Judgment : So moot a question that arises for consideration in all these actions, revolves on the interpretation of Sec. 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Act XXVI of 1881 for short ‘the Act’) relatable to the receipt of the notice, as contemplated therein. This question as such, being purely legal, there is no need at all. I think, to relate the facts, even in a summary or general way, in all these actions. Such an interpretation assumes signal and paramount importance, in the context of achieving the purpose, for which Chapter VII, by Sec. 4 of the Banking Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 (Act LXVI of 1988 for short ‘amending Act’), under a new nomenclature for the Chapter, “Of penalties in cases of dishonour of certain cheque for insufficiency of funds in the accounts” had been re-introduced. .2. ‘Negotiable Instruments’ were devised by the mercantile community, as a safe and very dependable method of discharging pecuniary liabilities and as a substitute for cash payment, which would always involve an element of ample risk, due to either the magnitude of the amount sought to be paid or the geographical distance between the payer and the payee. Such instruments could also be cleverly and conveniently used by several persons to discharge their financial liabilities, inter se. However, a smooth working of the system of negotiable instruments primarily depended upon the honesty and the integrity of the parties there to. The experience, however, of the mercantile community, particularly in India, has been far from adorable in recent times. A number of cheques dishonoured on the apparent ground of insufficiency of funds with the Bankers in the accounts of the drawer, has mounted to such an alarming proportion, as to create a justifiable, doubt and misgiving about the good faith and bona fide intentions of the givers, i.e., the drawers of the cheques and other endorsers. A practice, it is said has already crept into the several metropolitan markets in India to give cheques merely as a device to stall for the time being, the undesirable contingency of being prevailed upon to make the payment on the spot, thus, substantially eroding the credibility of cheque as a trustworthy substitute for cash payment. A practice, it is said has already crept into the several metropolitan markets in India to give cheques merely as a device to stall for the time being, the undesirable contingency of being prevailed upon to make the payment on the spot, thus, substantially eroding the credibility of cheque as a trustworthy substitute for cash payment. There was already a big clamour in the mercantile community about the element of insincerity and light-heartedness, which has crept into the practice of issuing cheques and a fairly effective, though not highly deleterious remedies had to be. provided for to eradicate the evil, which had incarcerated the operational anatomy of the business world. A cheque that is dishonoured may cause incalculable loss, injury or inconvenience to the payee or endorse thereof, in view of the fact that due to the latter’s unexpected disappointment, he has also to like the dust, while meeting his own future commitments to other persons. It is true that the Act, prior to the re-introduction of Chapter XVII by the Amending Act, has not failed to provide remedy for the aggrieved party. The remedy would be merely of a civil nature and the process to seek civil justice is notoriously dilatory. To ensure promptitute in remedy against defaulters, therefore, was the only way, in which the element of credibility and dependability could be re-introduced in the practice of issuing negotiable instruments in the form of cheques. The best way to do this is to provide a criminal remedy of penalty, which is the just thing that is said to be done by the amending Act. 3. Chapter (xi) of the objects and Reasons Clause in the Bill which is relevant for the present purpose, is couched in the following terms: .“(xi) to enhance the acceptability of cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalties in case of bouncing of cheques due to in sufficiency of funds in the accounts or for the reasons that it exceeds the arrangements made by the drawer, with adequate safeguards to prevent harassment of hones drawers” 4. Chapter XVII contains five sections, relatable to (1) Offence Aspect (Sec. 138): (2) Evidence Aspect (Secs.139 to 141) and (3) Procedural and limitation aspects (Sec. 142). Chapter XVII contains five sections, relatable to (1) Offence Aspect (Sec. 138): (2) Evidence Aspect (Secs.139 to 141) and (3) Procedural and limitation aspects (Sec. 142). With regard to those aspects, as dealt with therein, provisions of the said Chapter and that Chapter alone, are applicable and in respect of matters, not covered thereunder, as relatable to procedural aspect, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Act No. II of 1974), would be applicable, in the trial of offences, contemplated under Sec. 138. .5. So far as the offence, evidence and procedural and limitation aspects are concerned the provisions therein must have to be construed as a self-contained code and the object sought to be achieved by the said chapter solely depends upon the interpretation of those provisions in such a way, as not to frustrate the object so sought to be achieved. What is made an offence under Sec. 138 is not the drawing of the cheque alone. It must have been drawn in discharge in whole or in part of a legally enforceable debt or other liability. It must have been duly presented in time and dishonoured for the reasons specified. Then, there must be a written demand for payment of the amount, within a specified time, followed by failure to make payment, within another specified time. It becomes an offence, only on such failure. By way of elaboration, it may be stated that clause (b) of proviso to Sec. 138 prescribes that the payee or the holder in due course in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, has to make a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. 6. Proviso (c) to Sec. 138 further provides that the drawer of such cheque has to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. 7. 6. Proviso (c) to Sec. 138 further provides that the drawer of such cheque has to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. 7. If the demand, as made under the statutory notice issued, within the time stipulated under clause (c) of the proviso to Sec. 138, is not complied with, the cause of action for the launching of the prosecution against the drawer of such cheque accrues on and from the date of expiry of the period of the statutory notice and the cause of action so accrued enures of the benefit of the payee or the holder in due course to launch a prosecution within a period of one month therefrom, as had been provided for under clauses (b) of Sec. 142. Thus the offence becomes complete only when there is a failure on the part of the drawer to comply with the demand made in the statutory notice issued within the time limited under clause (c) of proviso to Sec. 138 and the prosecution launched, within a period of one month therefrom by the aggrieved payee or the holder in due course, as the case may be. .8. The notice, as contemplated in clauses (b) or (c) of the proviso to Sec. 138, must be in writing and there is no further prescription with regard to the made of despatch and service of such notice on the drawer of such cheque. Therefore, there can be no prohibition for such a notice to be despatched through post registered or otherwise, or by telegram or served in person by himself or through a special messenger. The date of service or receipt of such a notice, is a crucial factor and an important link, serving to decide the culpability or otherwise of the drawer of such cheque, in the sense of culpability of such a drawer coming to fruition on his failure to comply with the demand, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Such being the case, the expression ‘receipt’ has to be given its due meaning, in the context, in which it is used therein. Such being the case, the expression ‘receipt’ has to be given its due meaning, in the context, in which it is used therein. The etymological or literal, meaning ascribed to the expression ‘receipt’ as given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, Eighth Edition, at page 1001 runs thus: ."receipt n.1. the act or an instance of receiving or being received into one’s possession (will pay on receipt of the goods) 2. written acknowledgment of this, esp. of the payment of money. 3 (use.‘in p1) an amount of money etc., received......" .9. A literal or etymological meaning, as above, if given to the expression ‘receipt’ occurring in clause (c) of the proviso to Sec. 138, I am of the view, it will have the reverse effect of suppressing the mischief and advancing the remedy, as sought to be achieved by the Amending Act. In such a situation, better it is to pen down here the weighty observations of Lord Denning, L.J. or the interpretation of Statutes as had been extracted by the Apex Court in N.K. Jain v. C.K. Shah, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1289, reflecting thus: ."The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much poorer if it were. This is, where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A Judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if the Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsmen. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament and he must do this not only from the language of the statute but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy and then he must supplement the written word so as to give force and life’ to the intention of legislature. A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do so as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." 10. Worthwhile it is to note down here, as to what Justice G.P. Singh had stated, as respects the rule of ‘purpose construction’ or ‘mischief rule’, in his bock in ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ (fifth edition, 1992) at pages 82-83 which is couched thus: "The rule, which is also known as purposive construction’ or mischief rule enables consideration of four matters in construing an Act: (i) what was the law before the making of the Act, (ii) what was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide, (iii) what is the remedy that the Act has provided: and (iv) what is the reason of the remedy. The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which ‘shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.“The rule was explained in Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 661 at 674 by S.R. Das, C.J. as follows: "It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon’s case, (1584) 3 O.C. Rep. 7a, 7.7b: 76 ER 637, was decided that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common Law) four things are to be discerned and considered: 1st what was the common law before the making of the Act.“ 2nd - What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide, 3rd what remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the common wealth. 4th - the true reason of the remedy. and then the Officer of all the Judges is always to make such construction, as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief a pro private commode and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro bono publico”. .11. .11. With the back drop of the principles of interpretation, as above let the proceed to find out the contextual meaning of the expression ‘receipt’ occurring in clause (c) of the proviso to Sec 138, with the avowed object of giving force and life to the intention of the legislature “Receipt” of notice contemplated therein cannot at all be stated to be one of actual or physical receipt of the notice, but it can be one of either, ‘actual’ or ‘deemed receipt’ of the notice. The rationale for such an interpretation is rather obvious. The purpose for which the issuance of the notice, as contemplated therein, was to put the drawer to the knowledge of the dishonour of the cheque by the bank issued by him and requiring him to make necessary arrangements for payment of the amount of money covered by the cheque, within the statutory period of notice and nothing further. The knowledge of the drawer as to the dishonour of the cheque issued by him by the banker is inferable from various contimacious circumstances relatable to the conduct of the drawer and such inferential aspect can very well be understood from the scheme of the Amending Act itself. 12. The Amending Act contemplates prescription of the time limit of the cheque for encashment by the payee or holder in the due course thereof within a period of six months from the date of issue of the cheque by the drawer or the period of its validity, whichever is earlier, while prescribing such a time limit for encashment, it behoves upon the drawer not only to keep his account alive; but also make sufficiency of funds available in his accounts during the said period. This apart, a duty, by way of implication, is cast upon him to make himself available in his ordinary place of residence or usual course of business or to make arrangements, in case he could not be so available, for receipt of intimation from the payee or holder in due course, as respects the dishonour of the cheque it any, issued by him and a well to make arrangements for complying with the demand so made, as had been contemplated by Clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Sec. 138. Any failure on his part to do or being available, refuses to receive such notice or complying with the same, will have to be presumed to be an act evasion of such a duty so cast upon him. From such evasion, it is but legitimate to presume or infer that he had full knowledge of the dishonour of the cheque issued by him and with such knowledge he wilfully or wantonly failed to comply with the demand so made, within the statutory period stipulated therein. .13. Now, a question may arise as to from which date, the period of limitation has to be reckoned with. As adverted to earlier, the period of limitation has to be reckoned with, on and from the date of accrual of cause of action. No doubt true it is, that accrual of cause of action will arise after the expiry of the period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of such notice putting their drawer to knowledge of dishonour by the banker of the cheque which he issued. But, in the event of his non-availability, for whatever reason, at the time of delivery of such notice sent either by post or by telegram or arranged to be delivered in person or by special messenger, then the date of endorsement by postman or the person, to whom the said notice was entrusted for delivery to the drawer, will have to be taken to be the date of service on him, as the date when the drawer could have had full knowledge of the contents thereof and after the expiry of fifteen days therefrom, naturally the cause of action will accrue, syncronising with the date of commencement of the period of limitation and enuring for a period of thirty days therefrom for launching of a prosecution. But proof of the same, could be possible or plausible, by adduction of evidence only during the course of trial before the competent court of jurisdiction. This sort of an interpretation alone will foster and achieve the object and the purpose of Act, as intended by the Legislature and avoid creation of a non-sense situation. 14. But proof of the same, could be possible or plausible, by adduction of evidence only during the course of trial before the competent court of jurisdiction. This sort of an interpretation alone will foster and achieve the object and the purpose of Act, as intended by the Legislature and avoid creation of a non-sense situation. 14. This sort of a thinking, vistavision and clairvoyan mental eye was not there, when I had the occasion to interpret the provisions, as above, in R.M. Sundaram v. C.M. Ramraj, (1994) 1 L.W. (Crl.) 369, and that perhaps was the reason for the to have held then that receipt of notice contemplated therein cannot be any one other than actual receipt of notice and the decision so rendered, in the light of the reasoning, as now given by the in these actions, will not therefore hold the field any further. 15. For the reasons as above, all these criminal original petitions deserve to be dismissed and they are accordingly dismissed. Consequently, all the criminal miscellaneous petitions for stay are also dismissed.