This application has been filed on behalf of Assam Rajyik Udyog Karmi Sangha, through its President claiming the relief that the impugned corrigendum forwarded on 26.2.91 (Annexure IV) be set aside. The corrigendum is quoted below : xxxx  xxxxx xxxx 2. The brief facts are as follows : Under the Director of Industries there is a service known as Subordinate Industries Service (Technical) and the pay scale is as follows : xxxx  xxxxx xxxx In 1979 the Pay Commission recommended that Grade III be abolished and merged with Grade II to form a unified cadre, that is available at page 212 of the 1979 report. This recommendation was accepted and in Assam Services (ROP) Rules, 1983 in Schedule A, the pay scale of SIS (Technical) Grade II plus Grade III the scale of pay of Rs.420 to 730 was given. On 27.3.87 the Government amended Schedule A to ROP Rules, 1983 and the pay scale for Subordinate Industry Service (Technical) Grade II was Rs.470-800 that is Annexure 1 to the writ application and that is quoted below : xxxx  xxxxx xxxx 3. Meanwhile a new Pay Commission was set up and the report submitted on 8.5.90 and no modification was recommended in respect of the Industry Department. On 6.12.90 the Government by notification made the Assam Services (ROP) Rules, 1990 which was deemed to have come into force with effect from 1.1.89 and the pay scale of SIS Grade II plus Grade III were revised to Rs. 1065 to 2095 pm that is available at page No.227 of the report regarding Subordinate Industrial Services (Technical) Grade II and the same scale was also given to Grade III save and except moulder. Thereafter this impugned corrigendum was issued by which the pay scale was reduced to Rs.975 to 1935. Hence this writ application. 4. I have heard Mr. GK Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Shri M. Nath, learned Government Advocate, Assam. No affidavit-in-opposition was filed. No record was produced. Shri Bhattacharyya makes the following submissions : (i) That Grade III of the service was abolished and the corrigendum cannot create Grade III and that cannot be done inasmuch as a notification was issued incorporating the recommendation of the Pay Commission and that became a Rule under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and that cannot be changed by issuing of a notification. (ii) The corrigendum is arbitrary and not supported by any justification and it is unconstitutional and liable to be quashed. (iii) Without amending the Rules the corrigendum cannot be issued. 5. In support of his contention Shri Bhattacharyya relies on a judgment reported in (1981) 1SCC 246 (Akhil Bharatiya Karmachari Sangh (Railway) represented by its Assistant General Secretary on behalf of the Association vs. Union of India & others) and he specifically relies on paragraph 20,23,24 and 123. Paragraph 20, 24 and 123 are quoted below : “20. If one out of a few reasonable tenable constructions of the constitutional provisions vis-a-vis the impugned executive directives may sustain the latter, the Court should and would refrain from using the judicial guillotine. There is a committee of coordinate constitutional instrumentalities geared to shared constitutional goals which persudes the judicature to sustain rather than slay, save where the breach is brazen, the transgression is plain or the effective co-existence of the fundamental right and the administrative scheme is illusory. This Court has, on former occasions, upheld executive and legislative action hovering 'perilously near' but not pluning into unconstitutionality (see in re Kerala Education Bill). It is constant guideline which we must vigilantly remember, as we have stated earlier, that our Constitution is a dynamic document with destination social revolution. It is nor anaemic not natural but vigorously purposeful and value-laden as the very descriptive adjectives of our Republic proclaim. Where ancient social injustice freezes the 'genial current of the soul' for whole human segments our Constitution is not non-aligned. Activist equalisation, as a realistic strategy of producing human equality, is not legal anathema for Article 14 and 16. To hold otherwise is constitutional obscurantism and legal literalism, allergic to sociologically intelligent interpretation. 24. These broader observations are necessary to set our sights right, to appreciate that our Constitution lays the gravestone on the old unjust order and the cornerstone of the new human order. This constitutional consciousness is basic to interpretative wisdom. We may now start with the facts of the case and spell out the particular problem demanding our consideration. Constitutional questions cannot be viewed in vacuuo but must be answered in the social milieu which gives it living meaning. After all, the world of facts enlives the world of words. And logomachy is not law but a fatal, though fascinating, futility if alienated from the facts of life. Constitutional questions cannot be viewed in vacuuo but must be answered in the social milieu which gives it living meaning. After all, the world of facts enlives the world of words. And logomachy is not law but a fatal, though fascinating, futility if alienated from the facts of life. So, before pronouncing on the legality of the impugned ten orders we must sketch the social setting in which they were issued and the socio-economic facts “which clothe Article 16 (4) with flesh and blood. The wisest in council, the ablest in debate and the most agreeable companion in the commerce of human life, is that man who has assimilated to his understanding the greatest number of facts. 123. Because Fundamental Rights are justiciable and Directive Principles are not, it was assumed, in the beginning, that Fundamental Rights held a superior position under the Constitution than the Directive Principles, and that the latter were only of secondary importance as compared with the Fundamental Rights. That way of thinking is of the past and has become obsolete. It is now universally recognised that the difference between the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles lies in this that Fundamental Rights are primarily aimed at assuring political freedom to the citizens by protecting them against excessive State action while the Directive Principles are aimed at securing social and economic freedoms by appropriate State action. The Fundamental Rights are intended to foster the ideal of a political democracy and to prevent the establishment of authorisation rule but they are of no value unless they can be enforced by resort to Courts. So, they are made justiciable. But, it is also evident that notwithstanding their great importance, t he Directive Principles cannot in the very nature of things be enforced in a Court of law. It is unimaginable that any Court can compel a legislature to make a law. If the Court can compel Parliament to make laws then parliamentary democracy would soon be reduced to an oligarchy of judges. It is in that sense that the Constitution says that the Directive Principles shall not be enforceable by Courts. It does not mean that Directive Principles are less important than Fundamental Rights or that they are not binding on the various organs of the State. It is in that sense that the Constitution says that the Directive Principles shall not be enforceable by Courts. It does not mean that Directive Principles are less important than Fundamental Rights or that they are not binding on the various organs of the State. Article 3 7 of the Constitution emphatically states that Directive Principles are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. It folio was that it becomes the duty of the Court to apply the Directive Principles in interpreting the Constitution and the laws. The Directive Principles should serve the Courts as a code of interpretation. Fundamental Rights should thus be interpreted in the light of the Directive Principles and the latter should, whenever and wherever possible, be read into the former. Every law attacked on the ground of infringement of a Fundamental Rights should, among other considerations, be examined to find out if the law does not advance one or other of the Directive Principles or if it is not in discharge of some of the undoubted obligations of the State, constitutional or otherwise, towards its citizens or sections of its citizens, flowing out of the Preamble, the Directive Principles and other provisions of the Constitution.” 6. Article 166 of the Constitution requires that all executive action of a State Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. The Constitution however, does not require any particular formula of words for compliance with Article 166 (1). But the Court has to see is whether in substance of the requirement has been complied with because the provision is only directory. Thus there is substantial compliance with the clause where a notification is signed by a Secretary by order of the Governor. An order signed by the Chief Secretary on behalf of the Government has been held to be unsubstantial compliance with Article 166 even though if does not express to have been made in the name of the Governor. On the other hand there is no compliance that these clauses where a Secretary to the Government issues a letter without mentioning the name of the Governor at all (see AIR 1961 SC 1762 (Barsay vs. State of Bombay). On the other hand there is no compliance that these clauses where a Secretary to the Government issues a letter without mentioning the name of the Governor at all (see AIR 1961 SC 1762 (Barsay vs. State of Bombay). An inter-departmental communication issued by a Secretary without mentioning that he was acting by order of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi and there is no independent evidence to show that the Governor had in fact made or concurred in making of the order would vitiate the order (see 1962 (Supp) 3 SCR 713 (Bachhittar vs. State of Punjab) and 1959 SCR 1424 (Ghaomall vs. State of Delhi). Clause 1 of Article 166 of the Constitution does not prescribe how an executive action of the Government has to be performed. It only prescribed the mode in which such act is to be expressed. Hence failure to comply with Article 166 (1) does not nullify the order, but only takes away the constitutional immunity or proof, the order would be upheld if the State can otherwise proves that the order was in fact made by the Governor. This may be proved by producing the relevant Government records or by affidavit of a responsible officer. That is, what is, lacking in the instant case. The impugned notification is bad on that count. 7. The next question is that whether this corrigendum could have been issued in view of the fact that the earlier rule was made in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. No doubt clause 4 of that notification provides as follows: “4. If any question arises relating to the interpretation of these rules, it shall be referred to the Government of Assam in the Finance Department whose decision thereon shall be final.” And the corrigendum says that this was issued as per the direction of the Finance Department. But the clause quoted above will show that it relates to power of interpretation and it does not give any power to the Finance Department to issue a corrigendum. The Dictionary meaning of the word 'corrigendum' means things to be corrected. It means there must be an error and there is a necessity to amend or rectify it. In the garb of corrigendum a rule can not be altered and/or changed, but, that is, what appears to have been done in the instant case. The Dictionary meaning of the word 'corrigendum' means things to be corrected. It means there must be an error and there is a necessity to amend or rectify it. In the garb of corrigendum a rule can not be altered and/or changed, but, that is, what appears to have been done in the instant case. In order to alter or modify a rule the same procedure adopted in making of the rule have to be gone through. Modification means a change and alteration or amendment which introduces new element into the details or cancel some of them but leave the general purpose and effect of the subject matter intact. A modification is an alteration or change which may be characterised in quantitative change as either an increase or a decrease (see Black's Law Dictionary). In the instant case I find that by Annexure IV a modification was made in the garb of corrigendum infringing the rights of the petitioner and that cannot be done in the manner sought to be done vide Annexure IV. Accordingly, I hold that this Annexure IV is without authority of law and the same is quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to all the benefits as given in the ROP Rules which was duly accepted by the Government and in pursuance of which the earlier notification was issued. The writ application is accordingly allowed. 8. I however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.