A.K. Patnaik, J. — In this writ appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment and order dated 19.12.94 of the learned Single Judge, dismissing Civil Rule No.732 of 1988 filed by the appellant, following an earlier judgment dated 17.9.93 in Civil Rule No.733 of 1988. 2. Facts very briefly are that the appellant is a private limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and carrying on business of manufacturing tea. Since the appellant has no tea garden of its own, it buys tea leaves from others and manufactures tea in its factory at Rupai Siding, Doomdooma in the district of Dibrugarh. Manufacture of tea was subject to levy of central excise duty at the rate of Rs.2/- per Kg under Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944 (for short the Act) read with sub-heading No.0902.19, 0902.90 of the Schedule appended to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (for short the Tariff Act) at the relevant time. But by notification issued by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under sub-rule (1) of the Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (for short the Rules) read with Rule 96F of the said Rules numbered as notification No.32/1986 Central Excise, dated 10.9.86, however, tea manufactured in Zone V comprising of districts of Dibrugarh, Lakhimpur, Sibsagar, Jorhat and Sonitpur, but excluding Borsola Circle in the district of Sonitpur was exempted from so much of excise duty as was in excess of Rs.1.30 and under proviso (iv) (a) of the said notification, it was further stipulated that where the tea manufactured in a bought leaf factory is assessed according to the rate specified in the said notification the duty leviable on such tea in respect of all areas including in Zones, I, II and V to VII was to be reduced by 10% of such rate. In the explanation appended to the notification, the expression 'bought leaf factory' was explained to mean, a tea factory which has purchased not less than 2/3rd's of its green leaf from outside sellers during the financial year 1983-84 and in the financial year immediately proceeding in which the duty was levied. In the explanation appended to the notification, the expression 'bought leaf factory' was explained to mean, a tea factory which has purchased not less than 2/3rd's of its green leaf from outside sellers during the financial year 1983-84 and in the financial year immediately proceeding in which the duty was levied. But by a subsequent notification dated 29.10.87, the explanation in notification No.32/1986 Central Excise dated 10.2.86 was substituted by a new explanation which is quoted herein below : "Explanation : For the purpose of this notification the expression "bought leaf factory" means a tea factory which : (i) has worked for atleast six months during the financial year immediately preceding the financial year in which the duty is levied, and (ii) has purchased not less than two-thirds of the green leaf processed by the factory in the preceding financial year from any grower who has a holding not exceeding 10 hectares of land under cultivation of tea plants." The result was that while the appellant as a 'bought leaf factory' was entitled to a relief of excise duty at the rate of 10% from the rate of Rs. 1.30, the appellant's factory being situated in Dibrugarh District, after the notification dated 29.10.87, the appellant would be entitled to the said relief of 10% only if it purchased its green leaf from a grower holding not exceeding 10 hectares of land under cultivation of tea plants. It is this notification dated 29.10.87 which was challenged in Civil Rule Nos.732 and 733 of 1988 and upheld by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order. 3. Mr. PK Goswami, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted'that the impugned notification in so far as it puts a restriction on a manufacturer of tea in a bought leaf factory to purchase green leaf from a grower holding not exceeding 10 hectares of land under cultivation of tea plants for the purpose of availing exemption of 10% under the earlier notification dated 10.2.86 is ultra vires the power of the Central Government under Rule 8 of the Rules, According to Mr. Goswami, the explanation brought in by the impugned notification dated 29.10.87, in effect, amends the rate of duty that was leviable on the manufacturers of tea in a bought leaf factory such as the appellant which was Rs. 1.30 less 10% prior to the impugned notification. Goswami, the explanation brought in by the impugned notification dated 29.10.87, in effect, amends the rate of duty that was leviable on the manufacturers of tea in a bought leaf factory such as the appellant which was Rs. 1.30 less 10% prior to the impugned notification. He submitted that in the garb of a notification under Rule 8 of the Rules, the Central Government cannot levy rate of duty higher than that which has been prescribed by the Legislature and cited before us the judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of Bata India Ltd vs. Assistant Collector of Central Excise reported in 1978 ELT 211 . Alternatively, Mr. Goswami submitted that the object of the exemption in the notification dated 10.2.86 was to exempt a bought leaf factory which manufactures tea in the concerned area by 10% of the rate of duty of Rs. 1 .30 applicable to them, and the explanation now sought to be introduced by the impugned notification restricting purchase of green leaf from any grower holding not exceeding 10 hectares of land under cultivation of tea plants as a condition for availing the exemption is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as a classification is sought to be brought in which has no rational nexus with the said object of granting exemption to manufacturers of tea in a bought leaf factory. Mr. Goswami explained that the impugned notification sought to classify bought leaf factories into two groups : those purchasing green leaf from the growers holding not exceeding 10 hectares of land under cultivation of tea plants and those purchasing such green leaf from bigger growers but under the Act and the Rules and the notification thereunder it is the manufacturer of tea which is liable to excise duty and is also exempt from excise duty and the growers of tea do not at all come within the net of central excise, not being manufacturers of tea, and thus the classification on the face of it is unreasonable. Mr. Goswami, therefore argued that if it is held that the impugned notification was within the power of the Central Government under Rule 8 of the Rules, the impugned notification was liable to be struck down as being ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. Mr. Goswami, therefore argued that if it is held that the impugned notification was within the power of the Central Government under Rule 8 of the Rules, the impugned notification was liable to be struck down as being ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. Finally, he contended that since the explanation sought to be introduced by the impugned notification seeks to put a restriction on the business of the appellant preventing the appellant as it does from purchasing green leaf from the growers who hold land exceeding 10 hectares of land under cultivation of tea plants, it is unreasonable and violative of fundamental rights of the appellant to carry on his business under Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution. 4. In reply to the aforesaid submissions Mr. KN Choudhury, learned Senior CGSC, submitted that a plain reading of sub- rule ,(1) of Rule 8 of the Rules would show that the Central Government can impose conditions subject to which exemption from excise duty would be available to a manufacturer and by the impugned notification the Central Government has put a condition for manufacturers of tea in a bought leaf factory to purchase green leaf from the growers holding not exceeding 10 hectares of land under cultivation of tea plants in case they want to avail exemption under the notification dated 10.2.86. Mr. Choudhury also submitted that by imposing such condition, the Central Government has not in any way altered the rate of duty applicable to the appellant. He brought to our notice the provisions of sub-rule (3) of the Rule 8 of the Rules to show that the form and manner to exemption in a notification of exemption under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Rules may also be different from that in which the statutory duty is expressed so long as it did not impose a duty on excisable goods which is not in excess of the statutory duty. In reply to the submission that the impugned notification violates Article 14 of the Constitution by making an artificial and unreasonable classification, Mr. In reply to the submission that the impugned notification violates Article 14 of the Constitution by making an artificial and unreasonable classification, Mr. Choudhury cited before us the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Srinivasa Theatre vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1992 SC 999 , wherein has been held that although a taxation provision can also be challenged on the ground that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution, a large amount of latitude should be given to the Legislature and the Government in the matter of direct taxation and a greater amount of latitude has to be allowed to the Legislature and the Government in the matter of indirect taxation. In the present case, according to Mr. Choudhury, the very language of the explanation sought to be introduced by the impugned notification would show that the object of the notification is to ensure that purchase of green leaf by bought leaf factories are made from the growers holding land not exceeding 10 hectares of land under cultivation of tea plants and a classification based on such an object cannot be held to be unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. So far as the challenge to the notification under Article 19 (1) (g) is concerned, Mr. Choudhury submitted that no restriction as such has been imposed on a manufacturer of tea in a bought leaf factory to purchase green leaf from the growers holding land not exceeding 10 hectares and that such a manufacturer is always free to buy green leaf from bigger growers of tea. But it such a manufacturer wants to avail the exemption of 10% from the rate of duty, he must purchase tea from a small grower holding land not exceeding 10 hectares. 6. We have carefully perused the judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of Bata India Limited (supra), the paragraph of the said judgment on which reliance was placed by Mr. Goswami is quoted herein below: "Under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Rules, the Central Government has been authorised to exempt, on such conditions as may be specified in the notification, any excisable goods from the whole or part of the duty leviable on such goods by notification in the Official Gazette. Goswami is quoted herein below: "Under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Rules, the Central Government has been authorised to exempt, on such conditions as may be specified in the notification, any excisable goods from the whole or part of the duty leviable on such goods by notification in the Official Gazette. A plain reading of this provision, which has been quoted in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice, it is manifest that the power given to the Central Government is to exempt whole or part of a duty leviable. In otherwords, the power given to the Central Government to grant exemption and not to impose any excise duty. By the explanation attached to the impugned notification it seems obvious to me that the Central Government has provided for the imposition of excise duty on a manufacturer who has not manufactured the footwear. In other words, the explanation has attempted to give an extended meaning to the word manufacture as it has been defined in the Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944. Section 2 (0 of that Act provides that manufacture includes any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of manufactured product By the explanation appended to the impugned notification the word manufacture has been deemed to include any footwear which affixed with the brand or the trade name registered or not of any manufacturer. By this explanation, the word 'manufacture' has been included to mean a purchaser of a manufactured product, i.e. the footwear as also such footwear to which is affixed the brand or trade name registered or not of any manufacturer. In doing this, the Central Government has, to my mind gone beyond the four comers of the statute itself and has acted in excess of the power delegated to it under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8. The submission, of the learned Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. In doing this, the Central Government has, to my mind gone beyond the four comers of the statute itself and has acted in excess of the power delegated to it under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8. The submission, of the learned Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that the explanation appended to the impugned notification was merely a condition as contemplated under Rule 8 (1) imposed by the Central Government for exemption of certain foot wears from the duty leviable on such goods, cannot in view of what I have stated above, be accepted." A reading of the aforesaid judgment in the case of Bata India Limited would show that what was sought to be done by the notification under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Rules in that case was to insert an explanation so as to make even a person who was a manufacturer of footwear liable to excise duty in case he affixed on a manufactured footwear the brand or trade name registered or not of any registered manufacturer and such an explanation inserted in the notification under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Rules was held to be beyond the powers of the Central Government under the said rule inasmuch as such a person was not a manufacturer of footwear and did not come within the definition manufacturer in section 2 (f) of Act and was not liable to excise duty. 7. In the present case, the rate of duty in respect of tea has been fixed under section 3 of the Act read with sub-heading 0902.19,0902.29 and 0902.90 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act at Rs.2.00 per Kg. By the exemption notification dated 10.2.86, duty in excess of Rs. 1.30 less 10% was exempted in respect of tea manufactured in the bought leaf factory in some zones. The explanation in the exemption notification dated 10.2.86 defined the expression 'bought leaf factory' for the purpose of the notification and placed only one condition on such manufacturer for availing the exemption namely that purchase of green leaf would not be less that 2/3 from the outside seller during the financial year, 1983-84 and the financial year immediately preceding in which the duty was levied. By the impugned notification, the said explanation was substituted by a new explanation and it was stipulated therein that the bought leaf factory seeking to avail the exemption should have worked at least for six months during the financial year immediately preceding the financial year in which the duty was levied and should have purchased not less than 2/3 of the green leaf from outside seller and purchased green leaf from the growers holding land not exceeding 10 hectares under cultivation of tea plants. Hence all that was done by the impugned notification was to impose new conditions for availing the exemption of 10% under the notification dated 10.2.86 in case of a bought leaf factory. In other words, a manufacturer of tea in a bought leaf factory not satisfying the condition of purchasing green leaves from growers of tea having land not exceeding 10 hectares continues to be exempted from excise duty in excess of Rs. 1.30 and the rate of duty which is payable by the appellant is not in excess of the statutory duty of Rs.2.00 prescribed by the Legislature under section 3 of the Act read with sub-heading under the Central Excise Tariff Act. The contention of Mr. Go swami that by the impugned notification the Central Government has sought to amend the rate of duty imposed by the Legislature and is ultra vires the powers of the Central Government under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Rules, therefore, has no merit and is rejected. 8. Regarding the contention that the impugned notification is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, it has been explained by the Apex Court in the case of Srinivasa Theatre (supra) cited by Mr. Choudhury that greater amount of latitude is to be given to the Legislature and the Government in the matter of direct and indirect taxation. The relevant portion of the said judgment of the Apex Court is extracted herein below: "The instrument of taxation is not merely a means to raise revenue in India; it is and ought to be, a means to reduce inequalities. You don't tax a poor man. You tax the rich and the richer one gets, proportionately greater burden he has to bear. Indeed, a few years ago the Income-tax Act taxed 94p out of every rupee earned by an individual over and above Rupees one lakh. You don't tax a poor man. You tax the rich and the richer one gets, proportionately greater burden he has to bear. Indeed, a few years ago the Income-tax Act taxed 94p out of every rupee earned by an individual over and above Rupees one lakh. The Estate Duty Act, no doubt since repealed, Wealth Tax Act, and Gift Tax Act are all measures in the same direction. It is for this reason that while applying the doctrine of classification developed mainly with reference to and under the concept of "equal protection of laws" Parliament is allowed more freedom of choice in the matter of taxation viz a viz other laws. If this be the situation in the case of direct taxes, it should be more so in the case of indirect taxes since in the case of such taxes the real incidence is upon some other than the person who actually makes it over to the State though it is true, he cannot avoid the liability on the ground that he has not passed it on. In the matter of taxation it is thus, not a question of power but one of constraints of policy - the interest of economy, of trade, profession, and industry, the justness of the burden, its 'acceptability' and other similar considerations. We do not mean to say that taxation laws are immune from attack based upon Article 14. It is only that Parliament and Legislatures are accorded a greater freedom and latitude in choosing the persons upon whom and the situations and stages at which it can levy tax. We are not unaware that this greater latitude has been recognised in USA and UK even without resorting to the concepts of 'equality before law' or 'the equal protection of law'-as something that is inherent in the very power of taxation and it has been accepted in this country as well (see in this connection the decision of Subha Aao, CJ. (as he then was) in Gorantia Butchayya Chowdhury vs. State of AP, AIR 1958 Andhra Pradesh 294, where the several US and English decisions have been carefully analysed and explained). (as he then was) in Gorantia Butchayya Chowdhury vs. State of AP, AIR 1958 Andhra Pradesh 294, where the several US and English decisions have been carefully analysed and explained). In the context of our Constitution, however, there is an added obligation upon the State to employ the power of taxation-nay all its powers - to achieve the goal adumbrated in Article 38." It would be clear from the aforesaid language of the Supreme Court that the Legislature and the Government must be given wide latitude in the matter of taxation and the object of taxation policy may be reduce inequalities. Article 38 (2) of the Constitution casts an obligation on the State to strive to minimise inequalities in income and Article 39 of the Constitution provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards ensuring that the ownership and control of the material reasources of the community are so distributed as best to sub-serve the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. If this be the obligations of the State under Article 38 and 39 of | the Constitution, the object of fiscal policy can also be to ensure a market for small growers of tea leaf particularly those who are holding land not exceeding 10 hectares under tea cultivation. We are thus of the considered opinion that while the immediate burden of levy of central excise duly under the Act is on the manufacturer and the immediate relief of an exemption under Rule 8 of the Rules from central excise duty would be for a manufacturer, the object of a notification of exemption under Rule 8 of the Rules can also be to ensure a better income for small growers of tea. The purpose of the explanation substituted by the impugned notification is to effectuate this very object by encouraging purchase of green leaf by bought leaf factories from the growers holding land not exceeding 10 hectares and the classification between the two groups of manufacturers between those who purchase green leaf from bigger growers and those who purchase green leaf from small growers holding land and exceeding 10 hectares has a rational nexus with the said object sought to be achieved. Therefore, the notification cannot be held to be ultravires Article 14 of the Constitution. 9. Therefore, the notification cannot be held to be ultravires Article 14 of the Constitution. 9. Coming now to the challenge under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, in our view, by the impugned notification, the bought leaf factories are not prohibited as such from purchasing green leaf from any grower of tea holding land exceeding 10 hectares. They can always purchase such tea from bigger growers but if they do so they will not be entitled to exemption of 10% of Rs. 1.30 available to manufacturers to bought leaf factory under proviso (iv) (a) of the notification dated 10.2.86 as amended by the impugned notification. In our opinion, therefore, the challenge to the impugned notification on the ground mat it puts an unreasonable restriction on the right of the appellant to carry on business under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution therefore fails. 10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed but considering the facts and circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs.