J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) IN this first appeal filed under Sec. 82 of the Employees state Insurance Act, 1948 (Act for short) the appellants have questioned the legality and validity of the judgment and order passed by the Employees Insurance Court, ahmedabad, on 2nd February, 1979 rejecting the Application (ESI) No. 9 of 1974. ( 2 ) THE appellants are the original applicants who had filed the aforesaid application claiming the dependent benefits from respondent-original opponent employees State Insurance Corporation, Ahmedabad, (corporation for short ). The original applicants claiming to be the dependents of deceased Kantilal Kamlashankar pandya inter alia contended that they are entitled to the dependents benefits by making an application under Sec. 77 of the Act. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the case of the appellants deceased, Kantilal Pandya (deceased for short) was an insured person under the Act. Deceased was working in Ahmedabad new Cotton No. 2 Mills in a finishing department in the day shift. On 7th October, 1971 he got injured on his left hand on account of an accident which resulted into compound fracture of the radius and ulna bones of the left hand. He was admitted in the Civil Hospital on 7th October, 1971 and was treated by Dr. Patel in orthopaedic ward. It is, further, contended by the appellants that since he had not responded to the treatment, the deceased was admitted in the ward of Dr. D. B. Patel on 27th June, 1972 again. He was thereafter treated upto 12th August, 1972 when he unfortunately expired. The cause of death is alleged to be haepatic come due to cirrhosis of lever and that was because of the convulsion and seriousness of the injuries sustained by the deceased on his left hand in the accident arising out of his employment. Original appellant No. 1 is widow of the deceased and appellant No. 2 is minor son of the deceased and they claim to be dependents of the deceased. Since their claim of dependents of the deceased was rejected by a letter dated 13th July, 1992 they had filed the application before the Trial Court under Sec. 77 of the Act. ( 4 ) THE opponent-Corporation resisted the claim by filing the written statement, at Exh. Since their claim of dependents of the deceased was rejected by a letter dated 13th July, 1992 they had filed the application before the Trial Court under Sec. 77 of the Act. ( 4 ) THE opponent-Corporation resisted the claim by filing the written statement, at Exh. 43, inter alia contending that the deceased commenced his duties at 7-00 AM and at about 3-30 PM while he was guiding fabrics on Drying Rag Machine, accidentally, his left hand was dragged in along with the fabrics and it came in between the guide rolls because of which he sustained compound fracture. It was admitted that it was a case of employment injury. Deceased was paid for the period from 8-10- 1971 to 4-10-1972 and from 5-7-1972 to 12-8-1972. The amount of TDB had been paid to the nominee of the deceased as per the provisions of the Act. ( 5 ) THE opponent-corporation has also contended that the deceased had died on 12th August, 1972 due to cirrhosis of liver haepatic coma. The deceased was admitted in Civil Hospital on 27th June, 1972 and was discharged upon the request of the family on 12th August, 1972. The deceased was in the state of coma at the time of his discharge from the hospital. According to the contention of the corporation the cirrhosis of liver and haepatic coma which is the cause of death of the deceased had no nexus with the fracture injury sustained in the accident as an insured person. In short, the claim was denied on the ground that there was no nexus with the death and the injuries sustained in the accident. ( 6 ) THE Insurance Court framed issues at Exh. 4 and upon appreciation of the facts and circumstances and the evidence, on record, reached to the conclusion that the appellants are not entitled to claim dependent benefits. This application came to be dismissed without costs on 2nd February, 1979 by the Trial Court holding that there was no nexus between the cause of death and the employment injury. Thus, it was held by the Trial Court that the appellants have failed to prove that the injuries sustained by the deceased on 7th October, 1971 during the accident had resulted in his death on 12th August, 1972. Thus, it was held by the Trial Court that the appellants have failed to prove that the injuries sustained by the deceased on 7th October, 1971 during the accident had resulted in his death on 12th August, 1972. ( 7 ) BEING aggrieved by the said judgment the original applicants have, now, come up before this Court in this appeal under Sec. 82 of the Act. ( 8 ) LEARNED Advocate appearing for the appellants has contended that the impugned judgment is perverse and illegal. According to his contention the Insurance court has failed to appreciate the medical evidence properly which has resulted into miscarriage of justice. It is therefore contended that the appellants have been able to prove the nexus between the death and the employment injury. The learned advocate appearing for the respondent-Insurance Corporation has supported the judgment of the Trial Court and has seriously opposed the aforesaid contentions. He has also, seriously, argued that this appeal is not maintainable in view of the specific provisions of Sec. 82. He has contended that the present appeal does not involve a substantial question of law and, therefore, the appeal is incompetent under sec. 82 of the ESI Act. Sec. 82 of the ESI Act reads as under :"82. Appeal :- (1) Save as expressly provided in this section, no appeal shall lie from an order of an Employees Insurance Court. (2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law. (3) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (4) The provisions of Secs. 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to appeals under this section. " ( 9 ) IT is clear from the aforesaid provision that the appellate Court has no power to interfere with a finding of fact. Section 82 clearly prescribes for an appeal if it warrants substantial question of law. (4) The provisions of Secs. 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to appeals under this section. " ( 9 ) IT is clear from the aforesaid provision that the appellate Court has no power to interfere with a finding of fact. Section 82 clearly prescribes for an appeal if it warrants substantial question of law. It is a settled position of law that for determining whether substantial question of law is involved the proper test is to see whether there is a question of general public importance or whether it directly or substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. The proper legal effect of the proved fact is, essentially, a question of law. Prima facie one could say that in the circumstances of the present case there does not seem to be a substantial question of law. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, assuming that the question as to whether the death of the deceased was result of the employment injury or not is not a pure question of fact then also, the appreciation of facts made by the Trial Court could not be said to be in any way unreasonable, unjust or illegal requiring the interference of this Court. The insurance Court has taken into consideration all the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the present case including the medical evidence and has reached to a definite positive finding of facts that the deceased is not proved to have died on account of personal injuries in employment accident occurred on 7th Ocotber, 1971. The death occurred on 12th August, 1972 on account of cirrhosis of liver. The accident occurred on 7th October, 1971 whereby the deceased had sustained fracture injury on his left hand. After treatment in the hospital, he was discharged. Thereafter he was readmitted in the hospital for the treatment of cirrhosis of lever. According to the evidence on record the applicants have failed to prove that the deceased had died on 12th August 1972 because of the injuries sustained by him on 7th October, 1971 in the company. ( 11 ) ORTHOPAEDIC Surgeon, Dr. Thereafter he was readmitted in the hospital for the treatment of cirrhosis of lever. According to the evidence on record the applicants have failed to prove that the deceased had died on 12th August 1972 because of the injuries sustained by him on 7th October, 1971 in the company. ( 11 ) ORTHOPAEDIC Surgeon, Dr. Parikh had treated the applicant for a fracture of left hand. Reliance is placed on the evidence of Dr. Parikh. It is contended that dr. Parikh has stated in his evidence that the liver disease is possible if the fracture gets sceptic. If it gets sceptic, it can affect other organs like kidney, liver, spleen etc. and if the infection persists it may cause amyloi dosis and may bring about degeneration or reaction and functioning of liver decreases and may cause death. This part of the evidence of Dr. Parikh is strongly relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellant and he has contended that in the present case the death was due to the injury. This contention is incorrect and therefore it was rightly not accepted by the Insurance Court. What could have become in case of complication on account of sceptic is a general opinion of an orthopaedic surgeon but, that is not enough to connect the death with the injury. Dr. Parikh has, nowhere, stated in his evidence that there was a sceptic in the fracture injury sustained by the deceased and such a contention also not supported by the medical record. In fact, the deceased has sustained a fracture on left hand bones and there is nothing in the medical record to show that there was infection as a result of the fracture. Therefore, the aforesaid contention is devoid of evidence on record. ( 12 ) THE ESI Corporation has relied on evidence of Dr. P. P. Shah. Dr. Shah was examined at Exh. 64. According to him, the deceased was treated for the disease of liver in Civil Hospital by Dr. Patel who could not be examined as he had left for USA. Dr. Shah has worked under Dr. D. D. Patel then. He knew about the facts of the case and he had also produced the relevant case papers. Deceased was admitted in the Civil Hospital on 27th June, 1972 for cirrhosis of liver and was treated under the care of Dr. Dr. Shah has worked under Dr. D. D. Patel then. He knew about the facts of the case and he had also produced the relevant case papers. Deceased was admitted in the Civil Hospital on 27th June, 1972 for cirrhosis of liver and was treated under the care of Dr. D. D. Patel and was discharged on 12th August, 1972, upon the request of the relatives of the patient. Deceased was in coma when he was discharged. Dr. Shah has, subsequently, deposed that in case of deceased there was no relation of disease of cirrhosis of liver with fracture of left hand bones. There was no history of infection or sceptic in case of the deceased. ( 13 ) THE deceased has as such sustained employment injuries resulted into fracture of left hand on 7th October, 1971. After treatment, he was discharged from the hospital and subsequently he was admitted in the hospital for the treatment of liver cirrhosis. From the facts and circumstances and the medical evidence on record, it is out of place even to infer that the employment injury sustained by the deceased on 7-10-1971 has any even remote connection with the liver cirrhosis with which the deceased has been inflicted somewhere in June, 1972 and succumbed to the same on 12-8-1972 with the complication of haepatic coma. Therefore, in the circumstances, the conclusion of the Trial Court that the nexus between the death and employment injury is not established is quite justified and is required to be confirmed while dismissing this appeal. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. .