JUDGMENT U. L. BHAT, C.J. - Petitioner is a partnership-firm carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of agarbatti at Sagar and is registered as a dealer under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (for short, "the Act"). The petition relates to various periods of assessment from January 1, 1982 to December 31, 1984. Fourth respondent issued notices to the petitioner under section 19(1) of the former Act read with section 9 of the latter Act proposing to reassess the petitioner for the aforesaid periods on the ground that there was under-assessment. Petitioner has filed the writ petition challenging the constitutionality of the third proviso to rule 12(1) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957 (for short, "the Rules") and seeking to quash the notices. The provision is challenged as beyond the rule-making power of the Central Government under section 13 of the Central Act and arbitrary. 2. Petitioner obtained "C" forms from the purchasing dealers to avail of concessional rate of tax and produced the same before the assessing officer who accepted the same and allowed the concessional rate of tax. Subsequently, the auditor of the department found that the "C" forms were not according to the financial year, but according to the calendar year which was adopted by the petitioner as the accounting year. 3. Section 8(4) of the Central Act deals with the declaration and certificate in the prescribed form and containing prescribed particulars required to be submitted by the dealer to the prescribed authority in cases governed by section 8(1) of that Act. The pro forma is to be prescribed by the rule-making authority. Section 13(1)(d) of the Act confers on the Central Government power to make Rules providing for the form in which and the particulars to be contained in any declaration or certificate to be given under the Act, the State of origin of such form or certificate and the time within which any such form or certificate or declaration shall be produced or furnished. Rule 12(1) of the Rules states, inter alia, that the declaration and the certificate referred to in section 8(4) shall be in forms "C" and "D" respectively. Rule 12(1) of the Rules states, inter alia, that the declaration and the certificate referred to in section 8(4) shall be in forms "C" and "D" respectively. The third proviso to the rule reads thus : "Provided also that where, in the case of any transaction of sale, the delivery of goods is spread over to different financial years it shall be necessary to furnish a separate declaration or certificate in respect of goods so delivered in each financial year." 4. The third proviso originally contained the word "year" which, by 1975 Amending Rules, was substituted by the expression "financial year". "Year" would mean the accounting year followed by the assessee according to the definition in the State Act and the Central Act. Section 2(u) of the State Act defines "year" as financial year or accounting year chosen by the assessee. The Central Act refer to the word "year" as the year applicable to the assessee under the State law and where there is no such year applicable, the financial year. 5. Petitioner followed the calendar year as accounting year, Petitioner states that "C" forms are obtained according to the periods comprised in the calendar year and thus there was no conflict till the third proviso to rule 12(1) was amended in 1975. According to the original proviso, where delivery of goods is spread over different years, it shall be necessary to furnish a separate declaration or certificate in respect of goods so delivered in each financial year. According to the petitioner, the calendar year which was being followed as accounting year was consistent with this proviso, but after the 1975 amendment, where delivery of goods is spread over to different financial years, it would be necessary to furnish a separate declaration or certificate in respect of the goods so delivered in each financial year. Till March 31, 1984, the condition in the "C" form required that "C" form should be submitted in regard to goods up to the value of Rs. 10,000. This limit was increased to Rs. 25,000 with effect from April 1, 1984. Thus, the sale price of goods in each "C" form should not exceed Rs. 25,000 and for the excess price full rate of tax was leviable as the concession was limited to the value of Rs. 25,000. 10,000. This limit was increased to Rs. 25,000 with effect from April 1, 1984. Thus, the sale price of goods in each "C" form should not exceed Rs. 25,000 and for the excess price full rate of tax was leviable as the concession was limited to the value of Rs. 25,000. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, a "C" form may be obtained in regard to goods sold in March of a year and if the delivery is partly in March and partly in April, delivery is spread over to two different financial years and separate declarations and certificates are necessary in respect of each financial year. The petitioner did not submit separate certificates and declarations in regard to the said transactions and this was the defect noticed by the auditor. 6. The question for consideration is whether the substitution of the words "financial year" for the word "year" in the third proviso to rule 12(1) is beyond the rule-making power of the Central Government. Learned counsel stressed that section 13(1)(d) contemplates rules providing for the form and the particulars to be contained in any declaration or certificate. According to him, the requirement regarding different declarations and certificates in respect of goods delivered in separate financial years is not within the ambit of section 13(1)(d). It is said that declaration and certificate of each financial year will have to be submitted to the authority and if the delivery is spread over to two financial years, it would not be possible for the assessee to produce the document before the assessing authority the next financial year. Thus, it is said, the requirement is unworkable and arbitrary. 7. We are unable to agree with either of these submissions. The requirement that a declaration or a certificate should be confined to a delivery of goods made in a particular financial year falls within the ambit of the expression "particulars to be contained" in the declaration or certificate and is not foreign to the scope of the expression. There should be no difficulty in obtaining two forms and submitting the same in two financial years or obtaining one form and submitting it in one financial year and requiring the assessing authority to refer to the document during the assessment proceedings for the next financial year. We find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the requirement of the impugned proviso. 8. We find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the requirement of the impugned proviso. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641; AIR 1986 SC 515 where it is observed in para 76 (AIR) that a provision is arbitrary if it fails to take into consideration vital facts which are required to be taken into consideration by the statute or the Constitution. Reliance is also placed on the observations made in para 83 of the decision in State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. AIR 1988 SC 1737 to the effect that exercise of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of power is manifestly arbitrary and if the power has been exercised on non-consideration of relevant facts, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. Reference is made to Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1277 where it has been observed that any act of the repository power, whether legislative, judicial or administrative or quasi-judicial, is open to challenge if it is in conflict with the Constitution or governing Act or the general principles of the law of the land or is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fairminded authority would ever have made it. These decisions have no application to the present case. 9. In Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 334 , the Supreme Court observed that where validity of subordinate legislation is questioned, the court has to consider the nature, objectives and scheme of the instrument as a whole and on the basis of the examination it has to consider what exactly was the area in which the performance of power has been delegated by the governing law. It is also observed that rules are liable to be declared invalid if they are manifestly unjust or outrageous or directed to an unauthorised end or in violation of general principles of the law of the land and are worded in a way that it cannot be predicted with certainty as to what is prohibited by them or so unreasonable that they cannot be attributed to the power delegated or otherwise disclose bad faith. The impugned rule will not fall within any of the categories, contemplated in the above decision. 10. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in Second Income-tax Officer v. M.C.T. Trust [1976] 102 ITR 138. Section 11 of the Income-tax Act provided for exemption of income-tax for charitable trusts under certain circumstances. Time limited for accumulation of income was maximum 10 years. The statutory provision did not provide for any time-limit for investment. The form prescribed by the rule-making authority prescribed that accumulated income is to be invested within four months from the close of the accounting year. Since such a restriction was outside the contemplation of the statutory provision it was held to be ultra vires. 11. We are of the opinion that the decisions relied on are not helpful to the petitioner. While it is open to an assessee to adopt calendar year or financial year as accounting year, there is no corresponding duty on the rule-making authority to make rules which will be in conformity only with the year adopted by the assessee. If the rule-making authority is of the opinion that separate declarations and certificates should be submitted in respect of the goods delivered in each financial year where delivery is spread over two financial years, that is only reasonable since it is related to the monetary limit of exemption provided by the law and for the convenience of the assessing authority. The fact that the assessee should take care to produce the forms separately in regard to each financial year cannot be said to be unworkable or contrary to statute or arbitrary or unreasonable. The words "particulars to be contained" in section 13(1)(d) of the Act are wide enough to comprehend the period for which particulars are to be given. The challenge against the impugned proviso, therefore, fails. 12. The next contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no justification for reopening assessment and for reassessment. Reliance is placed on the decision in Laduram Ramniwas v. State of M.P. [1996] 102 STC 240 (MP) supra; [1994] 27 VKN 343. In that case, assessment had been completed imposing 2 per cent tax on the sale price of mawa. Reliance is placed on the decision in Laduram Ramniwas v. State of M.P. [1996] 102 STC 240 (MP) supra; [1994] 27 VKN 343. In that case, assessment had been completed imposing 2 per cent tax on the sale price of mawa. It was subsequently felt that because of the decision in [1984] 55 STC 140 (MP) [FB]; [1982] 15 VKN 132 (MP) [FB] (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Gyanmal Kesharichand) correct rate of tax would be 8 per cent. On that ground reassessment was made. It was held that reassessment cannot be made on the ground of a subsequent decision which is said to have impliedly overruled the earlier decision particularly when the earlier decision was pending challenge in the Supreme Court. The learned single Judge indicated that the words "for any reason" occurring in section 19(1) have a restricted meaning though the learned single Judge did not indicate what exactly is the restriction that is impliedly imposed on these words. Learned Judge held that there is no foundation laid to show that reassessment was not within the statutory parameters and it was only an attempt to review the earlier order. 13. We do not think that the above decision has any relevance to the facts of the present case. If there was a clear breach of the requirements of rule or the requirements of the pro forma which escaped notice at the earlier stage, we find no reason why the authority concerned should not attempt reassessment under section 19 of the State Act. The language of section 19 is wide enough to cover such a contingency. 14. The relevant portion of section 19(1) of the State Act states thus : "Where an assessment has been made under the Act and if for any reason sale or purchase of goods chargeable to tax under this Act during any period has been under-assessed or has escaped assessment or assessed at a lower rate or any deduction has been wrongly made therefrom, the Commissioner may, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after making such enquiry as he considers necessary, proceed in such manner as may be prescribed to reassess within a period of two calendar years ......." Reassessment can be made in any one of the contingencies referred to in the provision, i.e., under-assessment or escaped assessment or assessment at lower rate or granting a wrongful deduction. The petitioner in this case was granted concessional rate of tax based on the submitted "C" forms. If the "C" forms submitted are not in accordance with the Rules, the case could fall under the category of "under-assessment" for the reason that the defect in the "C" form was ignored or was not taken notice of. That certainly falls within the wide ambit of the expression "any reason" in section 19(1). The learned single Judge who decided [1996] 102 STC 240 (MP) supra; [1994] 27 VKN 343 (Laduram Ramniwas v. State of M.P.) made a casual observation that these words have a restricted meaning without explaining why it is so and without indicating the restriction. There is no express restriction contained in section 19(1). The language of the statute does not imply any restriction either. Therefore, there is nothing in the scheme of the statute or the provisions in section 19(1) of the State Act to indicate any legislative intent to give only a restricted meaning for these words. In these circumstances, we find no reason to quash the notice issued by the 4th respondent. 15. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 500. Security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.