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1995 DIGILAW 221 (KAR)

D. S. JAYARAM v. COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, SOUTH CIRCLE-11, BANGALORE

1995-06-08

L.S.SREENIVASA REDDY

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L. SREENIVASA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THESE petitions are filed under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the orders dated February 17, 1996, passed by the Special J. M. F. C. (Sales Tax), Bangalore, in C. C. No. 255 of 1995 and other connected cases ordering process to the accused for the offence under section 29 (1) (g)/ (a) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (for short, "the KST Act" ). ( 2 ) THE petitioner, Sri D. S. Jayaram, is said to be the partner of M/s. Vasishta Industries. Criminal Petitions Nos. 903 to 913 of 1995 and 761 of 1995 have been filed on behalf of vasishta Industries whereas the rest of the petitions have been filed by the petitioner in his individual capacity. ( 3 ) THE firm Vasishta Industries and D. S. Jayaram are assessees under the KST Act. The respondent has filed charge-sheets against them for non-filing of monthly statements in form No. 3 as required under section 12 (B) (1) of the KST Act and the Rules thereunder. ( 4 ) SINCE the petitioner in all these cases is the same and the complaints filed by the respondent in respect of different periods of non-filing of statements of turnover in form No. 3 and as common questions of law arises in these petitions, I have heard them together and am passing a common order. ( 5 ) SRI K. Suman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners put forward the following submissions : (i) The Special J. M. F. C. (Sales Tax) ought not to have taken cognizance of the alleged offences since they were time-barred in view of the period of limitation prescribed under section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the decision of this Court in J. P. Sujatha v. R. Rangappa, asst. Commercial Tax Officer, XII Circle (Cr. P. No. 1788 of 1993 dated October 21, 1993 unreported); (ii) The exercise of power under any statute should be in a reasonable manner within a reasonable time and since the respondent has filed the charge-sheets long after the alleged offences they are liable to be quashed; and (iii) The petitioner has been put to substantial loss on account of the fire accident in the factory and as the factory has not worked since then, this factor has to be taken into consideration. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, Sri Ibrahim, learned High Court Government Pleader, submitted that in view of the Karnataka Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1981 (Karnataka act No. 10 of 1982) which came into force with effect from March 29, 1982, Chapter XXXVI of the Criminal Procedure Code has been made inapplicable to certain offences, including the offence punishable under the KST Act which is one of the enactments specified in the Schedule to Karnataka Act No. 10 of 1982. ( 7 ) I have perused the judgment rendered by Krishnan, J. , which has been produced as annexure F to this petition. No doubt, in the said judgment it has been held that section 468 (2) (a), Cr. P. C. is applicable even to the proceedings arising under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act. Apparently, Act no. 10 of 1982 must have gone unnoticed by the learned Judge when he rendered the above decision. ( 8 ) SECTION 2 of Karnataka Act No. 10 of 1982 reads thus : "2. Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, not apply to certain offences. Nothing in Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974), shall apply to, - (i) any offence punishable under any of the enactments specified in the Schedule; or (ii) any other offences which under the provisions of that Code, may be tried along with such offences, and every offence referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) may be taken cognizance of by the court having jurisdiction as if the provisions of that chapter were not enacted. SCHEDULE (See section 2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. The Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 25 of 1957 ). " ( 9 ) BY the new provisions under Chapter XXXVI of Cr. P. C. , limitation has been prescribed for the first time for launching criminal proceedings in regard to offences not punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding three years. One of the objects in introducing these provisions is to put pressure on the organs of criminal prosecution to make every effort to ensure the detection and punishment of the crime quickly. One of the objects in introducing these provisions is to put pressure on the organs of criminal prosecution to make every effort to ensure the detection and punishment of the crime quickly. The provisions of this chapter have been made inapplicable to certain economic offences under the Central and as well as the State enactments, for these offences, by their very nature do not generally come to light as soon as they are committed and are often preceded by long periods of investigation or adjudication, and in the process the period of limitation prescribed in this chapter may run out in many cases thus enabling the offenders to escape prosecution under these acts. ( 10 ) IN support of his second contention, Sri Suman placed strong reliance on a decision of the apex Court in Mansram v. S. P. Pathak AIR1983 SC 1239 , 1983 (2 )SCALE1027 , (1984 )1 SCC125 , [1984 ]1 SCR139. The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. In that case, proceedings were initiated under the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 after lapse of 22 years. The reasonable time within which action will have to be commenced depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, the alleged offences being economic offences and as the bar under Chapter XXXVI of Cr. P. C. , for taking cognizance of the alleged offences under the KST Act after lapse of the period of limitation has been removed by Act 10 of 1982, it is difficult to accept that the proceedings have been initiated against the accused in an unreasonable manner or beyond reasonable time. ( 11 ) AS regards the last submission of Sri Suman, the question whether the petitioner incurred substantial loss on account of fire accident and that the factory has not been working, etc. , are all matters that cannot be gone into in these petitions. However, the petitioner shall be at liberty, if so advised to point out these extenuating circumstances before the trial court at the appropriate stage. ( 12 ) IT is needless to point out that power under section 482 of Cr. P. C. , is one of exceptional nature. It can be invoked only to prevent the abuse of process of court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. ( 12 ) IT is needless to point out that power under section 482 of Cr. P. C. , is one of exceptional nature. It can be invoked only to prevent the abuse of process of court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection. In the absence of any legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings in respect of the alleged offences or abuse of the process of any court, inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 of cr. P. C. to quash the proceedings of this nature cannot be exercised. ( 13 ) FOR the above reasons, all the criminal petitions are dismissed.