These appeals have been preferred by the appellants separately against the impugned judgment and decree dated 6.4.88 and 21.4.88 respectively passed in Money Suit No.9 of 1988. The MA (F) has been preferred by appellants Assam State Electricity Board against the order passed in Misc Case No.23 of 1988 by the Assistant District Judge, Hailakandi, the executing Court rejecting a claim made under Order 21 Rule 5 8 of CPC by the appellant ASEB. As both the appeals have arisen from the same judgment, I decide to dispose of the appeals by this common judgment. 2. The respondent as plaintiff instituted Money Suit No.9 of 1988 in the Court of the Assistant District Judge, Hailakandi, claiming Rs. 1,69,000/- only as price of an elephant belonging to the plaintiff and also claiming Rs.6,500/- per month as income of the elephant against the Chairman of the ASEB and other officers and also against the State of Mizoram on the ground that the domesticated elephant of the respondent (plaintiff) was electrocuted at a point where the transmission lines was maintained by the State of Mizoram and the electricity energy was transmitted by this line to the State of Mizoram by Assam State Electricity Board. The defendant officers of the ASEB contested the suit by filing written statement and the State of Mizoram filed written statement but did not adduce evidence, in spite of giving sufficient time for adducing evidence. Admittedly the ASEB, the corporate body was not made a party, in the suit, only the officers of ASEB, with designation were arrayed as defendants. The suit was decreed against both the defendants (appellants). The ASEB preferred appeal (FA No.37 of 1988) impugning the judgment and decree and stay was granted with condition to pay 50% of the decretal amount. As it appears, the dispute has arisen when the respondent plaintiff made application before the executing Court for attachment of certain properties of the appellants and the learned executing Court passed order to attach the value of the properties of the appellant ASEB, allegedly, presuming the property as the property of the said officers. 3. In both the appeals the appellants have taken similar grounds challenging the judgment and decree. 4. 3. In both the appeals the appellants have taken similar grounds challenging the judgment and decree. 4. In the plaint, the respondent (plaintiff) giving description of the elephant contended that they were the owners of Lakshmi Prasad, a male sikari (hunter elephant) (Makna Hati), aged about 32 years, which died on 20.12.85 as a result of electric shock at Bilaipur unprotected electric transmission station. The elephant was taken on hire by one Abdul Jalil (defendant No. 15) who engaged the elephant at works in Camp No.4 of Bilaipur Forest. On 9.12.85 the elephant was let loose in the jungle of Bilaipur Lalpani while the elephant came into contact with the high voltage electric current in the unprotected transmission station at Bilaipur and died at the spot. The plaintiff also contended that the Bilaipur main transmission station distributes 66 KV electric power and one of the most important power station maintained by defendants 2 to 6. The transmission station is situated within the jurisdiction of Hailakandi District, the then Sub Division of Assam, and is within the electrical jurisdiction of proforma defendants 8 to 14 (officers of ASEB). Further this station was set up on mutual arrangement among defendants 1, 7, 8 and 14 on the suggestion and co-operation of other principal defendants. The defendants 1 to 6 allowed to transmit supply, maintenance and operate all electric works at the said area. By this contention the plaintiff attempted to show that the operation thereof was carried out and maintained by the defendant No. 1 through its agents and employees (defendants 2 to 6) and that this transmission station was not protected by safety devices for protection of men and animal, by barbed wire fencing around the post and as a result of this negligent omission on the part of the defendants 1 to 6 the elephant was electrocuted and died on the spot. Plaintiff has fixed the valuation of the elephant as aforesaid. Immediate steps were taken by the plaintiff No. 1 by lodging FIR with the Lala Police Station on 21.12.85 and a case was registered and investigation started. Post mortem was carried on by the Assistant Veterinary Surgeon, Lala and the ASEB officers were informed by the police. As the State of Mizoram was not made a party the plaint was accordingly amended by impleading the State of Mizoram and other officers of the Mizoram Electricity Department. Post mortem was carried on by the Assistant Veterinary Surgeon, Lala and the ASEB officers were informed by the police. As the State of Mizoram was not made a party the plaint was accordingly amended by impleading the State of Mizoram and other officers of the Mizoram Electricity Department. Admittedly there was no dispute regarding installation of the power station within the jurisdiction of the State of Assam, but regarding maintenance of the power station, as alleged by the appellant in FA No.24 of 1989 (Mizoram Govt and its Electricity Department) there was no issue framed and hence there was no decision to put responsibility for compensation etc and the trial Court after found its jurisdiction to try one case and the same is affirmed by me. The points urged by the appellants side is that as there was no issue framed by the Court below regarding notice under section 80 of CPC the entire suit suffered for that and be dismissed. Exhibit 18 is the notice under section 80 CPC issued to the defendants 1 to 7 and similar notice was issued to the respondent 8 to 13. The points for consideration is whether those notice under section 80 CPC were issued. In the plaint there is no contention as such that notice was issued to the defendants under section 80 CPC. In para 9 of the plaint instead of notice it was stated as petition of claim. Mr. Pathak, Standing Counsel, Mizoram submitted that the claim petition cannot stand for notice under section 80 CPC which is mandatory provision and non compliance of which results in non maintainability of the suit. 5. On persual of the Ext 28 the notice (which is similar in contents to the nonce to respondents 8 to 14) it is seen that the contents of the notice/claim petition formulates the claim of the plaintiff. The entire construction of the notice fulfilled the requirements under section 80 CPC which indicated that the plaintiff was the owner of the elephant in question; that it was the subject matter of the suit against the defendants; that he claim was not defective. The object of notice contemplated under section 80 CPC is to give the Govt/officers opportunity to consider the legal position and settle the claim without litigation. The object of notice contemplated under section 80 CPC is to give the Govt/officers opportunity to consider the legal position and settle the claim without litigation. The validity of the notice has to be decided by dealing the notice as a whole in a reasonable manner (relied on AIR 1969 SC 674 ). The stand of the appellants is that there is no requisite notice. From Ext 28 is can be safely held that this has fulfilled the criteria under section 80 CPC and is in form and its contents bear the compliance of the provision under section 80 CPC. Admittedly, the appellants/defendants have not denied the service of notice but have raised objection as to its validity and sufficiency claiming the 'complaint petition' cannot substitute notice under section 80 CPC. Obviously in such a case Court has to examine the pleading in the light of the provision of the Code to see whether the terms 'complaint petition' can be meant a notice under section 80 CPC when the same fulfills the criteria of a notice under the said provision. From the foregoing reasons I hold the Ext 28 as a notice under section 80 CPC and therefore the submission of the counsel for the appellants is not sustainable. 6. The appellants in FA 37 of 1988 have taken the ground, amongst others, that the decree is not executable against the appellants (defendant Nos.8 to 14) as the ASEB as the corporate body was not made party to the suit and that the appellants being the employees of the ASEB cannot be made parties in a case of alleged tortuous act of the said defendants. In the memo of appeal the appellants in FA 37 of 1988 in ground No.4 only raised the point for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties. In the written statement of defendants 8 to 13 the appellants did not raise this point; even, as records shows, no question was put to the plaintiff in this point. Only in the MA (F) 136 of 1988 this point was raised as the application under Order 21 Rule 58 CPC (MC 23 of 1988) was rejected by the Court below in the Execution Case No.20 of 1988. Therefore, the defendants contested the suit filing written statement. Only in the MA (F) 136 of 1988 this point was raised as the application under Order 21 Rule 58 CPC (MC 23 of 1988) was rejected by the Court below in the Execution Case No.20 of 1988. Therefore, the defendants contested the suit filing written statement. The view of the learned trial Court is subscribed by me that (in MA (F) 133 of 1988) section 13 of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 provides jurisdiction to Chairman of the Board and he is empowered to all actions of the Board is authenticated by the signature of the Chairman or any other member authorised by the Board in this behalf and that Board acted through its officers in this case, therefore non-joinder of the Board cannot vitiate the suit because this non-joinder of parties can be regularised. In this case as reasoned above the ASEB has sufficiently acted upon by its officers particularly the Chairman, ASEB who all along contested the suit and the appeal. 7. Both the counsel for the ASEB and the State of Mizoram urged the point that the judgment and decree is illegal and not sustainable as no issue regarding contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs was framed which was a vital issue to decide the claim of the plaintiffs. 8. In the plaint description and value of the elephant in question was given. In para 3 of the plaint, which is quoted below, the plaintiff has given the circumstances in which the elephant faced the death. “Para 3 : On 19.12.85 the said elephant was let loose in the jungle of Bilaipur Lalpani for grazing while it came in touch with the high voltage electrical currents in the unprotected transmission station at Bilaipur at about 4 AM on 20.12.85 as a result of which the elephant died on the spot.” 9. From the foregoing para 3 it is admitted facts that the elephant was let loose for grazing. The claim of the plaintiff was that the elephant was a domesticated one. The question arises whether animal like elephant, even if domesticated, belong to a class which is categorised as dangerous class of animal. Mr. From the foregoing para 3 it is admitted facts that the elephant was let loose for grazing. The claim of the plaintiff was that the elephant was a domesticated one. The question arises whether animal like elephant, even if domesticated, belong to a class which is categorised as dangerous class of animal. Mr. Saikia, counsel for the ASEB referred the case of Aldham vs. United Dairies (London), Ltd, (1940) 1KB 507 and the case of Vedapuratti & Valia Thampuratti& others vs. M. Koppan Nair & others, (1912) ILR 35 Madras 708 in support of his submission that due to the negligence of the owner of the elephant, which falls in the class of dangerous animal, the accident took place. 10. In the case Vedapuratti (supra) their Lordships referred the decision of Filburn vs. People's Place and Aquarium Company, (1890) 25 QBD 258 at page 260 in which Lord Esher lays down as follows : “The law of England recognizes two distinct classes of animals; and as to one on those classes, it cannot doubted that a person who keeps an animal belonging to that class must prevent it from doing injury, and it is immaterial whether he known it to be dangerous or not. As to another class, the law assumes that animals belonging to it are not of dangerous nature, and anyone who keeps an animal of this kind is not liable for the damage it may do, unless he knew that it was dangerous.” Discussing further about the nature and class of elephant, their Lordships held that domesticated or tamed animal in India have been reclaimed from the wild state and that Mankada elephant (relating to that case) was caught when wild - even after they are tamed their nature often asserts itself. Their Lordships further proceeded to hold that if the test laid down by Lord Esher in the case of Filburn (supra), is applied in India, elephant is of a dangerous nature; that elephant undoubtedly as a class are dangerous though individuals may be tamed and perhaps domesticated. Further relying on a series of decisions their Lordships agreed with the view that in the nature of a tusker when left at large, it attack another. Their Lordships thus concluded that, it may be laid down as a rule of law that in India the elephant belongs to a dangerous class of animals. Further relying on a series of decisions their Lordships agreed with the view that in the nature of a tusker when left at large, it attack another. Their Lordships thus concluded that, it may be laid down as a rule of law that in India the elephant belongs to a dangerous class of animals. That a person who keeps an animal belonging to a class that is dangerous takes the risk of any danger it may do. 11. In the case of Aldham (supra) the case was that the pony was left unattended for half an hour while the rounds man delivered milk at a block of flats. The admitted position was that the animal had a habit of putting its forefeet on the pavement and that when left unattended it became restive, and behaved in a way which, to some persons at least, was alarming. The point for consideration before their Lordships was whether the defendants were, in the circumstances of the case, negligent in leaving the horse unattended, that admittedly defendants knew that it had a habit of straying on to the pavement. On the basis of this, his Lordships concluded that to leave a horse and the cart upon a highway in circumstances, in which the driver, knew or as a reasonable man, ought to have known, that the horse was likely to injure a member of the public, was unquestionable negligence, and that in that case the damage was due to such negligence. 12. From the foregoing discussion it emerges that the elephant as a class a dangerous animal and if it is left loose for the whole night in a jungle it is likely to cause damage to public or to itself for its spontaneous act. The tortuous claim of the plaintiff has to be examined from this point of view. 13. The question may arise that in the case in hand to decide the claim of compensation for damage, the act or nature of the animal is concerned. But undoubtedly it has to be kept in mind that when the animal like elephant has the probability of getting uncontrolled, the owner must be careful. Normally the domesticated elephant is always chained, certainly anticipating its wild nature which can at anytime happen. But undoubtedly it has to be kept in mind that when the animal like elephant has the probability of getting uncontrolled, the owner must be careful. Normally the domesticated elephant is always chained, certainly anticipating its wild nature which can at anytime happen. In that case it was the bounded responsibility of the owner/incharge to take reasonable caution while the elephant in question was let loose in the jungle and as a reasonable man ought to have foreseen that the act or omission might cause danger to the animal or to some of the persons, though he may not have been expected to foresee the exact kind or type of danger which caused in fact. Respectfully relying on the decision of their Lordships in Aldham's case (supra) I find the application of the views of their Lordships that the general principles are no less applicable to a case in which the negligence alleged is failure to control an animal than to one in which the negligence is management in the management of any inanimate object. Their Lordships further held that in such cases it is always necessary to remember that quite apart from the liability imposed upon the owner of animals or the person having control of them by reason of knowledge of their propensities, there is the ordinary duty of a person to take care either hold that, in the death of the elephant, which was kept astrayed from the evening of 19.12.85 for the whole night, the negligent act of the owner/inchage contributed to his death for which the plaintiff cannot claim entire compensation for the damage and for this the plaintiff is equally responsible. The learned trial Court, apparently did not consider this aspect which decided the quantum of compensation and in such case the amount of money awarded towards the compensation/damage be equally shared by both sides. 14. As it is found the transformer situated inside the land of Assam, ASEB being the regular supplier of the electricity for which purpose, the transformer was constructed within the territorial jurisdiction of State of Assam. 14. As it is found the transformer situated inside the land of Assam, ASEB being the regular supplier of the electricity for which purpose, the transformer was constructed within the territorial jurisdiction of State of Assam. In that view of the matter, it can be presumed that the transformer was constructed and maintained by the ASEB, as the respondent has not come forward with specific evidence that the transformer was maintained by the Department of the Govt of Mizoram and therefore, it is the respondent ASEB who has to bear the compensation amount alone. As discussed above the fact of contributory negligence was established and the respondent ASEB is required to pay 50% of the total compensation amount. Mr. Saikia has informed the Court that the respondents have deposited 50% of the amount and in the view of my above decision, no further payment to the plaintiff is needed to be paid. 15. The MA (F) is decided and discussed accordingly as this Court affirmed the decision of the Court below in view of the reasons discussed above. 16. The appeal of the State of Mizoram is accordingly allowed, and that of the respondents ASEB is partly allowed. No costs.