JUDGMENT 1. 1. By this Writ Petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing Rajasthan Molasses Rules, 1985. In the year 1985 sub-section (17A) was added to the Section 3 of the Rajasthan Excise Act, which reads as under : "17-A "Molasses" means the mother liquor produced in the final stage of the manufacture of sugar or Khandsari sugar by the Vacuum pan process or open pan process from sugar cane or gur." Likewise, molasses or lanced poppy heads had been added to clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 41 of the aforesaid Act and they have been made excisable articles. On the basis of this, Rajasthan Molasses Rules, 1985 have been framed and they are now under challenge. Provisions of the Excise Act are not under challenge. 2. The main ground of challenge is that in view of Section 18(c) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, an order was issued by the Central Government titled as the Molasses Control Order, 1961. This being an item mentioned in Entry No. 52 of list 1 of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India, the State Legislature has no power to frame any rule about the molasses. It is further claimed that rule under Section 41 of the Rajasthan Excise Act could be framed only for purposes of carrying out the objects of the Excise Act but there is no provision in the Excise Act how the control is to be exercised and, therefore, in absence of a provision of control of the molasses in the Excise Act itself, the State Government had no authority to frame Molasses Rules. 3. It was also claimed that although 'molasses' had been defined by Section 3 (17A) of the Rajasthan Excise Act, there is no other provision in the Act authorising the State Government to specify the purpose and area of control by the State Government and, therefore, the State Government had no authority to frame rules. 4. It was next claimed that a reading of rules 8 and 9 shows that the producer of molasses is not entitled to the possession of the molasses unless he fulfills the conditions specified in rule 9 and obtains a licence therefor and, therefore, these two rules deprive the petitioner of his property and it amounts to unreasonable restrictions on the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. 5. 5. It was further claimed that rules 11 to 17 deal with import and export of molasses and, therefore, these provisions deal with inter-State trade in molasses and it is controlled by the provisions of Article 301 to 304 of the Constitution of India. 6. Article 304(b) authorises the State Legislature to impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest but no bill or amendment for such restrictions can be moved in the State Legislature without the previous sanction of the President. 7. A reply to the Writ Petition as also rejoinder have been filed. Ground No. 5 has also been added to the Writ Petition by amending it. - 8. We have heard Mr. B.L. Purohit, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. L.S. Udawat, learned Addl. Advocate General appearing for the State and Mr. Rajendra Vyas, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Excise Department. 9. The case is squarely covered by a decision rendered in M/s. Sitaram and Bros v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1995 SC 356 , wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that sub-section (17A) added to Section 3 is totally valid and probably it has escaped the notice of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 41(2) has been amended by adding 'molasses' to clause (d) of subsection (2) of Section 41. Their Lordships have observed in this authority that Section 41 gives power to the State Legislature to make rules for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of the Rajasthan Excise Act or other law for the time being in force relationing to excise revenue, (b) liquidating the import, export, transport or possession of any excisable article. Thus, when the regulation is controlled by Section 41 and molasses have been included in the definition clause of Section 3(17A) and it has also been included under Section 41, then the State Government has full power to frame rules and regulations and, thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the State Government, in this respect, is functus officio because the Molasses Control Order, 1961 has been framed by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Section 18(G) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, cannot be sustained. Molasses have now been included under Section 41 of the Act and the State Government is authorised to frame rules about them in the parameters that are prescribed by Section 41 and, therefore, the State Legislature has full competence to frame rules about it, once that items stands added to Section 41(2) clause (d). These rules have to be framed in order to carry out the provisions of the Act and the Rules and it is not disclosed how they are contrary to any provisions of law. Although, the learned counsel has referred to amendment made in Section 3 by addition of sub-section (17A), probably addition of `molasses' to clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 41 has escaped his notice and it is because of this that it was canvassed by him that no guidelines are provided about them in Section 41. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also observed that such power vests in the State Government to frame the Rules to control the export, import, transport and possession of the excisable articles and, accordingly, this contention of the learned counsel has no force. If the regulations are valid and if a particular procedure for possession or sale of molasses has been prescribed then simply because a particular Industry produces or manufactures molasses, it does not automatically become authorised to deal with them as they are now made excisable by amending the Act and the Rules. The possession as well its export and import can be controlled by the regulations and if any licence is required, it has to obtain a licence and without it, it cannot deal with that article having been made excisable. It has not been shown to us to which provision of the Molasses Control Order, 1961 and the provisions of the Rajasthan Molasses Rules, 1985 are contrary to or are in conflict with each other and unless that is shown, Entry 33(a) of List III (concurrent list) of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution gives power to the State Legislature to enact the provision and Entry 24 of the State-List authorises the State Government to frame Rules about it. 10. 10. If a specific provision exists in the Central Rules then no contrary Rule to that provision, overriding the provisions of that Central Act can be framed by the State Legislature and if it wants to enact such a provision then it has to obtain consent of the President to enforce it. But, here in this case no inconsistency has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner between the Molasses Rules, 1985 and Molasses Control Order, 1961 and, therefore, there is no force in this argument as well. Moreover, such a contention has also not been raised in this Writ Petition. If there is any inconsistency between the provision and the rules of 1985 and the order of 1961, the petitioner can agitate it before an appropriate forum but so far as the Writ Petition is concerned, it does not form a part of it and, therefore, we are not called upon to decide this controversy at this stage, although this point was canvassed during arguments. 11. No other point has been urged before us. 12. In the result this Writ Petition has no force and it is hereby dismissed. 13. No order as to costs. *******