S. N. SAXENA, J. Applicant Bhagwant Din has moved this application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. and has prayed for direction to the opposite parties not to arrest him in Case Crime No. 609/92 under Sections 420 and 406, I. P. C. P. S. Kotwali, district Kanpur Nagar and also for quashing the First Informa tion Report, dated 27-8- 1992 on the basis of which the said case was registered against him. The applicant has come to this Court with the following allegations. 2. One Mohammad was had moved an application under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. on 17-8-1992 in the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, against the applicant. The learned Magistrate by order, dated 18-8-1992 called for the report of the Station Officer, Kotwali, who after making investigation in the case, submitted report, dated 25-8-1992, a copy of which is Annexure No. 2 of this application. The Station Officer recommended that during the pendency of the litigations between the parties, there was no need for any further action against the applicant. Mohd. Ilyas had already filed a civil suit in respect of the property which had given rise to various litigations between the parties and the same was pending decision in the Court of IV Additional District and Sessions Judge. Kaapur Nagar. It was for execution of a sale deed and he had instituted one more civil suit for cancellation of a sale deed executed by Ambika Prasad who was the brother of applicant Bhagwant Din and the same was pending decision in the Court of VI Additional District & Sessions Judge. Kanpur Nagar. He, thereafter, on 27-8-1992 lodged F. I. R. , a copy of which is Annexure No. J of the application at P. S. Kotwali, Kanpur against applicant Bhagwant Din and his brother Ambika Prasad under Sections 420 and 406, I. P. C. Mohd. Ilyas, in his afore said F. I. R. disclosed that he had entered into an agreement of sale of certain property mentioned therein with Ambika Prasad and Bhagwunt Din about which registered agreement of sale was executed on 26-8-1987 by the partio and had paid Rs. 35,000 on account of the sale money to them. Ilyas, in his afore said F. I. R. disclosed that he had entered into an agreement of sale of certain property mentioned therein with Ambika Prasad and Bhagwunt Din about which registered agreement of sale was executed on 26-8-1987 by the partio and had paid Rs. 35,000 on account of the sale money to them. Applicant Bhagwant Din, with intent to defraud him, did not sign the deed of agreement which was signed by Ambika Prasad alone although the aforesaid amount was paid by him to both of them. Both the brothers misappropriated the said amount of Rs. 35,000 and transferred the property, which was the subject matter of the agreement, to one Ajuber on 25-2-1992. They, thus, cheated him of the aforesaid amount which was misappropriated by them and, there fore, were liable for punishment under Sections 420 and 406, I. P. C. 3. The applicant, in the instant application, has contended that he had not executed the alleged agreement of sale and in any case criminal proceed ings against him could not be maintained by Mohd. Ilyas, as civil litigation was going on between the parties. Mohd. Ilyas, however, had started pairvi on the basis of the aforesaid F. I. R. against him and he apprehended his arrest in connection with the same. The criminal proceedings against him, however, were total abuse of the process and hence the present application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. 4. Learned A. G. A. raised a preliminary objection that the present application could not be moved by the applicant under Section 482, Cr. P. C. , is no charge-sheet had been submitted by the police which was seized of the investigation of the case on the basis of the aforementioned F. I. R. In support of his objection, he relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court (The Bench consisted of seven Honble Judges of this Court) in Criminal Misc. Applications NOB. 5939, 5664, 5940, 5977, 5985 and 6024 of 1988, dated February 1, 1989 reported in 1989 (26) ACC at p. 181 : 1989 JIG (All) (FB) Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U. P. and others, and argued that the appli cation of the applicant under Section 482, Cr. Applications NOB. 5939, 5664, 5940, 5977, 5985 and 6024 of 1988, dated February 1, 1989 reported in 1989 (26) ACC at p. 181 : 1989 JIG (All) (FB) Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U. P. and others, and argued that the appli cation of the applicant under Section 482, Cr. P. C. was not maintainable, as the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under the said provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure had got on jurisdiction in the matter unless charge-sheet had been submitted in the case by the police or a complaint had been filed against the accused persons in the competent court of law. He relied upon the following observation of this Court in the aforesaid Full Bench decision : "the power of the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C. to quash an F. I. R. or a complaint referred to above is with reference to proceedings in the court after the filing of a charge-sheet or a complaint and not to investigation prior to the filing of the charge-sheet in court. " 5. On behalf of the applicant, however, reliance was placed upon a single Judge decision of this Court reported in 1994 (31) ACC 346 ; 1994 JIC 755 (All), Rama Shanker Pandey and others v. V. P. Police, Station Officer, Kotwali, Ghazipur, whereby a contrary view was taken by my learned Brother M. Katju, J. in an application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. registered as Cr. Misc. Application No. 2310 of 1994 decided on April 6, 1994. In the said decision, it was held that on the basis of the following two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court, this Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P. C. , was competent to quash the F. I R, and the investigation on the basis of the same. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Cr LJ 527 : 1990 (2) JIC 997 (SC) ; State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. V. Pavithran, AIR 1990 SC 1266 : 1990 (1) JIC 467 (SC ). 6. Learned Single Judge also observed in the aforesaid decision that in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supraj had been followed in the case of Union of India v. B. R. Bajaj, 1994 (30) ACC 157 : 1994 JIC 238 (SC ). 6. Learned Single Judge also observed in the aforesaid decision that in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supraj had been followed in the case of Union of India v. B. R. Bajaj, 1994 (30) ACC 157 : 1994 JIC 238 (SC ). Learned Single Judge, thus, had taken a view which was directly at variance with the view laid down by the abovementioned Full Bench decision of this Court, but he did not find it necessary to refer the matter for decision by a larger Bench, as he was of the opinion that after the abovementioned pro nouncements by the Honble Supreme Court, it was not necessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench. Before me it was contended for the opposite parties that neither of the abovementioned decisions of the Honble Supreme Court laid down the law as contemplated by Article 141 of the Constitution of India, as the question relating to the scope of Section 482, Cr. P. C. was neither raised nor decided by their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in the said decisions and the Full Bench decision of this Court, therefore, continued to be good law. Before proceeding further, it would be proper to reproduce the following observations from the aforesaid single Judge decision of this Court: "17. A question may be raised whether a single Judge of this Court can hold a Full Bench decision of this Court to be no longer good law. In my opinion, though ordinarily a Single Judge is bound to follow a Full Bench decision of the same court, he should not follow the said decision it is contrary to a Supreme Court deci sion. In this connection 1 may refer to Article 141 of the Consti tution which says "the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. It may be noticed that there is no corresponding provision in the Constitu tion making decisions of the High Court binding on lower courts or on smaller benches of the High Court, though by the theory of precedents they are binding. 19. In the circumstances, I hold that the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Ram Lal Yadav case (supra) is no longer good law in view of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. 19. In the circumstances, I hold that the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Ram Lal Yadav case (supra) is no longer good law in view of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. The correct legal position is that the High Court, m exceptional circumstances, has power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. to quash the police investigation and/or quash the first information report and/or stay the arrest of the applicant. These circumstances are mentioned in paragraph 108 of Bhajan Lals case and there may be also some other exceptional circumstances since the 7 grounds mentioned in paragraph 108 of Bhajan Lals case are only illus trative and not exhaustive and the High Court can interfere in these exceptional circumstances even prior to the submission of the charge-sheet. " 7. After going carefully through all the aforesaid decisions, I find myself in very respectful disagreement with Honble Brother M. Katju, as, in my opinion, neither of the aforesaid decisions of the Honble Supreme Court laid down the law within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India having binding force upon all the subordinate courts in the country regarding the scope of Section 482, Cr. P. C. 8. Honble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal had not considered the scope of Section 482. Cr. P. C. although a sweeping reference of Section 482, Cr. P. C. finds place in the judgment as reported in the Journal. The matter before the Honble Supreme Court was registered as Civil Appeal No. 5412 of 1990 and it had arisen from a Division Bench deci sion, dated 8-9-1988 of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Writ Petition No. 9172 of 1987 whereby the entire criminal proceedings inclusive of regis tration of the F. I. R. and the direction to the second respondent Mr. Dharam Pal to pay the cost to the first respondent Chaudhary Bhajan Lal wore quashed. In this Civil Appeal, the question as to whether an F I. R. and the investiga tion based upon the same could be quashed by a High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482, Cr. Dharam Pal to pay the cost to the first respondent Chaudhary Bhajan Lal wore quashed. In this Civil Appeal, the question as to whether an F I. R. and the investiga tion based upon the same could be quashed by a High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. was not considered and decided by the Honble Supreme Court Very apparently, the aforesaid question had not at all arisen before the Honble Supreme Court as it was a case of exercise of writ jurisdiction, and this decision, therefore, could not be deemed to lay down the law as envisaged by Article 141 of the Constitution of India that the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P. C. could quash the first information report and the consequent investigation. 9. The other decision of the Honble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. V. Pavithran (supra) also had not considered and decided question relating to the scope of Section 482, Cr. P. C. U had arisen out of a decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in an application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. and the appeal, therefore, before the Honble Supreme Court was registered as a Criminal Appeal, but after going through the decision carefully, I find that the aforesaid question relating to the scope of Section 482, Cr. P. C. was not required to be considered and decided by the Honble Supreme Court, as the same was not raised before it. It appears that in this decision Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as the Honble Supreme Court had decided the controversy before them on the merits thereof irrespective of the scope of Section 4h2, Cr. P. C. This decision too, therefore, is not a decision on the basis of which it could be said that the Honble Supreme Court had laid down a proposition of law as contemplated by Article 141 of the Constitution of India that a High Court in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. had got the jurisdiction to quash the F. I. R. and the investigation based upon the same before charge-sheet had been submitted in the case or a complaint instituted before competent court of law. 10. P. C. had got the jurisdiction to quash the F. I. R. and the investigation based upon the same before charge-sheet had been submitted in the case or a complaint instituted before competent court of law. 10. The only decision in which the aforesaid question was considered and decided was the abovementioned Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U. P. and others (supra ). In this case, the full Bench had couriered another decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of freshet Gaur v. State of U. P. , 1988 (25) ACC 270 1988 JIG 147 (All) (FB), which too had considered the scope of Section 482, Cr. P. C. Question No. 1 which was considered and answered by this Court in the afore said two Full Bench decisions read as follows : "question No, 1. Whether under Section 482, Cr. P. C. the High Court has inherent power to interfere with the investigation by the police ?" 11. The Full Bench in the case of Rom Lal Yadav v. State of U. P. (supra) answered the abovementioned question in the negative. The answer read as follows "1. For the reasons given above, our answer to the first question referred to us is in the negative. " 12. Before proceeding further, reference may be made to Honble Supreme Courts decision, reported in AIR 1990 SC at p. 781, Miss. Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana and another, wherein the question as to what could be deemed to be a precedent in a decision of the Honble Supreme Court itself was considered and the proposition of law laid down thereby was as follows : "it is well settled that a precedent is an authority only for what it actually decides and not for what may remotely or even logically follow from it. " Vide para 23 of the decision. 13. The Honble Supreme Court had laid down the aforesaid legal position while considering the ratio of the decision in its own decision in Kandaswamis case reported in AIR 1975 SC at p. 1871. " Vide para 23 of the decision. 13. The Honble Supreme Court had laid down the aforesaid legal position while considering the ratio of the decision in its own decision in Kandaswamis case reported in AIR 1975 SC at p. 1871. Further, in para 34 of the decision in the case of Ms, Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana and another (supra), the Honble Supreme Court observed that a decision on a question which bad not been argued, could not be treated as a precedent. It need not be emphasised that the question relating to the scope of Section 482, Cr. P. C. was not raised and argued in either of its abovementioned three decisions, namely Slate of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. K. Pavithran and Union of India v. B. R. Bajaj (all supra ). With due respect to my learned Brother, M. Katju, J. , therefore, I find myself unable to come to the conclusion that the law laid down by this court in its Full Bench decision in the case of Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U. P. and others (supra) WAS no longer good law. To my mind, it continues to be good law, as no proposi tion of law to the contrary could be produced before me on behalf of the applicant. The application of the applicant Bhagwant Din, therefore, was not maintainable under Section 482, Cr. P. C. and left to me alone, it would have been dismissed. 14. Honble Supreme Court in its decision reported in AIR 1990 SC at p. 307, Shridhar v. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur, restated the well settled principle of judicial discipline that if a single Judge disagrees with the decision of another single Judge, it is proper to refer the matter to a larger Bench for an authoritative decision. I am, therefore, in spite of my conclusion that the law laid down in the case of Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U. P. and others (supra) is good law, bound to refer this question for consideration by a larger Bench. 15. In view of the above, I direct the office to put up this Judgment eloign with the application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. of Bhagwant Din before the Honble Chief Justice for reference to a larger Bench for an authoritative decision. 15. In view of the above, I direct the office to put up this Judgment eloign with the application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. of Bhagwant Din before the Honble Chief Justice for reference to a larger Bench for an authoritative decision. The question for consideration by the larger Bench appears to be as follows : Whether the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U. P. and others (supra), in spite of this Courts aforesaid decision in the case of Rama Shanker Pandey v. U. P. Police, Station Officer, Kotwali, Ghazipur (supra) continues to be good law. " Reference to larger bench. .