A. PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) SINCE all the three cases involve identical dispute they are taken up together, and this common judgment disposes of them. ( 2 ) SALE opposite party in each of the first two cases and opposite parties in the third case, are accused of offence punishable under section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short, the Act ). Their prayer for bail was accepted by the learned Sessions Judge, Kalahandi only on the ground that investigation of the concerned case having been conducted by the complainant in each case, there was reasonable ground for believing that they were not guilty of such offence. For taking this view, the learned Sessions Judge relied on the decision of apex Court in Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan. Being of the prima facie view that this is an untenable ground and having found that this ground has been given for release of the accused persons on bail of a serious offence like the one at hand in a large number of cases, it was desired that the point may be examined by a Division Bench, and that is how the matter has been placed before us. In Suo Motu Criminal Misc. Case Nos. 885 and 888 of 1993 the opposite parties have entered appearance through M/s. N. C. Panigrahi and S. C. Dash, while there is no appearance in Suo Motu Criminal Misc. Case No. 886 of 1993 in spite of notice. ( 3 ) MR. N. Prosty, learned Additional Govt. Advocate has taken us through the relevant part of the aforesaid decision in which what, had happened was that one Head Constable while coming across a person who was carrying some gram in violation of Rajasthan Food Grains (Restriction on Border Movement) Order, 1959 asked him to show documents authorising carrying of gram. As the person was not armed with such a document, to save himself from the operation of law, a bundle of currency notes containing Rs. 510/- was offered to the Head Constable as bribe, who took an exception to it and lodged the first information report for taking action against the person. Subsequently, on the case being registered, the same was investigated by the same Head Constable. The person concerned came to be convicted by the trial court and the conviction was upheld by the High Court. Subsequently, on the case being registered, the same was investigated by the same Head Constable. The person concerned came to be convicted by the trial court and the conviction was upheld by the High Court. The matter was carried in appeal to the apex Court and it was observed that the Head Constable to whom the bribe is alleged to have been offered was the only witness and his evidence having received no support from any independent witness, the same was regarded as an infirmity bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case. ( 4 ) WHAT was stated in Bhagwan Singhts case (supra), on which reliance was placed by the learned Sessions Judge for granting prayers of bail does not apply to the cases at hand. In Hazari Lal v. The State (Delhi Administration), it was contended that officer laying trap is an interested witness and, therefore, no credence would be put on his version. The apex Court did not accept such a view. The observations in Bhagwan Singhs case (supra) regarding vulnerability of prosecution case cannot be said to have universal application. In the facts of that particular case, the apex Court observed that in view of the fact situation the functioning of complainant as investigating officer was to be regarded as an infirmity bound to reflect on credibility of the prosecution case. A case is only an authority for what it decides. It cannot be quoted for proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions; but they are meant to explain and not to define. As observed by Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board, there is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment. It is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. ( 5 ) AT this juncture, a birds eye view of section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the Codet) would throw beacon light on the controversy. It is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. ( 5 ) AT this juncture, a birds eye view of section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the Codet) would throw beacon light on the controversy. Under the said provisions, Police have a statutory right to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities. In terms of sub-section (2) of section 156 irregularities in the conduct of investigations do not vitiate the trial before the Court. Even if a noncognizable offence is investigated by the, Police without proper authority, the defect is cured under sub-section (2) of section 156, and sub-section (2) of section 465. It is not enough to show that there was an illegality or irregularity in the course of investigation. The accused has to show that there is a sufficient nexus, either established or probabilised, between the conviction and the infirmity in the investigation. ( 6 ) ADDITIONALLY, we find that twin conditions are prescribed under section 37 of the Act in the matter of consideration of bail. The said section reads as follows:37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. 'as section 37 (1) (b) (ii) clearly provides, where a Public Prosecutor opposes the application, no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment for five years or more under the Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless, the Court is satisfied that (a) there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence; and (b) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative, and not independent of each other. It is when the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of offence and is also satisfied that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, bail can be granted. Reasons are to be indicated by the court in respect of both the conditions. There has to be not mere subjective satisfaction of the Court, but the objective assessment of fact situation, materials and evidence to be brought on record by the parties. For adjudicating on the second requirement, normally the antecedents of the accused and his potentiality to commit offence in future are some of the relevant considerations. ( 7 ) IN the case at hand, in addition to the fact that the decision relied on by the learned Sessions Judge has no application to the facts of the case, there is no discussion about the second condition, i. e. non-likelihood of accused committing any offence while on bail. That also renders the order of the learned Sessions Judge vulnerable. The irresistible conclusion is that the grant of bail in each case is indefensible. ( 8 ) BUT that is not end of the matter. There is no material brought on record to show that any of the accused has misused his liberty while on bail. Though that is not the sole criteria for not directing cancellation of bail it has to be borne in mind that grant of bail and cancellation of bail stand on different footings. There is no material brought on record to show that any of the accused has misused his liberty while on bail. Though that is not the sole criteria for not directing cancellation of bail it has to be borne in mind that grant of bail and cancellation of bail stand on different footings. The grounds on which there can be cancellation of bail, even after illegal grant of bail have been highlighted by the apex Court in Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra and by this Court in Hadiani Dei v. State of Orissa and others. In Suo Motu Criminal Misc. Case Nos. 870, 872 and 878 of 1993 by order dated 24-6-1993, a Division Bench of this Court did not interfere with the order of bail though it was observed that the grant of bail was illegal, in view of what has been stated in Aslam Babalal Desais case (supra ). We follow similar course. Trial in each case be expedited. All the three Suo Motu Criminal Misc. Cases are disposed of. Send back the lower court records immediately. Cases disposed of. .