Judgment :- Radhakrishnan, J. The question whether an order of temporary injunction can be granted on the application of a defendant has been referred to a Division Bench by a learned single Judge. The question more precisely is whether the injunction envisaged in Order 39 Rule 1c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the 'Code') can be granted when a defendant moves for the same. Learned Single Judge thought it necessary to have an authoritative pronouncement on the question as he felt that there is conflict between the observations contained in Vincent v. Aisumma, 1988 (1) K.L.T. 420 and the views expressed in Gopalakrishnan Nair v. Joshi,1985 KLT 132. 2. An injunction is a judicial process whereby a party is required to do or to refrain from doing, any particular act. One of the primary purposes of granting interim relief is preservation of the property in dispute till the legal rights and conflicting claims of the parties before the court are adjudicated. It is in the nature of a protective relief granted in favour of a party to prevent future possible injury. A temporary injunction is regulated by the provisions of Section 94 and Order 39 of the Code, and it can be granted at any stage of the suit. Grant of temporary injunction is in the discretion of the Court. The discretion, however, should be exercised reasonably, judiciously, and on sound legal principles. Order 39 Rule 1" is extracted below: 0.39. Rule 1: Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.- Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or (b) that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors, (c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit. the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or to make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff, in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, as the court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit, or until further orders. On a reading of the said provision, it is evident that the court can grant an injunction at the instance of both the plaintiff as well as the defendant, where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger at being wasted, damaged, or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree. Injunction can also be granted when the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors. Earlier there had been conflicting judicial views as to whether a court can issue an order of temporary injunction at the instance of the plaintiff or at the instance of the defendant, if either of them threatens to dispossess each other in relation to any property in dispute in the suit. 3. A Learned Single Judge of this Court in B.F. Varghese v. Joseph Thomas, 1956 KLT 615 endorsed the view that an injunction could be granted to a defendant by invoking the inherent powers of the court under Section 151 of the Code. Learned single judge relied on the principle followed by Buckly, J. in the case of Collision v. Warrant, (1901) 1 Ch.812. In B.F. Varghese 's case (supra), the defendant preferred an application for mandatory injunction restraining the plaintiff to remove the block up and replace the door as well as put back the smoke tiles on thereof. The trial court granted the prayer and learned-single judge upheld it, 4. Some of the High Courts have taken the view that the court has no inherent power to grant temporary injunction outside the limitations laid down i n Order 39, Rules 1 and 2. However, the controversy has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lai v. Seth Hiralal, A.I.R.1962 S.C. 527. Some of the High Courts have taken the view that the court has no inherent power to grant temporary injunction outside the limitations laid down i n Order 39, Rules 1 and 2. However, the controversy has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lai v. Seth Hiralal, A.I.R.1962 S.C. 527. It was held by the Supreme Court that the courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39 CPC. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the law stands settled now that the court has inherent power, de hors the provisions of Order 39 of the Code to grant temporary injunctions. A clear distinction is made by the framers of the Rules as between the situation in clause (a) and the situation in either clause (b) or clause (c) of Rule 1 of Order 39. In respect of the former, injunction can be granted whoever applied for the same, whereas in respect of the latter no injunction can be granted on the motion of a defendant. 5. The limitation of the legislation is primarily gathered from the language used. It means that attention must be paid to what has been said and also to what has not been said. When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, and they are suceptible to only one view, the courts are bound to give effect to the said view. The language of Order 39 Rule 1(c) is clear and explicit. There is no ambiguity in the said provision. When the language is plain and unambiguous, and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of the statute arises, for the provision speaks for itself. The result of construed on is then not a matter for the Court. As observed by Gajendragadkar, J. in Kandi Lai v. Paramnidhi, A.I.R.1957 S.C. 907 at 910: " If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act." 6. Since the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1(c) are clear and unambiguous, it cannot be contended that court should read into the said provision that the said relief can be granted at the instance of the defendant as well. Order 39 Rule 1(c) specifically refers to a threat by. the defendant to dispossess the plaintiff, or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit. Therefore only in cases where the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff, applicability of Order 39 Rule 1(c) arises. Since the Legislature has specifically thought of a situation when the defendant threatens the plaintiff, the court cannot read into the said provision a situation where the plaintiff threatens the defendant. In S.T. Commr., Parson Tools & Plants, Kanpur, A.I.R.1975 S.C.1039, Supreme Court has pointed out that: "if the Legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something of an analoguous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation, by analogy or implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equality. To do so, would be entrenching upon the preserves of the legislature, the primary function of a court of law being jus dicere and not jus dare." Supreme Court has taken the same view in P. K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries, AIR 1990 SC 923. When the Code was amended by Act 104 of 1976 the Legislature was well aware of the position of law then existing and also various judicial pronouncements with regard to the scope and ambit of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2. Legislature thought it fit to exercise only the saving power under Section 151 of the Code in aid of the defendant in a case where the plaintiff threatens to dispossess the defendant or otherwise cause injury to him in relation to any property in dispute in the suit. 7. Legislature thought it fit to exercise only the saving power under Section 151 of the Code in aid of the defendant in a case where the plaintiff threatens to dispossess the defendant or otherwise cause injury to him in relation to any property in dispute in the suit. 7. On the basis of the above mentioned principles, we are of the view that the defendant is disabled from moving an application under Order 39 Rule 1(c) of the Code, if the plaintiff threatens to dispossess the defendant or otherwise cause injury to him in relation to any property in dispute in the suit. The only remedy open to the defendant is to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 151 of the Code, which saves inherent power of the Court to pass orders to meet the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of process of court or to institute a separate suit to establish his case. 8. In Gopalakrishnan Nair v. Joshi,1985 KLT 132, learned single judge took the view that since the nature of injunction sought for by the defendant arose out of the plaintiffs cause of action, he can seek temporary injunction against the plaintiff. Even so, learned judge declined to grant the relief to the defendant. The question whether the petition filed by the defendant would lie under Order 39 Rule 1(c) was not considered in the decision. In Vincent v. Aisumma,1988 (1) KLT 420, the question involved was whether a mandatory injunction could be granted at the instance of the defendant. What was considered in that decision pertained to the scope of Order 39 Rule 1(a). It was held that there is no prohibition under Order 39 against a defendant making an application for injunction. 9. In the instant case, defendants 3 and 4 filed an application for temporary injunction restraining the plaintiff from trespassing into the property which, according to them, is in their possession. They alleged that on 19-10-1992 plaintiff along with his men attempted to trespass into the property. They contended until plaintiff proves Ext. Al was executed by fraud, undue influence, coercion, etc., the recitals in the document must be given due weight. In order to establish their case defendants 3 and 4 relied on Exts. B1 to B6 and the plaintiff relied on Exts. Al to A10. A commission was taken out, who submitted Ext. C1 report. They contended until plaintiff proves Ext. Al was executed by fraud, undue influence, coercion, etc., the recitals in the document must be given due weight. In order to establish their case defendants 3 and 4 relied on Exts. B1 to B6 and the plaintiff relied on Exts. Al to A10. A commission was taken out, who submitted Ext. C1 report. The lower court after considering the materials produced before it dismissed the petition holding that defendants 3 and 4 are not entitled to get any equitable relief of injunction, as defendants 3 and 4 have not come before the court with clean hands. 10. Plaintiff explains the reasons for executing Exts. A1 and the agreement Ext. A2 dated 17-3-1992. Plaintiff contended under Ext. Al document defendants 1 and 2 were never put in possession of the property. Plaintiff relies on Ext. A8 revenue receipt dated 18-12-1990 to show that he is in possession of the property. He also relies on Ext. C1 commission report. On the other hand, learned counsel for defendants 3 and 4 contended they are bona fide purchasers for value, and they were put in possession by defendants 1 and 2 on execution of Ext. B2 document dated 1-6-1992. They relied on Ext. B6 tax receipt dated 7-4-1992 in order to establish their possession. We are of the view that defendants 3 and 4 have not established their actual possession on the date of suit. Ext. B2 by which defendants 3 and 4 claim title to the property cannot be regarded at this stage to be of such presumptive value as to establish their possession. As defendants 3 and ^ failed to establish a prima facie case of possession, the lower court has rightly declined to grant the injunction prayed for. We are not hence inclined to interfere with the order passed by the court below. Appeal is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be rib order as to costs.