upon and recommended to the Governor by the Full Court alone. When the matter camp up for consideration before the Full Court, the Full Court agreed with the Inquiring Authority on the question of the petitioner being guilty on Charge No. 2, but did not agree that the punishment of removal from service had to be imposed in the circumstances of the case. The lesser punishment was therefore imposed by the Full Court. 20. For agreeing with the conclusion of the learned Single Judge who enquired into the matter that the petitioner was guilty on Charge No. 2, no speaking order was necessary because the report of the Inquiring Authority was a detailed one and contained reasons for his coming to such a conclusion. For imposition of a lesser punishment than suggested, no further hearing was necessary as the petitioner cannot be said to have been prejudiced by such a course having been taken. There is also no force in the argument that the Full Court should have sent back the case to the Inquiring Authority to impose the punishment as per the directions of Full Court and in that event the petitioner could have appealed against that decision before a Committee of three Judges. 21. When a Single Judge acts as an Inquiring Authority under the Resolution passed by the Full Court, he exercises powers of the Full Court and does not act as a subordinate authority. It is only under the Resolution itself that his decision is subject to review by three other Judges. 21. When a Single Judge acts as an Inquiring Authority under the Resolution passed by the Full Court, he exercises powers of the Full Court and does not act as a subordinate authority. It is only under the Resolution itself that his decision is subject to review by three other Judges. The Full Court cannot direct a Single Judge acting as Disciplinary Authority under the Resolution of the Full Court to impose a particular punishment. When the matter is before the Full Court for consideration of the recommendation by the Inquiring Authority to recommend punishment of removal or dismissal from service, the only course open to the Full Court is either to accept the recommendation and if it did not accept the recommendation to impose the lesser punishment itself. Obviously, if the penalty is imposed by the Full Court, there is no question of any appeal before any of the Committees of the Full Court. 22. In the aforesaid circumstances, we do not find any force in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.Petition dismissed *******