R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is a Councillor of the respondent-Nagarpalika challenges the notice dated 8th February 1995 at annexure-B to this petition given by the president of the respondent-Nagarpalika postponing the date of Special General meeting which was called on 9th february 1995 to 6th March 1995 and stating the agenda of that meeting. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner the board of the Porbandar Nagarpalika was constituted, on 4th February 1995 and by notice dated 4th February 1995 the president had called. Special General meeting of the Board on 9th February 1995 at the office of the Nagarpalika to consider the agenda items which included construction of various committee named at items (Nos. 2 (1) to 2 (12) of the notice. According to the petitioner the meeting was, therefore, convened on 9th February 1995 wherein 22 Councillors remained present. The Chief Officer at the commencement of the meeting brought to the notice of the Councillors not to proceed further as the President had cancelled the said meeting and postponed it to 6th March 1995 as per notice dated 8th February 1995. The Councillors however appointed one of them as a chairman of the meeting and proceeded with the agenda items of constituting committees. The petitioner apprehending that the meeting called on 6th March 1995 would be convened for the purpose of constituting committees filed this petition and on 6th March 1995, Honble mr. Justice S. K. Keshote while admitting the matter restrained the respondents from holding the meeting on 6th March 1995 for forming committees under the relevant provisions of the Gujarat municipalities Act, 1963 till further orders. ( 3 ) IT was strongly contended on behalf of the petitioner that the President had no power to postpone the date of the meeting as the meeting was properly convened or summoned. It was argued that in view of the provisions of Section 51 (11) of the said Act a general meeting could be adjourned only with the consent of a majority of Councillors and not by the president. It was argued that in view of the provisions of Section 51 (11) of the said Act a general meeting could be adjourned only with the consent of a majority of Councillors and not by the president. It was also argued that the reason assigned in the impugned notice dated 8th February 1995, that because 7 clear days notice was not given the date of the meeting was postponed to 6th march 1995, was self contradictoty and since the notice, for a Special General meeting required 3 clear days time only as per Section 51 (3) of the said Act it should be inferred that cancellation of the meeting under the impugned notice was mala fide and result of the rivalry amongst the Board members. It was also contended that mala fide intention inferred from the fact that the postponement of the meeting was done at the last minute and notice of such postponement was not even served on as many as 23 Councillors who had remained present. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on the decision of this Court in Babubhai v. Manibhai reported in 16 G. L. R. 566 and on another decision of the Division Bench in arun S. Mehta v. Bhavnagar Munucipal corporation reported in 1989 (1) G. L. R. 151 in support of the contention that the president could not have postponed the date of the meeting by the impugned notice. It was argued relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in sayabudinsab v. Municipality of Gadag betgeri reported in AIR 1955 SC 314 that the provision regarding convening the meeting under Section 51 (3) was directory and not mandatory and therefore irregularity in the earlier notice dated 4th February 1995 calling the proceedings of the meeting which was actually convened on 9th February 1995. It was also contended that irregularity in the earlier notice if any was not a proper reason for postponing the meeting. Relying on the rules framed by the municipality it was urged that the meeting could be adjourned only by the members who have convened at the meeting and not by the President. It was also contended that irregularity in the earlier notice if any was not a proper reason for postponing the meeting. Relying on the rules framed by the municipality it was urged that the meeting could be adjourned only by the members who have convened at the meeting and not by the President. ( 4 ) UNDER Section 51 (3) of the said Act, a three clear days notice of a Special general Meeting specifying the time and place is to be transacted thereat is required to be served upon the councillors and posted up at the municipal Officer or the local "kacheri" or some other public building in the municipal borough. Under sub-section (2) of Section 51 the President may call a special General Meeting and for such special General Meeting, three clear days notice is required to be given. The stage of calling of a meeting is prior to the date of convening of a meeting. A provision which relates to adjournment of a meeting when it is convened such as section 51 (11) of the said Act and Rule 21 of the Rules framed by the municipality would therefore apply only when the meeting is actually convened and the question of adjournment is to be decided. They have no bearing on the question of Presidents power to call a meeting. Therefore, the impugned notice cannot be assailed on the ground of violation of Section 51 (11) of the said Act or Rule 21 of the Rules framed by the municipality on the same lines. ( 5 ) THE President has express power to call a Special General Meeting under section 51 (2) by issuing a notice under section 51 (3 ). Under Section 21 of the bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 power to issue Notification, Orders, Rules or Bye-laws would include power to amend, vary any such Notifications, orders, Rules or Bye-laws. Therefore, the power to call a Special General Meeting on a particular date would also include power to change the date on which the meeting is called. As. noted above, ojice the meeting is actually convened, provisions of Section 51 (11) would apply and the adjournment could be given only by a decision taken at the meeting and the president can have no independent say in the matter. As. noted above, ojice the meeting is actually convened, provisions of Section 51 (11) would apply and the adjournment could be given only by a decision taken at the meeting and the president can have no independent say in the matter. Howeve,r, at the stage of calling of a meeting which is prior to its being convened, the President having been invested with the power to call a meeting has an implied power to change the date of such meeting for a valid reason. The decision of this Court in Arun s. Mehta v. Bhavnagar Municipal corporation (supra) cannot assist the petitioner on the proposition that the president will have no power to change the date of the meeting before it is convened, in view of the fact that the said decision has been reversed by the supreme Court in J. M. Patel v. Arun mehta reported in AIR 1984 SC 1289. The decision of this Court in Babubhai v. Manibhai (supra) also cannot assist the petitioner as it was reversed in respect of the said proposition by a Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 183 of 1974 decided on November 20, 1974 in which it was held that the president had a power to adjourn the meeting in certain extraordinary circumstances. This fact has already been noted by the Supreme Court in J. M. Patels case (supra ). ( 6 ) THE respondent-Corporation has filed an affidavit-in-reply in which it has been stated that three applications were received from the Councillors one on 7- 2-1995 and two on 8-2-1995 asking the president to change the date of the meeting on the ground that they were not given three clear days notice in respect of the meeting called on 9. 2. 1995. Some councillors had received notice on 7-2- 1995 and therefore they were justified in contending that three clear days notice as was required under Section 51 (3) of the said Act was not given. The fact that instead of three clear days notice the impugned notice mentioned seven clear days is of no consequence because the objections taken by eleven Municipal councillors were on the ground that they were not given three clear days notice for a Special General Meeting. Mention of seven clear days notice in the impugned notice is an obvious error and should be read as three clear days notice. Mention of seven clear days notice in the impugned notice is an obvious error and should be read as three clear days notice. There are 42 Municipal Councillors in the porbandar Municipality of whom 22 councillors were served with the impugned notice dated 8-2-1995 and therefore obviously they did not remain present on 9-2-1995 when the meeting was called by the earlier notice dated 4-2- 1995. Even the President and the Vice- president were not present on 9-2-1995 when 23 Councillors are purported to have convened the meeting and taken the decisions on their own. There is no sufficient material on. record to infer any mala fide intention on the part of the president in postponing the date of calling of the meeting from 9-2-1995 to 6-3-1995. No mala fide intention can be inferred from the fact that the postponement notice was given just one day before the date on which the meeting was called or because there was rivalry among the Councillors or the fact that some of the Councillors were not served with the notice dated 8-2-1995. Admittedly, the Chief Officer right at the inception on 9-2-1995 informed those 23 councillors, about the postponement of the meeting despite which those councillors proceeded with the agenda of meeting which was not to take place on that day and the calling of which was postponed to a future date. The impugned notice dated 8-2-1995 postponing the calling of the Special Meeting of the general Board to 6-3-1995 from 9-2- 1995 was therefore valid and no meeting could have been validly convened on 9- 2-1995 by these 23 Councillors. ( 7 ) EVEN if the provisions of Section 51 (3) were to be treated as directory and not mandatory on the ratio of shyabuddinsab v. Municipality of Gadag betgeri (supra) which considered the provisions of Section 35 (3) of the bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, it cannot be said that the action of the president in postponing the date of the meeting from 9-2-1995 to 6-3-1995 was unjustified or illegal. The said decision therefore cannot assist the petitioner. ( 8 ) UNDER the circumstances, there is no substance in the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and the petition deserves to be rejected. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated. --