ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) CLAIM of the appellants claiming compensation under S. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short, 'act') which was turned down by the learned Second Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Southern Division, Berhampur (in short, the 'tribunal') is the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal. ( 2 ) A detailed reference to the factual aspect is unnecessary as the fate of present appeal would depend on acceptance of the conclusion about belated approach for compensation. It needs to be pointed out here that earlier a claim was made before the Tribunal, which was dismissed for default. An application for restoration of the claim application was also dismissed for default. A fresh application which was subject-matter of consideration before the Tribunal was later on filed. Tribunal rejected the petition on the ground that there was no scope for condoning the delay beyond the period of one year in terms of S. 166 (3) of the Act. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to learned counsel for appellants a too technical view should not be taken in respect of a claim made by dependants of an unfortunate victim, who lost his life in an automobile accident. It is submitted that the appellants propose to move an application for restoration of application dismissed earlier, and on the same being accepted, the present application would be infructuous. It is stated that the amendment application to the second claim application when the original claim application was filed within the prescribed time. The learned counsel for respondents on the other hand supported the view of Tribunal. ( 4 ) SECTION 166 (3) of the Act which has application to the facts of the case, contemplates only a limited power of condonation of delay in filing claim. The provision reads as follows :"166. Application for compensation- (1) and (2) xx xx xx xx (3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident:provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. "the provisions in the Act in relation to period of limitation for lodging a claim depart from their counterpart in Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the 'old Act' ). claims arising out of accidents occurring before commencement of the Act, but instituted after its commencement are governed by S. 166 (3) of the Act. The position has been elaborately dealt with by the Apex Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. , 1991 ACJ 1060 (SC ). The Act came into operation with effect from 1-7-1989. In the case at hand, the accident took place prior to the commencement of the Act, but claim application was field subsequent to its commencement. Strong reliance was placed on a decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Swarnlata Das, AIR 1993 SC 1259 : 1993 AIR SCW 664, where the Apex Court declined to interfere, though undisputedly the application for claim was filed after the prescribed period of limitation. The facts involved are clearly distinguishable because in that case the point was raised for the first time before the Apex Court, and that was the basis for non-interference. In the case at hand, the point was raised at the very beginning. The conclusions of the Tribunal are irreversible. The appeal fails and is dismissed. If any proceeding is initiated in respect of earlier claim application, same shall be considered on its own merits.