JUDGMENT : B.N. Srikrishna, J. 1. This Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against an Award dated 5th January, 1988 made by the Presiding Officer, 2nd Labour Court, Pune, in Reference (IDA) No. 15 of 1985 under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. The Petitioner was working in the employment of the 1st Respondent as a Fitter since 1st January 1978. The 1st Respondent is a unit carrying business in Engineering Industry and employs more than 20 workmen. On 1st June 1984 the service of the petitioner was terminated by an order which says, "You are in the employment of our factory since 1.1.1978. Your services are no longer required. You are therefore discharged. At the time of discharge you will be paid one month's wages in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation as per rules. You are being paid the amounts today only and are being discharged from service with immediate effect". The Petitioner raised an industrial dispute for reinstatement in service with continuity and back wages and his industrial dispute resulted in the Reference being made to the Labour Court. The Labour Court by its impugned Award dated 5th January 1988 held that the Petitioner had failed to prove that the service was illegally terminated without following the provisions of the Act and also that he was not entitled to any relief, and rejected the Reference. Hence this writ petition. 3. Though ex facie the order of termination of service dated 1st June 1984 has the flavour of retrenchment, surprisingly, before the Labour Court the stand taken by the 1st Respondent employer was totally inconsistent with it. The 1st Respondent contended in its Written Statement that the Petitioner had caused obstruction to the movement of the materials from the factory and had instigated other workmen not to co-operate with the 1st Respondent which resulted in an oral warning being given to him by the 1st Respondent. It was further alleged that, despite the oral warnings, the Petitioner persisted in his conduct of obstructing movement of materials and delivery of goods along with the other workmen. It was considered as serious misconduct, and, therefore, "his termination was effected, which is punitive in nature and therefore the question of following seniority rules does not arise". It was further alleged that, despite the oral warnings, the Petitioner persisted in his conduct of obstructing movement of materials and delivery of goods along with the other workmen. It was considered as serious misconduct, and, therefore, "his termination was effected, which is punitive in nature and therefore the question of following seniority rules does not arise". While the Petitioner was making out a case of retrenchment in contravention of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The 1st Respondent specifically alleged that the termination of the service was punitive in nature and did not amount to retrenchment. It is not in dispute that no inquiry was held before the Petitioner's service was terminated. 4. In the evidence led before the Labour Court, the witness of the 1st Respondent stated that the incident of obstruction of materials occurred on 25th May 1984 or 27th May 1984. He admitted in cross-examination that there were delivery challans maintained by the 1st Respondent regularly, but the material delivery challans could not be produced because they had been destroyed. Even the Labour Court was constrained to observe that, "it would have been prudent action on the part of the employer to have examined either bullock-cart-man or any of the workers of substantiate his contentions of obstruction caused by the workman in the working". A perusal of the Award shows the confusion in the mind of the Labour Court. The Labour Court appeared to be unable to take a view as to whether it was case of retrenchment and then examine it with reference to the conditions precedent under Sections 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, nor was it able to make up its mind that the case was one of dismissal in which case evidence as to proof of misconduct ought to have been looked for. At one stage, the Labour Court says that the provisions of Section 25F were complied with, because in the letter of termination of service it is stated that one month's wages in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation would be paid. It is not in dispute that the letter was no personally served on the Petitioner but was despatched by Registered A. D. and came back undelivered. The Registered A. D. envelope was produced in the Court but was not even opened by the Labour Court. It is not in dispute that the letter was no personally served on the Petitioner but was despatched by Registered A. D. and came back undelivered. The Registered A. D. envelope was produced in the Court but was not even opened by the Labour Court. The 1st Respondent did not place reliance on its contents. Virtually, there is no evidence before the Labour Court to suggest that the notice pay and retrenchment compensation were unconditionally tendered to the Petitioner contemporaneously with the retrenchment. 5. Even on the stand taken by the 1st Respondent employer in its Written Statement, there is hardly any evidence on the basis of which the Petitioner could have been held guilty of a serious misconduct warranting dismissal from service. In my view, the reasoning of the Labour court is patchy and unsatisfactory and does not lead to the conclusion, on either ground, that the termination of service was legal or justified. 6. Mr. Bapat, learned Advocate for the Petitioner, rightly placed reliance on the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of L. Michael and Another Vs. Johnson Pumps Ltd.,. The Supreme Court, in the paragraphs 19 and 20 of the judgment, observes : "19... The law is simply this : The Tribunal has the power and, indeed, the duty to X-ray the order and discover its true nature, if the object and effect, if the attendant circumstances and the ulterior purpose be to dismiss the employee because he is an evil to be eliminated. But if the management, to cover up the inability to establish by an enquiry, illegitimately but ingeniously passes an innocent-looking order of termination simpliciter, such action is bad and is liable to be set aside. Loss of confidence is no new armour for the management; otherwise security of tenure, ensured by the new industrial jurisprudence and authenticated by a catena of cases of this Court, can be subverted by this neo-formula. Loss of confidence of the Law ill be the consequence of the Loss of Confidence Doctrine. 20. In the light of what we have indicated, it is clear that loss of confidence is often a subjective feeling or individual reaction to an objection set of facts and motivation. The Court is concerned with the latter and not with the former, although circumstances may exist which justify a genuine exercise of the power of simple termination. 20. In the light of what we have indicated, it is clear that loss of confidence is often a subjective feeling or individual reaction to an objection set of facts and motivation. The Court is concerned with the latter and not with the former, although circumstances may exist which justify a genuine exercise of the power of simple termination. In a reasonable case of a confidential or responsible post being misused or a sensitive or strategic position being abused, it may be a high risk to keep the employee, once suspicion has started and a disciplinary enquiry cannot be forced on the master. There, a termination simpliciter may be bona fide, not colourable, and loss of confidence may be evidentiary of good faith of the employer. It is unfortunate that, despite this clear pronouncement of the law, the Labour Court failed to X-ray the order of termination of service of the Petitioner and come to the correct conclusion. 7. I am of the view that the termination of the service of the Petitioner was both illegal and improper and was liable to be set aside. The Petitioner was both illegal and improper and was liable to be set aside. The Petitioner is entitled to the relief he has claimed. 8. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned Award of the Labour Court dated 5th January 1988 made in Reference (IDA) No. 15 of 1985 is hereby quashed and set aside. The 1st Respondent is directed to reinstate the Petitioner in service with continuity of service and full back wages from 1st June 1984 till the date of reinstatement. This order to be carried into effect not later than 15th May 1995, failing which the back wages would attract simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum until they are fully paid or recovered. Rule made absolute accordingly. 1st Respondent to pay to the petitioner costs quantified at Rs. 500/-. 9. Issuance of the certified copy of this judgment is expedited.