KARIGOWDA v. SAFDAR ALI — 1995 DIGILAW 251 (KAR)

H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is the defendant's second appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 22nd September, 1984 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Chickmagalur in Rent Appeal No. 30 of 1982 whereby the learned Lower Appellate Court dismissed the defendants' appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree dated 7-7-1982 passed by the Trial Court i. e. , the Principal munsiff and JMFC, Chickmagalur in Regular Suit No. 29 of 1981. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff-respondent filed Suit No. 29 of 1981 with the allegations to the effect that defendant-appellant 1 was the tenant of the house in dispute, on a monthly rental of Rs. 40/ -. According to the plaintiff, he purchased the property in dispute under sale deed dated 14-8-1980 from one D,k. Sheshappa Shetty and the tenancy was attorned. According to the plaintiffs case, plaintiff is entitled to collect the rent as well as to take proceedings for eviction of the tenant i. e. , defendant-appellant under the provisions of the transfer of Property Act. In the plaint it is asserted that defendant-appellant 2 is the wife of defendant-appellant 1 but she had been impleaded as a party in order to obtain an effective decree for eviction. The plaintiffs case is that plaintiff terminated the tenancy by notice dated 6-12-1980. The notice was served by refusal by the first defendant. Copy of the notice was also sent to the 1st defendant by certificate of posting. Plaintiff produced the registered envelope and the certificate of posting with the plaint. According to the plaintiffs case that inspite of service of the notice, defendants failed to comply with the terms of the notice and to vacate the premises of the suit. So there did arise the need or cause of action for filing of the suit for eviction of the defendants and possession of the property in the suit and for recovery of Rs. 180/- being the rents and damages for the house and occupation of the schedule property for the period 14-8-1980 and 31-12-1980 for further decree for future mesne profits pending decision of the case. ( 3 ) DEFENDANTS 1 and 2 filed the written statement. They denied the plaintiffs case. 180/- being the rents and damages for the house and occupation of the schedule property for the period 14-8-1980 and 31-12-1980 for further decree for future mesne profits pending decision of the case. ( 3 ) DEFENDANTS 1 and 2 filed the written statement. They denied the plaintiffs case. Defendants denied that they were the plaintiffs tenant or that defendant 1 was the tenant of the property in dispute under the plaintiff on a monthly rental of Rs. 40/ -. The defendants further asserted that they were not aware that the plaintiff purchased the schedule house under the sale deed dated 14-8-1980 from D. K. Sheshappa Shetty. They denied that the allegation that defendant 1 had attorned the tenancy in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants asserted that the rent of the schedule house in dispute was Rs. 15/- p. m. According to the defendants case, the defendants obtained the schedule house on rent from Smt. Girijamma wife of Sheshappa Shetty about 15 years back on a monthly rental of Rs. 10/- and thereafter it was increased to Rs. 15/- per month. Defendants also alleged that the schedule property belonged to one Shamanna and Shamanna agreed to sell it to the 2nd defendant. Defendants alleged that no legal notice of termination of tenancy was served on them by the plaintiff either by registered post or by certificate of posting. They further alleged that no tenement is available for rent in mudigere town and they would be put to great hardship than the plaintiff if they were evicted from the plaint schedule property and prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff proves that the 1st defendant is a tenant under him? (ii) Whether the plaintiff further proves that the monthly rent payable by the defendant is Rs. 40/- p. m. ? (iii) Whether the tenancy of the defendants is validly terminated? (iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the possession of the suit schedule property? ( 5 ) AFTER consideration of the evidence on record, the learned Munsiff held that the plaintiff has been able to prove that there has been a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the tenancy was on monthly rental of Rs. ( 5 ) AFTER consideration of the evidence on record, the learned Munsiff held that the plaintiff has been able to prove that there has been a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the tenancy was on monthly rental of Rs. 15/- p. m. in respect of the schedule property payable by the 1st defendant. The Trial Court further held that notice of termination of tenancy was issued by the plaintiff to the defendant-appellant and was served by him by refusal and so service of notice was sufficient. The Trial Court further held that notice of termination of lease issued to and served on the defendants to be legal and valid notice under Section 106 of the transfer of Property Act. In view of the findings recorded by it as above, the learned Munsiff decreed the suit of the plaintiff- respondent for the claim and granted defendant-appellants six months time, to vacate the schedule property in favour of the plaintiff, from the date of decree. ( 6 ) HAVING felt aggrieved from the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the defendants-appellants preferred Regular Civil appeal No. 30 of 1982. The learned Lower Appellate Court after having considered the evidence on record affirmed the findings of the Trial Court and held that the relationship of landlord and tenant had been established between the plaintiff-respondent and defendant-appellant 1 and that notice of termination of tenancy, issued by the plaintiff was served on defendant-tenant as found by the Trial Court and the service was sufficient. It affirmed the Trial Courts finding that the notice issued by the plaintiff has been legal and valid. Thus having affirmed the findings of the Trial Court, the First Appellate Court i. e. , the learned Civil Judge, Chickmagalur, dismissed the regular appeal filed by the defendant-appellant. Having felt aggrieved from the judgment and decree of the Courts below, the defendants- appellants have preferred the Second Appeal No. 135 of 1985 under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 7 ) 1 have heard Sri P. G. C. Chengappa, learned Counsel for the appellants at length and Sri D. Puttaswamy, learned Counsel for the respondent. It has been contended before me that the decree passed by the Court below affirming the Trial Court decree dated /-8-1982 in Suit No. 29 of 1981 is without jurisdiction and is nullity. ( 7 ) 1 have heard Sri P. G. C. Chengappa, learned Counsel for the appellants at length and Sri D. Puttaswamy, learned Counsel for the respondent. It has been contended before me that the decree passed by the Court below affirming the Trial Court decree dated /-8-1982 in Suit No. 29 of 1981 is without jurisdiction and is nullity. The learned Counsel for the appellant invited my attention in this regard to the substantial question which has been framed by the learned Judge while admitting the appeal. The said question reads as hereunder:-" (a) Whether the Lower Appellate Court has jurisdiction to confirm the decree passed by the Trial Court in view of the provisions in Karnataka Act No. 17 of 1983 which is deemed to have come into force from 31-12-1982; and in view of the decision of this Court in Sadiq Sab v akhilandamma1". No other substantial question of law had been raised at the time of the admission nor having been alleged to have been raised. Any how, the learned Counsel for the appellants contended that there is no proper attornment of tenancy in favour of respon- dent-landlord in accordance with law and as such there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants and the respondent. He contended that Ex. D. 1 has been wrongly interpreted in the sense that it had been looked into regarding the rate of rent but it has not been taken into consideration in coming to the conclusion regarding the tenancy and regarding the ownership. On behalf of the respondent, the learned Counsel for the respondent, Sri Puttaswamy submitted that firstly this court's jurisdiction in a second appeal is confined to substantial question of law formulated and raised by the appellants at the stage of admission in view of Section 100 of sub-section (5) of the code, and as such the appellant's Counsel is not entitled to urge any other point and so other contentions of appellants' Counsel be rejected, and be not considered. The respondent's learned counsel further submitted that as regards Ex. D. 1, its construction does not raise a question of law as it is not a document of title nor can it be said to be the document forming the basis of the claim in suit. The respondent's learned counsel further submitted that as regards Ex. D. 1, its construction does not raise a question of law as it is not a document of title nor can it be said to be the document forming the basis of the claim in suit. He submitted that it is only the interpretation of documents of title or the documents forming the basis of claim in the suit or defence in the suit that may amount to be one raising question of law but it is well-settled that interpretation of every document whatsoever its nature may be, can't be said to raise question of law. This contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent, in my opinion has got much substance. It is well-settled principle of law that it is not the interpretation of every document that can be said to involve or raise a question of law. It is only interpretation of documents of title or documents which form the basis for the claim or defence, the interpretation thereof may involve question of law. See Midnapur Zamindari company Limited v Uma Charan Mandal and Others, Diety pattabhiramaswamy v S. Hanymayya and Others and Nedunuri kameswaramma v Sampati Subba Rao. Ex. D. 1. is a letter written by one Saroja, wife of P. W. 2 to 1st defendant and rate of rent therein is mentioned Rs. 15/ -. This document may only be a piece of evidence but it is neither the document of title nor the one forming basis of claim or defence. So its interpretation does not raise any question of law. ( 8 ) SECONDLY no issue had been raised and pressed on the point during trial etc. , if the owner of the property was a different person. ( 9 ) AS regards the only question that whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to pass the decree and if it had passed the decree then whether such a decree is valid and has been passed in accordance with law by a Court having jurisdiction or it is one passed by Court having no jurisdiction and if so is it invalid. The plea of jurisdiction, at such a stage in the second appeal has been sought to be raised. The plea of jurisdiction, at such a stage in the second appeal has been sought to be raised. ( 10 ) NO doubt it is well-settled principle of law that this Court can entertain the plea going to the route of the jurisdiction of the court if plea is one of pure question of law. See Ram Chandra v muneshwar and Others , Kiran Singh and Others v Chaman paswan and Others and Chandrika Misir and Another v bhaiyalal. Here it is very material and profitable to make reference of the relevant provisions on the basis of which the question is sought to be raised. Section 2 of the Karnataka Rent control Act, 1961 is enforcement and application of clause of the act. Here sub-section (3) is relevant. "2. Application of the Act. (1) Parts I and VII of the Act shall be applicable to the whole of the State of Karnataka. (2) Parts II and III of this Act shall be applicable to the areas specified in Schedule I: provided that the said parts shall not apply to a building constructed after the 1st August, 1957 for a period of five years from the date of construction of such building. (3) Parts IV and V of this Act shall be applicable to the areas specified in Schedule II. (4) Part VI of this Act shall be applicable to the areas specified in Schedule III. (5) The State Government may by notification apply all or any of the provisions of Parts II, III, IV, V or VI to such other areas from such dates as may be specified in the notification. (4) Part VI of this Act shall be applicable to the areas specified in Schedule III. (5) The State Government may by notification apply all or any of the provisions of Parts II, III, IV, V or VI to such other areas from such dates as may be specified in the notification. (6) The State Government may at any time by notification direct that all or any of the provisions of Parts ii, III, IV, V or VI shall cease to be applicable to any area whether specified in Schedule I, II or III or not on such dates as may be specified in the notification, and on that date the said provisions shall cease to be applicable to such area: provided that Section 6 of the Karnataka General clauses Act, 1899 shall apply when any provisions of this act ceases to be applicable to any area, as if it had then been repealed by a Karnataka Act: provided further that the issue of notification under this sub-section shall not preclude the issue of notification under sub-section (5) applying all or any of the provisions of the said parts to such area". ( 11 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel for the appellants by virtue of Karnataka Rent Control Amendment Act, 1983 (Karnataka Act No. 17 of 1983) as per sub-sections (2) to (4) schedule II of the Act has been amended. Schedule II of the Act reads as hereunder:" "schedule II [see Section 2 (3)] I. Areas within the limits of cities under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 and the area within a radius of three kilometres from the limits of the said cities. II. Areas within the limits of City Municipalities, Town Municipalities and Notified Areas constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, except the Notified Area Committee, Bhadravathi. III. Areas within the limits of the Notified Area Committee, Bhadravathi, excluding New Town and Paper Town. IV. Area within the limits of Kolar Gold Fields Sanitary Board. V. Area within the limits of Town Panchayats of: 1. Bankapur 2. Gokarna VI. Areas within the limits of Revenue Village of: 1. Buntwal 3. Mudabidri 2. Kod 4. Mulki". ". III. Areas within the limits of the Notified Area Committee, Bhadravathi, excluding New Town and Paper Town. IV. Area within the limits of Kolar Gold Fields Sanitary Board. V. Area within the limits of Town Panchayats of: 1. Bankapur 2. Gokarna VI. Areas within the limits of Revenue Village of: 1. Buntwal 3. Mudabidri 2. Kod 4. Mulki". ". ( 12 ) THE learned Counsel submitted that under this Act, the areas that were lying in the town area, the Act was made applicable to the accommodation or premises lying in the town areas as well and as such the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decree the claim of the respondent, as the building and area is covered by Karnataka Rent Control Act and by Section 21 of the act. It is also profitable to mention that as per sub-section (2) of section 1 of Karnataka Act No. 17 of 1983, it has been provided that it shall be deemed to have come into force from 31st of december, 1982. In view of sub-section (2) of Section 1 of Act No. 17 of 1983, the Schedule II is to be amended with effect from 31st December, 1982 and according to it, it has been deemed to have come into force on that day, though Act No. 17 of 1983 got the assent of the President on 15th July, 1983. Section 21 of the karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 particularly sub-section (1) reads as hereunder:"21. Protection of tenants against eviction. (1) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant: provided that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds namely. . . . . . . ". ( 13 ) THE expression Court has been defined in Section 3 (d) of the Act. So Court has to be interpreted in that light. The question before this Court is whether in view of these provisions of law, the decree for ejectment which has been passed is without jurisdiction or not. . . . . . . ". ( 13 ) THE expression Court has been defined in Section 3 (d) of the Act. So Court has to be interpreted in that light. The question before this Court is whether in view of these provisions of law, the decree for ejectment which has been passed is without jurisdiction or not. The learned Counsel submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 21, suit for eviction was not maintainable and no decree could be passed against the defendant-appellants by the Munsiff even if Chickmagalur munsiff Court at all had jurisdiction to entertain the suit because Munsiff has been conferred jurisdiction over territorial area under the Act. The question to be considered is whether the suit was maintainable and decree passed by the Trial Court was without jurisdiction as being the one passed in the suit not maintainable in view of Section 21 of the Act. It is worth being noticed that in the present case the suit was originally filed on 24-1-1981 i. e. , long before the date the Karnataka Act No. 17 of 1983 received assent of the President as well as long before the date i. e. , 31-12-1982 from which the Act was given retrospective effect. It is also worth mentioning that the Trial Court in this case passed the decree on a date earlier than these two dates namely the date on which Act No. 17 of 1983 got the assent of the President as well as long before 31st December, 1982 from which date the Act No. 17 of 1983 was given retrospective effect. The decree in this case thus had been passed on August 7, 1982 long before the amendment of the schedule, even if the amendment which deemed to have been taken place with effect from 31-12-1982. No doubt the learned Counsel for the appellants is correct in contending that Section 21 (1) which has been quoted above puts the bar on the jurisdiction of the Court against the passing of an order or decree for recovery of possession of the premises in favour of the landlord and against the tenant. No doubt the learned Counsel for the appellants is correct in contending that Section 21 (1) which has been quoted above puts the bar on the jurisdiction of the Court against the passing of an order or decree for recovery of possession of the premises in favour of the landlord and against the tenant. The language used in the Section 21 (1) is not like that, that no suit shall be instituted for recovery of possession, instead the language used in the section is that "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or contract, no order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant". The bar is to become operative at the stage when the Court, before which the suit has been filed for the purpose of recovery of possession against the tenant, is going to decide and pass the decree for recovery of possession in favour of the landlord and against a tenant even if the suit had been filed earlier. That, on the date when the decree for eviction or decree for recovery of possession in favour of the landlord against the tenant was passed in this case by the Trial court, this bar did not exist, as the amending Act did come into play retrospectively with effect from 31-12-1982 and decree in this case was passed on 7-8-1982, as such on that date when the civil Court passed the decree there was no bar against the passing of the decree for eviction against the tenant as the Act and Section 21 of the Act did not apply to the area in question itself. The learned Counsel for the appellants contended that no doubt this plea was not taken by him at the initial or trial stage and there was no question of its being raised at the trial stage as at that time, the schedule had not been amended and the Act did not apply. He submitted that the appeal is in continuation of the suit and when appeal, filed by tenant was pending, the amending Act i. e. , Act No. 17 of 1983 came into operation, and thereby Act No. 22 of 1961 i. e. , Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, and Section 21 of the Act became applicable. He submitted that the appeal is in continuation of the suit and when appeal, filed by tenant was pending, the amending Act i. e. , Act No. 17 of 1983 came into operation, and thereby Act No. 22 of 1961 i. e. , Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, and Section 21 of the Act became applicable. So the Lower appellate Court could not have confirmed the decree passed by the Trial Court even though this plea was not raised before the lower Appellate Court. The learned Counsel submitted that this plea is open to be taken by him in appeal. In my opinion the plea being pure question of law going to the root of matter is open to be raised and needs consideration. ( 14 ) IT is one of the well-settled principles of law of interpretation that when the language of section is clear it has to be given its ordinary meaning. The Rent Control Act being Social welfare Legislation it has got to be construed reasonably and justly maintaining equilibrium between the landlord and the tenant and keeping in view legislative policy as well as to protect and advance the object of the Act in case where language is not clear. While interpreting the Rent Act it is to be taken note that it may not discourage or act as marring the incentive of those who desire to build the building or houses. Then the problem of availability of houses may arise and there may be difficulties for people to get accommodation. So these aspects are also to be kept in view along with the other aspects that no tenant, should be harrased or made to suffer illegally. In other words the Rent control laws must be so read that these laws do balance harmoniously the rights of landlord and obligations of tenant. Amarjit Singh v Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, Yudhishter v Ashok kumar. In other words the Rent control laws must be so read that these laws do balance harmoniously the rights of landlord and obligations of tenant. Amarjit Singh v Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, Yudhishter v Ashok kumar. Keeping these principles in view when I read Section 21 of the Act, I find that as per language used in the sub-section (1) of Section 21, the Bar is operative and becomes operative when the time or stage comes for the Court to pass the decree for recovery of possession of the premises at the instance of landlord against the tenant and then Court has to examine if the case is one covered by exception i. e. , grounds provided by various clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 21 and if not it has no jurisdiction to grant the decree for eviction of tenant. I may say what has to be considered is if at the time the suit had been decreed by the Trial Court whether at that time the bar did exist or not, in the matter of granting decree or passing the order for recovery of possession in favour of the landlord. If the bar did not apply nor did exist then, on that date the Court had full jurisdiction to decree it. In the present case the decree was passed on 7-8-1982 while amendment became operative retrospectively from 31-12-1982 and on that date as the schedule had not been amended, the provision of Section 21 did not apply as such the Trial Court's decree did not suffer from error of jurisdiction and so even the Appellate Court could not hold the decree to be illegal, null and void or without jurisdiction. It may be that the First Appellate Court had jurisdiction to set aside the decree on merits if it suffered from any error of fact or law but the decree could not be set aside on the ground that the decree was passed without jurisdiction and the decree so passed was illegal. It may be that the First Appellate Court had jurisdiction to set aside the decree on merits if it suffered from any error of fact or law but the decree could not be set aside on the ground that the decree was passed without jurisdiction and the decree so passed was illegal. There may be case where the Trial Court refused to pass the decree and dismissed the landlord claim in the suit which had instituted earlier than the material date i. e. , 31-12-1982 and, the first appeal was filed by the landlord and in the meantime i. e. , during the pendency of appeal the provisions did stand amended prior to the passing of the decree by the First appellate Court. Then it could be urged that neither the Trial court nor Appellate Court is possessed of any jurisdiction to decree the suit and pass the decree for recovery of possession against the tenant. The intention of the legislature is not that a party who has been litigating prior to the coming into force of the Act, who has got a decree passed in his favour prior to relevant dates should be deprived of the benefit of the decree simply because the Act later on becomes applicable to the area in which the building exists. Until the Act so provides in express terms or by necessary implication that a decree passed within jurisdiction would be nullity because of the subsequent application of the Rent Control Law, the decree passed prior to the amendment of the Act cannot be deemed nor be considered nor be held to be one without jurisdiction or to have become null and void. ( 15 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that as an appeal in continuation of the suit it may be held that though the decree has been passed by the Trial Court on a date earlier to the coming into force of the amendment Act and on a date earlier to the date on which the Act or provisions of Chapter parts IV and V became applicable, the decree passed by the Trial court had to be set aside by Lower Appellate Court and ought not to have been confirmed instead it ought not to have been deemed to have become null, void and without jurisdiction. No doubt if the decree would have been passed after 31st of december, 1982 by the Trial Court then there would have been some substance to the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants but that is not so in this case. In this case, I am of the view that the bar will operate on the Court when it is going to pass the decree or order for recovery of possession in favour of the landlord and against the tenant and as in the present case prior to the coming into force of Amendment Act No. 17 of 1983 and the Court had jurisdiction to pass the decree. It cannot be said that though the Trial Court decreed the suit now there will be bar on Appellate Court in affirming the decree. ( 16 ) IF I accept this contention of the Counsel for the appellant it will amount to legislate something not provided by legislature which is not open to Court of law. Had the legislature so intended to enact the law to affect the decrees validly passed by courts prior to application or enforcement of bar would be null or void and inoperative or would not be given effect or would not be executable or would abate it would have enacted a provision in that regard. In this regard it would be profitable to refer to u. P. Rent Law i. e. , U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, rent and Eviction) Act (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) therein legislature enacted Sections 39 and 40 which make provisions to rescue the tenants in certain circumstances and conditions from rigour or clutch of suit pending on the date of enforcement of the act or from the clutches of decrees passed by the Trial Court, before the material date that the date of commencement or application of Act, in case matter was pending in appeal or revision. Here there is no such provision in the Karnataka Rent control Act, 1961. So as held earlier the Trial Court decree passed on 7-8-1982 i. e. , earlier to 31-12-1982 could not be set aside by Lower Appellate Court on the ground of any such thing as want of jurisdiction or bar under Section 21 of the Act. Here there is no such provision in the Karnataka Rent control Act, 1961. So as held earlier the Trial Court decree passed on 7-8-1982 i. e. , earlier to 31-12-1982 could not be set aside by Lower Appellate Court on the ground of any such thing as want of jurisdiction or bar under Section 21 of the Act. ( 17 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants in support of his submission referred to me the decision of this Court in Sadiq sab's case. In this case the suit was still pending in the Trial court i. e. , the Court of Munsiff, Hospet and was disposed off by judgment and decree dated 1-10-1983. In that context, as the suit had not been decreed before 31-12-1982, but was pending on 31-12-1982 and the Court passed the decree for eviction of tenant on 1-10-1983 this Court was pleased to observe that on 1-10-1983 the Munsiff had no jurisdiction to pass the decree. May be that Munsiff might not have been taken note of this position but it was open to the Appellate Court to take note of this fact to decide whether the decree that was passed on 1-10-1983 was without jurisdiction or not in view of Parts IV and v of the Act made applicable to the area to the effect from 31-12-1982. There could be no dispute as regards Section 21 (1) is concerned. The section says that no decree or order shall be passed for eviction. Section 21 (1) bars the jurisdiction of the court to decree the suit with effect from the date of its application. This decision is of no assistance to appellant nor can it be read to laydown the law to the effect that the decree which was validly passed by Trial Court would be rendered invalid by subsequent application of the provisions to the area even if legislature did not so provide. ( 18 ) IN the case of Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mill and Ginning Factory v Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, relied by the learned counsel for the appellants that the suit in question was filed on 25th April 1957 for possession of the premises. The Court referred to provisions of Section 50 of Bombay Rent Restriction act, 1939 and the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging house Rates (Control) Act, 1944. The Court referred to provisions of Section 50 of Bombay Rent Restriction act, 1939 and the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging house Rates (Control) Act, 1944. The provisions thereby is quoted as under:"provided that all suits and proceedings between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery or fixing of rent or possession of any premises to which the provisions of Part II apply. . . . which are pending in any Court, shall be transferred to and continued, before the Courts which would have jurisdiction to try such suits or proceedings under this Act or shall be continued in such Courts, as the case may be, and all the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall apply to all such suits and proceedings". Their Lordships then referred to Section 12 of that Act and thereafter their Lordships observed that "then again Section 12 enacts that the landlord shall not be entitled to recover possession" and not that "no suit shall be instituted by the landlord to recover possession". The point of time when the sub-section will operate is when the decree for recovery of possession would have to be passed. Thus, the language of the sub-section applies equally to suits pending for being decreed when Part II comes into force and those to be filed subsequently. The contention of the respondent that the operation of Section 12 (1) is limited to suits filed after the Act comes into force in a particular area cannot be accepted. Now these observations very clearly indicate that where the provisions of section are to the effect that landlord shall not be entitled to recover possession or where the expression used by the Act is that "no decree or order for recovery of possession of any of the premises shall be made by any Court or Authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant", it means that these provisions will come into operation no doubt with respect of the pending suit, at this stage when the court would be going to pass the decree for eviction but the cases where the decree has already been passed for recovery of possession in favour of the landlord against the tenant long before the material date i. e. , 31-12-1982 in my opinion, the decree or passing of decree cannot be said to have been barred and as explained earlier. In case the suit would have been dismissed and Appellate Court would have to decree or would be going to pass the decree after that material date it would have been required to examine whether the bar exists or not. In my opinion the First Appellate Court while dismissing the appellants appeal did not commit any error of jurisdiction because it did not pass any decree for eviction against the tenant or decree for recovery of possession instead the Appellate Court only dismissed the appeal and maintained the decree which was passed when there was no bar to the jurisdiction of the Court (Trial Court) in the matter of passing decree in the suit for eviction in favour of landlord and against the tenant on 7-8-1982. No other point has been pressed. Second appeal is hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the courts below is affirmed as such. Interim order whichever is granted shall expire. It will be open to the respondent to proceed accordingly. --- *** --- .