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1995 DIGILAW 232 (CAL)

I. O. L. Ltd. v. Madhumilan Oxygen Pvt. Ltd.

1995-07-05

Tarun Chatterjee

body1995
JUDGMENT Tarun Chatterjee, J.: This revisional application is directed against an order passed by Sri D. N. Das, Judge, Second Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta in title suit No. 1084 of 1993. 2. I.O.L. Ltd. is the petitioner in this revisional application and is the plaintiff in the trial court. I.O.L. Ltd. has instituted the instant suit for a declaration that bank guarantee dated 12th January, 1993 is void, invalid and has no consequence being vitiated by fraud and the same should be returned to the plaintiff/petitioner after recording cancellation, for permanent injunction and also for other incidental reliefs. In the suit an application for temporary injunction restraining the opposite party No.1 from claiming and/or receiving and/or demanding and/or taking any step or further steps in relation to the bank guarantee and also restraining the opposite party No. 2 from remitting and/or acting and/or taking step on the basis of any demand being made by the opposite party No.1. On the said application for temporary injunction filed under Or. 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure the trial court granted an ad interim order of injunction. Feeling aggrieved by the said ad interim order of injunction the opposite party No. 1 preferred an appeal before a Division Bench of this court which was disposed of by directing the trial court to dispose of the application for injunction within the time specified therein. In the said order the opposite party No. 1 was also directed to submit their written objection against the application for temporary injunction in the trial court and the petitioner was also directed to file their reply to the same. From a perusal of the order of the Division Bench it is evident that the application for injunction was directed to be disposed of within a specified time. 3. On the date of hearing of the application for injunction the petitioner made an application before the trial court seeking direction for production of the deponents who affirmed affidavits for the purpose of cross-examination under Or. 19 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the petitioner, since the genuineness of the documents annexed with the affidavit was challenged by the petitioner, the said documents cannot be looked into by the trial court for the disposal of the application of injunction without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the deponents who had affirmed the affidavits. According to the petitioner, since the genuineness of the documents annexed with the affidavit was challenged by the petitioner, the said documents cannot be looked into by the trial court for the disposal of the application of injunction without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the deponents who had affirmed the affidavits. By the impugned order the said application of the petitioner filed under Or. 19 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure was rejected. Feeling aggrieved by this order the plaintiff/petitioner has come up to this court in revision. I have heard Mr. Roychowdhury appearing for the plaintiff petitioner and Mr. Bhaskar Bhattacharyya appearing for the opposite parties No.1. Mr. Roychowdhury contends, relying on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1972 SC page 338 (B. B. Supply Company vs. Workmen) that even at the interlocutory stage there is no bar to the petitioner to ask for cross-examination of the deponents who had filed an affidavit under Or. 19 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In my view this decision of the Supreme Court is not at all applicable to the facts of this case. In that decision the Supreme Court was dealing with the applicability of principle of natural justice before the domestic tribunals in a proceeding under Industrial Disputes Act and held that where issues were seriously contested and had to be established and proved the requirements relating to proof must be dispensed with. Mr. Roychowdhury appearing for the petitioner however, contends, relying on paragraph 14 at page 339 of the said decision that when any document is produced to establish some fact which is relevant to the enquiry the writer must be produced or his affidavit in respect thereof be filed and opportunity be afforded to the opposite party who challenges this fact. In my view this observation of the Supreme Court made in the said decision cannot be applied to the fact of this case as noted hereinabove. The Supreme Court while dealing with the principle of natural justice in a proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act was of the aforesaid view. It is also to be noted that such observation of the Supreme Court was made in a case under the Industrial Disputes Act which was finally disposed of by the concerned tribunal. The Supreme Court while dealing with the principle of natural justice in a proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act was of the aforesaid view. It is also to be noted that such observation of the Supreme Court was made in a case under the Industrial Disputes Act which was finally disposed of by the concerned tribunal. In that context the Supreme Court has held that while a party is producing an affidavit of a deponent to establish some fact which is relevant to the enquiry, writer of the said document must be produced or his affidavit be filed and opportunity be afforded to the other party to challenge this fact. This is not the case here. Order 39 rule 1 clearly says that temporary injunction can be granted in cases where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise the conditions laid down in sub-rules (a) (b) and (c) of Or. 39 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of temporary injunction. Therefore a discretion is left to the Court to grant or refuse to grant injunction on the basis of the affidavits filed by the parties or otherwise. 4. From a plain reading of Or. 19 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is also clear that Or. 19 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure also leaves a discretion to the court to order any particular fact to be proved by affidavit or to order attendance of deponents for cross-examination. The court therefore retains its discretion, considering the facts and circumstances of each case, to direct proof of some fact either by affidavit or by asking the person who has filed the affidavit to be available for cross-examination. Only in an exceptional case the court can issue direction in its discretion to take evidence by allowing the deponents who has filed the affidavit to be cross-examined. Therefore from a perusal of the provisions contained in Or. 19 R. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is clear that there is no discretion left with the court and no applicant has the absolute right to claim examination of a deponent on his affidavit as filed. It is only the court concerned which can decide, whether, if in the facts of a given case, the evidence of the deponent on his affidavit should be taken or not. It is only the court concerned which can decide, whether, if in the facts of a given case, the evidence of the deponent on his affidavit should be taken or not. Provisions of Or. 19 Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be resorted to when and where the court is expressly permitted to decide interlocutory matters on affidavits, either party to such a proceeding would not have any absolute right to cross-examine the deponent concerned. I have carefully perused the application under Or. 19 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. From a perusal of the same it cannot be said that any exceptional circumstances has been alleged by the petitioner. For the reasons aforesaid I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order which has been passed in the discretion of the court by directing that the injunction petition can be disposed of on affidavits. There is another aspect of this matter. As noted hereinabove, the Division Bench of this court directed the trial court to dispose of the application for injunction within a certain period of time. If the prayer of the plaintiff/petitioner is allowed and the deponent of the affidavit is directed to be cross-examined, there would mean delaying the hearing and disposal of application for injunction. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff has already obtained an ad interim order of injunction and therefore the plaintiff is interested in delaying the hearing of the application for injunction. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, there is no merit in this revisional application and accordingly the revisional application is rejected. 5. There will be no order as to costs. 6. Let the injunction application be taken up for hearing by the learned judge at an early date. I make it clear that at the time of the disposal of application for injunction if the court is of opinion that the application for injunction can not be disposed of without taking evidence on the points raised by the plaintiff petitioner, it will be open to the court in its discretion to take such evidence. Application rejected.