Honble YADAV, J. — This Special Appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated 7.2.1995 of the learned single Judge rendered in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.5399 of 1994 - Pukh Raj Mehta V. State of Rajasthan and others whereby the writ petition was dismissed holding that the nomination paper of the petitioner has rightly been rejected as he was not maintaining a Deposit Account with the Bank of a continuous period of two years with a credit balance of not less than Rs.500/- in accordance with a Bye-Law No.31 alleged to have been framed in exercise of its delegated powers to frame Bye-laws. (2). Facts necessary to be noticed for disposal of the appeal, briefly stated, are that the petitioner is a Member of Jodhpur Nagrik Sahakari Bank Limited, Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as the Bank). As the term of the Board of Directors has already expired by Notification dated 10.11.1994 (Annx.1) published in the Daily Newspaper "Rajasthan Patrika", the election of the Board of Directors was declared. Pursuant to the Election Programme, the petitioner filed his nomination paper for the office of Director. After scrutiny, on 18.11.94 the nomination paper of the petitioner was rejected on the ground that in his account Rs.500/-was not maintained for two years. (3). The aforesaid writ petition was filed on 21.11.94 . While issuing notices on 25.11.94, this Court ordered that in the meantime, the petitioner would be permitted to contest and participate in the election, which was postponed to 29.11.94 instead of 26.11.94 subject to the result of the writ petition. It was also ordered on 25.11.94 that the result be not declared. (4). In pursuance to the notice, respondent No.l filed reply on 3.12.94 along with Annx.R/1 declaration filed by the petitioner along with nomination from and Annx. R/2-petitioners Bank Account. An application under Art.226(3) of the Constitution was also filed to vacate the stay order dated 25.11.94. Rejoinder to the reply was also filed on 5.12.94. It was ordered that S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.5399/94-Pukh Raj Mehta V. Stale of Rajasthan and others be heard along with S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.5394/94 Devi Chand V. State of Rajasthan and others and S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 5381/94- Nirmal Nahar V. State of Rahasthan and others. (5). Rejoinder to the reply was also filed on 5.12.94. It was ordered that S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.5399/94-Pukh Raj Mehta V. Stale of Rajasthan and others be heard along with S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.5394/94 Devi Chand V. State of Rajasthan and others and S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 5381/94- Nirmal Nahar V. State of Rahasthan and others. (5). According to the learned Single Judge, since it was found clear from the Bye-Law No.31 that one shall not be eligible to be elected as Director unless he is a share-holder member of the Bank for atleast two continuous years prior to the date of election and should have maintained a deposit account with the Bank for a continuous period of 2 years with the credit balance of not less than Rs.500/-. Learned Single Judge noticed the argument of Mr. A.R.Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant to the effect that the petitioner was having Rs.500/- in Fixed Deposit in the Bank, hence, the petitioner was eligible to contest the election of the office of the Director. Learned Single Judge further noticed the arguments advanced in rebuttal by learned counsel , for Respondent No.2 Mr.M.R.Singhvi to the effect that fixed deposit of Rs.500/- does not fall within purview of credit balance of the share-holder account. The learned Single Judge refused to entertain and address himself to the aforesaid rival contentions raised at the Bar because this fact was not brought to the notice of the Election Officer(respondent No.3). (6). We have heard learned counsel for the appellant Mr.A.R.Mehta and learned counsel Mr.M.R.Singhvi appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 and Mr.Sangeet Lodha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No.l and 3 at length and have also critically gone through the material available on record. (7). The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that learned Single Judge has not considered the fixed deposit account showing that the petitioner was maintaining an account of Rs.500/- for a continuous period of two years as envisaged under Bye-law No.31. (8). Apart from the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in special appeal before us as well as argument raised by him before the learned Single Judge, this Court is called upon to decide in the present special appeal as to whether if sub-sec. (8). Apart from the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in special appeal before us as well as argument raised by him before the learned Single Judge, this Court is called upon to decide in the present special appeal as to whether if sub-sec. (4) of Sec.34 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965(hereinafler referred to as the Act of 1965) declares it lawful to the petitioner-appellant to contest the election for the office of Board of Directors can it be declared unlawful by bye-law No.31 declaring the petitioner-appellant not eligible to contest the election for the office of Board of Directors of the Bank. (9). Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 Mr.M.R.Singhvi and learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No.l and 3 Mr.Sangeet Lodha refuted the aforesaid arguments advanced on behalf the petitioner-appellant and contended before us that the learned Single Judge has rightly and legally dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner- appellant refusing to entertain a writ petition involving roving and fishing factual enquiry about the deposit of Rs.500/- in Fixed Deposit Account No. 57. According to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, the learned Single Judge has rightly refused to entertain the writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Thus, according to the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents, the order and judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is eminently just and proper and does not require indulgence of this Court in Special Appeal. (10). As regard the second question posed by this Court, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents invited our attention to the rule making power of the State Government under Sec.148 as well as Sec.149 of the Act of 1965, which envisages laying of the Rules framed by the State Government before the State Legislative. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents further invited our attention towards rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act of 1965, which empowers the Society to frame Bye-Laws. Thus, according to learned counsel , for Respondents, Bye-Law No.31 has statutory force and his nomination paper can be rejected by the Election Officer on this ground. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents further invited our attention towards rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act of 1965, which empowers the Society to frame Bye-Laws. Thus, according to learned counsel , for Respondents, Bye-Law No.31 has statutory force and his nomination paper can be rejected by the Election Officer on this ground. It is also submitted by the learned counsel , for Respondents that since the validity of Bye-Law No.31 was not challenged before the learned Single Judge and is also not challenged before this Court by the appellant, therefore, it cannot be declared ultra vires even if this Court comes to this conclusion that prima facie, Bye-law No.31 transgressed the mandatory statutory provision contemplated under sub-sec. (4) of Sec.34 of the Act of 1965 read with rule 8 of the Rules framed under the said Act. Both the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents have adopted the arguments advanced by them in Special Appeal No.161 of 1995 in support of their argument on this point. (11). We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised at the Bar. In our considered opinion, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner-appellant to the effect that the learned Single Judge has not considered about the deposit of Rs.500/- in Fixed Deposit Account No.57 by the petitioner-appellant, is not acceptable to us in view of the arguments raised before us in rebuttal by learned counsel , for Respondents. In our humble opinion, since the deposit of Rs.500/- in Fixed Deposit Account No.57, alleged by the petitioner- appellant and denied by the respondents in their reply, involves a roving and fishing enquiry, therefore, the learned Single Judge has legally refused to entertain the writ petition on this ground and an argument contrary to it advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant is not tenable. It must be taken to be a settled principle of law that a factual investigation cannot be gone into under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. (12). As regards the second question involved in the present Special Appeal, is a pure question of law, which does not require any factual investigation, rather it is based on pure interpretation of sub-sec.(4) of Sec.34, Sec.148 and Sec.149 of the Act of 1965 read with statutory rule 8 of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act, along with Bye-law No.31. (13). (13). It is pertinent to mention that under the Act of 1965 the affairs of the Co-operative Societies are to be governed and its affairs are envisage to be managed on the basis of collective wisdom of the elected representatives of the members of the Society. Thus, to contest the election for the office of the Board of Directors of the Bank assumes a greater importance and required our serious consideration. (1.4). The answer of the aforesaid legal proposition depends on the following questions formulated by us : — 1) WHETHER the State Government under rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act of 1965 has delegated its powers to add further qualifications to contest the election of the Committee other than prescribed under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 34 of the Act of 1965? 2) WHETHER the petitioner-appellant can be debarred to contest the election of Director on the basis of Bye-law No. 31 framed by the Society? 3) WHETHER Bye-law No. 31 had transgressed the mandatory stateutory provision contemplated under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 34 of the Act of 1965 making it un-lawful for the petitioner appellant to contest the election for the office of the Board of Directors of the Bank while it is lawful for the petitioner- appellant to contest the election of office of the Board of Directors of the Bank within the meaning of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 34 of the aforesaid Act? 4) WHETHER, since the validity and invalidity of Bye-law No. 31 was not challenged before the learned Single Judge and no foundation has been led before us in the Special Appeal, therefore, it cannot be gone into by this court in this special Appeal, although, it is based on pure question of law? (15). Since the question formulated at S.No.1,2 and 3 are iriter- linked therefore, we propose to deal these three qurstiond together. (16). (15). Since the question formulated at S.No.1,2 and 3 are iriter- linked therefore, we propose to deal these three qurstiond together. (16). A close scrutiny of sub-Sec. (4) of Sec.34 of the Act of 1965 reveals that a person will be eligible for being elected or appointed as Member of the Committee if he is not in default to the Society or any other Society in respect of any loan or loans taken by him in such period as is specified in the Bye-laws of the Society-concerned or in any case for a period exceeding three months and as such, a member as aforesaid shall cease to hold office as soon as he has incurred the disqualification mentioned in this sub-section. It would be expedient to quote sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 34 of the Act of 1965 in extenso; 34. Dis-qualification of membership of Committee: (3)................................. (4) No person shall be eligible for being elected or appointed as a member of a Committee if he is in default to the Society or to any other Society, in respect of any loan or loans taken by him for such period as is specified in the bye-laws of the Society concerned or in any case for a period exceeding three months and such a member as aforesaid shall cease to hold office as soon as he has incurred the disqualification mentioned in this sub- section. (17). Thus, sub-sec. (4) of Sec.34 can be divided in two parts. The first part refers to the eligibility of being elected or appointed as a member of a Committee and second part is with regard to the person already elected or appointed as a member of Committee and subsequent to his election or appointment incurred the disqualification. The words "no person shall be eligible for being elected or appointed as a member of a committee if he is in default to the society or to any other society in respect of loan or loans taken by him", are significant and refer to default of a person who has taken loan. Therefore, except the aforesaid disqualification, there is no other disqualification under the Act of 1965 which may debar the petitioner-appellant to contest the election for the office of the Board of Directors of the Bank. (18). It is true that the State Legislature under Sec. 148 (1) had delegated powers to the State Govt. Therefore, except the aforesaid disqualification, there is no other disqualification under the Act of 1965 which may debar the petitioner-appellant to contest the election for the office of the Board of Directors of the Bank. (18). It is true that the State Legislature under Sec. 148 (1) had delegated powers to the State Govt. to make rules for whole or any part of the State and for any class of the Co-operative Societies after previous publication to carry out the purpose of this Act with a proviso that any rule may be made under this Section without previous publication if the State Government considers that it should be brought into force at once. Sub-sec (2) of Sec.148 further provides that in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the fore-going power of such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: — (xxv) the qualifications or disqualifications for membership of a Committee. (19). Section 149 of the Act of 1965 provides that the Rules made by the State Government under Sec.148 of the Act of 1965 to be laid before the State Legislature. Thus, the rules made by the State Government under Sec.148 are subject to the approval of the State Legislature which means nothing more than that it is a sort of a check upon the delegated legislation and does not in any way alter quality or character of the Rules, so made under the rule making power. The Rules approved by the State Legislature, undoubtedly, have the force of law but not force of an enactment of the legislature. It is apparent under Topic (xxv) of sub- sec.(2) of Sec.148 quoted above that the State Government in exercise of its delegated powers can add further qualifications or disqualifications for membership of a committee in addition to the qualification prescribed under sub-sec. (4) of Sec.34 of the Act of 1965 for contesting the election for membership of a Committee of the Bank. The words "Membership of a Committee" used under Topic (xxv) of sub-sec. (2) of Sec.148 are synonymous with the words "Membership of a Committee" used under Sec.34 of the Act of 1965. Nothing has been brought to our notice that in exercise of its rule making power, the State Government added further qualifications for contesting the election for the membership of a Committee of the Bank other than qualifications prescribed under sub-sec. (2) of Sec.148 are synonymous with the words "Membership of a Committee" used under Sec.34 of the Act of 1965. Nothing has been brought to our notice that in exercise of its rule making power, the State Government added further qualifications for contesting the election for the membership of a Committee of the Bank other than qualifications prescribed under sub-sec. (4) of Sec.34 of the Act of 1965, therefore it goes without saying that except the qualification prescribed under sub-sec. (4) of Sec.34 the State Government has not prescribed any additional qualification or dis-qualifications for the membership of a Committee. In this connection, it would be relevant to examine rule 8 framed by the State Government authorising a Co-operative Society to frame Bye-laws on the subject matters enumerated under rule 8. For ready reference relevant portion of rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act of 1965 is quoted, below: — "8. Subject-matter of bye-laws: (1) The bye-laws of a co-operative society shall provide for the following matters, namely; — (m) the mode of appointment of the committee by election or otherwise and removal of the committee and mode of appointment and removal of other officers, the duties and powers of the Committee and such officers and their term. (20). A close scrutiny of subject-matters enumerated under rule 8 of the Rules framed by the Stale Government in exercise of its powers under Sec. 148, the subject matters of framing Bye-laws by a co-operative society has not authorised a Co-operative Society to frame bye-laws prescribing additional qualif-cations or dis- qualifications for election of membership of a Committee . In our considered opinion, since the State Government in exercise of its rule making power has not delegated the subject matter of qualifications or dis-qualifications for election of membership of a Committee to the Bank, therefore, the Bank being a Co-operative Society has no authority to frame Bye-law No.31 prescribing further qualifications for membership of a Committee to contest the election for the office of the Board of Directors. In our humble opinion, Bye-law No.31 prescribing additional qualification for contesting the election for the Board of Directors framed by the Bank is beyond its power to frame such a Bye law, hence the petitioner-appellant cannot be debarred to contest the election for the office of the Board of Directors on the basis of Bye-law No.31. (21). In our humble opinion, Bye-law No.31 prescribing additional qualification for contesting the election for the Board of Directors framed by the Bank is beyond its power to frame such a Bye law, hence the petitioner-appellant cannot be debarred to contest the election for the office of the Board of Directors on the basis of Bye-law No.31. (21). The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the answering respondents have invited our attention to sub-rule (m) of Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act of 1965 quoted in the preceding paragraph in support of their argument that the respondent-Co- operative Bank can add further qualification for contesting the election for membership of its Committee. The aforesaid argument is attractive but fallacious for the reasons that the aforesaid rule authorities the respondent-Co-operative Bank to frame Bye- laws to provide a full proof procedure (made) for appointment of the Committee by election or otherwise but cannot be allowed to add further qualification or dis-qualification for election of members of its Committee which can be done only by the State Government in exercise of its rule making power under sub-sec.2 (xxv) of Sec. 148 of the Act of 1965. Secondly, the State Legislature has delegated its powers to add further qualification or disqualification for election of membership of a Committee of the respondent Co-operative Bank to the State Government subject to its approval as contemplated under Sec. 149 of the Act of 1965 as stated above cannot be further delegated to the respondent-Co-operative Bank. This is precise reasons as to why the State Government in the present case in hand has not delegated the power to the respondent-Co-operative Bank under rule 8(1) (m) to add further qualification or disqualification for contesting the election for the membership of the Committee of the respondent- Bank. (22). Where the enactment is plain, the Rules and Bye-laws must if possible be reconciled with the enactment if that cannot be done, the Rules and Bye-laws must give way to the plain terms of the enactment. In other words, if the Rules or Bye-laws are repugnant to the provisions of the enactment, the Rules and Bye- laws though made under the power of enactment could not be allowed to over-ride the enactment itself. In other words, if the Rules or Bye-laws are repugnant to the provisions of the enactment, the Rules and Bye- laws though made under the power of enactment could not be allowed to over-ride the enactment itself. Here in the present case, it is apprarent from the aforesaid discussion that bye-law No.31 has not been framed even within the subject matter enumerated under rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act of 1965, which empowers the Co-operative Bank to frame Bye-laws for transacting its business and to frame bye-laws prescribing only mode of appointment of the Committee by election or otherwise which can be only ministerial in character facilitating free and fair appointment of the Committee by election or otherwise hence Bye-law No.31 is to be treated as non est. (23). It is already demonstrated in earlier part of our judgment that Bye-law No.31 has not been framed within the subject matter of framing bye-laws enumerated under rule 8 of the Rules framed under the said Act therefore Bye-law No.31 prescribing additional eligibility to debar the petitioner appellant to contest the election for the office of the Board of Directors is non est and the said Bye-law is to be ignored. This court cannot afford to permit Bye-law No.31 to neutralise the mandatory statutory provisions enacted by the State Legislature under Sub-sec. (4) sec.34 of the Act of 1965 prescribing qualifications to contest the election for the office of the Board of Directors. (24). There is yet an another reason to ingnore Bye-law No. 31 debarring the petitioner appellant to contest the election for the office of the Board of Directors that the Bye-laws of the Co- operative Societies even if framed in pursuance of the provisions of the relevant Act and Rules cannot be held to be a law or have the force of law. The aforesaid question came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. The Additional Indutrial Tribunal Andhra Pradesh (1), where it is ruled by their Lordships as under : — "The bye-laws that can be framed by a society under the Act are similar in nature to the Articles of Association of a Company incorporated under the Companies Act and such Articles of Association have never been held to have the force of law. The bye-laws that are contemplated by the Act can be merely of those which govern the internal management, business or administration of a Society. They may be binding between the persons affected by them, but they do not have the force of a Statute." (25). A similar principle was reiterated in the decision of the Supreme Court in Babaji Kondaji Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co- operative Bank Limited, Nasik (2), wherein it is ruled by their Lordships that bye-laws of a co operative society can at best have the status of an Article of Association of a Company governed by the Companies Act, 1956. (26). Here in the present case even the Bye-law No.31 adding additional eligibility for contesting the election for the office of the Board of Directors is beyond the subject matter enumerated under rule 8 of the Rules frmaed under the Act of 1965 to frame the Bye laws by the respondent-co-operative Bank, hence, there is no alternative except to ignore Bye-law No.31. In our considered opinion, the essential requisite of a Bye law should be that a Bye-law must not be in excess of the statutory power authorising it to frame such Bye-laws and secondly, it must not be repugnant to the statute or general principle of law. Since in the instant case, we found that bye-law No. 31 is not in consonance with the statutory provision contemplated under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 34 of the Act of 1965, therefore, it is non est and is to be ignored. (27). The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents Shri M.R. Singhvi and Shri Sangeet Lodha to the effect that since the validity and invalidity of Bye-law No.31 has not been challenged before the learned Single Judge and no foundation has been led in the Special Appeal, therefore, it cannot be gone into by this Court in the present Special Appeal although it is based on a pure question of law is not tenable. An identical question arose before one of us sitting singly in the case of Bheru Dan and others V. Firm Sohanlal Shiv Narain (3) and it was held in paragraphs 27,28 and 29 as follows; — "27 In order to remove doubt about the circular letters mentioned above, it is held that if any enactment is inconsistent to the constitutional provisions it is repugnant to the extent of its inconsistency to the constitutional provisions. If statutory Rules framed under on enactment transgress the provisions of an enactment, it should always be treated to be redundant and repugnant to the extent of its transgression to the provisions of the enactment. Similarly if G.O. (Government Order) Circular letters, office memorandum and departmenatal instructions are found by a court of law to be inconsistent to the statutory Rules, such Government orders, circular letters, office memorandum and depart-mental instructions must be treated to be non est to the extent of in consister to the statutory Rules framed under an enactment. However it is made clear that if statutory Rules are silent on a particular subject it can always be supplimented by Government orders, Circular letter, office memorandum and departmental instructions. 28. In the instant case, the field of weeding out record of Sub-ordinate Court is already occupied by the statutory Rules i.e. Rajasthan General Rules (Civil), 1986 therefore, both circular letters mentioned abover have no application after enforcement of afore-mentioned statutory Rules. 29. Where statute or Rules are not ambiguous or capable of two interpretations it is hardly necessary to have recourse to rule of construction. In such cases, what a court has to do, is to see of those words and give effect to them regardless of the consequence that may ensue. If language is plain, the fact that the consequence of giving effect to proviso of Rule 175 of the said Rules may lead to some in-convenience to the sub-ordinate courts and Officer in-charge of the Record Room in Rajasthan to know about the pendency of the Civil Appeal or Revision in the higher Courts, is not a factor to be taken into account in interpreting the said Rules. The rule making authorities in this case may have unconsciously are without sufficient fore-sight may have framed these but if so it must be left to the Rule making authorities to correct its irror." (28). The rule making authorities in this case may have unconsciously are without sufficient fore-sight may have framed these but if so it must be left to the Rule making authorities to correct its irror." (28). What has been held in the case of Bheru Dan and others (supra) by one of us silting singly in respect of enactment, Rules, Government orders, Circular letters, Office memorandum and departmental instruction about its redundancy and repugnancy to the extent of its transgression is equally applicable to the Bye- laws also. In the instant case, the field of qualification for contesting election for the office of the Board of Directors is already occupied by sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 34 of the Act of 1965 enacted by State Legislature. Therefore, Bye-law No. 31 framed by the Co-operative Bank respondent no. 2 is to be held to be redundant to the extent of its transgression to the aforesaid section. Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 34 of the Act of 1965 is neither ambiguous nor capable of two interpretation, therefore, it is hardly necessary to have recourse to rule of construction, In such a situation what we have to do, is to see of those words and give effect to them regardless of the consequence that may ensue. (29). In our considered opinion, since Bye-law No.31 has been framed by the Respondent-Co-operative Bank beyond the subject matter enumerated under rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act of 1965, therefore, it is non est and it can be ignored even if no such foundation was led before the learned single Judge and no such foundation is led before us in Special Appeal. (30). It is well to remember that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is always expected to do so. (30). It is well to remember that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is always expected to do so. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the course of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the answering- respondents in the instant case cannot be allowed to claim to have vested right in injustice being done to the petitioner because the question of validity or invalidity was not challenged before the learned single Judge nor foundation to declare it non est is led in the Special Appeal before us, although it is apparent from the interpretation of Sec. 148 and 149 of the Act of 1965 and from Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the said Act, the Bye law No.31 framed by the respondent Bank is beyond its power to frame such a Bye-law. It is not disputed before us by the learned counsel for the parties that this court has no jurisdiction to declare the Bye-law No. 31 to be non est rather it is admitted that this court has jurisdiction under the Rules of the Court to declare any law ultra vires, intra vires or non est. Thus, this court cannot afford to allow in this case, the substantial justice either to escape or slide on the mere technicalities as argued by the learned counsel , for Respondents. The aforesaid view taken by us in the instant Special Appeal is buttressed by a recent decision rendered by the Apex court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantage and others v. Mst. Kati ji and othes (4). (31). As a result of the afore-mentioned discussion, the order of the learned single Judge dated 7.2.1995 is hereby set aside and the instant Special Appeal is allowed with costs assessed to be Rs. 1000/-. We have ken informed that the petitioner-appellant was permitted to contest the election. Under these circumstances, we direct the counting of votes be done and result thereof be declared treating the petitioner appellant as a candidate for the office of the Board of Directors of Jodhpur Nagrik Sahakari Bank Limited, Jodhpur.