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1995 DIGILAW 233 (GUJ)

PALANPUR KARIANA MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION v. STATE

1995-04-19

R.K.ABICHANDANI

body1995
R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners have challenged the decision of the respondent Municipality of revising and increasing the rates of Octroi as per the public notice dated 25th August, 1989 at Annexure "d" to the petition. As per the said public notice issued under Sec. 103 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, the Government had published the revised Octroi Rules sanctioned by their order dated 23-1-1989 and it was indicated in the notice that the Octroi prescribed by the revised Rules was to come into force from 1st October, 1989. ( 2 ) THE increase in the Octroi rate under the revised Rules has been challenged by the petitioners on the following grounds, which were urged by their learned counsel : 1. The objections received against the proposed increase of Octroi were not considered by the Government while giving sanction under Sec. 102 of the said Act. 2. The respondent Municipality had not separately opined on particular objections which were raised against the proposed increase in Octroi. 3. The right to trade of the petitioners was virtually taken away by reason of the excessive taxation imposed under the revised Octroi Rules. 4. In view of the delay in bringing into force the revised Octroi Rules after objections were invited, it should be inferred that the proposal for increasing the Octroi rates was abandoned by the Municipality. The contention raised on behalf of the respondent-Municipality is that the petitioners had not raised any written objections under Sec. 101 (c) of the said Act and the objections which were received by the Municipality were all forwarded to the director of Municipalities by the Administrator on 27-2-1986 alongwith his opinion. It was further argued that the increase in the rates of Octroi even as per the statement prepared by the petitioners was in the range of 1% to 1-1/2%, which cannot be said to be excessive. ( 3 ) IT was contended by the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 that the sanction was accorded to the Octroi rules in consonance with the provisions of Sec. 102 of the said Act. ( 4 ) OCTROI is one of the taxes which can be imposed by a Municipality under sec. 99 (1) (iv) of the said Act. 1, 2 and 3 that the sanction was accorded to the Octroi rules in consonance with the provisions of Sec. 102 of the said Act. ( 4 ) OCTROI is one of the taxes which can be imposed by a Municipality under sec. 99 (1) (iv) of the said Act. The procedure preliminary to imposing taxes is prescribed by Sec. 101 of the Act and the entire controversy mainly centres around the provisions of clause (c) of Sec. 101 of the Act, which relates to inviting objections to the imposition of the tax or rate proposed or to the classes of persons or property to be made liable to pay tax or the question of exemption. A notice is required to be published inviting objections from the inhabitants of the Municipal Borough. Within one month from the publication of the notice, the objections are to be preferred. The Municipality itself can take into consideration such objections or may authorise a Committee to consider them, in which event the Committee is required to make a report thereon. Unless the Muncipality decides to abandon the proposed tax, it is required to submit such objections with its opinion thereon and any modifications proposed in accordance therewith together with the notice and Rules to the State Government for sanction which is required to be given under Sec. 102 of the said Act before any Rules proposing tax could be effectively brought into existence. In context of these procedural requirements, the attack of the petitioners is two pronged: one that the Municipality had not opined on the objections and the other that the objections were not considered by the State Government. It was added that the State Government could not have properly considered the objections as the municipality did not opine on particular objections which were raised. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Jayantilal v. Dholka Municipality, [1983 (1)] xxiv (1) GLR 597, in which while construing provisions of clause (c) of Sec. 101 of the said Act, it was held that it was imperative on the Municipality to submit the objections received from the inhabitants of the Municipal Borough together with its opinion thereon to the State Government. It was held that before the State government gives its sanction, it must be satisfied that either there is no objection at all or there is no objection which is in its opinion sufficient for refusing to accord sanction. The question of sufficiency of the objection cannot be decided if they are not before the State Government. It was, therefore, held that there can be no doubt that the proposal must be accompanied by the objections received by the Municipality in order to enable the State Government to apply its mind to the proposed tax. The requirement of Sec. 101 (c) regarding submission the of objections alongwith the opinion of the Municipality to the Government was mandatory and could not be by-passed. It will be noticed from this decision that it is given in context of the finding that the objections were not submitted by the Municipality to the State government alongwith the opinion of the Municipality as required by Sec. 101 (c) of the Act. In that case, when the Court inquired whether it could be pointed out from the Government file available that the objections were examined and scrutinised by the Government before the concerned authority reached the conclusion that they were not sufficient, nothing could be pointed out from the file to that effect. It was held that a mere glance through the objections at the time of local visit was not what was contemplated by Secs. 101 (c) and 102 of the said Act. There can be no exception to the proposition laid down in the aforesaid decision, with which i respectfully agree, to the effect that the objections which are received from the inhabitants of the Municipal Borough under Sec. 101 (c) of the said Act are required to be submitted to the State Government for its sanction alongwith the opinion of the Municipality. Therefore, it will be essential to find out as to whether in the present case the objections and opinion were submitted to the Government by the municipality or not and whether they were considered by the State Government. ( 5 ) THE respondent-Municipality has in the affidavit-in-reply, categorically stated that there were no written objections received from the petitioners and this stand is not disputed at the time of arguments. Sec. 101 (c) requires written objections to be submitted to the Municipality and no oral objections are contemplated by that provision. ( 5 ) THE respondent-Municipality has in the affidavit-in-reply, categorically stated that there were no written objections received from the petitioners and this stand is not disputed at the time of arguments. Sec. 101 (c) requires written objections to be submitted to the Municipality and no oral objections are contemplated by that provision. Only such written objections which are received under the said provision are required to be forwarded to the State Government alongwith the opinion of the municipality. The statutory provision does not contemplate taking into account any oral objections or forwarding the same. The petitioners had not submitted any written objections and therefore, there was obviously no question of forwarding such objections to the State Government with the opinion of the Municipality. The petitioners have referred to objections which were filed by Banaskantha Zilla Vepari mandal and others. It may be mentioned that Banaskantha Zilla Vepari Mandal had filed a Suit (Civil Suit No. 273 of 1989) in the Civil Court, Palanpur against these very rules when the new rates were brought into force from 1st October, 1989. In that suit stay was granted against the implementation of the revised Octroi rates. Ultimately, that stay came to be vacated by the Civil Court and an appeal which was filed against that order was dismissed by the District Court. The High Court confirmed the orders of the lower Courts by rejecting the Revision Application (Civil revision Application No. 1211 of 1994) on 17th November, 1994. Close on heels of the order of the High Court rejecting the Revision Application, the present petition was filed on 29th December, 1994 by these petitioners. For more than five years the revised Octroi rates remained in abeyance because of the Court orders and the interim stay having been ultimately vacated by virtue of rejection of the Revision application on 17th November, 1994, the present petitioners are now trying to pick up the thread for another innings for thwarting the implementation of the revised octroi rates. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners were not parties in the Suit and therefore, they were entitled to take up the issue at this stage. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners were not parties in the Suit and therefore, they were entitled to take up the issue at this stage. The petitioners may not have been party to the Suit and therefore, may be technically justified in starting the proceedings anew, but the fact that states on the face of the record is that they were sitting pretty on the fence waiting for the outcome of the proceedings in the Civil Suit, which ultimately culminated in vacating the interim stay and now after a lapse of several years, want to start the innings again against the revised Rules which were supposed to be brought into force on 1st October, 1989. The petitioners cannot justify their inaction for such a long period on the ground that some other party was fighting the battle in the Civil Court and that it has ultimately lost in retaining the interim stay which operated till 17th november, 1994. Therefore, the petitioners would fail even on the ground of gross delay on their part in challenging the impugned revised Rules. They never bothered even to join as party in the Civil proceedings wherein the very Rules were challenged. Therefore, to say the least the petitioners are not fit persons to be entrusted with the Writ of this Court. ( 6 ) APART from the aforesaid aspect, it clearly transpires from the affidavit of the Municipality that the objections which were received by the Municipality were forwarded to the State Government by letter dated 27th February, 1986 at Annexure "d" to the affidavit-in-reply of the Municipality. It is stated that the proposal was sent to the Director alongwith the record and papers. The said letter dated 27th february, 1986 shows how the objections were invited and notice published as well as the hearing given. It refers to the discussion with the traders and to the fact that objections were properly considered. The forwarding letter shows that all the original objection applications were forwarded to the State Government and a statement of the objections was also prepared and forwarded. The proposal was justified on the footing that additional income was required for the Municipality, which was estimated to be Rs. 7,50,000. 00, if the increase proposed in the Octroi was sanctioned. The Resolution No. 8 dated 18-12-1985 of the Administrator was also forwarded. The proposal was justified on the footing that additional income was required for the Municipality, which was estimated to be Rs. 7,50,000. 00, if the increase proposed in the Octroi was sanctioned. The Resolution No. 8 dated 18-12-1985 of the Administrator was also forwarded. That Resolution which is at Annexure "c" to the affidavit-in-reply narrates all the relevant particulars regarding the objections which were raised and records that all the relevant facts and papers were taken into consideration. The main opinion which was recorded against all these objections was that the increase in rate was justified because the rates ought to be on the ad-valorem basis. The reason that Octroi should be chargeable on ad-valorem basis is a just and proper reason. It is also recorded that the proposed increase was in the interest of the Municipality. ( 7 ) ON behalf of the State of Gujarat it is stated in the affidavit-in-reply that the Municipality had followed the procedure prescribed by Sec. 101 of the Act and no irregularities were committed. The suggestion of the petitioners that the State government failed to consider all the objections received against the proposed rates while issuing sanction under Sec. 102 of the Act was denied and it has been stated that the Government took into consideration the proposal in all respect. The order dated 23rd January, 1989 issued by the Director of Municipalities to exercise the powers of the State Government under Sec. 102 of the said Act which is produced at Annexure "i" to the affidavi-in-reply of the Government shows that the Director had sanctioned the proposal of the Municipality, as modified, regarding amendment in the Schedule of the Octroi Rules. This order clearly shows that the letter of the administrator dated 27-2-1986 and other papers were taken into consideration. As noted above, the letter of the Administrator dated 27th February, 1986 forwarded all the papers alongwith the opinion of the Administrator contained in Resolution no. 8 dated 18-12-1985 to the State Government. A statement of the objections showing the opinion of the Municipality was also prepared and forwarded. It, therefore, clearly transpires that the requirement of Sec. 101 (c) of forwarding all the objections alongwith the opinion of the Municipality is fully satisfied. It was not necessary for the Administrator to have given a detailed reasoning on each objection which was raised. In any event. It, therefore, clearly transpires that the requirement of Sec. 101 (c) of forwarding all the objections alongwith the opinion of the Municipality is fully satisfied. It was not necessary for the Administrator to have given a detailed reasoning on each objection which was raised. In any event. the resolution of the Administrator dated 18th December, 1985 takes into consideration all the objections which were received and it also contains the opinion of the Administrator that it was in the interest of the Municipality to impose the proposed hike in the rates and adopt the ad-valorem basis notwithstanding these objections. The record satisfactorily establishes that the objections and opinion which were forwarded to the State Government were duly considered before according the sanction under Sec. 102 of the Act. Thus, since the requirements of Secs. 101 (c) and 102 are fully satisfied in the present case, the decision of this Court in Jayantilals case (supra) cannot assist the petitioners. ( 8 ) THE contention that the proposed rates are excessive and virtually take away the right to trade, of the petitioners, is not supported by any cogent material. On scrutiny of the statement at Annexure "b", which is prepared by the petitioners showing comparative rates, it appears that on the items mentioned therein, the new rates though in excess of the earlier rates which were imposed in 1963, range around 1% to 11/2% of Octroi which can hardly be called to be excessive. The comparison is sought to be made between these revised rates and the Octroi rates prevalent in other places since long. The fact that other Municipalities have not revised their rates of Octroi, which may be for local reasons, cannot constitute a barrier in the way of this Municipality and it can increase the rates having regard to its own needs. Variation in rates of Octroi in different Municipalities is not an unknown phenomenon. The fact that it may adversely affect the business to some extent, cannot lead to the conclusion that fundamental right to business is taken away. The fundamental right to business is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law. The imposition of taxes is statutorily done and there is nothing to show that the proposed increase constitutes any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on business. The fundamental right to business is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law. The imposition of taxes is statutorily done and there is nothing to show that the proposed increase constitutes any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on business. It is a settled principle that the law fixing taxes cannot be questioned in the Courts on the ground that the tax is heavy and oppressive. This is on the ground that power to tax is an incidence of sovereignty. The power would undoubtedly be subject to the constitutional provisions. It cannot be said from the facts of the present case that the power to impose the revised rates of Octroi has taken away fundamental right of the petitioners to do business as was sought to be contended on behalf. Therefore, the decision in S. Anandakrishnan v. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1952 Madras 395 on which reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioners, cannot assist them. ( 9 ) THE contention that the proposal for the increased rates of Octroi was abandoned, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the proposal was being pursued by the Municipality and ultimately it came to be accepted by the State government quite late on 23-1-1989. Thereafter, the Banaskantha Zilla Vepari mandal had filed a Suit in which the revised Octroi Rules were stayed until the stay was vacated finally when the Civil Revision Application was rejected on 17- 11-1994. There has to be more cogent reason for inferring abandoment than from mere delay when it is a question of exercise of statutory power to impose tax for which no limitation is prescribed in the provision conferring that power. It has been denied on behalf of the Municipality that the proposal was abandoned and there is nothing on record to show that the proposal was abandoned as suggested by the petitioners. There is, therefore, absolutely no reason to infer abandonment of the proposal. ( 10 ) UNDER the above circumstances, the contentions which are raised on behalf of the petitioners cannot be accepted and the petition deserves to be rejected. Notice is, therefore, discharged with no order as to costs. .