Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. -heard counsel for the parties. 2. This writ-petition has been filed against the order dated 4th April, 1985 passed by respondent No.2 in a proceeding under Sec.45-B of the bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus land Act), 1961. After filing of this writ-petition operation of the said order was stayed by a Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 14th May, 1985 and on the same day this writ petition was admitted. 3. Assailing the order of reopening, learned counsel for the petitioner raise two grounds in support of his contention (I) while reopening the proceeding, the authorities concerned relied on certain reports which were never disclosed to the petitioner; (II)while passing the order for reopening of proceeding the authorities concerned have come to certain findings and conclusions and as such the reopening order has traversed beyond the scope of section 45-B of the Ceiling Act. 4. On the aforesaid submissions learned counsel for the petitioner prays for quashing the impugned order of reopening and also prays that the matter may be sent back to the Collector once again for giving an effective opportunity of hearing before passing any order under Sec.45-B of the Act, if any. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the State-Respondent has submitted that any order for reopening of the proceeding is explanatory in nature and at that stage no final decision is arrived at. The person against whom the proceeding is reopened will get ample opportunity for contesting the said proceeding right up to the stage of revision. Therefore, the contentions raised in the writ-petition are pre-mature at this stage and all the contentions will be considered at the appropriate stage. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the private respondent in mis case supported the argument of the counsel for the State- respondents. 7. Considering the aforesaid rival contentions of the parties and on consideration of various reported decisions on the scope and ambit of a re-opening proceeding under Sec.45-B of the said Act, the Court comes to the following conclusions : I. A proceeding under Sec.45-B can only be ordered on discovery of some new and relevant materials which must have a clear nexus to the proceeding, which is sought to be reopened. II. II. The power under Sec.45-B of the Act must be very sparingly used and a roving and fishing enquiry in the name of reopening is not permissible. III. At the time of reopening of the proceeding, the authorities concerned must have due regard to the fact that already proceedings have been concluded a finality reached. Therefore, this concept of finality is a fact which must be kept in the mind of the authorities before ordering a reopening of the proceeding. In other words unless the authorities have reasons to believe that finality was wrongly reached, reopening should not be ordered. IV. Merely because the power under Sec.46-B have been couched in a very wide language it does not mean that the power has to be exercised in a blanket fashion in matters ot reopening of the proceeding. The authority concerned must duly apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and must pass an order disclosing cogent reason in support of its order for reopening of the proceeding. V. The words occurring in the Section "if it thinks fit" do not confer unfettered or unreviewable direction on the authority for reopening the proceeding. 8. In this connection reference may be made to the judgment of the supreme Court in the case of M. A. Rashid and others V/s. The State of Kerala reported in A. I. R.1974 S. C. page-2249. In the said judgment, Chief Justice a. N. Ray (as his Lordship then was)observed that where powers are conferred on the authorities to exercise the same when they are satisfied, or when it appears to them or when in their opinion certain state of affairs exists then such power enables different authority to take "such action as they think fit" in relation to a subject-matter, the "courts will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of an executive authoritys opinion as to the existence of a matter of law or fact upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicated. " (page-2252 of the report.) 9. " (page-2252 of the report.) 9. In M. A. Rashid (para) in para-9 it has been laid development when powers are conferred in subjective terms and the decision must be taken in good faith and on relevant consideration, the Court would enquire whether a reasonable man could have come to the decision in question without mis-directing himself on the law or the facts in a material respect. This Court is of the opinion that same considerations should apply in judging the validity of an order directing reopening under Sec.45-B of the Act. 10. Here evert though the section does not spell out that at the stage of reopening of the proceeding any hearing is necessary such a requirement has been read into the provisions of Sec.45-B of the said Act by judicial pronouncement as reopening of the proceeding may prejudicially effect a person in whose favour a proceeding has already been concluded. 11. Judging by the aforesaid tests this Court is of the opinion that by ordering reopening of the proceeding in the facts and circumstances of the case, the authorities have not committed any error having regard to the materials which have come on the records. The materials do justify the reopening of the proceeding. It is well known that the Court cannot go into the question of adequacy of the material. The Courts power is only confined to see whether there are relevant materials. Here the court finds the materials which have been discussed in the order by which the proceeding has been reopened are relevant materials. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner also did not seriouslydispute that reopening of the proceeding can be ordered in such circumstances. His objection is otherwise. His main objection is that even though the petitioner was heard, in the hearing all the materials were not made available to him on the basis of which reopening was ordered. His main grievance is regarding the propriety of the manner in which hearing was given prior to reopening. 13. It is well known that the principles of natural justice cannot be put on a strait jacket and the principles must admit of situational adjustment. So the nature of hearing must vary from case to case. His main grievance is regarding the propriety of the manner in which hearing was given prior to reopening. 13. It is well known that the principles of natural justice cannot be put on a strait jacket and the principles must admit of situational adjustment. So the nature of hearing must vary from case to case. The nature of hearing given to a person in connection with a reopening proceeding cannot be compared with the nature of hearing to a person when he is facing a disciplinary proceeding which may result in imposition of penalty on the person concerned. 14. A reopening proceeding by itself does not impose any penalty on the persons concerned. The reopening may be prejudicial and that is why the person concerned is heard. But hearing at this stage cannot be equated to detail hearing which the person concerned will get when the proceeding will start afresh from the stage of Sec.10. Therefore, the petitioners grievance that he was not given the copy of the materials on the basis of which the reopening order is rather unfounded. The petitioner will be getting an opportunity to controvert all the materials in the subsequent proceeding which he be called upon to face after reopening is ordered. Here fairness of the reopening of the proceeding is satisfied by giving to the petitioner an opportunity of hearing but from the facts of the case it appears that on three occasions the petitioner did not avail himself of the opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the petitioner cannot complain of a lack of opportunity of hearing. 15. The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that at the time of reopening of the proceeding the authorities have come to certain definite conclusion and made some positive determinations which are clear from the impugned order dated 14th May, 1985. 16. It is not open to the authorities passing the order of reopening of the proceeding to come to any definite conclusion inasmuch as an order of re-opening is prefatory in nature. Therefore, all the findings which are recorded in the order dated 4th april, 1985 are quashed. 17. 16. It is not open to the authorities passing the order of reopening of the proceeding to come to any definite conclusion inasmuch as an order of re-opening is prefatory in nature. Therefore, all the findings which are recorded in the order dated 4th april, 1985 are quashed. 17. Since the matter is an old one, inasmuch as, the proceeding of reopening is of the year, 1984-85, the conclusion of the proceeding pursuant of the reopening of the matter is expedited, and the authorities concerned are directed to act with utmost expedition and promptitude in the matter of conclusion of the proceeding. 18. It is made clear that the authorities who will start proceeding under Sec.10 (1) of the Act pursuant to the order of reopening will not be in any way influenced by any finding made in the order, dated 4th April, 1985 and start the proceeding afresh. 19. This writ-petition is thus allowed to the limited extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs petition Allowed.