S. RAJENDRA BABU, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against an order made in suo motu proceedings initiated under Article 215 of the Constitution of India in Writ Petition 5100/94. In the writ petition an order was made on 29-11-1994 as follows :"mr. Kalagi, learned High Court Government Pleader accepts notice on behalf of respondents 1 and 2. Let the case be listed for final disposal on 5-1-1995. G. P. to secure the records and file the statement of objection. In the meanwhile, if the petitioner is in possession, the same shall not be disturbed. "pursuant to this order, the office issued notice to the parties concerned along with the interim order granted by this Court and for the purpose of convenience it is extracted :"whereas a Writ Petition filed by the above named petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been registered by this Court. Read the Interim Order granted on 29-11-1994. Read I. A. , filed on 19-11-1994 by the Advocate for the petitioner for direction. After hearing, the Court made the following :order :if the petitioner is in possession of the land bearing Sy. No. 29 of Arakere village, Bhadravathi Tq. , measuring about one acre and twenty seven guntas, the same shall not be disturbed, till 5-1-1995. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Court, this the 29th day of November, 1994. " ( 2 ) THE learned Judge on noticing this aspect of the matter felt that issuing of the orders in the manner done in this case, which is extracted above, would amount to "intermeddling and mending the course of administration of justice" by the Registry of this Court; that the men in the Registry changes the order of the Court by deleting certain expressions and by adding certain expressions in accordance with their own knowledge and understanding that they first of all trespass illegally over the authority of the Court in the sense that expression "in the meanwhile" has been deleted and the expression "till 5-1-1995", has been interpolated. This approach and course adopted has led to polluting the course of justice by the Registry of this Court and that by reading the order issued by the Registry, the respondent could have taken the plea that the interim order has expired on a particular day, namely, on 5-1-1995. This approach and course adopted has led to polluting the course of justice by the Registry of this Court and that by reading the order issued by the Registry, the respondent could have taken the plea that the interim order has expired on a particular day, namely, on 5-1-1995. ( 3 ) ON 17-2-1995 the learned Judge made an order directing issue of notices to the appellants to show cause as to why action under Article 215 of the Constitution of India be not taken against them for having committed contempt of court of interpolating certain words in the interim order dated 29-11-1994 while issuing notices and the explanation should be furnished in the form of an affidavit in writing by them on or before 27-3-1995 in the Registry and thereafter the matter be listed before the Court on 29-3-1995 for further orders. On 29-3-1995 the learned Judge proceeded to reserve the order and passed the order on 6-4-1995 which is the subject matter of this appeal. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that there are two types of attack on the order under appeal. Firstly, that there are procedural lapses on the part of the learned Judge in making the order in question. Secondly, even assuming for a moment the learned Judge had jurisdiction to make the order or had properly proceeded in the case there is no case made out for contempt because the Order communicated by the Registry was in conformity with the order made by this Court. Alternatively it is submitted even if there is any error or mistake in conveying the order of this Court, the same could be got corrected as if is only a clerical error as a result of inadvertent omission and not deliberate intention. It is also submitted that even if the appellants failed on the aforesaid contentions the Court should have taken a lenient view in the matter and dropped the further proceedings in the ease bearing in mind that there is no malice alleged against the appellants in issuing the interim order though the same may not be exactly in conformity with the order made by the Court in the writ proceedings. He made it clear that the majesty and grandeur of law lies in being magnanimous and merciful in such matter, than in taking harsh steps on the ministerial staff which has absolutely no intention to commit any contempt of this Court. ( 5 ) MR. Umashankar and Miss Vaishali Hegde appearing for Mr. Mohandas Hegde for some of the parties submitted that this appeal is not maintainable, inasmuch, as, the order under appeal is not made in the course of a writ proceeding but as a result of initiation of proceedings suo motu under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. At this stage the learned Counsel for the appellants filed a memo to permit the appellants to convert the writ appeal into an original side appeal on the file of this Court. ( 6 ) WHETHER the order is made on the writ side or on the contempt side by a learned single Judge of this Court an appeal lies to the Division Bench either under the Contempt of Courts Act or under the High Court Act. Under Section 4 of Karnataka High Court Act 1961 an appeal lies from a judgement, decree, order or sentence passed by a single Judge in the exercise of original jurisdiction of the High Court under the said Act or under any law for the time being in force and we have no doubt in our mind that exercise of power in contempt proceedings is inherent in the Court but still such jurisdiction is original in nature. Hence an appeal is maintainable under Section 4 of the said Act. If the order in question is considered to have been passed under Contempt of Courts Act 1971, an appeal lies under Section 19 (1) (a) of the said Act. In either case, whether under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act or Contempt of Courts Act appeal lies to a Bench of not less than two other Judges of the High Court. In that view of the matter, we do not think there is any substance in the contention urged on behalf of some of the respondents for whom Mr. Umashankar and Miss Vaishali Hegde, appear. In fact on the filing of the memo we permitted the learned Counsel to proceed as if this is an original side appeal and we allowed the memo. Umashankar and Miss Vaishali Hegde, appear. In fact on the filing of the memo we permitted the learned Counsel to proceed as if this is an original side appeal and we allowed the memo. Let this appeal be treated as an original side appeal. ( 7 ) IN elaborating the contentions on behalf of the appellants the learned Counsel for the appellants stated that the procedure adopted by the learned single Judge in this case gives a complete go-by to the procedure prescribed under the High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 1981. He submitted that the said Rules have been framed not only under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, but also under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. When a procedure is prescribed by the Court itself, he submitted, the same should be followed scrupulously. He contended that the cognizance for contempt can be taken only by a Division Bench of not less than two Judges, except in cases arising under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act when in presence of the Judge the offence is alleged to have been committed and in accordance with the provisions thereof. He further submitted that after the order was made on 17-2-1995 directing issue of notices to the appellants to show cause why action under Article 215 of the Constitution be not taken against them for having committed contempt of court, all that it meant was to show cause as to why proceedings should not be initiated against them. Under Rule 10 hearing of cases and trial is provided and on the accused filing his reply supported by an affidavit the court may drop the proceeding and discharge the accused or upon hearing the court is satisfied that there is prima facie case it shall proceed to frame the charge and furnish a copy of the same to the accused. In this case, it is submitted that the explanation was furnished as directed by the Court in its order dated 17-2-1995 to the Registry by the appellants and thereafter they did not know whether the Court made up its mind to accept their explanation or choose to proceed further and no order was made on that aspect of the matter except to reserve the matter for pronouncement of order resulting in, the sentence under appeal. ( 8 ) WE find great force in this submission made on behalf of the appellants. It is undoubtedly clear that the power exercisable under Article 215 of the Constitution is unfettered by any procedure, but when the Court itself chooses to prescribe certain procedure in the matter of dealing with the proceedings arising under the contempt jurisdiction, needless to say, such procedure must be followed. In this case when the learned single Judge was satisfied that there is a prima facie case for proceeding further should have allowed the matter to be proceeded and dealt with, by two Judges as provided under Rule 6 of the Rules. Under Rule 6 cognizance for contempt could not have been taken by the learned single Judge. As long as the rules are in force that procedure could not have been ignored and with great respect, we find the learned Judge did not have jurisdiction to pass the order under appeal. ( 9 ) EVEN on merits we find it difficult in accepting the order made by the learned Judge in the writ proceeding. In the writ petition the order made on 29-11-1994, it was stated, that the case has to be listed for final disposal on 5-1-1995. In the meanwhile, if the petitioner is in possession, the same shall not be disturbed. The learned Judge found that while communicating this order to the parties concerned, the appellants did not convey the same in conformity with the order, inasmuch as, the case had been posted for final disposal to 5-1-1995 and in the meanwhile the possession shall not be disturbed, and on the other hand it was conveyed that the same shall not be disturbed till 5-1-1995. What assumes significance in this case is as to what meaning is to be attributed to the expression "in the meanwhile". "in the meanwhile" could be understood only at as an interregnum between two points of time when certain events shall take place or not take place. The starting point here is the date of the order, that is, 29-11-1994 and ending point is the next date of hearing, that is, 5-1-1995. Therefore, "in the meanwhile" could only mean between those two dates and no other meaning could be attributed to it. The starting point here is the date of the order, that is, 29-11-1994 and ending point is the next date of hearing, that is, 5-1-1995. Therefore, "in the meanwhile" could only mean between those two dates and no other meaning could be attributed to it. Let us now examine the aspect that when the case was set down for final disposal on 5-1-1995, the expression "in the meanwhile" should be attributable to the expression for final disposal. If that were the meaning to be attributed to the expression 'in the meanwhile' the order would read us until further order or until disposal of the case and not in the meanwhile. That was what was meant by the learned Judge, when he made the order on 29-11-1994 and he clearly stated that the cause has to be listed on 5-1-1995. When the case was directed to be listed on a particular date from another date, as to what should happen during the interregnum is dealt with by the next sentence making it clear by using the expression "in the meanwhile". With great respect to the learned single Judge, we are of the view, that he was not right in holding that the expression "in the meanwhile" will have to be alluded to the expression final disposal and not to the expression 5-1-1995. When we have come to this conclusion that the order conveyed by the appellants is perfectly in conformity with the order made by this Court, question of disobedience, wilful or otherwise does not arise at all. Therefore, it is unnecessary to consider the other questions raised in this case as to whether the appellants who are only ministerial staff of this Court could have committed contempt or not or whether any other course could have been taken. Hence, we are clear in our mind that such action of the appellants even in that eventuality would not have pollutted or intermeddled or mended the course of justice. Therefore, it is unnecessary to refer to various Text Books and other literature or decisions relied upon by the learned Judge in this context as to whether the officer of this Court also could commit contempt or not. Therefore, it is unnecessary to refer to various Text Books and other literature or decisions relied upon by the learned Judge in this context as to whether the officer of this Court also could commit contempt or not. ( 10 ) EVEN if we have come to the conclusion, though not possible, that the order conveyed by the appellants is not in conformity with the order made by the Court, we are of the view, no contempt of Court arises, inasmuch as, there is no malice or intention or deliberate action on the part of the appellants to mislead any one in understanding the order of the Court nor has the same resulted in any pre-judice to any party in any manner. After the order was communicated to parties and appearance thereof on 5-1-1995 further proceedings have taken place. ( 11 ) IN the view we have taken this appeal is allowed and the order made by the learned single Judge on 6-4-1995 in suo motu proceedings under Article 215 of the Constitution of India in Writ Petition 5100/94 is set aside. ( 12 ) APPEAL allowed. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .