JUDGMENT The instant revisional application is directed against Order No. 126 dated 9.2.1995 passed by the 2nd Court of the learned Assistant District Judge at Alipore in Misc. Case No. 29 of 1993. The said misc. case arises out of a proceeding on an application under Order 21, Rules 99, 100 and 101 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The admitted position is that the plaintiff/opposite party No. 1 is a retired employee of proforma defendant/opposite party No. 10 being India Foils Limited. The said opposite party No. 1 was provided with an accommodation in the suit premises as a licencee by the proforma defendant/opposite party No. 10 as an amenity attached to his services. In the original petition leading to the initiation of the misc. case, the said opposite party No. 1 has also asserted that he came into possession of the said premises as Chief Executive of proforma defendant/opposite party No. 10 India Foils Limited and he subsequently rose up to the position of the President of the said company. The said opposite party No. 1 has further asserted that he was let into possession of the suit premises pursuant to an agreement entered into between the said opposite party and the company, as a result of which he was provided with an accommodation and it was further mentioned therein that the same would be allowed to be enjoyed by him till he was offered an alternative accommodation. The suit property which is being occupied by the plaintiff/opposite party No. 1 in his capacity as licencee of the tenant inducted in the suit premises but the said opposite party continued to remain in possession even after his retirement from service and/or exit from the company. In respect of the suit property, there was a suit filed in the 2nd Court of Assistant District Judge at Alipore being Title Suit No. 136 of 1986 for specific performance of an agreement against the predecessor-in-interest of the opposite party Nos. 7, 8 and 9 since deceased. The said suit was decreed on contest sometime on 18.11.1991. The decree in question was put into execution in Title Execution Case No. 4 of 1992 before the same Court and a writ of delivery of possession was ultimately issued. 7, 8 and 9 since deceased. The said suit was decreed on contest sometime on 18.11.1991. The decree in question was put into execution in Title Execution Case No. 4 of 1992 before the same Court and a writ of delivery of possession was ultimately issued. It was averred in the revisional application that execution was completed with the help of the bailiff and possession was delivered in favour of the nominees who are figuring as opposite party Nos. 3 to 6 in this proceeding. Simultaneously with delivery of possession it is averred in the revisional petition that an Indenture of Lease was entered into between the parties and the revisionist petitioner was inducted as a lessee of the suit premises at a monthly charge of Rs. 10,000/- payable according to the English Calendar month. 2. That in the parent petition leading to the initiation of the connected misc. case, it was specific case made out by the petitioner in the said misc. case that he was provided with residential accommodation as a benefit attached to his services. The Court by way of elicitation of enquiry came to know from Mr. M.L. Bhattacharya, the learned Advocate of the plaintiff/opposite party No. 1 that he would be prepared to pay rent to the proforma opposite party No. 10. The Court was bit perplexed to take note of the readiness of the plaintiff/opposite party No. 1 to pay the rent payable by India Foils Limited to the landlord which could not be reconciled with the stand taken by the said opposite party that his lien of occupation on the premises is continuing. After the decree passed in the aforesaid suit for specific performance was executed, the said opposite party No. 1 filed the instant misc. case. The said defendant/opposite party No. 1 appears to have been attempted to be dispossessed from the suit premises in execution of the earlier suit as referred to above for specific performance where the plaintiff/opposite party No. 1 was not figuring as a party. After the suit for specific performance was decreed, the proforma defendant/opposite party No. 10 came to an understanding with the then landlords of the premises and they recognised the said landlords as lawful landlords of 16, Mayfair Road, Calcutta under whom the proforma defendant/opposite party No. 10 was figuring as a tenant. After the suit for specific performance was decreed, the proforma defendant/opposite party No. 10 came to an understanding with the then landlords of the premises and they recognised the said landlords as lawful landlords of 16, Mayfair Road, Calcutta under whom the proforma defendant/opposite party No. 10 was figuring as a tenant. The said company has accepted not only the relationship of the parties as landlord and tenant and they wanted to extricate themselves from the course of marathon process of manifold offshoots of litigations. Accordingly, the said company surrendered their tenancy in favour of the then landlords which would be appearing from the letter dated 8.10.1993 addressed by the Secretary of the company which is marked as annexure 'D' to the original revision petition. The same appears to be followed by adoption of resolution passed by the Board of Directors of India Foils Limited at their meeting held on 10.12.1993 where the company took the definite stand that it had not sublet or underlet or assign any right, of the tenancy to anybody. The company also noted the factum of surrender of the tenancy in favour of the landlords and it also recorded that the company's possession was recovered by the owners apart from the resolution regarding the factum of surrender. It is also further mentioned therein that no employee of the company, past or present, has any right, title or interest in the said premises. In terms of the communication made by the company on 8.10.1993, the said company has not only abandoned its claim in respect of the property in question but also wanted itself to be exonerated from the liability of payments of rent since possession was parted with in favour of the owners. In the backdrop of the same: in the petition for misc. case arising under Order 21, Rules 99, 100 and 101, prayers were made therein for declaration of the right and interest of the said defendant/opposite party No. 1 vis-a-vis the right of the India Foils Limited and entitlement of the said opposite party to be in occupation of possession of the same suit premises and restoration of possession forthwith. The nature of the original misc. case, according to Mr. The nature of the original misc. case, according to Mr. Bachwat, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the said defendant/ opposite party No. 1, is to be taken as a proceeding under Order 21, Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Bachwat, the learned Counsel, has further elaborated his contention by saying that Rule 99 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives right to any person other than the judgment debtor if he is dispossessed from the immovable property. In this context, a reference may be made to a salient piece of the argument advanced by Mr. S.P. Roy Chowdhury, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, that Rule 99 of Order 21 is required to be read further in terms of the provision when dispossession will take place by the holder of a decree for possession of such property. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, such question will be required to be determined in accordance with Rule 101 of Order 21 as aforesaid but the applicant in misc. case must assert against the act of the decree holder seeking adjudication. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the prayer in the misc. case as couched would indicate that in a proceeding under Rule 99 of Order 21, a relief is prayed for declaration of the right in interest of the petitioner not only vis-a-vis the decree holder or the owner of the properly but also adjudication of the right of the India Foils Limited. India Foils Limited who is in actual constructive possession has not come forward in the misc. case. The said defendant/opposite party No. 1 has never asserted his independent right nor he has put forwards claim as a tresspasser to the property but he has all along been trying to take refuge under the umbrella of the protection of the original tenant India Foils Limited wherein he is living as a licencee. This, according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, is not a case set up by a third party by way of assertion of independent right or right of hostility of lawful claim but as a licencee of a person in the eye of law being in actual physical possession. According to Mr. This, according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, is not a case set up by a third party by way of assertion of independent right or right of hostility of lawful claim but as a licencee of a person in the eye of law being in actual physical possession. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the same does not come within the purview of Order 21, Rule 99 and as such the said question namely which has been espoused for determination of rights of India Foils Limited do not come within the ambit of all questions as contemplated under Rule 101 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defendant/opposite party No. 1 ought to have asked for determination of a question relating to his independent right, title or interest in the property only vis-a-vis the decree bolder but not vis-a-vis India Foils Limited. Mr. Roy Chowdhury is right to elaborate the submissions of Dr. Monotosh Mukherjee by contending with force that the proceeding itself in the nature of initiation of a misc. case is misconceived. 3. In the backdrop of the same, series of applications are being filed by the petitioner and all the petitions are for interim relief of restoration of possession. The learned Judge by the impugned order refuses to consider the said successive petitions for restoration of possession in the suit property till the disposal of the matter namely the misc., case and has further ordered rejection of the said petition on contest. Dr. Monotosh Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has assailed the said order as for not being backed up by proper reason and further grievances were made before this Court that the order impugned bespeaks of complete non-application of mind on the part of the adjudicating authority. Dr. Mukherjee has referred to in this context and has relied upon the case of (1) Vasuja Viswanath Saraf v. New Education Institute & Ors., reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court page 2105 and it has been quoted by Dr. Dr. Mukherjee has referred to in this context and has relied upon the case of (1) Vasuja Viswanath Saraf v. New Education Institute & Ors., reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court page 2105 and it has been quoted by Dr. Mukherjee that when there is statutory provision for appeal to the higher Court in the hierarchy of Courts in order to enable the superior Court or the Appellate Court to know or to be apprised of the reasons which impel the Court to pass the order in question, the recording of reasons in disposing of those applications is a mandatory requirement to be fulfilled in consonance with the principle of natural justice. It is no answer at all to this legal proposition that for the purpose of expeditious disposal of cases a laconic order like 'dismissed' or 'rejected' will be made without passing a reasoned order or a speaking order. Dr. Mukherjee has further contended that there is intrinsic inconsistency between the impugned order and the order passed on an earlier occasion being Order No. 57 dated 17.1.1994. Non disposal of the said petitions in succession in accordance with law on merits is likely to make them infructuous. The said petitions have been kept pending in the file of the Court from the end of 1993 onwards. A further reference was made to Order No. 52 dated 20.12.1993 passed by the Trial Court wherefrom it appears that a special officer was appointed at the material point of time at a tentative remuneration of Rs. 5,001/- for the time being and the said special officer was further authorised to appoint a clerk to help him. While disposing of the petition under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Trial Court has allowed continuation of posting of police in the suit premises till 27.1.1994 which would be borne by the defendant/opposite party No. 1. This Court has been apprised that the order of police posting by the Court is continuing even as on this date, as a result of which huge accumulations of dues on account of police help was there to the tune of more than Rs. 8 lacs. This Court has been apprised that the order of police posting by the Court is continuing even as on this date, as a result of which huge accumulations of dues on account of police help was there to the tune of more than Rs. 8 lacs. This Court has been further apprised that now in order to reduce the load of financial liability, lessor number of police personnel are posted at the site, as a result of which there is a recurring liability of payments on account of police cost at the rate of Rs. 1,400/- per day. An apprehension has been expressed on behalf of the petitioner that it may escalate into a staggering figure and that may encumber the property. It has been pointed out that insistence was made for disposal of successive petitions for recovery of possession in the pendency of the misc. case so that the property in question may not be burdened with onerous liability. It has been contended by Dr. Mukherjee that on a speculative misc. case which is doubtful as to whether the same can be maintained, property should not have been allowed to be encumbered. However, Sri Mihir Lal Bhattacharjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant/opposite party No. 1, has submitted in this context that the application for considering the apportionment and fixation of financial liability on account of police help is under consideration before the Trial Court and there is no knowing as to how the liability will be affixed on the respective parties. Mr. Bhattacharjee also tried to make desperate submission that it may be possible in the event if it is held that posting of police is necessary in the suit property to prevent breach of peace then it ought to have been the liability of the State. In a proceeding under the relevant provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such orders can be passed only on apprehension of disturbance of public tranquility. But here in this case, in a civil adjudication arising out of a private property police posting was necessary and if it could not be directed to be borne by the State then property would likely be encumbered. But here in this case, in a civil adjudication arising out of a private property police posting was necessary and if it could not be directed to be borne by the State then property would likely be encumbered. The defendant/opposite party No. 1, in the considered opinion of this Court for ends of justice, should not be allowed to pursue merely with speculative litigation by encumbering the suit property with huge liability of encumbrance over the same in terms of financial commitment. Mr. Bhattacharjee, on behalf of his client, did not agree to put any substantial portion of amount in Court by way of security deposit so that the escalating financial liability on account of police cost can be taken care of. This Court while considering a revisional application and being alive to the entire scope of the present amended provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is of the view that for ends of justice and to prevent irreparable harm or prejudice to the suit property, the same should not be allowed to be clouded by uncertainty of financial commitment. The learned Judge of the Court below seems to have missed the vital aspect of the matter on this count and the said oversight has resulted in material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction because of non-disposal of pending petitions for restoration of possession in accordance with law during the pendency of the misc. case. The said non-appreciation of an important facet of the controversy may eat into the very vitals of the foundation of the order impugned and the same may appear to be tinctured with irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction resulting in material failure of justice. On the said consideration alone, the impugned order is liable to be interfered with as this Court is in agreement with Dr. Mukherjee's submission that the order under challenge speaks of complete non application of mind on the part of the learned Judge. Interim order is always in the aid of the final order in a pending lis but here refusal to consider the question of feasibility of passing interim order may not only affect the final order in the pending lis but it may expose the property covered in the suit to the risk of irreparable damage which may not be retrieved. 4. Dr. 4. Dr. Monotosh Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, being ably assisted by Sri Shyama Prosanna Roy Chowdhury, has addressed this Court at length on the scope of Order 21, Rules 99 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this context, a catina of cases have been referred to by Dr. Mukherjee starting from cases reported in (2) AIR 1964 Allahabad page 302, AIR 1980 M.P. page 146 and also reliance was placed with regard to a judgment reported in (3) 1995 Volume I CHN page 417. There has been much dilation about the effect of amendment introduced to the relevant provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the scope of controversy and analysis was made about construction of Order 21, Rules 99 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this context references were made to some of the judgments even under Rule 97 of Order 21 and the same have been attempted to be distinguished by Mr. Bachwat, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant/opposite party No. 1, that they are distinguishable as some of the cases cited are on Rule 97 and not on Rule 99 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same has been attempted to be controverted by Mr. Roy Chowdhury by drawing the attention of the Court to Rule 101 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it has been submitted that all questions relating to Rule 97 and/or Rule 99 are required to be resolved in accordance with Rule 101 and as such the same principle governing adjudication of Rule 97 should apply in case of Rule 99. This Court while considering the same cannot be oblivious of the implications of germane significance of the impugned order where non disposal of successive petitions for restoration of possession is likely to result in staggering accumulation of financial liability on account of police help due to the property. Still in view of elaborate submissions made by the respective sides on this facet, this Court is called upon to make a reference to the same in terms of the decisions cited above and also the distinctive features of the said decisions as attempted to be projected by Mr. Bachwat, the learned Counsel of the defendant/opposite party No. 1. Still in view of elaborate submissions made by the respective sides on this facet, this Court is called upon to make a reference to the same in terms of the decisions cited above and also the distinctive features of the said decisions as attempted to be projected by Mr. Bachwat, the learned Counsel of the defendant/opposite party No. 1. In the backdrop of the same, it is necessary to make reference to salient submissions made on behalf of the respective parties with regard to pith and content of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same is required to be adjudicated upon with regard to intrinsic questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In terms of the Order 21, Rule 35(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, possession is capable of being delivered by removing any person bound by the decree and the said decree is straightway not only capable of being executed but the person found in possession who is representing the judgment debtor can also be removed. Reference may be made in this context to a full bench decision in the case of (4) Smt. Usha Jain & Ors. v. Manmohan Bajaj & Anr. reported in AIR 1980 MP 146 (FB) and the relevant Rules being Rules 97 and 99 of Order 21 may be merely permissive and not mandatory and a decree holder cannot be forced to resort to it and may even apply for a warrant under Order 21, Rule 35. The omission by the executing Court to investigate into objection filed by a third party may not result in injustice to the third party if he is claiming his right, title and interest through judgment debtor. Here, in this case, the admitted position and pleading of the defendant/opposite party No. 1 is that be is a licencee and/or employee of India Foils Limited. The operative portion of Order 21, Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure as read contemplates of a person bound by a decree but not to a person who has put up an independent right as a third party. The operative portion of Order 21, Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure as read contemplates of a person bound by a decree but not to a person who has put up an independent right as a third party. There appears to be no convincing material in support of the defendant/opposite party No. 1's plea that he can get the benefit of compliance of rules as indicated hereinbefore by taking recourse to the paraphernalia of the said Rules provided he does not claim through the judgment debtor. Here, the admitted position is that defendant/opposite party No. 1 is creeping the head through the banner of the protective umbrella of the judgment debtor who is his employer, and/or licensor in the property. As such, this Court fails to understand the implication of the bone of contention as to how the defendant/opposite party No. 1 can take the benefit of Order 21, Rule 99 read with Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure when in terms of his own admitted pleadings, he is taking up the stand that he has been inducted through his licensor. The licensor, in this particular case, appears to be a tenant against whose landlord a decree of possession has been obtained and the said possession has been delivered through bailiff by legal process. The proforma/opposite party No. 10 has further made a categorical stand that it has surrendered its tenancy in favour of the landlord in order to extricate itself from liability of occupation charges and from the spate of litigations. In the said perspective a serious controversy has been attempted to be raised on behalf of the defendant/opposite party No. 1 as to whether the same is a valid surrender. Mr. Bachwat, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant/opposite party No. 1 has contended that surrender without actual physical delivery of possession or when surrender is not accompanied by delivery of possession, the same is an anachronism. According to Mr. Bachwat, the surrender of a property without accompanying delivery of possession is a contradiction in terms. In support of the same Mr. Bachwat has referred to Section 111(e) of the Transfer of Property Act in order to indicate the delivery of possession is necessary and insufficient notice to quit accepted by the landlord does not operate as a surrender if the lessee remains therein possession. Mr. In support of the same Mr. Bachwat has referred to Section 111(e) of the Transfer of Property Act in order to indicate the delivery of possession is necessary and insufficient notice to quit accepted by the landlord does not operate as a surrender if the lessee remains therein possession. Mr. Bachwat has also further tried to improve upon his legal submissions by making reference to FOA's General Law of Landlord and Tenant (8th Edition, Chapter IV, page 637) in order to contend that the surrender of a lease does not operate to extinguish the rights of the third persons not parties thereto who have acquired an interest under the lease before surrender. Mr. Bachwat has also referred to the case of (5) T.J. Parekh v. Lala Premchand reported in AIR 1950 Bombay page 89 and be has emphasised on that aspect of ratio where it has been laid down in the said judgment that in order to constitute surrender there must be delivery of possession by the tenant to the landlord and acceptance of possession by the landlords. In order to further strengthen the said contention, the learned counsel has also referred to and relied upon the case of (6) W. H. King v. Republic of India & Ors. reported in AIR 1956 Supreme Court page 156 and Mr. Bachwat has pointed out that surrender must be in favour of the lessor by mutual agreement between them. The relinquishment of possession must be to the lessor or one who holds its interest. A further reference has been made to the case of (7) Gostabehari Roy v. Ramesh Chandra reported in AIR 1978 Calcutta page 235 in order to drive home the point that surrender when was vitiated by fraud but even assuming that it was a valid surrender but the same would not be treated as to have been acted upon. According to Mr. Bachwat here in this case fraud has been perpetrated by making abuse of process of law and possession that has been shown to have been granted in favour of the landlord is a sham transaction and therefore the same cannot be deemed to be a valid surrender. Dr. Monotosh Mukherjee, in order to counter the submissions of Mr. Bachwat here in this case fraud has been perpetrated by making abuse of process of law and possession that has been shown to have been granted in favour of the landlord is a sham transaction and therefore the same cannot be deemed to be a valid surrender. Dr. Monotosh Mukherjee, in order to counter the submissions of Mr. Bachwat, has referred to a passage from Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant, 25th Edition by Lionel A. Blundull and he has referred to Para 2084 of the said book and the passage referred to is quoted hereunder :- "However in certain cases a party may be estopped from disputing the validity of the notice to quit and if the landlord actually accepts possession pursuant to the insufficient notice by the tenant, even though he acted under a mistake induced by the act of the tenant, there will be a surrender by the giving and acceptance of possession". 5. The said passage has been quoted keeping in view the reference in record namely annexure ‘D’ dated 8.10.1993 appended to the revisional application written by the Secretary of India Foils limited wherein attention was drawn to the effect that landlords were asked to take over possession of the premises as concomitant feature of tenancy by the lawful tenant. Dr. Mukherjee has referred to the extracts of a resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the company at the meeting held on 10.10.1993 and he has drawn the attention of the Court to the relevant portion therein where it is recorded that the possession of the same has been recovered by the present owners. According to Dr. Mukherjee, the said annexures will unmistakenably indicate that the tenant has not only surrendered but landlords have recovered possession. In this case, the original tenant is not coming up inspite of being impleaded in the suit to challenge either the factum of surrender or the accompanying act of delivery of possession. So, according to Dr. Mukherjee, the same leaves no room for doubt that on factual score the controversy relating to validity of surrender sought to be raised by the defendant/opposite party No. 1 is by way of misplaced reference. Dr. Mukherjee, by way of reiteration of the proposition expounded as earlier, has contended that investigation is not necessary where a misc. Mukherjee, the same leaves no room for doubt that on factual score the controversy relating to validity of surrender sought to be raised by the defendant/opposite party No. 1 is by way of misplaced reference. Dr. Mukherjee, by way of reiteration of the proposition expounded as earlier, has contended that investigation is not necessary where a misc. case is initiated excepting by a third person who is not asserting his independent right or hostile right. According to Dr. Mukherjee, the question of surrender as attempted to be projected by Mr. Bachwat does not and cannot arise in the wake of the background of the facts and circumstances of this case as the defendant/opposite party No. 1 was in the employment of an erstwhile tenant who had surrendered his tenancy. According to Dr. Mukherjee, in terms of the observations made by Lord Denning, J. in the case of (8) Chrem v. Morris reported in 1965 Volume III of All English Reporter 1977 where it has been held that a servant may be a licencee but he is permitted to do so only for the convenience of his work. A specific illustration was given in this case of a licencee in the house with permission to stay there so long as he remains in employment of the master. Once he ceased to be in that employment, he should be turned out. A demand is sufficient and a writ claiming possession is the self-sufficient demand. Dr. Mukherjee has contended that in view of the admitted locus standi of the defendant/opposite party No. 1 as a licencee of the original tenant and the tenant after having surrendered his tenancy with recording in the minutes of the meeting about delivery of possession it is not open for him to challenge the said act of his master and/or employer. According to Dr. Mukherjee, the question of surrender should have been agitated if it was a combat in between a lessor and the lessee and/or a landlord and a tenant but not between the servant in respect of his possession of his master where he had no qualms with his landlord. According to Dr. Mukherjee, the said submissions made by Mr. Bachwat are by way of idle exercise for academic speculation having no nexus with reality of the present case. According to Dr. Mukherjee, the said submissions made by Mr. Bachwat are by way of idle exercise for academic speculation having no nexus with reality of the present case. This Court feels that the parties are in the combat of the questions as with regard to surrender must be in the category of lessor and lessee and landlord and tenant. The defendant/opposite party No. 1 in view of his admitted stand, he cannot embark into a speculative journey to analyse the question of surrender unless he can prove his locus standi either as a lessee or as a tenant. Keeping the context in view of the admitted locus standi projected by the defendant/opposite party No. 1, this Court does not feel inclined to go in for any indepth analysis of the question relating to surrender because that question does not arise here in the case of nature of the facus standi of the parties. 6. Dr. Mukherjee has also strongly argued that it does not lie in the mouth of an erstwhile employee to challenge the veracity of the extracts of the resolution passed by the Board of Directors of India Foils Limited at their meeting held on 10.12.1993. According to Dr. Mukherjee, it is only the shareholders of the Directors of the company who can ventilate such a grievance but not a retired staff of the company. In this context Dr. Mukherjee has also referred to the provisions of Section 630A(b) of the Companies Act and he has contended that the term officer or an employee of a company applies not only to existing officers or employees but also to past officers and employees. It is asserted by Dr. Mukherjee that the defendant/opposite party No. 1 with a dishonest intention is wrongfully withholding the flat and has instituted speculative miscellaneous proceedings with ulterior object of protracting the same. According to Dr. Mukherjee, it is the wrongful withholding of such property meaning the property of the employer company after termination of the employment which is an offence under Section 630 of the Companies Act. If the property is held back after exit from employment, the retention possession would amount to wrongful withholding of the property. According to Dr. Mukherjee, it is the wrongful withholding of such property meaning the property of the employer company after termination of the employment which is an offence under Section 630 of the Companies Act. If the property is held back after exit from employment, the retention possession would amount to wrongful withholding of the property. In this context a reference was made in the case (9) Baldev Krishna Sahi v. Shipping Corporation of India Limited & Anr., reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court page 2245 and the same has been referred to with a view to illustrate that even under that law a person has no semblance of legal right to perpetuate his possession and he cannot be allowed to have luxury of litigation by encumbering the property in question or by exposing his employer to the risk of sufferance. 7. This Court after taking into the entire gamut of the range of controversy is of the view that the impugned order is liable to be set aside for ends of justice as it is not backed up by any reason whatsoever and the same bespeaks of complete non-application of mind when a cryptic reference is made to the effect that successive petitions for restoration of possession pending for years stand dismissed on contest. The Court cannot allow a party to suffer by exposing the property to the risk of financial ruination and the learned Trial Court has positively acted with material irregularity in passing the impugned order resulting in material failure of justice. The impugned order thus stands set aside. This Court also vacates, in exercise of its revisional power for ends of justice, the order No. 52 dated 20.12.1993 passed by the Trial Court and the special officer appointed by the Trial Court is thus discharged forthwith. The Trial Court is further directed to dispose of the pending petition in the connected misc. case of police help by apportionment and fixing up of liability on the parties respectively for whose instance the police pickets were directed to be issued. The applicant in the misc. The Trial Court is further directed to dispose of the pending petition in the connected misc. case of police help by apportionment and fixing up of liability on the parties respectively for whose instance the police pickets were directed to be issued. The applicant in the misc. case if directed to pay any amount on account of cost for police help, he will be required to pay the same first in compliance of the Court's order and the Trial Court is directed to pass a reasoned order fixing the liability on the count of expenses incurred in respect of the suit property by the deployment of police. The property in question cannot be allowed to be retained unguarded and possession should be given forthwith in favour of the present revisionist petitioner and the said possession is to be handed over by the present special officer namely Sri Maloy Singh Advocate against obtaining of receipts granted on behalf of the revisionist petitioner. The said receipt will be required to be filed before the learned Court below in the pending misc. case by the said special officer. His further remuneration if found due would be required to be adjudicated and the Court directs payment of the same to the parties in accordance with equity and law guiding governance of fixing and reimbursement of remuneration to the Receiver. After disposal of the pending petition for police help on apportionment and fixing of the liability, the Trial Court is directed to proceed with the misc. case as expeditiously as possible. The said order of immediate restoration of possession is passed in favour of the revisionist petitioner keeping in view of the security of the property and of the patent fact that the defendant/opposite party No. 1 has been allowed to enjoy the property either in part or in full or by way of partial enjoyment of vestige of right by initiation of a misc. case. No premium should be given in favour of a person to cloud a property free of any charge or liability. The revisional application thus stands allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The special officer Sri Maloy Singh Advocate, is directed to hand over possession immediately to the petitioner against granting of receipt which is required to be filed in the Trial Court with the special officer in the pending misc. case. The Court records the submission of Dr. The revisional application thus stands allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The special officer Sri Maloy Singh Advocate, is directed to hand over possession immediately to the petitioner against granting of receipt which is required to be filed in the Trial Court with the special officer in the pending misc. case. The Court records the submission of Dr. Mukherjee on instructions of his clients that his client will be holding the property and in the event of success by the defendant opposite party No. 1 in the misc. case and if restoration of possession in favour of the said defendant/opposite party is directed then the revisionist petitioner or anybody claiming through the said petitioner will be required to return it in favour of the defendant/opposite party No. 1. As a result thereof the revisional application succeeds but there shall, however, be no order as to costs. 8. The prayer is made for stay of operation of the order. But this Court does not feel inclined to grant any order of stay as Special Officer is still in possession of the property and the said Special Officer after making inventory of the same will be required to hand over the property namely, the deity in question in favour of the defendant/opposite party No. 1 and the goods claimed by him on recording of the satisfaction that the said defendant/opposite party No.1 has succeeded to prove the ownership in respect of the said goods. The Special Officer is directed to carry out the present order as expeditiously as possible in view of the directions made hereinbefore upon notice to the respective parties. 9. The learned Advocates for the parties are directed to make inspection of the order so that on proper perusal of the same they can take steps as contained therein and the Special Officer shall act on such communication. The Registrar, Appellate Side, is directed to further direct the office to prepare urgent certified xerox copies of this order for the learned Advocates of the respective parties and the operative portion of this order may also be communicated by the Registrar, Appellate Side to Sri Maloy Singh, an Advocate Special Officer.