D. K. SETH, J. The petitioners in this case have challenged the order dated 9th May, 1975 (Annexure xiv to the writ petition) dismissing the Revision Application filed under Section 133 of the Displaced Parsons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act ). The said revision was preferred against an order dated 25th April, 1975 dismissing the revision application filed under Section 24 of the said Act before the authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner by the petitioners against the order dated 29th January, 1975 passed on appeal preferred by the peti tioners being Annexure xi to the writ petition arising out of the order dated 3rd September, 1974 passed by the Managing Officer on remand after the appeal preferred by respondents 5 and 6 was allowed by the appellate autho rity by order dated 21st April, 1973 in an appeal under Section 22 of the said Act preferred by respondents 5 and 6. 2. The petitioners case in the writ petition, inter alia, was that plots Nos. 215, 216, 217, 150 and 124 situate in village Gowli, tehsil Dhampur district Bijnor originally belonged to An oar Husain and others who were evacuees within the meaning of the said Act. The said properties were record ed as evacuee properties during the consolidation proceedings, as would appear from Annexures 1-A and 1-B to the writ petition. Respondents 5 and 6 got allotted in their names in 1950 - some evacuee properties other than those dis puted plots. On 14th May, 1964, the above said plots were put to public auction in which the petitioners purchased the said plots upon depositing full price on the spot whereupon the Zonal Manager had issued receipts therefor (Annexures iii-A, iii-B and iii-G to the writ petition ). It was alleged by the petitioners that though possession of the plots were delivered to the petitioners but the sale certificates were not issued. The petitioners had been visiting the office of concerned respondents. Ultimately on 1972, the petitioners were asked to submit the original receipts with affidavit before the Managing Officer, Lucknow. The petitioners complied with the said requirement. After verifying the sale in favour of the petitioners, sale certificates were issued on 18th December, 1972 by the Managing Officer, Office of the Regional Settle ment Commissioner, U. P. Lucknow (Annexures iv-A iv-B and iv- C to the writ petition ). The petitioners complied with the said requirement. After verifying the sale in favour of the petitioners, sale certificates were issued on 18th December, 1972 by the Managing Officer, Office of the Regional Settle ment Commissioner, U. P. Lucknow (Annexures iv-A iv-B and iv- C to the writ petition ). The said sale certificates were duly registered and the names of the petitioners were accordingly mutated in the revenue papers. 3. At that point of time, respondents 5 and 6 preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the said Act and the same was allowed on 21st April, 1973 by the appellate authority (Annexure vii to the writ petition) treating respondents 5 and 6 as allottees in respect of those plots and had remanded the case for fresh decision by the Managing Officer with the observations, namely, (i) Record not traceable ; (ii) Record to be reconstructed ; (iii) Acceptance of full price instead of earnest money was against the rules ; (iv) Sale in favour of the peti tioners was doubtful; (v) No acceptance letter was produced ; (vi) Allotment papers produced by respondents 5 and 6 (though it does not appear that respondents 5 and 6 had filed it by any record to prove the same); (vii) Appeal under Section 22 of the said Act is maintainable ; (viii) The Managing Officer should examine the matter again. 4. On 1st August, 1973, the Managing Officer directed the Tehsildar, Dhampur to expunge the names of the petitioners from the records and to incorporate the name of respondents 5 and 6 therein. The petitioners in writ petition No. 7813 of 1973 challenged the said order dated 1st August, 1973 which was, however, disposed of by this Court with the observation that the Tehsildar will proceed in accordance with law. 5. However, on remand, several dates were fixed which were successive ly adjourned. Ultimately the case was decided ex parte on 3rd September, 1974 treating respondents 5 and 6 as allottees of the plots in dispute. The petitioners learnt the said order in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the said order dated 3rd September, 1974, it was held that the petitioners could not produce the documents of auction purchase by them nor they could produce any programme of the auction or any cost of earnest money or any letter of acceptance of the bid. In the said order dated 3rd September, 1974, it was held that the petitioners could not produce the documents of auction purchase by them nor they could produce any programme of the auction or any cost of earnest money or any letter of acceptance of the bid. The authenticity of the receipts were also not proved. The entries in Cash Books from the office could not be supplied. The petitioners could not get any certificate from the Treasury. The erstwhile Zonal Manager was involved in a case of embezzle ment and the receipts issued by him were not accounted for and whether the said receipts were forged or genuine could not be ascertained. 6. Against the said order, the petitioners preferred an appeal on 14th October, 1974. The said appeal was dismissed on 29th January, 1975 confirming the order passed by under Section 24 of the said Act against the said order. The revision was decided against the petitioners on 25th April, 1975. The petitioners preferred a further revision under Section 33 of the said Act The said revision was also dismissed on 9th May, 1975. 7. Against the aforesaid order, the petitioners have moved the present writ petition before this Court on the grounds (a) respondents 5 and 6 had no locus standi to file an appeal, (b) against the order issuing sale certificate, no appeal under Section 22 is maintainable, (c) the validity of the auction sale was never challenged under Rule 92 (d), the first appellate order itself was wholly without jurisdiction and subsequent proceedings are null and void, (e) respondents 5 and 6 had never produced any document to show that the plots were ever allotted to them nor there was any document of title issued to them, as provided under the said Act, and, therefore, they cannot claim title in respect of the said property. Further more the purported sale-deed produc ed by respondent No. 5 does not include the plots in question. Further more the purported sale-deed produc ed by respondent No. 5 does not include the plots in question. 8, Respondents 5 and 6 contested this case by filing their counter affidavit in which they had made out a case that the concerned plots were allotted to them in 1950 as aod that the said plots were ultimately sold to the contesting respondents by following the procedures provided under Rules 90 and 91 of the said Act and that the petitioners were never put into possession and that they are the owners of the said plots by virtue of the said allotment on account of their being displaced persons defined under the said Act though, however, their names were not recorded during the consolidation proceedings. 9. We have heard the contentions made by the learned Advocates appearing for the parties in support of their respective contentions. Mr. S. P. Gupta the learned senior Advocate for the petitioners very strenuously argued that since respondents 5 and 6 could not produce any document show ing allotment in their favour and that though they had claimed that the plots were ultimately sold to them following the procedure laid down in Rules 90 and 91 framed under the said Act, but no documents relating thereto having been placed before the authority, the authority could not have held in favour of respondents 5 and 6. Even then the alleged document, produced by respondents 5 and 6 purported to be a sale-deed, bears different plots apart from the fact that the number of plots described in the schedule of the copy of the deed does not include the plots in dispute and the said document also does not appear to have been registered. He further argued that no scrap of paper or document was filed before the autho rity concerned by respondents 5 and 6 in order to prove their own case. He had also pointed out that respondents 5 and 6 could not have any locus standi to prefer an appeal under Section 22. According to him, once the petitioners were issued a sale certificate, no appeal under Section 22 lies. He further argued that the sale certificate issue I in their favour was issued after proper verification by the concerned authority and was also registered. According to him, once the petitioners were issued a sale certificate, no appeal under Section 22 lies. He further argued that the sale certificate issue I in their favour was issued after proper verification by the concerned authority and was also registered. The non-production of the records relating to auction is a fault on the part of the authorities concerned for which his client cannot suffer, particularly when certificate was issued certifying that the receipts granted to his client were genuine. He has further argued that he was not given proper opportunity of contesting the case before the Managing Officer, He also supported the grounds of challenge as indicated in para 7 above. 10 On the other hand, Mr. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the respon dents had contended that since no documents could be produced by the peti tioners in support of the auction sale, the petitioners cannot claim any title and the findings of the concerned authorities are wholly justified, legal and valid. If the petitioners fail to prove their title, they cannot maintain the writ petition and the present writ application is liable to be dismissed. Mr. Mandhyan further submitted that the orders under challenge have passed through several tiers right from the Managing Officer to the State Government at different stages, namely, by way of appeal under Section 22, then revision under Section 24 arid further revision under Section 33 and in all the cases, the Endings of fact having been concurrently arrived at by all the authorities on the basis of the materials placed before them, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, this Court cannot interfere with the same. 11. Adverting to different points raised by the learned counsel, it appears that a displaced person is entitled for payment of compensation in the form and manner as provided under Section 8 of the said Act. One such manner as prescribed in sub-section (1) (c) of Section 8 is by sale to displaced person of any property from the compensation, pool through various methods and manner with which now we are not concerned. Admittedly the property in dispute is evacuee property and belonged to the compensation pool constituted under Section 14 of the said Act. 12. One such manner as prescribed in sub-section (1) (c) of Section 8 is by sale to displaced person of any property from the compensation, pool through various methods and manner with which now we are not concerned. Admittedly the property in dispute is evacuee property and belonged to the compensation pool constituted under Section 14 of the said Act. 12. There is nothing on the record to show that respondents S and 6 were paid any compensation in terms of Section 8 (1) (c) of the said Act inasmuch as the said Act was enacted on 9th October, 1954. Therefore, the case of respondents 5 and 6 that the said plots were allotted to them as displaced persons in 1950 cannot be sustained. It is also not the case that the allotment made in 1950 in favour of respondents 5 and 6 was regularised in terms of Section 19 (4) of the said Act. Though respondents 5 and 6 also makes an alternative claim that the said plots were sold to them following Rules 90 and 91 framed under the said Act, but no document to that effect is available on the materials on record. 13. In fact Section 20 empowers the authority to transfer the property out of compensation pool in the manner provided in clauses (a) to (e) thereof. Such powers has to be exercised in the manner provided is sub-rule (1) (a) to (3) of that section. However, even if it is assumed that the said plots were transferred in favour of respondents 5 and 6, then also Rule 33 stares on the face inasmuch as such transfer can be executed in the form provided in the rules. While Rule 34 speaks of the date of transfer and Rule 68 provides for grant of Sanad, Rule 71 requires a declaration by an allottee in the form referred to in Appendix XVI. Respondents 5 and 6 did not show any compliance with regard to the rules, referred to above. Over and above, the copy of the sale deed produced by them does not appear to have been registered and is also blank in many places and at the same time the plots mentioned in the schedule of the purported deeds does not include (he plots in question. Over and above, the copy of the sale deed produced by them does not appear to have been registered and is also blank in many places and at the same time the plots mentioned in the schedule of the purported deeds does not include (he plots in question. Respondents 5 and 6 also could not show any papers relating to following of procedure under Rules 90 and 91, as alleged by them. 14. In any event, Rules 90 and 91 cannot be followed together. Rule 90 relates to the procedure for public auction while Rule 91 deals with auction by tender. Therefore, both the rules cannot be followed simultaneously. However, no document with relation to any of the said rules, so far as respondents No. 5 and 6 are concerned, are forthcoming. Though Rule 87 prescribes that transfer can be made by auction or through tender or in any other manner but it is not the case of respondents 5 and 6 that they had obtained the plots through other manners. 15. It is also not on record that respondents 5 and 6 were/are displaced persons. None of the authorities deciding the case has come to the conclusion that respondents 5 and 6 have been able to prove that they were displaced persons. 16. Thus it is clear that respondents 5 and 6 have not been able to establish their right in respect of the said plots. Though, however, it was sub mitted by Mr. Mandhyan that if the petitioners fail, then title of respondents 5 and 6 would be confirmed, we cannot accept the said submission as well founded inasmuch as Mr. Mandyans clients cannot rely for their title on the weakness of the petitioners. The failure of the petitioners to prove their title does not confer title on the respondents when they have been unable to prove their title, as pleaded by them. At this stage, they cannot make out a third case or rely on their possession which is also disputed inasmuch as both the petitioners and respondents 5 and 6 are claiming possession unto themselves and disputing the possession of each other. 17. At this stage, they cannot make out a third case or rely on their possession which is also disputed inasmuch as both the petitioners and respondents 5 and 6 are claiming possession unto themselves and disputing the possession of each other. 17. So far as the petitioners case is concerned, it appears that they were mainly relying on the sale certificate issued on 18th December, 1972, long after the auction alleged to have taken place on 14th May, 1964 on the basis of an affidavit and a receipt filed by the petitioners. The Managing Officer had applied its mind to the facts of the case in detail. No records could be traced out with regard to the alleged auction. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the person who had signed the receipt was charged for embezzlement. Moreover, there is no entry in the relevant register about the said deposit for which the receipt was granted. He had arrived at a finding that (a) the petitioners could not prove their auction purchase (b) there was no programme of auction nor any receipt of earnest money nor any letter of accep tance of bid, (c) the authenticity of the receipt was not proved, (d) a verification from the officer could prove with regard to the alleged auction, (e) no entry in the cash book could be found. The petitioners could not file any certificate from the treasury, (f) a case of embezzlement was initiated against Sri Pratap Singh, ex-Zonal manager who had granted the receipt, (g) on verification of the record, the amount cannot be found to have been deposited, though, however, the said officer could not arrive at a definite finding as to whether the receipts were forged or genuine. Upon a consideration of materials on record, the Managing Officer came to the conclusion that, the petitioners failed to prove the auction in their favour, whereas in appeal, the appellate authority held that there was no publication of notice of auction, there was no bid sheet, there was no confirmation of bid and in fact there was no auction and the genuineness of the receipt was also doubtful. In fact the appellate authority had concurred with the findings of fact arrived at by the Managing Officer. In fact the appellate authority had concurred with the findings of fact arrived at by the Managing Officer. In revision, the respondent No. 2 held that the order of the Managing Officer was a speaking order and that the petitioners remained absent and no evidence of auction sale was available on the record and that there was no entry about the said deposit in the Cash Book and that the allegation of deposit of the full amount at the time of the auction was not valid. 18. Now that the four authorities have adverted to the facts of the case which are disputed between the parties and have concurrently found that the petitioners had no title to the property, we are afraid that sitting in writ jurisdiction exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court can delve into exercise of determining facts which can be done only through the evidence which has already been exercised by the authorities meant for the purpose. 19. Therefore, we do not propose to interfere with the facts found by the authorities in respect of the petitioners case, since we do not consider such finding to be perverse or based on non-application of mind or on non-consi deration of materials placed before it. 20. However, so far as the finding that respondents 5 and 6 have title in respect of the said plots, on the basis of the observations made above, we are of the view that such finding is wholly perverse and based on no material whatsoever. We, therefore, hold that respondents 5 and 6 also do not have any title to the said plots. 21. So far as the question of locus standi is concerned, in order to prefer an appeal under Section 22 of the said Act, it is not necessary that the person having title to the property may prefer an appeal. The section pres cribes any person aggrieved by the order of the Settlement Officer or Manag ing Officer may prefer an appeal. any person referred to therein has not been qualified. If respondents 5 and 6 bonafide believed that these were their plots, they had every right to prefer an appeal and once such appeal is prefer red, it is for the appellate authority under Section 22 (3) to pass any order either by confirming or varying or reversing the order. any person referred to therein has not been qualified. If respondents 5 and 6 bonafide believed that these were their plots, they had every right to prefer an appeal and once such appeal is prefer red, it is for the appellate authority under Section 22 (3) to pass any order either by confirming or varying or reversing the order. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we do not feel that the order passed by the appellate authority remanding the case at the first instance is without jurisdiction. 22. Once there was remand, the Managing Officer has the authority to decide the case afresh. Therefore, we do not find much substance in the argument made by Mr. Gupta relating to his contention that respondents 5 and 6 did not have any locus standi or that the appeal under Section 22 was not maintainable. 23. Nowhere it has been stated that the appeal is dependent on any other provision, namely, that respondents 5 and 6 may have resorted to Rule 92 for setting aside the sale and that non-resorting to Rule 92 makes the appeal under Section 22 incompetent. We have not been able to read any such provision either in the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder. 24. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, before we part, we feel it necessary to record our observation that the concerned authorities ought to have taken appropriate steps, as provided under the said Act and the Rules relating to the said property, since neither the petitioner nor respondents 5 and 6 have any vestige of title in respect thereof and are not entitled to hold the same. 25. It will be open to the respondents to take steps for resumption of the said land and utilise the same in accordance with law. 26. In the result, the writ petition fails and is disposed of accordingly. Petition disposed of. .