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1995 DIGILAW 254 (DEL)

SURJIT SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA

1995-03-16

D.P.WADHWA, M.K.SHARMA

body1995
D. P. Wadhwa, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, who is in the business of transport, has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ, order or direction against the respondents for quashing the order dated 24 October 1991 passed by the fourth respondent (Deputy Commissioner of Police, Provisions and Lines, Delhi) and the order dated 29 January 1992 passed by the third respondent (The Commissioner of Police, New Delhi ). Petitioner also prayed that his contract for supply of commercial matadors etc. to the respondents be restored for remaining period under the contract. As far as this second prayer is concerned, the period under the contract has already expired. ( 2 ) THE third respondent had issued a tender inviting offers for supply of commercial Matadors for use in the police force. The tender of the petitioner was accepted and a contract entered into on 8 March 1991 for a period of one year. Under the contract the petitioner was to supply commercial Matadors to the police department and had deposited Rs. 14,000. 00 as security for the due performance of the contract. ( 3 ) THE respondents at a later date, considering that the terms of the contract had been violated, issued a show cause notice to the petitioner and thereafter by order dated 24 October 1991 of the fourth respondent cancelled the contract, forfeited the security deposit, and also black-listed the petitioner firm in its dealings with the Delhi Police. The petitioner represented and he was informed by the third respondent by letter dated 29 January 1992 that his request for setting aside the order of black-listing him could not be acceded to. It was, however, stated that his pending bills regarding hire charges of Matadors (commercial/private) were being cleared. This petition was filed on 6 July 1992 and it was only on 19 January 1995 that a sum of Rs. 30,202. 00 was paid to the petitioner which was as per the calculations made by the police department. This amount was accepted by the petitioner without prejudice to his contentions. It was stated by the respondents that an amount of Rs. 616. 00 had been deducted towards income tax from the amount payable to the petitioner. 30,202. 00 was paid to the petitioner which was as per the calculations made by the police department. This amount was accepted by the petitioner without prejudice to his contentions. It was stated by the respondents that an amount of Rs. 616. 00 had been deducted towards income tax from the amount payable to the petitioner. ( 4 ) AS to why the contract of the petitioner was cancelled, the ground was that the petitioner did not supply nine seater Matadors which should have been commercial vehicles and instead he supplied nine seater Matadors which were private. We do not think the stand taken by the respondents is correct. The contract was for supply of commercial Matadors. A nine seater Matador cannot be a commercial vehicle and only a sixteen seater Matador can be a commercial vehicle. The petitioner has filed a certificate from the Directorate of Transport wherein it is mentioned that "nine seater Matator cannot be registered as commercial vehicle". As a matter of fact, the fourth respondent himself admitted that Matadors having capacity of nine seats were counted as private Matadors and Matadors having capacity of more than nine seats were commercial vehicles. He said only the commercial vehicles with seating capacity of sixteen persons could be hired for transportation of police force. But then how is the petitioner to be blamed if the various departments under the Delhi Police ask for a nine seater Matador. Petitioner has filed a letter dated 5 April 1991 from the Commandant, 120 Aux Bn, C. R. P. F. Wazirabad, New Delhi, to the petitioner. This letter is to the following effect :- "subject : Regarding 9 Seater Matador Dear Sir, Today vehicle No. DEP 5177 Matador 16 seater reported to this Hq as replacement of Vehicle No. D. B. B. 9195 is returned herewith in keeping view of the deployment of this unit. This unit required 9 seater Matador instead of 16 seater so it can ply in crowded and narrow streets without involving any risk. 2. It is therefore requested that 9 seater Matador may please be sent to this Hq immediately. @sd/ = Yours faithfully, sd/- 5/4/91. COMMANDANT 120 Aux Bn. " ( 5 ) A copy of this letter was endorsed to the fourth respondent with a request to direct the petitioner to provide nine seater Matador instead of sixteen seater. 2. It is therefore requested that 9 seater Matador may please be sent to this Hq immediately. @sd/ = Yours faithfully, sd/- 5/4/91. COMMANDANT 120 Aux Bn. " ( 5 ) A copy of this letter was endorsed to the fourth respondent with a request to direct the petitioner to provide nine seater Matador instead of sixteen seater. There is yet another letter dated 8 April 1991 from Mr. R. K. Singh, S. I. /mti, CISF Camp, Saket, New Delhi, to the petitioner again asking for nine seater Matador. The petitioner, therefore, supplied nine seater Matadors which had to be private and now the fourth respondent and also the third respondent raised objections that how could petitioner supply private vehicles. It is no fault of the petitioner if he supplied nine seater private Matador as no permit is granted to a nine seater matador and, it is, therefore, not a commercial vehicle. If there is any fault, it is on the part of the police department for which petitioner has been unduly made to suffer. It was pointed out by Mr. Kailash Gambhir, learned counsel for the petitioner, that now in the fresh invitation to tender the respodnents have specifically said that they want the firms to supply commercial Matadors of nine and sixteen seats when there was no such stipulation in the earlier tender. Mr. Gambhir also submitted that no permit is required for a vehicle used by the police force and in that connection he referred to section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This section, in relevant part, is as under :- "66. Necessity for permits.- (1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whethr or not such vehicle is actually carrying any passengers or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority authorising him the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used : Provided. . . . . . . . . . (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply - (a) to any transport vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government and used for Government purposes unconnected with any commercial enterprise; (b) to any transport vehicle owned by a local authority or by a person acting under contract with a local authority and used solely for road cleansing, road watering or conservancy purposes; (c) to any transport vehicle used solely for police, fire brigade or ambulance purposes; (d) to any transport vehicle used solely for the conveyance of corpses and the mourners accompanying the corpses; ( 6 ) CLAUSES (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) of section 66 apply to a transport vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government or by local authority (emphasis supplied), while under clause (c) there is no condition that transport vehicle used solely for police should also be owned by the police. It is, therefore, apparent that it was immaterial if the vehicle supplied was private or commercial so long it was a transport vehicle used solely for the police. There is nothing on record to show as to why the respondents wanted a commercial vehicle when there was no legal bar to use of a private vehicle. But then it can be a term of the tender that only commercial vehcles will be supplied as that condition cannot be said to be violative of clause (c) of section 66 (3) of the Act. No such condition was, however, stipulated in the contract in question. We, therefore, find merit in the submissions of the petitioner that his contract was wrongly terminated and that he could not have been black listed as there was no breach of any of the terms of the contract by him. ( 7 ) THIS petition is, therefore, allowed. The impugned orders cancelling the contract and black listing the petitoner are set aside. Petitioner will be entitled to the return of his security deposit and all other dues under the terms of the contract as if the same had not been cancelled. Petitioner will be entitled to costs. Counsel fee Rs. 2,000. 00.