M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against a money decree passed in O. S. No. 4179 of 1990. The plaintiff therein had contended that the defendant has executed a promissory note for a sum of Rs. 70,000/- on 15-5-1990 and that there was an assurance that the amount would be repaid within a short period with certain interest which was not done. Certain further allegations Were made to the effect that the defendant had taken the money for business purposes and also that he has sold his house and pone away and that therefore, the plaintiff had no option except to ask for a decree against him. The plaintiff had also averred that he had met the defendant on a few occasions and asked for the money, that he was given assurance of the payment which did not materialise. ( 2 ) THE evidence basically consisted of the document in question. The oral evidence of the plaintiff supported by one of the attesting witnesses whereby, it was established to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge that the promissory note had in fact been executed as a collateral for the payment of Rs. 70,000/ -. The defendant took up the contention that the plaintiff is a shop owner and that he was temporarily in need of some money and on his approaching the plaintiff, he was asked to execute a promissory note on the assurance that the loan would be given to him. He stated that the loan was not forthcoming and being in dire need of money, that he sold his house and obtained the money during which period, he overlooked the fact that the promissory note had been left with the plaintiff. According to him, there is no consideration for the execution of the promissory note, that no amount was received by him and that he is not liable to repay anything to the plaintiff. ( 3 ) THE learned trial Judge has carefully assessed the material placed before him. He has held that the promissory note in question was duly executed by the defendant. He has further held that there is no ground to uphold the defence that the loan of Rs. 70,000/- was not given and he has also come to the conclusion that there is no evidence of the payment. He has held that the promissory note in question was duly executed by the defendant. He has further held that there is no ground to uphold the defence that the loan of Rs. 70,000/- was not given and he has also come to the conclusion that there is no evidence of the payment. Under these circumstances, a decree for the amount in question along with interest has been passed. There were certain subsidiary issues canvassed on behalf of the defence such as the plea that the plaintiff is a money lender and that he is doing his business without licence and the learned trial Judge has also applied his mind to these contentions and has negatived them for reasons which in my opinion are absolutely correct. It is against this decree that the present appeal has been directed. ( 4 ) I have heard the appellant's learned Advocate at considerable length. He has in the first instance taken me through the relevant portions of the evidence and he seeks to place strong reliance on certain statements that appear in the evidence of D. W. 2 who is one of the attesting witnesses particularly the sentence which states that the witnesses were not aware of any transactions between the parties. On the basis of this material and certain parts of the record, the appellant's learned Advocate had submitted that the defendant has raised a very serious doubt on the question of whether at all the money has passed in this case. He has also relied on certain other supportive references in the evidence such as the fact that the name of the business concern which the defendant is running has been incorrectly set out by the plaintiff and he submits that on a totality of this material, that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is seriously in doubt. I have carefully considered these submissions and to my mind, none of them really impeaches the credibility of the plaintiff. The most important and crucial aspect of the matter is that the oral evidence in this case is quite secondary to the documentary evidence. The execution of the promissory note is admitted. Some doubts were sought to be cast on its veracity by referring to the fact that there appears to be a little visual difference between the inks in the various parts of the handwritings. The execution of the promissory note is admitted. Some doubts were sought to be cast on its veracity by referring to the fact that there appears to be a little visual difference between the inks in the various parts of the handwritings. Undoubtedly, each of these writings belong to different persons and therefore it is inevitable that such differences would occur. The real point is that if the challenge was substantial enough to the extent of establishing that the promissory note is a doubtful document or that it is forged or fabricated, the matter would have been entirely different. What has been pointed out, to my mind, is trivial, inconsequential and fully explainable. Under these circumstances, the finding of the learned trial Judge that the execution of the promissory note and that the document itself requires to be accepted is a finding that cannot be disturbed. ( 5 ) THE appellant's learned Advocate has drawn my attention to the position in law. In the first instance, he has relied on the well-known decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kundan lal Rallaram v Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay. The supreme Court had occasion to interpret the ambit of Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. This is a special provision which applies to negotiable instruments and fastens a heavy burden on the defendant to establish to the satisfaction of the Court that the presumptions that apply to negotiable instrument have been rebutted. The Supreme Court had occasion to hold that merely because Section 118 applies to a negotiable instrument, that it does not ipso facto become sacrosanct and unassailable. Even such a document is assailable and what had been laid down was that the burden of establishing that the presumption has been rebutted is heavily on the defendant in such situations. It is precisely that principle that is required to be applied to the facts of the present case. A few suggestions have been thrown out to the plaintiff pointing out that he does not pay income-tax or wealth-tax and certain suggestions have also been made with regard to whether the transaction took place in the house or in the shop. To my mind, none of these suggestions have materialised into anything of consequence that would cast a serious doubt either on the plaintiffs evidence or more importantly, on the evidentiary value of the promissory note in question. To my mind, none of these suggestions have materialised into anything of consequence that would cast a serious doubt either on the plaintiffs evidence or more importantly, on the evidentiary value of the promissory note in question. It is certainly open to the defendant in a situation of this type to either demonstrate by breaking down the evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff or through other means such as during the production of the defendant's evidence to establish that the case made out by the plaintiff is untrue or unacceptable. That burden is a heavy one and to my mind, has not been discharged in the present case. Under these circumstances, the provisions of Section 118 would clearly be applicable to the present situation. ( 6 ) APPELLANT's learned Advocate then drew my attention to another decision of this Court in the case of Patel Bettegowda v coorg and Mysore Coffee Company. This Court had occasion to deal with Section 118 and on the facts of that case, the Court held that the defendant had succeeded in establishing that there was no consideration for the execution of the promissory note. A perusal of the judgment will indicate that the defendant had discharged the burden that the law cast on him and that consequently, this Court negatived the presumption that would normally arise under Section 118. There is no dispute with regard to the principles enunciated in that case and to my mind, the situation before the Court on that occasion was entirely different and distinguishable from the facts of the present case. ( 7 ) THE last submission canvassed by the appellant's learned Advocate is that this is a Regular First Appeal, that the defendant-appellant has seriously assailed the correctness of the judgment and order and that therefore, this Court should entertain the appeal as at least one review is permissible. There is no dispute about the fact that by law, a second look in cases of seriousness is warranted. There are however situations wherein the facts and the law have been so correctly assessed and the decision is absolutely unassailable in such situations, the admission and rehearing of an appeal is purely academic because there can be no other decision possible on those facts. There are however situations wherein the facts and the law have been so correctly assessed and the decision is absolutely unassailable in such situations, the admission and rehearing of an appeal is purely academic because there can be no other decision possible on those facts. It is precisely for this reason that the law prescribes an admission procedure wherein the appeal is required to go through some process of swifting. The examination of the record of this case, the facts, the law, the assessment of the evidence by the learned trial Judge, his findings and his decision are all to my mind absolutely correct and in this view of the matter, no purpose whatsoever would be served by admitting the present appeal. It is in these circumstances, and after a thorough consideration of all the material placed before this Court that I am inclined to hold that the appeal cannot be admitted and therefore stands dismissed. The decree passed by the Trial Court stands confirmed. The appeal to stand disposed of. --- *** --- .