Judgment :- Shanmugam, J. The original petition is filed praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the case connected with I.D. No. 89 of 1978 on the file of the Labour Court, Kozhikode and to quash the award. 2. This is yet another case where justice is denied to workmen by a long delay of 24 years since their suspension and 10 years since the award. Though one of them has retired, the other has been reinstated in the year 1993. They were yet to see the results and it is probable that this may go beyond this century before reaching the finality. The management had delayed the passing of the final order of termination by six years since the submission of the report and 11 years after the passing of the award. Reference was sought to a Larger Bench at the time of hearing to decide the question of permissibility of adducing additional evidence before the Labour Court. This we have declined since the principle has been settled by the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath v. Bank of Baroda (AIR 1984 SC 289). 3. Two workmen belonging to the 1st respondent-Union were suspended on 6-1-1971 and 31-1-1971 respectively on the allegation that they had failed to remit a sum of Rs. 250/- and Rs. 200/- respectively. After framing charges and enquiry the management found them guilty and were terminated on 9-5-1972. On appeal before the Board of Directors fresh enquiry was ordered and the second enquiry report was submitted on 10-11-1972. One of the workers was exonerated and the other one was found guilty, but was recommended for reduction of pay by the executive committee on 2-4-1973, The Board did not accept the recommendations but chose to refer the matter for the opinion of another member of the Board who happened to be the District Collector of the Palghat District. The District Collector/ member appears to have approved the recommendation of the executive committee on 14-3-1975. Not being satisfied with this opinion the Board once again referred it for the opinion of the other member of the Board on 17-8-1975. The said member gave his opinion on 5-10-1977 reversing the findings of the 2nd enquiry officer and also of the executive committee and found the workers guilty. Not being satisfied with this opinion the Board once again referred it for the opinion of the other member of the Board on 17-8-1975. The said member gave his opinion on 5-10-1977 reversing the findings of the 2nd enquiry officer and also of the executive committee and found the workers guilty. The management accepted his opinion and terminated the workers from service by order dated 1-2-1978. On reference for adjudication before the Labour Court on 4-10-1978 the 1st respondent-Union filed their statement on 4-1-1979 and the management tiled the written statement on 15-3-1979. The Union filed their rejoinder on 4-5 -1979 and the award was passed on 1-2-1985 holding that the management has violated the principles of natural justice by deliberately delaying the proceedings so as to enable them to get a favourable report in their favour. Labour Court also held that there was no valid and proper enquiry conducted. The Labour Court further found that no opportunity was sought for adducing fresh evidence in support of the charge and therefore ordered reinstatement of the workmen with backwages. 4. The submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner are two fold. Firstly the Labour Court has failed to give opportunity for adducing fresh evidence and secondly the Labour Court has found the enquiry bad based on subsequent events and therefore it is illegal.' 5. On the facts and findings of the Labour Court it is clear that the respondent-Union in their rejoinder application dated 4-5-1979 has specifically raised the plea that the findings of the second enquiry is perverse and a mere speculation and that the enquiry officer and management have committed grave error and consequently there has been a grave miscarriage of justice. The Union has also stated that the delay was deliberately made in passing the final order by the management and contrary to the settlement. The management neither filed any written statement nor reply nor sought for specific permission to adduce fresh evidence before the Labour Court in reference to this specific plea in the rejoinder. The stand of the management that while arguing the legality of the domestic enquiry before the Labour Court they had orally requested for an opportunity to lead evidence does not Appear to represent the true facts. In any event admittedly there was no plea in writing till the final day and conclusion of argument before the Labour Court. The stand of the management that while arguing the legality of the domestic enquiry before the Labour Court they had orally requested for an opportunity to lead evidence does not Appear to represent the true facts. In any event admittedly there was no plea in writing till the final day and conclusion of argument before the Labour Court. The Labour Court held that no opportunity can be afforded to the management to adduce fresh evidence following the rulings of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath v. Bank of Baroda (AIR 1984 SC 289). 6. The Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath's case went to the question whether the management has got right to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charge or charges framed against the workmen in an enquiry under Ss.33,10,11 and 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act and held that in so far as the enquiry under S.33 of the I.D. Act, if the management chooses-to exercise its right to adduce further evidence to substantiate the charge it must make up its mind at the earliest stage and file the application for that purpose without any unreasonable delay. But when the question arises in a reference under S.10 of the Act the management must make the request for the opportunity in the written statement itself. If he does not choose to do so at that stage it cannot be allowed to do it at any later stage of the proceedings by filing any application for the purpose which may result in delay which may lead to wrecking the morale of the workman and compel him to surrender which he may not otherwise do. 7. Desai J. in the same judgment supporting the view of Varadarajan, J. who rendered the judgment for himself and on behalf of Chinnappa Reddy, J. while explaining the decision in Shankar Chakravarti's case (AIR 1979 SC 1652) and Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe (AIR 1975 SC 1900) held that the statement that if an application is made during the pendency of the proceedings it does not mean that some independent right to make an application at any time is conferred on the employer. Ordinarily where a party claims reliefs, he must plead for the same. Ordinarily where a party claims reliefs, he must plead for the same. It was not for a moment suggested that an application at any stage of the proceedings without explaining why the relief was not claimed in the original pleading has to be granted. If a separate application is made it would be open to the Labour Court to examine the question whether it should be granted or not depending upon the stage when it is made, the omission to claim the relief in the initial pleading, the delay and the motivation of such delayed action. It has to be examined as if it is an application for amendment of original pleadings. Desai, J. further held that the observation was not made to lay down the proposition of law that as and when it suits the convenience of the employer at any stage of the proceedings, it may make an application seeking such opportunity and the Labour Court was obliged to grant the same. On the facts of the case the Supreme Court found that there was hardly any explanation for the delay in making the application. 8. In Rajendra Jha v. Labour Court, Bokaro Steel & Ors. (1984 - II LLJ. 459) the Supreme Court held that on the facts of that case, the order passed by the Labour Court allowing the employer to lead evidence" has been accepted and acted upon by the appellant. In the circumstances it was held that the Labour Court cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction. In this decision the earlier view in Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co, Ltd. (AIR 1979 SC 1652) and Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh (1972-1 LLJ 180.) which was explained in Shambhu Nath v. Bank of Baroda (AIR 1984 SC 289) was found approved. In Rajendra Jha's case the Supreme Court also found that it is doubtful whether the norms prescribed by these two decisions were followed strictly in this case. Ultimately the Supreme Court found that the order passed by the Labour Court allowing the employer to lead evidence had been accepted and acted upon by the appellant, He had already given a list of his own witnesses and had cross-examined the witnesses whose evidence was led by the employers. Ultimately the Supreme Court found that the order passed by the Labour Court allowing the employer to lead evidence had been accepted and acted upon by the appellant, He had already given a list of his own witnesses and had cross-examined the witnesses whose evidence was led by the employers. It would be wrong, at this stage, to undo what has been done in pursuance of the order of the Labour Court. Besides, the challenge made by the appellant to the order of the Labour Court has failed and the order of the Patna High Court dismissing the appellant's writ petition has become final. 9. 'In Vijaya Mohini Mills v. Industrial Tribunal & Ann (1993-1 LLJ 605) a learned single judge of this Court while following Kodakkat Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Labour Court - (1988) 73 FJR 12, held mat the application seeking opportunity to adduce fresh evidence ought to have been filed at the earliest opportunity and allowed the Original Petition and directed the application for permission to adduce evidence to be proceeded with afresh and in accordance with law. The said decision did not consider the Supreme Court decision in Shambhu Math's case. 10. In Kodakkat Service Co-operative Society Ltd, v. The Labour Court, Kozhikode (1988 (2) 1LR Ker. 369) a Division Bench of this Court considered the question whether the management should apply at the earliest point of time for chance to lead evidence, for justifying the dismissal. The Division Bench following the decision in Shambhu Nath's case (AIR 1984 SC 289) and Shankar Chakravarti's case (AIR 1979 SC 1652) held that the application for seeking opportunity must be made at the earliest opportunity, for, any delay in making such an application or request acts prejudicially to the interests of the workman. The Division Bench relying on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court held that in labour disputes the parties are unequal, the management being strong and powerful and the workman is often weak and helpless. When a workman is kept out of job for a long number of years the suffering and harassment that he undergoes would be enormous. The Division Bench relying on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court held that in labour disputes the parties are unequal, the management being strong and powerful and the workman is often weak and helpless. When a workman is kept out of job for a long number of years the suffering and harassment that he undergoes would be enormous. If the delay is unreasonable the workman cannot stand the delay in the termination of the proceedings not because there is weakness in his case but he cannot continue to remain in a State of unemployment and may knuckle down and accede to the demands of the management. This results in unfair treatment of the workman. 11. In Raveendra Kamath v. Dholakia (1992 (1) KLT 573) a Division Bench of this Court held that the fact that the plea was not taken in the pleadings wi-11 not be fatal. The permission to adduce additional evidence can be prayed for even orally and even at a stage before the hearing of the application come to a close. In the said decision even though the Supreme Court decisions (Shambhu Nath v. Bank of Baroda - 1984 SC 289 and Desh Raj Gupta v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1990 SC 2174) were noted, none of the decisions were discussed or considered. The earlier Division Bench decision in Kodakkat Service Co-operative Society Ltd. 's case (1988 (2) ILR Ker. 369) was not brought to the notice of this Division Bench. 11-A. The relevant facts and the context in which the Division Bench in Raveendra Kamath's case (1992 (1) KLT 573) came to the conclusion are noteworthy. In that case when reference was made to the Labour Court, it stood posted for evidence on 21-5-1990. Counsel for the management could not appear on that day, since he could not climb the steps due to the cardiac troubles. He entrusted the tiles containing the entire papers to another advocate for being produced in the Labour Court. The Company as well as its advocate were under the impression that the files were produced before the Labour Court. But it turned out that it was not so done and the advocate, to whom the matter was entrusted, did not even appear before the Labour Court. The Company and its advocate were not aware of it. The Company as well as its advocate were under the impression that the files were produced before the Labour Court. But it turned out that it was not so done and the advocate, to whom the matter was entrusted, did not even appear before the Labour Court. The Company and its advocate were not aware of it. The Company came to know the award only long after when the Advocate wrote a letter to the Company and therefore, the Company did not gel an opportunity of adducing evidence to substantiate the charges. Thus in that case the enquiry report was not and could not be produced before the Labour Court due to unforeseen circumstances. Under the above circumstances when the Labour Court came to the conclusion that though the enquiry conducted by the management was not legal and proper, the management was given an opportunity to produce the entire reports and to substantiate their case before the Labour Court. The Division Bench while dealing with the appeal concurred with the findings of the learned Single Judge and held that the overall facts and circumstances disclose that the stage or situation or opportunity which behave the management to decide and pray for adducing evidence before the Labour Court did arise. On those facts the Division Bench held that the above view of the learned single judge cannot be characterised as perverse or arbitrary and that the plea not being taken in the pleadings will not be fatal. This decision also help the petitioner since they had enough time and opportunity to adduce evidence if they really wanted but chose not to move the Labour Court. It has to be again emphasised that the law which has been laid down on this question in Shambhu Nath's case is categorical and gives no room of doubt in our minds and is binding on us. 12. In C.B. W.I.C. Society Ltd. v. K.K. Bharathan & Ann (1994 -II LLJ 396) the learned single judge following the Division Bench judgment referred above set aside the award of the Labour Court which was passed without giving an opportunity to adduce fresh evidence. But in this case the request for adducing fresh evidence was made in the written statement itself. But in this case the request for adducing fresh evidence was made in the written statement itself. In Desk Raj Gupta v. I.T. IV, Lucknow & Ann (1991-1 LLJ 120) the Supreme Court held that by asking the management to justify the punishment by adducing additional evidence, the Tribunal merely reminded the employer of his rights and the employer promptly availed of the opportunity. No illegality has been committed in the course adopted. In this decision also the question of the entitlement of the management to adduce fresh evidence was not decided. 13. In Basu Deba Das v. M.R. Bhope & Ann (1993-11 LLJ 1022) a single judge of the Bombay High Court held that it is true that the management has not asked for permission to lead evidence to justify an order of dismissal. No counter was filed by workman even though a copy was served on his Advocate. When no objection was raised for grant of permission it will not be open to the workmen to raise the objection at a belated stage to make a grievance about the opportunity granted to the management to lead evidence to make good of his order of dismissal. The employer must seek for an opportunity diligently and without undue delay. It should be an application bona fide made. It should not be at a belated stage so as to prejudice the interest of the worker. It would not be made by an employer who is found to adopt dilatory tactics so as to break the back-bone of the worker through financial stress. The application should not have the effect of further delaying the proceedings. If the application does not suffer from any of these vices ordinarily an application ought to be granted. If however the application is shown to be tainted with any of the aforesaid defects or some such similar defects, no duty is cast upon the Labour Court to grant the application. The said finding of the learned single judge was based on the earlier Supreme Court decision on the point and including the decision in Kamal Kishre Lakshman v. Management of M/s. Pan American World Airways Inc. and Others (1987 -I LLJ 107). Thus none of these decisions support the stand of the petitioner. 14. The said finding of the learned single judge was based on the earlier Supreme Court decision on the point and including the decision in Kamal Kishre Lakshman v. Management of M/s. Pan American World Airways Inc. and Others (1987 -I LLJ 107). Thus none of these decisions support the stand of the petitioner. 14. As we found earlier, the management has not raised any plea at the earliest stage of time even though the plea of illegality of the domestic enquiry and violation of principles of natural justice was taken by the Union in their rejoinder on 4-5-1979. The management had time till the final award was passed on 1-2-1985. That apart, the sequence of events would clearly go to show as found by the Labour Court that the management had been adopting dilatory tactics and pre-determination to terminate the workers. The fact that even after submission of the second enquiry report on 10-12-1972 the termination order could be passed only on 1-2-1978, after nearly six years of the enquiry report and the management did not seek to adduce fresh evidence during the pendency of the proceedings from the year 1978 to 1985, would go to show that the plea of the management before this Court that they were not given opportunity is not bona-fide. Firstly, admittedly they did not make any application before the Labour Court pending the proceedings and secondly even the oral request said to have been made at the time of argument is not borne out from the finding of the Labour Court. In these circumstances we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Labour Court is justified in finding that no fresh opportunity need be given to the management to adduce evidence. 15. The second point taken by the management is that the finding of the Labour Court that the enquiry was based on subsequent events is not sustainable. It is to be remembered that the enquiry report exonerated one of the workman and the executive committee of the management who' considered the report recommended a lesser punishment, ie., reduction of pay. But the management not being satisfied with this, referred it for the opinion to the member of the Board of Directors and the opinion of the member who was the District Collector, was in favour of exoneration and lesser punishment to another workman. But the management not being satisfied with this, referred it for the opinion to the member of the Board of Directors and the opinion of the member who was the District Collector, was in favour of exoneration and lesser punishment to another workman. In spite of this the management referred the matter again to another member of the Board for his opinion. These facts have been taken into account to hold that there is a clear violation of the principles of natural justice. Apart from the fact that an order or punishment should have been passed within a reasonable time, it has taken nearly eight years from the date of suspension on 2-12-1971 before the order of termination on 1-2-1978 come to be passed. This inordinate delay in passing the termination order is itself a punishment to the workers and violates the principles of natural justice. A domestic enquiry is a quasi judicial proceeding and as such one of the essential requirement is that the rules of natural justice have to be observed in holding it. The third reference to a member of the Board enabling the management to differ from the enquiry officer, executive committee and one of the Board members, would only show that the trial was reduced to a mere mockery. The reference of the second enquiry report to the opinion of a third member is not a subsequent event that has to be ignored. Taking all these facts together, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the enquiry proceedings were not proper and the only inference possible is that the management was not pleased with the two opinions given in favour of workmen and probably wanted a report in their favour. Normally the Board of Directors are bound by the recommendations of their own executive committee which had been approved by the District Collector on reference to him. The further reference to another member does not appear to be proper. On these premises the labour Court further found rightly in our view that even if the management has got a right to differ from the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer the method adopted by the management has to be deprected and amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. On these premises the labour Court further found rightly in our view that even if the management has got a right to differ from the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer the method adopted by the management has to be deprected and amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. In these circumstances we are of the view that the order of the Labour Court is valid and just and there is no infirmity in the order and is hereby confirmed. The contentions of the petitioner are devoid of any merit. Taking all these circumstances of the case, we find that it is a fit case for awarding costs against the petitioner. Accordingly the Original Petition is dismissed with costs.