Judgment :- In this writ petition the petitioner mainly challenges Ext. P5 order passed by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, rejecting a statutory complaint filed under S.27 of the Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The said order was passed in pursuance of a direction issued by this court in Ext. P4 judgment in O.P. No. 2843 of 1995 dated 7-6-1995. 2. The petitioner, Lt. Col.Maharaj Brelvi, is a member of the Defence Force, While he was working at Station Workshop, E.M.E., Trivandrum, he was transferred to Saugar (Madhya Pradesh) vide Ext. P2 order issued by the Military Secretary, Army Headquarters, New Delhi, the second respondent herein. That order was challenged by the petitioner before this court in the abovesaid writ petition. This court after considering the grounds raised by the petitioner directed the Government of India to consider the petitioner's complaint on merits and pass orders thereon within a period of one month. This court also directed the respondents to allow the petitioner to continue in Trivandrum till final orders are passed by the Government of India. 3. The main point canvassed by the counsel for the petitioner is that Ext. P5 order is vitiated for non-application of mind by the first respondent. Counsel points out that no reasons are stated in Ext. P5 order for rejecting the complaint. In other words, the question is whether an order passed by the Union of India on a statutory complaint preferred by a member of the Defence Force under S.27 of the Act should disclose all the reasons for the conclusion thereof. What the Government of India said in Ext. P5 is this: "The Central Government, after considering the statutory complaint dated 8 Feb 95 submitted by Lt. Col (TS) Maharaj Brelvi (IC-33664) EME against posting and after examination of relevant records is satisfied that no injustice has been done to him in this regard. The statutory complaint is, therefore, rejected". 4. The point in substance, therefore, is whether the above observation contained in Ext. P5 would be sufficient in law in the present set of facts. S.27 of the Act does not contemplate any enquiry on the complaint preferred by an aggrieved officer. So also it does not indicate as to how the order or conclusion shall be arrived at on such complaint. P5 would be sufficient in law in the present set of facts. S.27 of the Act does not contemplate any enquiry on the complaint preferred by an aggrieved officer. So also it does not indicate as to how the order or conclusion shall be arrived at on such complaint. The Section only provides that any officer who deems himself wronged by his commanding officer or any superior officer and who on due application made to his commanding officer does not receive the redress to which he considers himself entitled, may complain to the Central Government in such manner as may from time to time be specified by the proper authority. The Central Government is the statutory authority' to entertain the compl aint under S.27 and to take a decision thereon. It is the satisfaction of the Central Government which is required either for deciding in favour or against the officer who prefers the complaint under S.27. The Central Government may conduct an internal enquiry on the matters, made mention of in the complaint and come to a satisfaction either way. The proceedings are strictly confidential as is evidentfrom Ext. P3 complaint itself. The Defence Force is a strong wing of the Government where strict obedience and discipline are insisted in public interest. In this basckground I am persuaded to hold that the satisfaction recorded in Ext. P5 would sufficiently establish that it had been passed in due application of the mind by the Central Government. Here the Central Government is functioning as a statutory authority and not as aquasi judicial or administrative tribunal. I am of the view that no officer can insist that the Central Government should disclose all reasons for rejecting a complaint filed under S.27. Such disclosure may sometimes be opposed to public interest. A Division Bench of this court in State of Kerala v. Raj an (1989 (2) KLT 666) observed: "That is a matter entirely of administrative discretion to be exercised in the larger interests of administration. It is not a question of a judicial or quasi-judicial decision being taken. Hence no reason are required to be given when transfers are effected in public interest. Superior authorities are normally presumed to act consistent with the interest of the administration and therefore in public interest when transfers are effected. It is not a question of a judicial or quasi-judicial decision being taken. Hence no reason are required to be given when transfers are effected in public interest. Superior authorities are normally presumed to act consistent with the interest of the administration and therefore in public interest when transfers are effected. A variety of situations are required to be taken into consideration in the matter of effecting transfers and to accommodate the claims and interests of large number of persons". 5. There is no dispute in this case that the post in question is a transferrable post. In B.Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka and others (AIR 1986 SC 1955) the Supreme court laid down thus: "It is well understood that transfer of a Government servant who is appointed to a particular cadreof transferable posts from one place to another is an ordinary incident of service and therefore does not result in any alteration of any of the conditions of service to his disadvantage". The apex court further said in Gujarat Electricity Board and another v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani (1989 (2) SCC 602) as follows: "No government servant or employee of public undertaking has legal right for being posted at any particular place. Transfer from one place to other is generally a condition of service and the employee has no choice in the matter. Transfer from one place to other is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public administration". In view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision, Ext. P5 order passed by the Central Government in this case cannot be said to be illegal or improper. 6. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. S.1 Abbas (AIR 1993 SC 2444) observed: "Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by malafides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it". In this case there is no definite allegation of malallde and on that ground the order is not attacked. No violation of any statutory provision is also involved in the present case. 7. Above all, the Central Government Standing Counsel submitted that the petitioner had been relieved from the present post on 14-7-1995 and the substitute had already taken over charge on the same day. 8. In the result, the writ petition is devoid of any merit and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.