This second appeal by the State of Tripura and others which raises some interesting questions of law is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31st of January, 1991 of learned District Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar by which the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court were affirmed. 2. The case of the plaintiff was that while he was serving as a Forester under the Forest Department, Govt. of Tripura, a disciplinary proceeding was drawn up against him by the Chief Conservator of Forests under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 on the allegation that he married one Smti Gita Rani Malakar during the life time of his first wife Smti Anju Nath. An article of charge was framed to the above effect and after enquiry the plaintiff was found to have married Smti Gita Rani Malakar during the life time of his first wife. Accordingly, after completion of the enquiry, the enquiring authority made the finding that the plaintiff married for the second time during the life time of his first wife. Thereafter he submitted the report to the disciplinary authority, namely, the Chief Conservator of Forests who after perusal of the findings of the enquiring authority accepted the findings of the enquiring authority and proposed to remove the plaintiff from his service. He, therefore, called upon the plaintiff to submit his representation within a period of fifteen days as to why he should not be removed from the service. The plaintiff made his submission in response to that notice but the Chief Conservator of Forests, namely, the disciplinary authority passed the order of his removal with effect from 18.3.1983. The plaintiff thereafter preferred an appeal before the appellate authority but the appellate authority by this order dated 2.5.1983 rejected the appeal. The plaintiff thereafter filed a review petition but that the view petition also faced the same fate. 3. Therefore, the plaintiff filed the instant suit for quashing the order of removal on the ground that the entire disciplinary proceeding was vitiated by reason of the fact that during the material time the Rule 21 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules was not in force in Tripura. It was stated that the charge which was framed against the plaintiff did not been signature of the disciplinary authority and as such it had no validity in the eye of law. It was stated that the charge which was framed against the plaintiff did not been signature of the disciplinary authority and as such it had no validity in the eye of law. It was further stated that even though the plaintiff denied the charge, the enquiring authority without basis of any evidence and without adhering to the principles of natural justice made the findings against the plaintiff. The further case of the plaintiff was that the enquiry was held in utter violation of the rules and that the enquiring authority was bias right from the beginning as during the course of enquiry he also passed some biased remarks against the plaintiff. It was also stated that the appellate authority without application of his mind to the facts of the case dismissed the appeal by a cryptic order. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit for quashing the order of punishment removing him from the service. 4. The defendants contested the suit by filing a joint written statement. They denied all the material averments of the plaint and contended further that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and that it was barred by limitation. It was further averred that during the material time CCS (Conduct) Rules were very much in force in Tripura prior to introduction of Tripura Duties, Rights and Obligation Rules, 1982. It was contended that according to Rule 21 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 bigamy was strictly prohibited and it was punishable during the subsistence of first marriage so far as the Government employees were concerned. It was further stated that the enquiry was held in accordance with rules and opportunities were given to the plaintiff for his defence. But during enquiry he not only admitted his second marriage but the evidence which was adduced also proved that he married for the second time during the subsistence of his first marriage. It was further contended that the disciplinary authority examined all pros and cons before passing the order of removal and it was not a fact that he did not apply his mind to the facts of the case. Similarly the review petition was also examined and thereafter it was rejected. It was, therefore, submitted that the suit was liable to be dismissed. 5. Upon the pleadings the learned trial Court framed the following issues, namely: 1. Similarly the review petition was also examined and thereafter it was rejected. It was, therefore, submitted that the suit was liable to be dismissed. 5. Upon the pleadings the learned trial Court framed the following issues, namely: 1. Is the suit barred by the law of limitation ? 2. Is the departmental proceeding against the plaintiff conducted properly ? 3. Is the order of removal of the plaintiff from service illegal, void and operative? 4. What other relief the plaintiff is entitled to get? 6. The learned trial Court after appreciation of the evidence of both the parties arrived at the conclusion that the article of charge, namely, the marriage for the second time by the plaintiff was not proved and as such the order of removal was bad in law. The learned trial Court, therefore, decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff was to be treated as in continuous service and he would be entitled to get his pay and allowances for the period he ramained without job on account of the impugned order of removal. The first appellate Court also affirmed the judgment of trial Court dismissing the appeal of the present appellant. 7. It would be apparent from the pleadings as stated above that the vital question which is needed to be disposed of in this case was whether the respondent-plaintiff married for the second time during the subsistence of his first marriage. Mr. Sana, learned Government Advocate has, however, contended that the judgment of the first appellate Court is no judgment as a bare perusal of the judgment will show that the Judge neither mentioned the points to be decided nor he actually decided the points involved in the case. In drawing my attention to the provision laid down under Order 20 Rule 4 of CPC it has been submitted by Mr. Saha that under this rule it is incumbent upon the Judge to mention the . points to be decided and he is also required to give decision on each point. But in the instant case the judgment assailed here will show that the learned appellate authority neither mentioned the points to be decided nor had dealt with the real points. It may be a fact that learned appellate authority did not mention the points to be decided nor did actually deal with the real points in controversy. But in the instant case the judgment assailed here will show that the learned appellate authority neither mentioned the points to be decided nor had dealt with the real points. It may be a fact that learned appellate authority did not mention the points to be decided nor did actually deal with the real points in controversy. But can that be a sole ground for setting aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below ? If on scrutiny of the records it is found that the judgment of the: trial Court is not vitiated by any error" of law then there is no reason why Ac judgment should not be maintained simply because that the appellate authority committed some error in not mentioning the points to be decided. 8. Admittedly the only point which is involved in this appeal is whether the Courts below committed any error of law in arriving at the conclusion that it was not established by the appellant that the respondent married for the second time during the subsistence of his first wife. I have quite carefully gone through the entire records, particularly the order sheets of the trial Court and I find that although the trial Court gave a number of dates for peremptory hearing, the defendants i.e. the present appellants did not adduce any evidence in support of their written statement. The order dated 20.12.89 of the trial Court shows that 'that was a date for peremptory hearing i.e. for the evidence of defendant side but on that date the learned counsel for the defendants declined to adduce any witness . and hence the learned trial Court fixed the case on 11.1.1990 for argument. This being the position, it has to be seen whether the allegation that the respondent married for the second time during the subsistence of his first wife was proved during the departmental proceeding. The report of the enquiring authority in the departmental proceeding has been marked as Ext 2. The Ext 2 enquiry report shows that the respondent in his preliminary statement pleaded not guilty to the charge claiming to make his defence. But the enquiring authority placed reliance upon the evidence of three witnesses who were examined on behalf of the prosecution side. Enquiring authority dealt with the evidence of three witnesses and recorded that they stated that the respondent married for the second time. But the enquiring authority placed reliance upon the evidence of three witnesses who were examined on behalf of the prosecution side. Enquiring authority dealt with the evidence of three witnesses and recorded that they stated that the respondent married for the second time. But from the report it does not transpire that any of these witnesses witnessed the solemnization of the marriage. Mr. Sana, learned Government Advocate has, however, argued that even if some infirmities are found in the departmental proceeding then also a civil Court is not competent to alter the decision of the departmental authority. 9. But Mr. KN Bhattacharjee, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has contended that a civil Court is competent enough to set aside the finding of the departmental authority if it is found that the whole proceeding was improperly conducted. In the instant case it was specifically alleged that the enquiring authority was biased right from the beginning and that there was no legal proof to show that the respondent married for the second time during the subsistence of his first marriage. In this context we may refer to the provisions of section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act which makes the marriage between two Hindus void if two conditions are satisfied viz (i) the marriage is solemnized after the commencement of the Act, (ii) at the date of such marriage either party had a spouse living. The word * solemnize' means, in connection with a marriage, "to celebrate the marriage with proper ceremonies and in due form". If follows, therefore, that unless the marriage is celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies and due form it cannot be said to be 'solemnized'. As already stated, the appellants ie defendants did not adduce any evidence whatsoever to establish that the alleged second marriage was duly performed in accordance with religious rites applicable to the form of marriage. Learned trial Court has specifically mentioned it in its judgment that the present appellants did not adduce any evidence to show that there was a valid second marriage. To arrive at their conclusion there was no evidence to prove the second marriage. Learned trial Court has specifically mentioned it in its judgment that the present appellants did not adduce any evidence to show that there was a valid second marriage. To arrive at their conclusion there was no evidence to prove the second marriage. Learned trial Court placed reliance upon a decision rendered in the case of Kanwal Ram & others vs. The Himachal Pradesh Administration, reported in AIR 1966 SC 614 wherein their Lordships held : "In a bigamy case, the second marriage as a fact, that is to say, the essential ceremonies constituting it, must be proved. Admission of marriage by the accused is not evidence of it for the purpose of proving marriage in an adultry or bigamy case." 10. In the instant case even if reliance is placed upon the report of the enquiring authority then it would also appear that there is no legal evidence to show that the respondent's marriage with one Gita Rani Malakar was solemnized as per Hindu rites during the subsistence of his first marriage. 11. Apart from that the appellants did not adduce any evidence to show that the departmental proceeding was conducted properly. It was alleged by the respondent that the enquiring authority was not only biased right from the beginning but he also did not give proper opportunity to the respondent for conducting his case. Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India makes it obligatory to hold an inquiry before the employee is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. A departmental enquiry consists of four main stages, viz (a) charge, (b) investigation of the charge, (c) finding, punishment and (d) appeal. It is, however, true that a departmental enquiry is not conducted with the rigidity of a judicial trial and a charge which is to be framed need not be framed with the precision of a charge in a criminal proceeding. The main article of charge which was framed against the respondent reads as follows : "That Sri Sushendra Kumar Nath, Forester while functioning as Beat Officer, Sarbadalipara under Kanchapur Forest Division entered into bigamous marriage with Smti Gita Rani Malakar, SEW, Barahaldi SE Centre on 28.6.80 having his 1st wife Smti Anju Nath living. He has thus violated Rule 21 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and acted in a manner unbecoming to a Government servant." 12. He has thus violated Rule 21 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and acted in a manner unbecoming to a Government servant." 12. This being the charge it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the respondent married for the second time during the life time of his first wife. It appears that there was some preliminary enquiry before framing of his charge. But that preliminary report was not made available to the respondent. Moreover the evidence which was adduced in support of the charge does not show that any of the three witnesses actually saw solemnization of the second marriage. The enquiry report does not indicate that the respondent was allowed to take any defence assistant for his defence. Moreover there is nothing on record ! to show that the respondent was furnished with a copy of the report of the enquiring authority. 13. For all these reasons it must be held that the departmental proceeding was not conducted properly. 14. For the reasons stated above, this appeal has no merit and accordingly it is dismissed but the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to get 40% of his pay and allowances of the period for which he could hot render services on account of the orders of suspension and dismissal.