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1995 DIGILAW 237 (PAT)

Ram Pravesh Singh v. Addl. Member, Board Of Revenue

1995-04-24

S.N.JHA

body1995
Judgment S. N. Jha, J. 1. -this application under Article 227 of the Constitution by the transferee arises out of a proceeding under Sec.16 (3) of the Bihar land Reform (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus land)Act, 1961 (in short the Act ). The petitioner succeeded before the first authority, namely, the Deputy Collector, land Reform, but lost before the Additional Collector, and the Board of Revenue. He has challenged the orders of the paid two authorities. 2. Section 16 (3) of the Act provides that where any transfer of land is made to any person other than a co-sharer or raiyat of an adjoining land, co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred shall be entitled to claim re-transfer of the landto him on the same terms and conditions as contained in the deed. This right of re-conveyance in the legal parlance is known as right of pre-emption. The land transferred in the instant case comprises of seven plots. It is an admitted position that the applicant of the proceeding i. e. the pre-emptor is co-sharer of the transferor as well as adjoining raiyat of all the plots. A co-sharer or adjoining raiyat, as stated above, is entitled to claim pre-emption but the claim can be allowed, inter alfa only if the transfered himself is not either co-sharer or the adjoniog raiyat. It is not in dispute in the instant case that the transferee i. e, the petitioner is adjoining raiyat of at least one plot, vis. , plot No.101. On this ground the claim of pre-emption was rejected by the d. C. l. R. holding that there cannot be partial pre-emption The Additional collector held otherwise. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue, while agreeing with the Additional Collector, took the view that the ialf share in the plants having been railed by the transferors, in the absence of partition between the transferors and the pre-emptor, it may well be that in the event of north southdivision of plot No.101, the eastern portion any fall to the share of the transfer of and in that case plot No.102 belonging to the petitioner situate on the western side of the plot transferred i. e. plat No.101 will not touch it and, therefore, he will not be the adjoining raiyat of even plot. Counsel for the pre-emtor-respondent No.4, however, very fairly did not support that logic inasmuch as plot No.102 is shown on the western boundary of plot No.101 in the sale-deed itself. It is, thus, an admitted position that the petitioner holds land adjacent to plot No.101, one of the plots transferred. 3. It is well-settled that a pre-emptor in order to succesed in his claim must prove that be is either co-sharer of the transferor or the adjoninig raiyat of all the plots transferred. Where the transferee himself holds land adjacent to the plots no such claim is maintainable. The point |for consideration is whether the transferee holding land ajacent to only one of the several plots and not all can resist the claim The penil is not res Integra. 4. In Ramchabila Singh V/s. Ramsagar Singh 1969 Bljr 203 as many as 148 plots had been transferred. The transferees held land adjacent to a large number of them but not all. The question for consideration as framed in paragraph 8 of the judgment was whether when several plots are transferred by one sale deed the co-sharers in respect of all the plots can claim a right of pre-emption under Sec.16 (3) when the transferee is himself an adjacent raiyat in respect of some of the plots. The learned Chief Justice after ousting the provisions of Sec.16 (3) (/) observed :- ". . . the clause refers to "land transferred" and "purchase money". The expression "land" any include several plots : but the clause contemplates only one transaction of transfer. The "purchase money" also is intended to be one unit. A further subdivision of the land transferred, with a view to make on apportionment between a co-sharer on the one hand and an adjacent raiyat on the other, is not contemplated in that clause, nor does the clause give any indication as to the priority of right between these two persons or the method of apportioning between them. On the other hand, by saying that the application before the Collector should be "for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed", the legislature has clearly indicated that, when the right of pre-emption is granted to the applicant, the transferee will be directed to transfer the land to him on the same terms and conditions as were contained in the deed of transfer. It is now well-settled that the amount of consideration money in a sale-deed is a term of document. Thus, the legislature did not authorise the. Collector to split up the total consideration money and allow a right of pre-emption to the applicant on payment of a portion of the same in respect of some portions of the land transferred. The rules also do not contemplate any such division and appointment. " An exception to the above rule, however, was pointed out in the following words : "it is true that the mere fact that there is only one sale deed may not be decisive of the question as to whether there was one transaction of sale or two pr more distinct transactions of sale, though all of them were embodied in one document. If, for instance, in the sale deed, two separate transactions of sale are mantioned, the consideration money for such of the transactions is also separately indicated, and there are other materials to hold that the slae was cf a composite nature, there may be some justification for the view that the Collector may, on a fair construction of the document, allow presumption in respect of one transaction of sale, where other conditions are satisfied, and reject the right of pre-emption in respect of the other Such an order will not amount to either splitting up of the land or apportionment of the purchase-money. " After making the above observation the question was answared in the following words : "if the transferee happens to be the adjacent raiyat in respect of some of the plots, the co-shaer cannot claim any right of pre-emption under this section. ", 5. There is complete unanimity on the point of impermissibility of apportionment of the purchase money and partial pre-emption. Reference may be made to the case of Ram Chandra V/s. Parstdh Narain Singh (1970 PUR 1101 : AIR 1971 Patna 302 (F. B. .) vide paragraph 18 of the judgment, and sudama Devi V/s. Rajendra Singh, (AIR 1973 Patna, 190; vide paragraph 8 of the judgment. 6. Although the point in issue is squarely covered by a decision in the case of Ramchabtla Singh (supra) both in law as well as on facts, I would give another reason in respect of the conclusion. 6. Although the point in issue is squarely covered by a decision in the case of Ramchabtla Singh (supra) both in law as well as on facts, I would give another reason in respect of the conclusion. Dwelling upon the incidents of the right of pre-emption under the general law the Supreme Court in the famous case of Bishan Singh V/s. Khazan Singh (AIR 1958 Supreme Court 838)observed : "the plaintiff is bound to show not only that his right is as good as that of the vendee. Decided cases have recognised that this superior right must subsist at the time the pre-empter exercises his right and that right is lost if by that time another person with equal or superior right has been substituted in place of the original vendee. Courts have not looked upon this right with great favour, presumably, for the reason that it operates as a clog on the right of the owner to alienate his property. The vendor and the vendee are, therefore, permitted to avoid accrual of the right of pre-emption by all lawful means. The vendee may defeat the right by selling the property to a rival pre-emption with preferential or equal right. To summarise : (1) The right of pre-empion is not a right to the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be said. This right is called the primary or inherent right. (2) The pre-empter has a secondary right or a remedial right to follow the thing sold. (3) it is a right of substitution but not or re-purchase i. e. , the pre-empter takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the original vendee, (4) It is a right to acquire the whole of the property sold and not a share of the property sold, (5) Reference being the essence of the right, the plaintiff must have a superior right to that of the vendee or the person substituted in his place. (6) The right being a very weak right, it can be defeated by all legitimate methods, such as the vendee allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being substituted in his place. (6) The right being a very weak right, it can be defeated by all legitimate methods, such as the vendee allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being substituted in his place. " So far as the nature of the right of pre-emption under Sec.16 3) of the act is concerned, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sudama Devi (supra) has observed : "but the law of pre-emption engifted in Sec.16 (3) of the Act, to my mind, is of a weaker nature than the customary law of pre-emption. There, as pointed out by Mahmood, J. , the pre-empter in effect, steps into the shoes of the vendee. And, yet subba Rao, J. , has said in paragraph 11 that the vendee may defeat the right by selling the property to a rival pre-empter with preferential or equal right. The scheme of the law engrafted in section 16 (3) of the Act is to permit the pre-empter to have the property conveyed to him by the transferee. Until possession is delivered to the pre-empter under clause (ii), he does not get any right in the property and until property is conveyed to him by a sale deed executed in pursuance of clause (iii) he does not become the owner of the property. " 7. Having regard to the nature of the right of pre-emption under the act, the pre-empter in order to succeed must make out a foolproof case. The transferee need only point out the loopholes. They do not stand on the same footing. The pre-emptcr must show that he is either the Co-sharer or the adjoining raiyat of all the plots, where the land comprises of more than one plot, which the transferee is not. The transferee, on the other hand, may successfully resist the claim if he is able to show that he is adjoining raiyat of some of the plots even one of them, and he cannot, therefore, be made to reconvey those plots except where the transfer of other the plots can be identified as separate transaction. In that case, Partial pre-emption not being permissible, the claim of pre-emption as a whole will have to be rejected. 8. In that case, Partial pre-emption not being permissible, the claim of pre-emption as a whole will have to be rejected. 8. The view of a learned Single Judge in Punlt Rai V/s. Additional Member, board of Revenue (1985 PLJR 910) holding that the purchaser should as well be adjoining raiyat of all the plots, which was relied upon by the counsel for the pre-emptor, does not appear to be correct. It appears that the attention of the learned Judge was not drown to the Bench decision in the ramchabila Singh (supra) 9. In the instant case the transfer of all the seven plots forms one transaction. The petitioner admittedly holds land adjacent to one of the plots. The claim of pre-emption, therefore, is not maintainable as against the said plot. Since the transfer of that plot cannot be separated, the claim of the pre-emptor even though otherwise maintainable against the other six plots have to be rejected as a whole because there cannot be partial preemption. The order of the D. C. l. R. rejecting the claim for pre-emption on that very ground has, therefore, to be upheld. 10. In the result, this application is allowed. The order of the additional Collector and the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, as contained in Annexures 2 and 3 are quashed. There ,will be no order as to cost. Petition allowed.