JUDGMENT 1. 1.The petitioner has filed this petition under S. 482, Cr.P.C., with a prayer to quash criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. 1459/83 pending in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur City, under S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The prayer is based on inordinate delay in trial. 2. In brief the facts are that F.I.R. No. 158/81 was registered at Police Station, Gangapur city for the offence punishable under S. 3/7 of the Act. It was alleged in the report that the petitioner, as Secretary of Bicholal Gram Seva Sahakari Samiti, Panchayat Samiti, Gangapur City failed to maintain the stock register of sugar, did not display the pending stock of the sugar on the notice board of the business premises and that there was shortage in the stock of sugar when the checking was made by Enforcement Officer. After completion of investigation a charge-sheet came to the filed against the petitioner under S. 3/7 of the Act in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur City. Before any charge could be framed an application was moved by Additional Public Prosecutor to implead other office bearers of the society as accused and it took more than 3 years for deciding the said application. Ultimately, the charge was framed against the petitioner on 23.9.1990 and prior to it the prayer of A.P.P. to implead other office bearers as accused was rejected vide order dated May 1, 1990. Even after framing charges the case was adjourned on several occasions but no prosecution witness has been examined so far. It further appears that the Additional Public Prosecutor has again moved application 10.10.1991 to implead the society as an accused and on the said application learned Magistrate has directed to implead the Bicholal Gram Seva Sahakari Samiti as an accused through its Chairman. After the said order no further progress has been made in the case. 3. It was seriously contended by the learned counsel that more than 14 years have passed but still the case is at the initial stage inasmuch as not a single prosecution witness has been examined in the trial court so far. Learned counsel contended that such a protracted trial is quite unreasonable and is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. It was seriously contended by the learned counsel that more than 14 years have passed but still the case is at the initial stage inasmuch as not a single prosecution witness has been examined in the trial court so far. Learned counsel contended that such a protracted trial is quite unreasonable and is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. Learned counsel placed reliance on a series of judgments of this Court as well as of the Apex Court of the country. I need not refer all these judgments as I had occasion to consider this aspect in Chotay Lal Jain v. State of Rajasthan 1991(1) R.L.R. 98 . After scrutiny of all the relevant judgments on this point the proposition of law laid down in para 12 of the judgment as under: "(i) A speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused within the ambit of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. But, the question whether this fundamental right has been violated or is likely to be violated on account of the delay in the trial will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no outer limit can be fixed in a general way for all the cases, (ii) While considering the length of delay, the Court will take into account the period consumed in the investigation of the case and the delay caused in actual proceedings in Court after filing of the charge-sheet. A speedy investigation and a trial arc equally mandated both by the letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (iii) While deciding such question, the Court shall take into account the working of the judicial system in India and the lack of satisfactory working conditions in judicial courts, including large pendency and institution of the cases, inadequacy of judge strength and under-staffing etc.; (iv) In a pending case to decide the question whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed or any other appropriate direction be given to the trial court to secure the ends of justice will depend on several factors to be taken into consideration, such as, the gravity and seriousness of the offences, whether the delay was occasioned by the tactic or conduct of the accused himself, whether the accuse.d objected at any state when such delay occasioned and whether the accused is prejudiced in his defence on account of delay; (v) If the delay has caused prejudice to the accused in the conduct and his defence, the pending criminal proceedings should be normally quashed as in that situation it could be said that the accused has been denied an adequate opportunity to defend himself and the trial is not fair and reasonable; (vi) In grave and serious offences against the society or in relation to Nation's economy, defence or security, the criminal proceedings should not be normally quashed on the ground of delay simplicitor without anything further; (vii) In trivial offences having no or very little impact on the society, quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of delay simplicitor shall be in the interest of justice as it will provide a room for serious and grave offences and will lessen the burden of the Court with heavy work-load." 4. At the out-set it may be stated that the petitioner is not at fault in delay of the trial. Further, the accusations against the petitioner are more of technical nature. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that there is no allegation against the petitioner that he had any mala fide intention in not properly maintaining the stock register. There is no allegation that any black marketing of sugar was made by the petitioner. This aspect is not disputed by the learned Public Prosecutor. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that there is no allegation against the petitioner that he had any mala fide intention in not properly maintaining the stock register. There is no allegation that any black marketing of sugar was made by the petitioner. This aspect is not disputed by the learned Public Prosecutor. In such a state of affairs when the accusations against the petitioner are not of serious nature and 14 years have already passed since the occurrence and the petitioner has been appearing in the court since 1983 or so, I am of the confirmed view that it is neither expedient nor in the larger interest of justice that the trial of the accused-petitioner should be allowed to proceed. Further, the delay in the instant case has also prejudiced the defence of the petitioner as it would be difficult to procure witnesses after 14 years or so. 5. The net result of the above discussion is that this petition is allowed and the proceedings in the Criminal Case No. 1459/83 are quashed. *******