M. R. CALLA, J. ( 1 ) THE facts of this case reveal that the petitioner has approached this Court in the third successive inning in the matter of his dismissal from the service on the basis of the allegation of procuring the employment by producing a forged marksheet and it is also revealed that it was not a single and isolated case of the petitioner, but there are about 410 such cases. There were also many other cases of this nature in which the marks have been inflated in the original marksheets by interpolation and on that basis, the employment was procured. The petitioner herein was appointed on 22nd August 1986 as a Primary teacher on the basis of the selection which was held subsequent to the advertisement issued in the year 1985. It has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that, on 13th May 1993, the orders were passed by the respondent District Panchayat and District Primary Education Officer, junagadh, removing the primary teachers at mass-scale and as many as ,410 such primary teachers were dismissed/ terminated. It is submitted by the learned counsel that, in certain cases, appeals were preferred against such orders, but the present petitioner did not prefer any appeal and he straightway filed Special civil Application before this Court. Special Civil Application No. 6889 of 1993 came to be decided on 30th september 1993 and in that decision, the impugned orders were quashed and set aside, the respondent-authorities were directed to continue the petitioners in service as if no orders had been passed against them. The operative part of this order is reproduced as under :"the respondent-authorities are directed that they shall issue show-cause notices to the petitioners, if they want to take any action against the petitioners on the grounds and allegations levelled against them in the impugned/proposed orders. If and after such show-cause notices are issued to the petitioners, they (the petitioners) will reply to such notices and they will also be at liberty to produce evidence, documents and/or material if any, and it is directed that after considering the reply and the evidence, documents and material produced by the petitioners, the respondent-authorities will pass appropriate orders according to law. Since the allegations of the respondent-authorities are that there is fraud, collusion and irregularities on a large-scale, and undue advantages had been extended in favour of undeserving; ineligible and unqualified candidates, depriving qualified and more meritorious candidates, in larger public interest, the petitioners are directed to submit the reply, explanation and evidence, if any, within a period of four weeks from the date of service upon them of the notice referred to hereinabove, and the authorities are directed to decide all such cases as expeditiously as possible thereafter, preferably within four weeks from the date of receipt of such reply, explanation, etc. if any, from the petitioners. At the conclusion of the inquiry, if any order adverse to the petitioners is passed, the respondent- authorities are directed not to implement the same for a period of two weeks from the date of communication of such orders to the petitioners. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. "accordingly, the petitioner was reinstated in service and thereafter, a show-cause notice dated 5th November 1993 was issued against the petitioner, calling upon him to explain the allegations of tampering with the marksheets and cheating the respondents. To this show cause notice, the petitioner filed a reply dated 26th November 1993, denying the charges and also stating therein that, simultaneous to these proceedings, a criminal case had also been filed against him and, therefore, so long as the criminal case is not decided, these proceedings for taking disciplinary action against him may not be proceeded against and that the decision of the High court in Special Civil Application No. 6889 of 1993 to be followed and an opportunity of personal, hearing be afforded. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred yet another Special Civil application No. 14199 of 1993 for the stay of the departmental inquiry so long as the criminal case is not decided and the said Special Civil Application was withdrawn by the petitioner on 16th august 1994 on the ground that, by this time, the petitioner had already been dismissed, by the order dated 23rd June 1994 and that he had also challenged the said dismissal order in the present Special civil Application. The order dated 23rd july 1994, hy which the petitioner was dismissed from service has been placed at annexure-D in this Special Civil application. The order dated 23rd july 1994, hy which the petitioner was dismissed from service has been placed at annexure-D in this Special Civil application. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, against this dismissal order dated 23rd June 1994, the petitioner has not preferred any appeal under Section 24 of the Bombay Primary education Act, 1947 and it has been staled in paragraph 5 of the Special Civil application that the impugned orders have been passed without following the principles of natural justice and, therefore, the order is in nullity and it was not necessary for the petitioner to go for the alternative remedy and while referring to the alleged matters relating to some other case, it has been stated that the Tribunal is dictated by the higher authorities and the same was not acting independently and, therefore, no purpose will be served by filing appeal before the tribunal against the impugned order since the Members arc biased. Although, in my opinion, these reasons given by the petitioner for not filing appeal are not at all tenable, are not based on any factual foundation with the specific averments in this regard and on such grounds, neither preferring of a statutory appeal can be avoided nor the jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can be straightway invoked by bye-passing the effective and adequate alternative remedy and this Special Civil application is liable to be rejected on this ground alone so as to relegate the petitioner to the statutory alternative remedy. But looking to the facts of this case, that this is the third inning of the litigation and further that in cognate matters, orders have been passed by this court dismissing the identical matters. I propose to deal with the case on merits as argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, instead of dismissing the same on the ground of alternative remedy alone. ( 2 ) THE main argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order has been passed without holding any inquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the gujarat Panchayat Service (Discipline and appeal) Rules, 1961. ( 2 ) THE main argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order has been passed without holding any inquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the gujarat Panchayat Service (Discipline and appeal) Rules, 1961. He has particularly invited my attention to the procedure for imposing major penalties as provided in rule 7 and has argued that, according to sub-Rule (5) of Rule 7, the person against whom inquiry is to be held, is to be permitted inspection of the records and take extracts from such records as may be specified for the purpose of preparing his defence. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that, no oral inquiry whatsoever was held in the case at hand and no opportunity was given to the petitioner in the matter of producing the documents and witnesses although he had asked for a personal hearing in the reply to the show-cause notice and according to the learned counsel, the request for personal hearing includes the request for oral hearing also, and accordingly, the submission of the learned Counsel is that the impugned order is passed in utter disregard to the procedure prescribed for imposing major penalties and the same cannot be sustained in the eye of law. In respect of his contention, the learned Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of Patna high Court reported in 1976 (1) SLR 313 in the case of Mohammad Sarfuddin v. State of Bihar and Ors. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel Mr. Popat appearing for the respondents has submitted in the first instance that, the respondents have acted in conformity with the directions as issued by this Court in the earlier petition filed by the petitioner himself, i. e. Special Civil application No. 6889 of 1993, in which, the Court had categorically directed the issuance of the show-cause notice to the petitioner and in that order, it was also directed that after the issuance of the show-cause notice, the petitioners will reply to such notices and they will also be at liberty to produce evidence, documents and/or material, if any, and after considering the. reply and the evidence and material produced by the petitioners, the respondent authorities will pass appropriate orders according to law. It has been argued by learned Counsel Mr. reply and the evidence and material produced by the petitioners, the respondent authorities will pass appropriate orders according to law. It has been argued by learned Counsel Mr. Popat that, admittedly, the show-cause notice had been issued and after the show-cause notice had been served, it was open for the petitioner to act as per the directions contained in the order dated 30th September 1993. If the petitioner failed to avail this opportunity which was available to him under the orders passed earlier in his own cause, he has to thank himself. It is argued that the petitioner did not make any such request in his reply to the show cause notice and all that was contended by him was that, during the pendency of the criminal case, the inquiry cannot be proceeded with and that he should be given the opportunity of personal hearing. The petitioner did not produce any list of witnesses or any list of documents and in this view of the matter, the grievance with regard to the violation of the Rules is wholly misconceived. Learned Counsel Mr. Popat has invited my attention to several decisions rendered by this Court in certain matters of identical nature and he has referred to the decision in Special civil Application No. 8612 of 1994 rendered on 25th November 1994, and it has been submitted that, similar decisions have been rendered on the same date in other matters also. It was also given out that against this decision rendered on 25th November 1994, Letters Patent appeals were also preferred and the appeals have also been dismissed. A reference was made to Letters Patent appeal No. 710 of 1994 in Special Civil application No. 8609 of 1994 decided on 22nd December 1994. It is pointed out that in the decision dated 22nd December 1994, the Division Bench has dismissed letters Patent Appeal Nos. 709 to 711 of 1994. ( 4 ) I have considered submissions made by the learned Counsel on behalf of the parties. It appears from the impugned order dated 23rd June 1994 that the allegation against the petitioner was that, he had inflated the marks in the original marksheet from 339 to 439 marks and on that basis, the employment was procured. ( 4 ) I have considered submissions made by the learned Counsel on behalf of the parties. It appears from the impugned order dated 23rd June 1994 that the allegation against the petitioner was that, he had inflated the marks in the original marksheet from 339 to 439 marks and on that basis, the employment was procured. The respondents verified this fact from the concerned Board and after being satisfied that the marksheet had been tampered they had initiated action against the petitioner, which ultimately, culminated into the passing of the impugned order. In this view of the matter, when the impugned order annexure-B dated 23rd June 1994 had been passed after giving the show-cause notice to the petitioners as directed by this Court and at that juncture, while giving reply to the said show-cause notice, the petitioner had not claimed any oral or formal inquiry as contemplated under the Rules and rest contended by raising the grievance with regard to the simultaneous proceedings in the inquiry and the criminal case and by making a request that a personal hearing be afforded, he now cannot be heard saying that inquiry in accordance lo the procedure under Rule 7 should have been held. I also find that according to the language of Rule 7, in case of a formal inquiry also, the elaborate procedure as given in Rule 7 is to be followed as far as may be and the basic object is to afford reasonable opportunity. I also find that according to the language of Rule 7, in case of a formal inquiry also, the elaborate procedure as given in Rule 7 is to be followed as far as may be and the basic object is to afford reasonable opportunity. In the instant case, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and the allegation of fraud which vitiate everything and in the petitioners own case, this Court had directed the respondents to give show-cause notice to the petitioner with a liberty to produce evidence, documents or material and had the petitioner filed any such thing before the concerned authority and yet it would have denied the opportunity to the petitioner, then and then alone, there could be a breach of the principles of natural justice, but the document produced by the petitioner, namely, the reply to the show-cause notice betrays the grounds which the petitioner now seeks the urge in this Special Civil Application and therefore, in my view, the ground with regard to the procedure prescribed under Rule 7 raised in this Special Civil application is wholly misconceived, rather ill-conceived and whatever procedure the respondents were required to be followed in terms of the orders passed by the Court in the earlier Special civil Application filed by the petitioner himself have been fully complied with by the respondents and no grievance in that behalf can now be entertained in this third inning of the litigation. ( 5 ) SO far as the petitioners argument that his request for personal hearing includes a request for oral inquiry and the reference made to the decision of the patna Bench in the case of Mohammad sarfuddin (supra) is concerned it is clearly distinguishable on the sole basis that, in that case the request was to be heard in person coupled with the request for adducing evidence in defence. In the instant case, the petitioner has never requested for adducing any evidence nor has he filed any list of documents and the witnesses which he wanted to examine and thus, the decision of the Patna Bench is of no help t o the petitioner and in this decision also, it has not been held as a question of law that a request for personal hearing includes a request for oral inquiry. What has been held in the said decision is that the language in which the request of the petitioner was couched it was specifically mentioned about adducing evidence in defence and therefore, it was an interpretation of the sentence which was used by the petitioners in that case and otherwise the said decision does not lay down a proposition of law that, request for personal hearing includes an opportunity of personal hearing, this argument of learned Counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, rejected. The learned Counsel, at the fag end argued that, in the reply to the show-cause notice, he had requested for personal hearing so that he could produce documents. So far as the production of the documents is concerned, no personal hearing is necessary. No material has been placed to show that he was prevented from producing any documents. He could have very well produced the documents and made submissions in this regard, but he failed to do so. Moreover, it has been pointed out by learned Counsel Mr. Popat that the opportunity of personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner and even during the course of personal hearing, he did not produce any evidence or anything. ( 6 ) THUS, I do not find any merit whatsoever , in this Special Civil application and the same is hereby dismissed. Notice is hereby discharged with no order as to costs. The ad interim order passed on 8th July 1994 shall automatically stand vacated. Petition dismissed. .