M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS r. f. a. and the companion c. r. p. can both be conveniently disposed of through a common order. The short point that arises is with regard to the correctness of an Order passed by the learned trial judge in an application for setting aside an ex parte decree. A plea was raised on behalf of defendant No. 5 (a) that there had been no valid service on her and that consequently, the decree passed is liable to be set aside and she should be afforded an opportunity to contest the proceeding on merits. After a detailed hearing, the learned trial judge set aside the ex parte decree as far as defendant No. 5 (a) is concerned. The appellants' principal contention is that this is not a money decree nor is it a type of decree that is separable as far as the parties who are bound by that decree are concerned and that consequently, if the court took the view that even one of the defendants was unserved and that the matter should be heard denovo on merits, that the only permissible Order that could have been passed was that all the defendants should have an opportunity to participate in the proceedings when the same are reopened. It is in respect of the Order passed by the learned trial judge that this appeal and the companion c. r. p. have been filed before this court. ( 2 ) THE respondents' learned Advocate who was present and who mentioned the matter at 10. 30 a. m. today, brought one fact to my notice, namely that even though the suit proceedings are pending before the high court, that no interim orders were passed as a result of which in normal course, by virtue of the Order of setting aside of the decree against defendants 5 (a), that the trial court took up the matter for hearing thereof and has proceeded. Apparently, it was never brought to the notice of the learned trial judge that technically, the Order of dismissal stood as against the remaining defendants other than defendant 5 (a) and that therefore, on "a strict construction, they may not be entitled to plead any defence at the hearing. Apparently, it was never brought to the notice of the learned trial judge that technically, the Order of dismissal stood as against the remaining defendants other than defendant 5 (a) and that therefore, on "a strict construction, they may not be entitled to plead any defence at the hearing. Overlooking this fact, the learned trial judge has proceeded to take up the matter on merits and has afforded all the defendants an opportunity of participating in the proceedings. ( 3 ) WHEN the appeal was taken up for hearing, the principal submission canvassed by the learned Advocate for the appellants is that once valid ground existed for rehearing or setting aside of the decree, that all defendants must get equal benefits thereof as a decree for specific performance cannot be set aside piece-meal insofar as it binds only one of the defendants. It is unnecessary for me to go into the intricacies of the contentions that are raised in these two proceedings, because effectively, the trial court has proceeded correctly. All that is necessary is to ratify that position through the present order. ( 4 ) THE appeal and the c. r. p. to stand disposed of with the clarification that the original decree stands set aside as against all the defendants and that the trial court was perfectly correct and justified in having permitted all the defendants to appear and participate in the proceedings. If any of them have been precluded from doing so, it is clarified that they shall be permitted to take part in the proceedings. It is unnecessary for me to add that as far as the present appellant is concerned, that by virtue of the aforesaid Order, he is entitled to participate in the proceedings and defend the suit on merits. ( 5 ) THE appellants' learned Advocate submits that he would been titled to refund of court fee on the ground that his appeal has not been pressed in view of what has been pointed out by me in this order. To my mind, this submission is erroneous. It was essential for this court to have issued certain clarifications for purposes of rectification of the position, by virtue of which the appellants are also the beneficiaries. To my mind, this submission is erroneous. It was essential for this court to have issued certain clarifications for purposes of rectification of the position, by virtue of which the appellants are also the beneficiaries. Having regard to what has transpired, it may be that no detailed hearing was necessary in the appeal, but that does not mean that no orders have been passed. The Court Fees Act specifically permits refund only in certain specified instances and this is not one of them. Appellants' learned Advocate draws my attention to Section 67 which has absolutely no application to the facts of this case. The request for refund of court fee, therefore, cannot be granted. ( 6 ) MR. Suresh, learned Advocate who represents the appellants, thereafter, advanced one more submission. He contended that half the court fee paid should be refunded by virtue of the provisions of Section 66 (c) of the Court Fees Act. That Section provides that one half of the court fee shall be refunded if the appeal is disposed of before the final hearing. According to the learned advocate, the disposal of the appeal today is in such circumstances that the provisions of Section 66 (c) will apply. ( 7 ) IT is quite amazing that an argument of this type is advanced. The appeal and the c. r. p. were set down for final hearing today. They have been called out in normal course and the appellants' learned Advocate has appraised me of what has transpired in the case on the basis of which, the Order was dictated in court. Despite this, a submission is sought to be canvassed that the disposal is at a stage prior to the hearing. One expects applications of this type to be accompanied by a certain degree of responsibility, particularly when they involve serious issues like refund of court fees. The disposal of this appeal has been at the stage when it was set down for final hearing and not at any earlier stage. The order_ passed by this court is also necessary for purposes of the appellants, having regard to what has transpired, being permitted to participate in the proceedings and in Order to ratify and regularise that position. The disposal of this appeal has been at the stage when it was set down for final hearing and not at any earlier stage. The order_ passed by this court is also necessary for purposes of the appellants, having regard to what has transpired, being permitted to participate in the proceedings and in Order to ratify and regularise that position. Under these circumstances, merely because a couple of hours were not spent by the court in plodding through the record, no responsible submission can be made that the disposal is prior to the stage of hearing. Section 66 (c) will not apply to the facts of this case and the application for refund therefore, cannot be granted. --- *** --- .