JUDGMENT The petitioner who is a Pradhan of Murarisha Gram Panchayat, P.O. Burarisha, Dist. 24-Parganas (North), has filed this writ application challenging the impugned notice dated 6.6.95 as contained in Annexure ‘A’ to the writ application. 2. Mr. J. Islam, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner has raised a short question in support of his contention. The learned Counsel contends that a bare perusal of the said notice would demonstrate that the same is vague and does not satisfy the requirements of Section 12 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the said Act). The learned Counsel submits that a statutory authority must act strictly in conformity with the statute and in support of the aforementioned proposition he has relied upon a decision in the case of (1) P.N. Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal reported in 70 CWN 503. The learned Counsel further has relied upon a decision in the case of (2) R.C. Sood V. Asst. Settlement Officer reported in 76 CWN 149. It was further submitted that all statutory requirements should be complied with before passing the order. The learned Counsel has also relied upon a decision in the case of (3) Ramchandra v. Govind reported in AIR 1975 SC 915 . It was however submitted that if there is repugnancy between Section 12 and Section 16 of the Act the same should be reasonably construed. In support of his aforementioned contention the learned Counsel has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of (4) P. Mahato v. Stale of West Bengal reported in 90 CWN 74. 3. The impugned notice as contained in Annexure 'A' to the writ application reads thus :- Copy to :- 1. B. D. O. Hasnabad 2. S. D. O. Basirhat 3. D. P. O. Barasat North 24 Parganas 4. A bare perusal of the said notice demonstrates the intention of the members of the Gram Panchayat who are 12 in numbers was to call upon the petitioner to call a meeting for the purpose of discussing of an Agenda relating to removal of the Pradhan. 5. Section 12 of the Act provides for removal of the Pradhan and Upa-Pradhan. Section of the said fact provides for the manner in which a meeting is to be called. 6. 5. Section 12 of the Act provides for removal of the Pradhan and Upa-Pradhan. Section of the said fact provides for the manner in which a meeting is to be called. 6. Section 12 of the Act provides for removal of Pradhan and Upa-Pradhan and Section 16 lays down the procedure therefor. In the impugned notice the members of the Gram Panchayat have clearly stated that they intended to remove the petitioner from the post of Pradhan. It is now well settled by various decisions of the Supreme Court of India that non-mentioning of the provision of law in the order does not invalidate the order of there exists a power in relation thereto. Reference may be made in this connection to the case reported in (5) AIR 1992 SC 1535 , Union of India v. Khazan Singh. It is not the case of the petitioner that Pradhan cannot be removed at all. Section 12 of the said Act confers power upon the members of the Gram Panchayat to pass a resolution removing the Pradhan. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, non-mentioning of the provision of law does not vitiate the notice itself. 7. The decision of D. Basu, J, in the case of P.N. Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal reported in 70 CWN 503 upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. J. Islam, learned Counsel for the petitioners, was in relation to a matter arising out of the West Bengal Land (Requisition & Acquisition) Act. It was held that the Collector acting under the said Act, must apply his mind to the requirements of law. The provision of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act is not in parimateria with the provisions of the West Bengal Panchayat Act. As by reason of the provision of the said Act a person is to lose his right, title and interest in respect of the property which is said to be requisitioned, it was held that the provision of the said Act must be strictly complied with. It is well settled that expropriatory legislation must be strictly construed. In the case of R.C. Sood V. Asstt. It is well settled that expropriatory legislation must be strictly construed. In the case of R.C. Sood V. Asstt. Settlement Officer reported in 76 CWN 149 a learned Single Judge of this Court was again considering a case under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act and in that context it was held that if any suo motu proceeding was initiated only to adjudicate the title of the petitioner vis-a-vis his father to find out whether son is the real owner or merely the benamdar for the father or not it was not within the jurisdiction of the Assistant Settlement Officer to make any such adjudication. The said decision, therefore, in my opinion, has no application to the fact of the present case. In the case of Ramchandra v. Govind reported in AIR 1975 SC 915 the Supreme Court was considering the matter under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. In teat case a tenant surrendered his tenancy in the agricultural land. The Supreme Court held that the requirements for surrender of land must be fulfilled in order to make such surrender valid and effective. In the case of P. Mahato v. State of West Bengal reported in 90 CWN 74 Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J, was seized with an absolutely a different question. The question which arose for consideration in that case was whether Section 12 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 must be read subject to the provisions of Section 16(4) of the said Act but the said question does not arise in this writ application, inasmuch as, by reason of the impugned notice the petitioner has been asked to call a meeting and such notice was issued in terms of Section 16 of the said Act. The petitioner is himself a statutory authority and he is under a statutory obligation to call a meeting in terms of the said provision. Second proviso appended to Section 16 postulates that when called upon to do so, the Pradhan should call a meeting within 15 days and also serve notice upon the prescribed authority. The Pradhan himself being a statutory authority cannot refuse to call a meeting on the alleged ground that the notice in question does not mention the provision of law under which the same was given nor the time therefor had been stated therein. A notice to call a meeting does not affect anybody's right. The Pradhan himself being a statutory authority cannot refuse to call a meeting on the alleged ground that the notice in question does not mention the provision of law under which the same was given nor the time therefor had been stated therein. A notice to call a meeting does not affect anybody's right. The provisions of Section 16 of the Act are directory in nature. In the impugned notice it was clearly stated that a meeting be called immediately whereupon it was obligatory on the part of the petitioner to do so in compliance with the provision of Section 16 of the said Act. He, having failed to do so, cannot take, advantage of his own wrong. Evidently 12 members out of 25 members of the Gram Panchayat have issued the said notice in compliance with the provision of Sections 12 and 16 of the Act. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this writ application. It is accordingly dismissed.