JUDGEMENT - A.C. AGARWAL, J. :--The appellant is the original defendant. He has preferred the present appeal seeking to impugn the judgment and decree passed on October 6, 1987 by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Quepem, in Special Suit No. 43 of 1986. Under the decree the defendant has been directed to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 71, 432/- with interest at 18% per annum from the date of the suit till actual payment. He has also been directed to pay the costs of the suit. 2. The suit was filed on December 18, 1986 under the provisions of Order XXXVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides for filing of summary suits. After the suit summons was served the defendant caused his appearance to be filed on March 23, 1987. The plaintiff on April 14, 1987 filed an application for summons for judgment. On August 10, 1987 the defendant filed an application for leave to defend. By the impugned judgment and decree leave to defend is refused and the decree prayed for in the suit is passed. Aggrieved by the said decree the defendant has preferred the present appeal. 3. Mr. Diniz, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant, has submitted that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit under the provisions of Order XXXVII, Rule 1 of the Code. He has pointed out that the aforesaid provision has undergone an amendment which has come into force with effect from April 1, 1987. Whereas Order XXXVII, Rule 1 in so far as is relevant for the present inquiry prior to its amendment read as under :--- "Order XXXVII, Rule 1:---Courts and classes of suits to which the Order is to apply--- (1) This order shall apply to the following courts, namely :--- (a) High Courts, City Civil Courts and Courts of Small Causes; and (b) other Courts." after the amendment the provision reads :--- "(1) This order shall apply to the following Courts, namely :--- (a) High Courts, City Civil Courts and Courts of Small Causes; and (b) such other Courts as may be specifically empowered in this behalf by the High Court from time to time by a notification in the Official Gazette." 4. Placing reliance on the above amendment it is contended by Mr. Placing reliance on the above amendment it is contended by Mr. Diniz that whereas the trial Court prior to the amendment had jurisdiction in terms of sub-rule (b) of Rule 1 to try the suit under summary procedure it had ceased to have jurisdiction after the amendment as the trial Court was not notified by the High Court as being empowered under the amended sub-rule (b) of Rule 1. Though the instant suit had been filed prior to the amendment, the amendment is in respect of a procedural law and hence the amendment will have retrospective effect and therefore on April 14, 1987 when the plaintiff filed its application for summons for judgment it would be the amended procedure which would operate. Since the trial Court is not a notified Court in terms of sub-rule (b) the entire proceedings under Order XXXVII, Rule 1 are without jurisdiction and hence the impugned decree is liable to be set aside. 5. Mr. Thali, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, has, on the other hand, sought to support the impugned Decree by contending that the law existing on the date of the filing of the suit will govern the conduct of the suit and any amendment which seeks to take away a right vested in the plaintiff to a summary and speedy trial as provided under Order XXXVII cannot be applied retrospectively as the same will divest vested rights of the plaintiff. 6. In order to decide the controversy raised, it will be useful to refer to certain decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the contending parties. In the case of (J.M.P. Dias v. Dena Bank and another)1, 1989(2) Goa Law Times 146 it has been observed by a learned Single Judge of this Court as under :-- "2. As regards the first submission of the appellant, it is pertinent to note that the Bombay High Court amendment to Rule 1 of Order XXXVII was not in force at the relevant time of the filing of the suit. In fact, the suit was filed on 15th June, 1983, and the notification bringing into force the aforesaid amendment was published in the Official Gazette only in the year 1987. In fact, the suit was filed on 15th June, 1983, and the notification bringing into force the aforesaid amendment was published in the Official Gazette only in the year 1987. In the said Notification, it is specifically stated that the aforesaid Amendment would come into effect from 1st April, 1987, although the said Amendment had come into force within the territory of the State of Maharashtra on 1st October, 1983. The suit was disposed of by the trial Court by Judgment and decree dated 13th January, 1986, i.e. much before the coming into force in this State of the aforesaid Amendment to Rule 1 of Order XXXVII. On basis of this background of facts, Mr. U.S. Kolwalkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 submitted that the suit was entirely competent and there is no question whatsoever of setting aside the decree on that count. He further submitted that the said Amendment is prospective in nature, and obviously, is not attracted and cannot be applied to suits filed much before its coming into force. In any event, by virtue of the provision of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, whatever was done under the law which was prevailing before it, is saved. Mr. Khandeaparkar, however, countered by saying that an appeal is continuation of the suit, and therefore, the arguments advanced by Mr. Kolwalkar have no force. He urged that Rule 1 of Order XXXVII is merely a procedural provision of law and no party has right to a particular procedure to vindicate his rights. Thus, according to Mr. Khandeaparkar, the said Amendment is to be applied with immediate effect and the result therefore is that the decree has to be set aside, especially because no notification empowering the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Mapusa, to deal with the summary suits was issued. 3. There is no doubt whatsoever that an appeal is the continuation of the suit, and therefore, a matter that has been decided by the trial Court but which is pending in appeal cannot be set (sic) to be finally determined. The amended procedural law, therefore, applies to such proceedings but one has to bear in mind that the question which falls for determination is not whether a case is finally disposed of or whether the appeal is continuation of the suit. The amended procedural law, therefore, applies to such proceedings but one has to bear in mind that the question which falls for determination is not whether a case is finally disposed of or whether the appeal is continuation of the suit. In fact, the questions that fall for determination are touching the effects which a modification of the procedural law have in the said proceedings which are pending before the appellate Court. Is the law as modified or amended to be applied retrospectively in such a manner that even acts done under the law which was prevailing before become void? Or, are the acts upto the coming into force of the amendment of the procedural law saved? The answer to this question can, in my view, be only one and that is the acts done regularly under the procedural law which was prevailing and committed upto the time of coming into force of the Amendment, are saved. This is the natural sequitor of the provision of section 6 of the General Clauses Act which, inter alia, provides that whether the said Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the Act, repeals any enactment made or to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. The view I am taking is fortified by the dictum of the Supreme Court in (N.G. Mitra v. State of Bihar)2, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1636. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after quoting from (King v. Chandra Dharma)3, 1905(2) K.B. 335, observed that it is clear that as a general rule, the amended law relating to procedure operates retrospectively. But there is another equally important principle, viz., that a statute should not be so construed as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the amending Act came into force. But there is another equally important principle, viz., that a statute should not be so construed as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the amending Act came into force. The Supreme Court observed that the same principle is embodied in section 6 of the General Clauses Act and then held that the effect of the application of this principle is that pending cases, although instituted under the old law but still pending, are governed by the new procedure under the amended law, but whatever procedure was correctly adopted and concluded under the old law cannot be opened again for the purpose of applying the new procedure. Now, in the present case, the suit was filed on 15th June, 1983 and decreed by the trial Court on 13th January, 1986. The Bombay High Court amendment to Rule 1 of Order XXXVII, C.P.C. came into effect in the State of Goa only on 1st April, 1987, although it had come into force within the State of Maharashtra from 1st October, 1983. The proceedings had, therefore, been instituted and concluded in the trial Court much before the said Amendment came into force. It was only at the appellate stage that the said Amendment became effective, and therefore, the effect thereof is only from 1st April, 1987. Whatever was done prior to that is not affected and is saved. The first submission of Mr. Khandeaparkar, therefore, fails." In the aforesaid case the suit had been filed and decided before the amendment of Order XXXVII, Rule 1 of the Code. Hence an amendment brought into force pending the appeal could not vitiate a decree which was passed by a Court having jurisdiction to pass the same. In the instant case the amendment has come into force pending the suit and the question to be decided is whether the suit will be governed by the amended provisions or the unamended one. In this context a reference can usefully be made to the case of (Nani Gopal Mitra v. State of Bihar)4, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1636 which has been referred in the aforesaid case. In the said aforesaid case it has, inter alia, been observed as under :--- "5. In this context a reference can usefully be made to the case of (Nani Gopal Mitra v. State of Bihar)4, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1636 which has been referred in the aforesaid case. In the said aforesaid case it has, inter alia, been observed as under :--- "5. It was in the first place contended on behalf of the appellant that section 5(3) of the Act was repealed by Parliament while the appeal was pending in the High Court and the presumption enacted in section 5(3) of the Act was not available to the prosecuting authorities after the repeal of the sub-section on December 18, 1964. The argument was stressed that it was not open to the High Court to invoke the presumption contained in section 5(3) of the Act in considering the case against the appellant. It was also said that the presumption contained in section 5(3) of the Act was a rule of procedural law and not a rule of substantive law and alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective in character unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be. It was, therefore, submitted that the judgment of the High Court was defective in law as it applied to the present case the presumption contained in section 5(3) of the Act even after its repeal. We are unable to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant as correct. It is true that as a general rule alterations in the form of procedure are retrospective in character unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be. In (James Gardner v. Edward A. Lucas)5, (1878)3 A.C. 582 at p. 603, Lord Blackburn stated: "Now the general rule, not merely of England and Scotland, but, I believe, of every civilized nation, is expressed in the maxim, "Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis'---prima facie, any new law that is made affects future transactions, not past ones. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the subject-matter of an Act might be such that, though there were not any express words to show it, it might be retrospective. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the subject-matter of an Act might be such that, though there were not any express words to show it, it might be retrospective. For instance, I think it is perfectly settled that if the legislature intended to frame a new procedure, that instead of proceeding in this form or that, you should proceed in another and a different way, clearly there by gone transaction are to be sued for and enforced according to the new form of procedure. Alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be. Then, again, I think that where alterations are made in matters of evidence, certainly upon the reason of the thing, and I think upon the authorities also, those are retrospective, whether civil or criminal." In the King v. Chandra Dharma, (1905)2 K.B. 335, Lord Alverstone, C.J., observed as follows : "The rule is clearly established that, apart from any special circumstances appearing on the face of the statute in question, statutes which make alterations in procedure are retrospective. It has been held that a statute shortening the time within which proceedings can be taken is retrospective (The Ydun, 1899 p. 236), and it seems to me that it is impossible to give any good reason why a statute extending the time within which proceedings may be taken should not also be held to be retrospective. If the case could have been brought within the principle that unless the language is clear a statute ought not to be construed so as to create new disabilities or obligations, or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time when the Act came into force. Mr. Compton Smith would have been entitled to succeed; but when no new disability or obligation has been created by the statute, but it only alters the time within which proceedings may be taken, it may be held to apply to offences completed before the statute was passed. That is the case here." It is therefore clear that as a general rule the amended law relating to procedure operates retrospectively. That is the case here." It is therefore clear that as a general rule the amended law relating to procedure operates retrospectively. But there is another equally important principle, viz., that a statute should not be so construed as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the amending Act came into force (See In re a Debtor)6, 1936 Ch. 237 and (In re Vernazza)7, 1960 A.C. 965). The same principle is embodied in section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which is to the following effect : "6. Effect of repeal.---Where, this Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not--- x x x x x x x x x (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or x x x x x x x x x (c) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." 6. The effect of the application of this principle is that pending cases, although instituted under the old Act but still pending, are governed by the new procedure under the amended law, but whatever procedure was correctly adopted and concluded under the old law cannot be opened again for the purpose of applying the new procedure." The above decision, in our view, clinches the issue. The decision provides that pending cases although instituted under old Act but still pending are governed by the new procedure under the amended law and whatever procedure was correctly adopted and concluded under the old law cannot be reopened for the purpose of applying a new procedure. In the instant case though the trial Court had jurisdiction to try the suit summarily on the date when the suit was filed it ceased to have the said jurisdiction by virtue of the amendment. Hence the trial Court was bound to follow the amended provisions for the trial and disposal of the suit. In the instant case though the trial Court had jurisdiction to try the suit summarily on the date when the suit was filed it ceased to have the said jurisdiction by virtue of the amendment. Hence the trial Court was bound to follow the amended provisions for the trial and disposal of the suit. The provision is a procedural provision and does not deal with substantive rights as is sought to be contended by Mr. Thali. The amendment would therefore be retrospective in nature and will govern the conduct of the suit. The trial Court was therefore in error in proceeding with the suit under the unamended provision of Order XXXVII, Rule 1 of the Code. 7. Faced with this predicament Mr. Thali tried to salvage his position by placing reliance on the case of (New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra)8, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 237. The case related to amendments brought about in the Motor Vehicles Act which, inter alia, pertains to establishment of Accident Tribunals and which confers jurisdiction on them by ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. In the above case the Supreme Court observed :--- "5. On the plain language of sections 110-A and 110-F there should be no difficulty in taking the view that the change in law was merely a change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is a well-established proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action, or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective. The expression "arising out of an accident" occurring in sub-section (1) and "over the area in which the accident occurred", mentioned in sub-section (2) clearly show that the change of forum was meant to be operative retrospectively irrespective of the fact as to when the accident occurred. To that extent there was no difficulty in giving the answer in a simple way. To that extent there was no difficulty in giving the answer in a simple way. But the provision of limitation of 60 days contained in sub-section (3) created an obstacle in the straight application of the well-established principle of law. If the accident had occurred within 60 days prior to the constitution of the Tribunal then the bar of limitation provided in sub-section (3) was not an impediment. An application to the Tribunal could be said to be the only remedy. If such an application, due to one reason or the other, could not be made within 60 days then the Tribunal had the power to condone the delay under the proviso. But if the accident occurred more than 60 days before the constitution of the Tribunal then the bar of limitation provided in sub-section (3) of section 110-A on its face was attracted. This difficulty of limitation led most of the High Courts to fall back upon the proviso and say that such a case will be a fit one where the Tribunal would be able to condone the delay under the proviso to sub-section (3), and led others to say that the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to entertain such an application and the remedy of going to the Civil Court in such a situation was not barred under section 110-F of the Act. 10. Appropos the bar of limitation provided in section 110-A(3), one can say, on the basis of the authorities aforesaid, that strictly speaking, the bar does not operate in relation to an application for compensation arising out of an accident which occurred prior to the constitution of the Claims Tribunal. But since in such a case there is a change of forum, unlike the fact of the said cases, the reasonable view to take would be that such an application can be filed within a reasonable time of the constitution of the Tribunal, which ordinarily and generally, would be the time of limitation mentioned in sub-section (3). But since in such a case there is a change of forum, unlike the fact of the said cases, the reasonable view to take would be that such an application can be filed within a reasonable time of the constitution of the Tribunal, which ordinarily and generally, would be the time of limitation mentioned in sub-section (3). If the application could not be made within that time from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal, in a given case, the further time taken in the making of the application may be held to be the reasonable time on the facts of that case for the making of the application or the delay made after the expiry of the period of limitation provided in sub-section (3) from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal can be condoned under the proviso to that sub-section. In any view of the matter, in our opinion, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted as soon as the Claims Tribunal is constituted and the filing of the application before the Tribunal is the only remedy available to the claimant. On the facts of this case, we hold that the remedy available to the respondents was to go before the Claims Tribunal and since the law was not very clear on the point, the time of about four months taken in approaching the Tribunal after its constitution can be held to be either a reasonable time or the delay of less than 2 months could well be condoned under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 110-A." In the aforesaid case the accident in question had occurred on September 11, 1966. By virtue of Article 82 of the Limitation Act the legal representatives of the deceased had a cause of action to sue for compensation within a period of 2 years of the occurrence of the accident but in the meantime the Government constituted a Claims Tribunal under section 110 of the Act by a Notification published in the Official Gazette on March 18, 1967. The heirs filed an application under section 110-A on July 8, 1967. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the application was put in question and it was found that by virtue of the amendment as soon as a Claims Tribunal was constituted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred by section 110-F of the Act. The heirs filed an application under section 110-A on July 8, 1967. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the application was put in question and it was found that by virtue of the amendment as soon as a Claims Tribunal was constituted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred by section 110-F of the Act. It would thus appear that on the aforesaid facts the filing of the application before the Tribunal, which was filed after the establishment of the Claims Tribunal, was found to be justified. In our judgment the aforesaid decision rather than furthering the contention of Mr. Thali, supports the one advanced by Mr. Diniz. 8. Mr. Thali next relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of (Eknath Kira Akhadkar and another v. The Administrative Tribunal and others)9, 1990(1) Goa Law Times 271. The case relates to an Amendment brought about in section 22(3) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 which provides for an issue of a notice before filing of a suit for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. It has been observed : "5. In all the proceedings which gave rise to these appeals the landlords have contended that the respective tenant has been in arrears of rent for a total period of three months. Under the unamended section 22(2)(a), the tenant is liable to be evicted in case of such arrears. The amendment, however, has made a provision that the tenant should not only be in arrears as above but he should have failed to pay such arrears within 30 days of the receipt of the notice or of the refusal of the registered notice served on him. It is not disputed that at the time when the proceedings under appeal were filed before the Rent Controller there was no such necessity of giving such notice, and consequently the landlord has not given any such notice. That necessity of notice has been introduced during the pendency of the proceedings. The contention of the tenant, however, is that this amendment of 1976 is retrospective in operation and that the proceedings initiated by the landlords are liable to be dismissed as they have not given any notice as contemplated by the amended provision. That necessity of notice has been introduced during the pendency of the proceedings. The contention of the tenant, however, is that this amendment of 1976 is retrospective in operation and that the proceedings initiated by the landlords are liable to be dismissed as they have not given any notice as contemplated by the amended provision. As against this, the submission on behalf of the landlords is that this amendment is of prospective nature and that it would not be applicable to those proceedings which were already initiated before the amendment came into force. Section 22(2)(a) gives a ground to the landlord for evicting his tenant. It would be very difficult for the appellants to contend that such a provision is a procedural one. In fact section 22(2)(a) creates a right in favour of the landlords and as such it is a substantive provision. It is a fundamental rule of law that no Act can be construed to have a retrospective effect unless such a construction appears clearly from the provisions of the Act or it arises by necessary implication. Normally, retrospective operation is not possible so as to impair the existing right or obligation unless the legislature has otherwise specifically or by implication provided to the contrary. Similarly if a substantive law is altered during the pendency of a litigation, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as was in force when the proceedings have been started. Of course, this is subject to an express or implied provision to the contrary. These are the basic principles. They have also been incorporated in section 6 of the General Clauses Act. An amendment has, to a certain extent, an effect of repeal of the existing law. Section 6 provides that such a repeal, unless a different intention appears, shall not affect any rights, privileges and obligations or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred. Similarly that section provides that such a repeal will not affect any legal proceeding in respect of such right, privilege, obligation or liability. Such a proceeding has to be continued as if there is no repeal or amendment. It is material to note that the Amending Act of 1976 does not expressly state that the amendment would have retrospective operation. 6. Such a proceeding has to be continued as if there is no repeal or amendment. It is material to note that the Amending Act of 1976 does not expressly state that the amendment would have retrospective operation. 6. The contention on behalf of the appellants, however, is that the very purpose of the Act and the scheme thereof would suggest that the amendment would be retrospective in operation. Thus the submission is that there is an implicit intention to make the amendment retrospective in operation. It is true that the Act is for the purpose of controlling the general rights of the landlord to evict his tenant. Our attention is drawn to the objects and reasons for introducing the amendment. Those objects amongst other things state that there should be a provision for relief against eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent. However, the object of introducing the bill cannot have much relevance while deciding as to whether the provisions of the enactments are prospective or retrospective. 13. It would thus be clear that the above-mentioned decisions lay down a principle that implied retrospective operation is permissible only if the main act and the amendment thereof disclose the legislative intention in this respect. We have already discussed the provisions of the Goa Rent Act and the amendment to section 22(1)(a) and have found that the Act and the amendment do not permit the giving of the retrospective effect to the amendment by implication. Obviously, there is no express provision for such a purpose. The net result, therefore, is that the 1976 amendment to section 22(1)(a) (which introduces a need of giving one month's notice before filing of the suit) would not apply to the proceedings that were already pending before the amendment came into force." 9. The above case it is apparent does not deal with an amendment in respect of procedural law. The amendment was in respect of substantive law. It related to the right of landlords to seek eviction on complying with certain conditions. Such an amendment will always be prospective unless the same is made retrospective by necessary intendment or by necessary implication. In the instant case we are concerned with an amendment which is procedural in nature. It does not deal with substantive rights of the parties and hence the same will have retrospective operation. 10. Mr. Such an amendment will always be prospective unless the same is made retrospective by necessary intendment or by necessary implication. In the instant case we are concerned with an amendment which is procedural in nature. It does not deal with substantive rights of the parties and hence the same will have retrospective operation. 10. Mr. Thali next relied upon the case of (The Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarni and others)10, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 794. The case related to repeal of section 153(C) of the Companies Act, 1913 which before its deletion gave certain rights to the shareholders of the company to put the company as well as its Directors and Managing Agents under certain liabilities. An application in that case was made before the provision was deleted. After the repeal of the 1913 Act and enactment of the Companies Act of 1956, which came into force on April 1, 1956, the Company and its Directors on June 28, 1956 made an application for dismissal of the application filed under section 153-C of 1913 Act on the ground that on the repeal of that Act the Court had ceased to have jurisdiction to deal with it. In this context the Supreme Court has observed thus :--- "4, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act provides that where an Act is repealed, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right or liability acquired or incurred under the repealed enactment or any legal proceeding in respect of such right or liability and the legal proceeding may be continued as if the repealing Act had not been passed. There is no dispute that section 153-C of the Act of 1913 gave certain rights to the shareholders of a company and put the company as also its directors and managing agents under certain liabilities. The application under that section was for enforcement of these rights and liabilities. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would therefore preserve the rights and liabilities created by section 153-C of the Act of 1913 and a continuance of the proceeding in respect thereof would be competent in spite of the repeal of the Act of 1913, unless of course a different intention could be gathered." 11. This again was a case which related to substantive rights. This again was a case which related to substantive rights. The amendment would therefore operate prospectively and the same cannot be made retrospective and hence the right already vested in the share-holders for making an application under section 153-C of the 1913 Act could not be divested by the amendment. This case also therefore does not further the submissions advanced by Mr. Thali. 12. Mr. Thali next relied upon an unreported decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of (Union of India and others v. K.S. Mamadapur and Brothers)11, (Civil Revision Application No. 29 of 1988) decided by Dr. G.F. Couto, J., on November 4, 1988. The case related to an amendment of section 26 of the Civil Courts Act brought about by the Goa, Daman and Diu Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 1987. It has been observed thus :--- "6. The unamended sub-section (1) of section 26 of the Civil Courts Act reads as under :--- "No Court other than the District Court shall receive or register any suit in which the Central Government or the Administrator or the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu or any officer of the Government in his official capacity, is a party." By virtue of the 1987 Amendment, the aforesaid provision of law now reads as under :--- "No Court other than the Court of a Senior Civil Judge shall receive or register any suit in which the Central Government or the Administrator or the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu or any officer of the Government in his official capacity is a party." Prior to the amendment suits against the Government and its officers were maintainable in District Courts. By the amendment such suits were made triable by the Courts of Civil Judge, Senior Division. By the 1987 Amendment Section 26 of the Civil Courts Act was amended whereby the expression 'District Court' was substituted by the words 'Court of a Senior Civil Judge'. The question before the Court was whether suits already instituted in a District Court prior to the amendment were required to be continued in the District Court or were required to be transferred to the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division. The question before the Court was whether suits already instituted in a District Court prior to the amendment were required to be continued in the District Court or were required to be transferred to the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division. In the context it has been observed that jurisdiction conferred on a Court can be ousted only if there is a specific provision in the Act or such ouster has necessarily to be implied. If the intendment of the legislature had been to oust the jurisdiction of the District Court to try and dispose of pending suits, an express provision would have been made but that was not done nor that is to be inferred by necessary implication. Hence the only inference to be drawn was that the pending suits were to continue with the District Courts and that the fresh suits of the kind be filed, registered and disposed of in the Courts of Civil Judge, Senior Division. It is thereafter observed :--- "It is thus clear that the Amendment made is restricted to the substitution of the expression "District Court" by the expression "Court of a Senior Civil Judge" and though the Legislature was fully aware that suits of the kind were pending before the District Courts and what was the mischief intended to be removed, no reference at all was made to such suits in the amendment nor it can be said by necessary implication that pending suits were brought under the sweep of the 1987 Amendment. It would thus prima facie appear that what the Legislature had in mind while amending the aforesaid section 26(1) of the Civil Courts Act was only to establish a new forum for the fresh suits and not for the pending suits. But nowhere it is stated and clarified that the amendment would also cover the already pending suits or whether it would solely govern the receiving and registering of fresh suits of the kind, although this was manifestly necessary. Was the overburden on the District Court sought to be removed by taking away from such Court only the fresh suits of the kind or also those which were already pending before it? This question was kept wide open in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. Was the overburden on the District Court sought to be removed by taking away from such Court only the fresh suits of the kind or also those which were already pending before it? This question was kept wide open in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. Therefore, for all these reasons, I am of the firm view that the 1987 Amendment is applicable only to the fresh suits and hence, the District Courts continue to have jurisdiction to try and dispose of those which were pending at the time of the coming into force of the said Amendment." 13. The issue which arose in the above case was in relation to pending suits and it has been held that the jurisdiction of the District Court by virtue of the Amendment had not divested the said Court of its jurisdiction. Such suits were, therefore, not liable to be transferred but were held to be cognizable by the District Court. In our view the aforesaid case can have no application to the present case. 14. The last case relied upon by Mr. Thali is the case of (Garikapati Vereaya v. N. Subhiah Choudhry and others)12, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 540 wherein it is observed :- The legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the list commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. Where the suit was instituted on April 22, 1949, the right of appeal vested in the parties thereto at that date and is to be governed by the law as it prevailed on that date, that is to say, on that date the parties acquired the right, if unsuccessful, to go up in appeal from the sub-Court to the High Court and from the High Court to the Federal Court under the Federal Court (Enlargement of jurisdiction) Act, 1947 read with Clause 39 of the Letters Patent (Mad.) and sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided the conditions thereof were satisfied, unless that right had been taken away expressly or by necessary intendment by any subsequent enactment. It is erroneous, to say that the language of Article 133 impliedly takes away the right of appeal. In construing the articles of the Constitution courts must bear in mind a cardinal rule of construction that statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested right. The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed. In the next place Courts must take into account the surrounding circumstances that existed at the time when the Constitution makers framed the Constitution and for which provision had to be made by them. In construing the Articles relating to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court it is well to remember the several categories of persons who were at the date of the Constitution, interested in the right of appeal from judgments, decrees or final orders of a High Court to a superior court in one way or another." This again is a case which pertains to a substantive right and will not assist Mr. Thali as the present case relates to procedural law. 15. Mr. Thali has sought to urge that the right of a plaintiff to sue in a summary fashion under Order XXXVII, Rule 1 should be held to be a substantive right. Thali as the present case relates to procedural law. 15. Mr. Thali has sought to urge that the right of a plaintiff to sue in a summary fashion under Order XXXVII, Rule 1 should be held to be a substantive right. It is not possible to accede to the submission. The provision is purely in respect of a procedure for conduct of a suit. The rule provides for a procedure to be followed in suits filed on bills of exchange and the like and in respect of suits which have been specified in sub-rule (2) of Rule 1. It is therefore not possible to accede to the contention that the said provision relates to substantive rights. The contention of Mr. Thali in that behalf is therefore rejected. 16. In the result we find that the trial Court was in error in proceeding with the present suit under the provisions of Order XXXVII, Rule 1. The judgment and decree impugned in the appeal is therefore liable to be set aside. The matter is remanded to the trial Court for a re-trial under the procedure for trial of regular suits. The appeal is allowed. Since the suit is of the year 1986, the hearing of the suit is expedited and is directed to be disposed of within a period of one year. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.