JUDGMENT - R.M. LODHA, J. :--The substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission of second appeal and which needs to be decided is "Whether the Appellate Court erred in Applying the principle of "feeding the estoppel" to the case of respondent No. 1 and, therefore, holding that the respondent No. 1 proved the title over the house property." 2. The relevant facts giving rise to the aforesaid substantial question of law are that respondent No. 1 Shamrao (for short "original plaintiff") filed a suit for possession of suit house and the agricultural land against respondent No. 2 Arjun (for short "defendant No. 1"), present appellants Onkarnath and Vasant (for short original "defendants 3 and 4") and Smt. Janabai (since deceased - original defendant No. 2). The plaintiff also claimed arrears of rent and damages in respect of suit house amounting to Rs. 155/- and mesne profits of past two years amounting to Rs. 300/- from defendants 1 and 2 and enquiry into future mesne profits. The claim of the plaintiff was based on the ground that defendant No. 1 Arjun, owned disputed property had sold the same to the plaintiff by way of registered sale-deed dated 26-12-1969 for a consideration of Rs. 1,000. According to the plaintiff, after the purchase of the property, he leased the suit house to Arjun at a monthly rent of Rs. 5/- on first of January, 1970 and so far as the agricultural land was concerned, it remained in possession of the plaintiff. The details of house was mentioned in para 1(a) of the plaint. The plaintiff further averred that the defendant Arjun did not pay rent regularly and became in arrears of rent, which necessitated the plaintiff to file the suit for recovery of arrears of rent and the said civil suit was decreed ex parte on 28-7-1972 by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Jalgaon-Jamod. Thereafter, by legal notice dated 1-3-1973, plaintiff determined the tenancy of defendant No. 1 of the suit house with effect from 1-4-1973 but the defendant failed to deliver the possession of the house. Defendants 2, 3 and 4 were joined as parties since they were enjoying possession of the suit house. During the pendency of the suit in the year 1973, defendant No. 2 died and her name was deleted from array of parties. 3. Defendants 2, 3 and 4 were joined as parties since they were enjoying possession of the suit house. During the pendency of the suit in the year 1973, defendant No. 2 died and her name was deleted from array of parties. 3. The defendant No.1 did not contest the suit and suit proceeded ex parte against him. Defendant No. 3 filed his written statement and denied the averments made in the plaint. Defendant No. 4 contested the suit by filing written statement and setting up a plea that the property originally belonged to one Vithal (father of defendant No. 1 - Arjun) and he died about 15 years ago leaving behind his widow Janabai - original defendant No. 2 and three sons viz. Shriram, Ramrao and Arjun. According to defendant No. 4 Onkar Ramrao died without leaving any heir. Shriram died about 5 years ago leaving behind his widow and son Bhimrao and according to defendant No. 4, therefore, Arjun alone was not the owner of the property. In this view of the matter, defendant No. 4 challenged the right and title of defendant No. 1 - Arjun to transfer the entire property to the plaintiff. Defendant No. 4 also claimed that he was bona fide purchaser of the suit house from Arjun vide registered sale-deed dated 8-7-1971 and that of the Agricultural land from Arjun and Janabai under sale-deed dated 13-1-1972. 4. The trial Court framed as many as 26 issues. The plaintiff led oral as well as documentary evidence. Against defendant No. 1, suit proceeded ex parte and defendants 3 and 4 despite opportunities failed to adduce any evidence. The trial Court, however, after hearing learned Counsel for parties, dismissed plaintiffs suit vide judgment and decree dated 31-8-1976. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., Jalgaon-Jamod dismissing plaintiffs suit, plaintiff preferred appeal before the Assistant Judge, Khamgaon. The Appellate Court after hearing parties, partly allowed the appeal and modified judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The Appellate Court decreed plaintiffs suit so far as it related to the suit house, details of which were given in para 1(a) of the plaint. As regards, Agricultural land, the Appellate Court maintained the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 5. Against the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court on 14-8-1980, two appeals came to be filed. As regards, Agricultural land, the Appellate Court maintained the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 5. Against the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court on 14-8-1980, two appeals came to be filed. The present appeal has been filed by defendants 3 and 4 challenging that part of the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court, whereby it has decreed plaintiffs claim for suit house. The plaintiff filed Second Appeal No. 416 of 1980 against the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court relating to claim in the Agricultural field, details of which were given in para 1(b) of the plaint. It would be pertinent to note that S.A.No. 416 of 1980 filed by the plaintiff has been allowed by this Court on 18-8-1992 and plaintiffs suit relating to Agricultural field has been decreed and judgment and decree passed by the Assistant Judge, Khamgaon on 14-8-1980 affirming the judgment and decree of Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., relating to Agricultural field has been set aside and decree for possession of Agricultural field Survey No. 31/6, measuring 2 acres and 15 gunthas has been decreed together with the direction to hold enquiry into the mesne profits in respect of the said land till delivery of possession under Order 20, Rule 12 C.P.C. The present second appeal, filed at the instance of original defendant 3 and 4, therefore, is only restricted to the suit house: and as observed above, the only question that needs to be decided in this second appeal is whether the Appellate Court was justified in applying the principle of "feeding the estoppel" to the case of the plaintiff and thereby holding that plaintiff has proved his title over the suit house. 6. Miss. Dave, learned Counsel for the appellants strenuously urged that the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that defendant No. 1 - Arjun and his mother defendant No. 2 - Janabai (since deceased and deleted from array of parties) were having only ½ shares each in the disputed house and after the death of defendant No. 2 - Janabai, defendant No. 1 - Arjun become the sole owner was not justified. In this connections, the learned Counsel urged that the house in question originally belonged to Vithal father of Arjun, who died long back leaving behind his wife defendant No. 2 - Janabai and three son viz. Shriram, Ramrao and Arjun. According to the learned Counsel, though Ramrao died without leaving any heir, Shriram left behind him his son Bhimrao and therefore, Arjun had only 1/3rd share and he cannot be said to have become full owner of the suit house, after the death of defendant No. 2 - Janabai. The learned Counsel would thus urge that the Appellate Court was not justified in applying section 43 of Transfer of Property Act and committed serious error in applying the principle of "feeding the estoppel". The learned Counsel for appellants urged that the plaintiff has not been able to establish that there was fraudulent representation by defendant No. 1 - Arjun or that Arjun erroneously represented to the plaintiff that he was authorised to transfer the suit house and in the absence of proof of fraudulent representation or erroneous representation, section 43 of T.P. Act had no application. 7. On the other hand, Mrs. Maldhure, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 vehemently contended that there was no merit in the submission of learned Counsel for appellants that defendant No. 1 - Arjun and defendant No. 2 - Janabai were not having half share each in the suit house and that after the death of defendant No. 2 - Janabai, defendant No. 1 - Arjun did not inherit her share. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that despite number of opportunities given to defendants 3 and 4, no evidence was led by them and, therefore, the facts stated in the written statement were not at all proved. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 in this connection, invited my attention to para 16 of the Appellate Courts judgment, wherein it is observed by the Appellate Court that no evidence has been adduced by the defendant and that there was nothing on record to show that except Arjun and his mother - Janabai, any other person had interest in the said house or any other person having interest in the suit house was alive, when the plaintiff purchased the property on 26-12-1969. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 thus urged that suit house was owned by Arjun and Janabai and Arjun could not have sold the entire house by sale-deed Exh. 37 dated 26-12-1969 but he represented himself to be the owner and sold the same to the plaintiff but after the death of Janabai in the year 1973, defendant No.1 Arjun got her share in the house and, therefore, the Principle of "feeding the estoppel" was fully applicable under section 43 of Transfer or Property Act and the said Principle has rightly been applied by the Appellate Court. 8. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by the learned Counsel for parties. It is not disputed that the present appellants did not lead evidence in support of their defence set out in the written statement. In the absence of any evidence led by the appellants it cannot be said that the finding of fact recorded by the Appellate Court that there was nothing on record that except Arjun and his mother Janabai, any other person having interest in the suit property was alive when plaintiff purchased the property on 26-12-1969, suffered from any error. The Appellate Court thus rightly concluded that in the suit house Arjun and his mother Janabai had half share each and by the sale-deed dated 26-12-1969, defendant No. 1 Arjun could not have transferred the suit house in which Janabai had half share. The very fact that though Janabai had half share in the suit house, yet the entire house was transferred by defendant No. 1 Arjun to the plaintiff vide sale-deed dated 26-12-1969 would show that there was representation either fraudulent or erroneous on the part of defendant No. 1 Arjun made to the plaintiff, which led the plaintiff to believe that defendant No. 1 was owner of the property and he purchased the suit property from Arjun. In this background, it cannot be said that finding recorded by the Appellate Court that it was obvious that Arjun had fraudulently represented to plaintiff that entire house was owned by him and he could transfer the same and he proceeded to make transfer not of his share but his mothers also for a consideration vide sale-deed dated 26-12-1969 suffer from any error or infirmity. That being the position and the fact that subsequently Janabai died in the year 1973, leaving behind defendant No. 1 - Arjun as her sole heir, the question that needs to be determined whether the Principle feeding the estoppel as envisaged in section 43 of Transfer of Property Act could be attracted. 9. Section 43 of Transfer of Property Act reads as under :- "Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immoveable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option." 10. "Feeding the Estoppel" is an expression which is part of English Law of Estoppel and by it is meant that where a grantor has purported to grant interest in land which he did not at the time possess but subsequently acquires, benefit of subsequent acquisition goes automatically to the earlier grantee. 11. The English Rule "Feeding the Estoppel" with some exceptions and departure is engrafted in section 43 of Transfer of Property Act, which provides that if a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer immoveable property and transfers such property for consideration, at the option of the transferee, such transfer shall operate on any interest, which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists, subject, however, to the conditions that the rights of transferee in good faith for valuable consideration without notice of the existence of said option are not affected. Under proviso to section 43 of Transfer of Property Act, therefore, right of a transferee who has purchased the immoveable property from transferor on a fraudulent or erroneous representation that he was the owner of the property or authorised to transfer such immoveable property though he was not, and if subsequently such transferor acquired the interest in the property, which has been transferred to the transferee and such transferee has exercised his option, can still be defeated by a subsequent transferee having purchased the property in good faith for valuable consideration without notice of the existence of option by first transferee. In the present case, however, the trial Court has found as a fact that the appellants have failed to prove that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The finding recorded by the trial Court that defendants 3 and 4 who are the present appellants were not the bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration has not been set aside by the First Appellate Court. In this view of the matter, the exception contained in section 43 that nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferee in good faith for consideration without notice of existence of the said option is not at all attracted and the case is squarely covered under the provisions of main section 43. On the basis of facts found in the present case, it can also be said that the plaintiff has erased the option. The expression "option " occurring in section 43 does not require that such option has to be exercised by the express terms by the transferee. The word option implies that the transferee may take the after-acquired interests of the transferor and the very fact that the plaintiff was claiming his title over the entire suit house showed that he exercised his option of taking after-acquired interests of the transferor. No particular form of option is required under section 43 of Transfer of Property Act. 12. In (Gomathy Ammal v. Rukmini Amma)1, A.I.R. 1967 Kerala 58, the Kerala High Court held as under :- "The main question turns on the true understanding of the scope and contents of section 43 of Transfer of Property Act, which reads as follows :- "Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immoveable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee operates on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferee in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option." The plain reading is that when the other ingredients prescribed are found to exist, upon the acquisition by the transferor of any interest in the property professed to be transferred, there springs into existence an option for the transferee to have the transfer operate on such newly acquired interest. That option accrues to him, by the terms of the section proprio vigore and not by anything that he has to do. Being an option, it is open to him not to claim the benefit. In this sense, the newly acquired interest does not automatically pass, co instante which the acquisition as under the English Law, there being the interposition of the opinion. The manifestation of the will of the transferee to have the transfer so operate, may be deemed to be an exercise of the option but this is not to say, such exercise. He need only require or demand of the transferor that such interests shall pass to him. This idea runs through the second part of the section, which speaks of the existence of the said option and of the exercise of the option. This view gains considerable strength from the observations of the Supreme Court in (Jumma Masjid Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Davia)2, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 847 at page 850 where Venkatrama Iyer, J., observed as follows on section 43 :- "When these conditions are satisfied, the section enacts that if the transferor subsequently acquires the property, the transferee becomes entitle to it, if the transfer has not meantime been thrown up or cancelled and is subsisting." 13. In (Krishnadhan v. Kanailal)3, A.I.R. 1973, Calcutta, 422 the Calcutta High Court thus observed : "The further question that comes up for consideration is whether under section 43 of Transfer of Property Act, it is necessary for the transferee to make a demand in exercise of or showing his option for acquisition of the title which his transferor subsequently acquires. The section reads as follows :- "43. Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immoveable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall at the option of the transferee may operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which contract of transfer subsists. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of a transferee in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of such option." The trial Court on an interpretation of the section has come to the conclusion that there must be an exercise of option by demand which is requisite under that section. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of a transferee in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of such option." The trial Court on an interpretation of the section has come to the conclusion that there must be an exercise of option by demand which is requisite under that section. The Appellate Court is of the opinion that there was no demand in exercise of option in the present case and the institution of the suit cannot to be recorded as exercise of his option because the suit is for declaration of his interest in the lease but the interest cannot accrue to him on the basis of the after-acquired title of his lessor unless a demand was made to that effect in exercise of the option. There is no dispute and it is settled law that subsequent acquisition of title by the transferor does not automatically invest the transferee with the title so acquired as in English Law, and for such acquisition there must be an option by the transferee under our law. The section however does not lay down that exercise of such option can only be by a demand by the transferee and in fact the section mentions only about the option of the transferee and not exercise of option by him. Any action by the transferee indicative of such option will in my opinion, be sufficient when a transferor transfers any immoveable property as his own, to operate on any interest in the property which he subsequently acquires. Such option may be indicated by any over action by the transferee and an institution of a suit for declaration of title in the immoveable property may be one such over act of option for the purposes of the section and no formal demand in exercise of the option is necessary or contemplated under the section. It was observed so in Gomathy Amal v. Rukmini Amma, A.I.R. 1967 Ker. 58 in the following words :- "The manifestation of the will of the transferee to have the transfer to operate may be deemed to be an exercise of this option, but this is not to say, that he must adhere to any specific form for such exercise. He need only require or demand of the transferor that such interest shall pass to him. He need only require or demand of the transferor that such interest shall pass to him. This idea runs through the second part of the section, which speaks of the existence of the said option, not the exercise of the option....." It is true that in the present case there was no demand in exercise of the option but the admitted facts are that the plaintiff has been in possession of the suit property since his lease of 1948 and such possession had been continuing when the suit was filed in 1956 long after the sales in favour of the plaintiffs lessors and by them to the defendants 1954/54. Such action on the part of the plaintiff amply indicates and makes out the option by him under the law which would enable him to be benefit under section 43 and no formal demand for the purpose is necessary." 14. In (Girja Shankar v. Jagannath)4, A.I.R. 1952 Allahabad 301, the Allahabad High Court held as under :- The question of some importance is, what is the exact form of notice that the subsequent transferee should have to enable the equitable interest to be enforced against him. The Lower Court has assumed notice of the prior mortgage even though there was no issue on the point. As the prior mortgage was a registered document the Lower Court has assumed that the subsequent mortgage must be deemed to have had notice of the same. Section 43 T.P. Act, is as follows :- "Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immoveable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operates on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option." It is suggested that it must be established that the transferee had exercised his option before the equitable interest can operate on the property transferred but subsequently acquired. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option." It is suggested that it must be established that the transferee had exercised his option before the equitable interest can operate on the property transferred but subsequently acquired. I do not think the section requires that after the transferor has acquired title in the property, the transferee must immediately give him notice that he proposes to hold him bound by the agreement and that it is the exercise of this option that the subsequent transferee must have notice of before he can be bound. It is true that in the second part of the section, it is not said that the second transferee should have had notice of the "existence of the said option". But I do not think it is necessary to establish that the second transferee had known that the transferors title was defective on the date of the transfer, that the transferor later acquired interest which had previously purported to transfer and that the transferee had elected to hold the transferor bound by his agreement. If that were so, then the mere fact that the second transferee knew of the first transfer would not be enough and it would be further necessary for him to know that the transferors title on the date of transfer was defective and he had subsequently acquired interest which he had purported to transfer. This could not be the law. A second transferee, if he knew of the first transfer and did not know of the defect in the transferors title must have agreed to take the second transfer subject to the first. I do not see why the second transferees want of knowledge of the defect in the transferors title at the time of first transfer should place him in a better position. To me the phrase "notice of the existence of the option" has been used as first transferee who has an equitable interest only has nothing more than an option to proceed against the property included in his transfer, it being merely an equitable right and not a transfer of a legal interest. The subsequent transferee must be deemed to have notice of the existence of the said option, if he had knowledge of the previous transaction. The subsequent transferee must be deemed to have notice of the existence of the said option, if he had knowledge of the previous transaction. If it was necessary to decide this point, I would have referred the case for decision by a larger bench but the point not having been taken in the pleading and there being no issue on the point I do not think the Lower Court was justified in assuming that the second mortgage had notice of the first mortgage especially when the first mortgage quo 1/18th share in the property was bad and conveyed merely an equitable interest. This is especially so as the second mortgage was not made subject to the first mortgage and there was no mention in the second mortgage deed of the first mortgage. On the finding recorded by the trial Court, the first mortgages interest was not legal interest and unless, therefore, the second mortgage knew that 1/18th share mortgaged to him had been mortgaged to Jagannath under the first mortgage of 3-11-1930, it would not be said that he had notice of the equitable interest." 15. I am also of the considered view that the option exercised by the transferee under section 43 is not required to be exercised in express term or in a particular form. The exercise of option by the transferee can be implied from the very fact that the plaintiff has been claiming his right over the entire property and that he was proceeding against not only transferor but also the so called subsequent transferees. In the present case, therefore, on the basis of facts found, it can be concluded that the plaintiff has exercised his option and that the defendants 3 and 4 i.e. the present appellants have failed to establish that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice and, therefore, the Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding that the Principle of "feeding the estoppel" and provisions contained in section 43 of Transfer of Property Act were fully attracted. By applying the Principle of "feeding the estoppel" and section 43 of Transfer of Property Act, the Appellate Court has not committed any error in holding that the plaintiff has proved his title over the house property. 16. Consequently, there is no merit in this second appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. *****