Both the above Civil Rules involve common questions of law and fact. Therefore, I propose to dispose of both the Civil Rules by a common judgment and order. 2. Petitioner in Civil Rule No.2583 of 1995 has challenged Annexure X letter dated 22.6-.95 issued by the 3rd respondent Sales Manager, North Eastern Coal Fields. Coal India Ltd. and has prayed for issuance of writ of Certiorari for quashing the said Annexure X letter or any other appropriate writ or direction and also for a direction to the respondents to forbear from acting in pursuance of the said Annexure X letter. Similarly, petitioner in Civil Rule No.2779 of 1995 has challenged Annexure VII letter dated 22.6.95 issued by the 3rd respondent - Sales Manager. North Eastern Coal Fields. Coal India Ltd. 3. The facts of the cases may be stated as follows : The petitioner in Civil Rule No.2583 of 1995 is a contractor by profession and is carrying on the business of unloading of coal from Meter Gauge Wagons, stacking and loading into Broad Gauge Wagons under the Coal India Limited, for Short 'Coal India' since 1986 and thus he has acquired experience in the trade of unloading and loading of coal from and into wagons in large quantity. He does this job with a minimum of 31,0,00 tonnes per month in every year. The 1st respondent is a Government of India enterprise carrying on the business of extraction of coal in Assam with its Head Office at Guwahati (Kamrup). The petitioner in Civil Rule No.2779 of 1995 is a firm registered under the Partnership Act with its Head Office at Margherita. The firm is engaged in loading, unloading and transhipment job and carries on the business under contract for unloading of coal from Meter Gauge Railway Wagons, stacking and loading in Braod Gauge Railway Wagons under the North Eastern Coal Fields. The 1st respondent through the 2nd respondent issued notice dated 1.3.93 inviting sealed tenders from experienced and registered contractors for unloading coal from Meter Gauge Wagons, stacking and loading into-Broad Gauge at New Guwahati siding. Pursuant to the said notice inviting tenders, petitioner submitted his tender strictly fulfilling the requirements of the notice inviting tenders. The 1st respondent through the 2nd respondent issued notice dated 1.3.93 inviting sealed tenders from experienced and registered contractors for unloading coal from Meter Gauge Wagons, stacking and loading into-Broad Gauge at New Guwahati siding. Pursuant to the said notice inviting tenders, petitioner submitted his tender strictly fulfilling the requirements of the notice inviting tenders. Petitioner's tender was accepted and, thereafter, work order was issued to the petitioner in the said work order there was a clause that in case the Meter Gauge of Lumding section was converted to Braod Gauge and the proposed Lumding Yard of the respondents was commissioned before completion of the contract the petitioner would have to work at Lumding siding at the same rates and terms and conditions. Various types of job like unloading of coal from Meter Gauge Wagons, stacking and loading of coal into Broad Gauge Wagons, picking of shale and multi and foreign materials while loading and keeping them separately, cleaning of the wagons etc were to be done by the petitioner in terms of the said contract. The quantity of coal required to be transhipped was approximately 10,000 tonnes per fortnight. The contract was for a period of 2 years. As per clause 7 of the said work order in case of failure to complete the above contract in time, the security deposit would be forefeited. The management also reserved the right to engage any outside agency for doing the job of transshipment so allotted to the petitioner and the excess amount required for the purpose would be recovered from the pending bills or from the security deposits of the petitioner. The work order having been received by the petitioner was accepted. The entire work as mentioned in the notice inviting tenders was divided into two parts. One was given to the petitioner in Civil Rule No.2583 of 1995 Tulashi Kumar Dutta, the other was given to the petitioner in Civil Rule No.2779 of 1995 - M/s K & K Traders, Margherita. However, M/s K & K Traders was unwilling to work at New Guwahati siding and, therefore, the respondents offered the entire transshipment work of New Guwahati siding to the petitioner Tulashi Kumar Dutta on the same terms and conditions and he accepted the same. However, M/s K & K Traders was unwilling to work at New Guwahati siding and, therefore, the respondents offered the entire transshipment work of New Guwahati siding to the petitioner Tulashi Kumar Dutta on the same terms and conditions and he accepted the same. After acceptance of the work order Tulashi Kumar Dutta was directed to deposit a sum of Rs.2.5 lakhs as security deposit and accordingly he complied with the direction and deposited the said amount. Petitioner K & K Traders of Margherita (Civil Rule No.2779 of 1995) and one M/s MB Modern Construction, Kamakhyaguri were also offered work orders for transshipment of coal at Kamakhyaguri siding of the said period at the same rate and terms and conditions. In their work orders also it was mentioned that if Lumding section was converted to Broad Gauge and the proposed Lumding yard was commissioned before completion of the period of contract, they would also be required to work at Lumding siding at the same terms and conditions. The said respondents informed the petitioners that the conversion of Lumding section from Meter Gauge to Broad Gauge had been started by the Railway and it was expected that the work would be completed by 15.12.93 and, therefore, the petitioners were advised to take advance action for shifting their stations to Lumding siding so that they could start work immediately after commissioning of Lumding siding. Such letters had also been issued to M/s MB Modern Construction. Petitioners commenced work of transshipment of coal in compliance with the letters issued by the 3rd respondent and it was informed to the 3rd respondent. Jobs done by the petitioners were to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned. The 1st respondent sent a letter to the petitioners through the 3rd respondent informing them that the period of work had further been extended for one year with effect from 1.4.95 to 31.3.96, however at the same rate and the terms. The period of contract was also extended in respect of M/s MB Modern Construction. The 1st respondent sent a letter to the petitioners through the 3rd respondent informing them that the period of work had further been extended for one year with effect from 1.4.95 to 31.3.96, however at the same rate and the terms. The period of contract was also extended in respect of M/s MB Modern Construction. The petitioners and other tenderer had been working at different sidings prior to the commissioning of the Lumding siding and after commissioning of Lumding siding all of them were asked to work at the same siding at Lumding and the respondent authorities had instructed the petitioner in Civil Rule No.2583 Tulashi Kumar Dutta to work at Lumding siding from the 1st day to I0th day of every month. Similar instruction had also been issued to the petitioner in Civil Rule No.2779 of 1995 - M/s K & K Traders directing this petitioner to work from 11th day to 20th day of every month and M/s MB Modern Construction was instructed to work from 21st day to the end of the month. According to the petitioners the 3rd respondent with a malafide intention to induct some other person in the work, tried to entrust a portion of the transshipment work at the Lumding siding to someone during the continuance of the term of the aforesaid work order in favour of the petitioners. No tender notice was even issued prior to the induction of any new person at the said siding. But because of the objections lodged by the petitioners and the other contractor the same could not be done by the 3rd respondent. The 3rd respondent thereafter by letters dated 22.6.95 informed the petitioners alleging that the average loading and unloading at Lumding siding was very poor and, therefore, the competent authority had decided to engage some outside agency for additional deployment of labourers at the siding as per clause No.7 of the work order and that for smooth operation of the transshipment siding it had been decided to allot the dumping area in the Line No.7 (BG) to the new agency and accordingly the BG Wagons placed at the Line No.6 and proportionate MG Wagons would be handled by the petitioners and this arrangement would be effective with effect from 25.6.95. Such letter was also issued to another contractor. The petitioners, however, protested against it immediately thereafter. Such letter was also issued to another contractor. The petitioners, however, protested against it immediately thereafter. According to the petitioners as per terms of the work order, the work of the petitioners including loading of coal from MG Wagons, stracking and loading of coal into BG Wagons was one process where both the unloading and loading was included in the work order and, as such, work order for transshipment of coal from MG Wagons to BG Wagons could not be divided since it was a continuous process of one contract and the rate would be ascertained only after completion of the entire process. The petitioners further contend that the decision to give some work to another person without cancelling the work order given in favour of the petitioners was illegal and without jurisdiction. Besides, if the dumping area in the Line No.7 was allotted to the new agency as proposed, it would cause difficult situation and the petitioner would be put in great hardship. The petitioners further state that without concelling the work order issued in favour of the petitioners a portion of the work under the said work order could not be allotted to any new person of agency and that too without giving any opportunity to the petitioners to represent their cases or to show cause against the proposed action. Clause 7 of the work order issued in favour of the petitioner not being at all applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the cases, the action of the respondents pursuant to letter dated 22.6.95 was illegal and without jurisdiction. 4. No affidavit-in-opposition has been filed in the Civil Rules. However, respondents had filed an application in Civil Rule No.2583 of 1995 for vacation or modification of the interim order dated 27.6.95 passed in the Civil Rule. The said application was numbered as Misc Case No.734 of 1995. Against this application an affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the petitioner Shri Tulashi Kumar Dutta and a reply affidavit to the affidavit-in-opposition was also filed. At the time of hearing the counsel for the parties submitted that they would refer to the statements made in the said application, affidavit-in-opposition and the reply affidavit. 5. In the application in the said Misc Case No.734 of 1995 respondents admitted the averments made in the petition. At the time of hearing the counsel for the parties submitted that they would refer to the statements made in the said application, affidavit-in-opposition and the reply affidavit. 5. In the application in the said Misc Case No.734 of 1995 respondents admitted the averments made in the petition. They, however, stated that from April, 1995 the petitioners and other contractor began to fail in unloading and loading of coal and, as a result, the wagons allotted by the Railway to Coal India had to be detained beyond permissible limit. Situated thus, the respondents issued reminders to the petitioners directing them to improve the work by increasing the man power. At that time the petitioners had been carrying on their job of loading and unloading satisfactorily. Only after the extension of the period of contract their performance deteriorated. Several reminders were issued. Respondents received complaints regarding undue delay in loading and unloading of the steel grade coal. The Railway by FAX message as well as as by letters informed the Chief General Manager of the respondents to improve the performance. However, in spite of repeated reminders their performance did not improve. As a result the progress of the work of despatching steel grade coal was highly impaired. Situated thus, the authority was compelled to engage an outside agency for additional deployment of labourers at the steel siding as per clause No.7 of the work order. It was further decided to allot the dumping area in the BG Line No.7 to the new agency and accordingly wagons placed at Line No.7 and proportionate MG Wagons would be handled by the petitioners and this arrangement was to take effect from 25.6.95. Besides, the petitioners were once again requested to increase the man power so as to make up for the despatch losses suffered in the previous days. On 24.6.95 the 3rd respondent informed the petitioner that stock measurement would be taken by the Measurement Committee in order to find out physical stock at the dumping area between BG Line No.7 and MG Line No.2. By letter dated 24.6.95 3rd respondent advised M/s Shyam Sundar Agarwal, Transshipment Contractor to commence work at Lumding steel siding in the dumping area between BG Line No.7 and MG Line No.2. By letter dated 24.6.95 3rd respondent advised M/s Shyam Sundar Agarwal, Transshipment Contractor to commence work at Lumding steel siding in the dumping area between BG Line No.7 and MG Line No.2. These respondents further stated that the demand for steel grade coal was between 45,000 MT per month but at that time only 25,000 to 30,000 MT per month could be sent to the steel plant because of the inability of the petitioners to perform their job efficiently. The transshipment of the steel grade coal was very important as delay in despatching the steel grade coal would cause enormous loss to the steel factories. Besides, delay also caused great inconvenience to the Railway. Because of this it became necessary to engage a third person to eke out the difficulties faced by the Railway. These respondents also stated that they never allotted any work to any other person nor they sliced out a portion of the petitioners' work and gave it to another person. The petitioners were still free to unload and load wagons they were capable of. Besides, according to these respondents as per the terms of clause 7 of the work order they were entitled to engage in the event of failure of the petitioners to carry out the works and exactly this power had been exercised by the respondents in appointing the third agency, namely, M/s Shyam Sundar Agarwal. Petitioner could not have any grievance on this. Besides, these respondents further stated that as per NIT stock maintenance at the siding was the responsibility of contractors. On 25.6.95 said M/s Shyam Sundar Agarwal was handed over the stock at Lunding steel siding No.7 by the representative of petitioners and the said another contractor in presence of the officials of the respondents. M/s Shyam Sundar Agarwal accordingly had commenced transshipment work after order was passed. The petitioners and the other contractor having failed to carry out the works as required, they were not entitled make any complaint against the engagement of third agency. 7. Heard the counsel for the parties. 8. Mr. JP Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner in Civil Rule No.2583 of 1995 submitted that the action of respondents were arbitrary, illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice. 7. Heard the counsel for the parties. 8. Mr. JP Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner in Civil Rule No.2583 of 1995 submitted that the action of respondents were arbitrary, illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice. According to him without cancelling the work order given in favour of the petitioner, a portion of it could not have been given to some other person during the continuance of the work order. He also refuted the claim of the respondents that clause 7 of the work order was applicable. Learned counsel submitted that clause 7 of the work order would be applicable only after cancellation of the work order given to the petitioner and for that purpose also it was necessary to issue a separate tender notice as required under the law. As nothing was done, the entire action of the respondents cannot sustain in law. On the facts also the learned counsel submitted that the allegation of poor unloading and loading of coal on the part of the petitioners was not correct. Learned counsel also submitted that allotment of dumping area in Line No.7 (BG) to the new agency also caused an anomalous situation and bacause of this it would not be possible to ascertain the value of the works done by loading coal on the Line No.7 (BG) along. The action sought to be taken as per letter dated 22.6.95 by respondent No.3 had impliedly modified or cancelled the work order issued to the petitioner in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. Besides, such action of the respondents was devoid of fair play. Learned counsel further submitted that the entire action of the respondents was illegal, without jurisdiction and arbitrary. 9. Mr. AK Bhattacharyya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner in Civil Rule No.2779 of 1995 also challenged the action of the respondents on similar grounds. Mr. AK Bhattacharyya further submitted that the decision to allot a portion of the work of the petitioner and other two contractors to the 4th respondent M/s Shyam Sundar Agarwal was actuated with malafide intention of the respondent authorities. The entire process of allotting the dumping area between Line No.2 (MG) and Line No.7 (BG) at Lumding steel siding is vitiated with malice in law as well as in fact. The entire process of allotting the dumping area between Line No.2 (MG) and Line No.7 (BG) at Lumding steel siding is vitiated with malice in law as well as in fact. Therefore, according to him also the decision of the respondent authorities in allotting the aforesaid portion of the steel siding in favour of M/s Shyam Sundar Agarwal 4th respondent in Civil Rule No.2779 of 1995 was illegal and liable to be set aside. Mr. AK Bhattacharyya had drawn me attention to Annexure VIII arid IX to refute the allegation that loading, unloading and stacking of coal by the petitioner and other contractors had dwindled. 10. Mr. DN Chowdhury, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.4, on the other hand, supported the action of the respondents. According to him in the facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner has no right to approach this Court. He further submitted that in this case the petitioner has approached this Court for an appropriate writ or direction to implement the terms of contract entered into by and between the petitioner and the respondent authorities. In the present facts and circumstances of the case, according to law no judicial review in possible. Besides this the learned counsel also submitted that the actions of the respondents were not arbitrary and, therefore, no interference was called for. Mr. PK Goswami, learned counsel also supported the action of the respondents. 11. On the rival contentions of the parties it is to be seen whether the action taken on the basis of letter dated 22.6.95 can sustain in law. The letter dated 22.6.95 issued by the Sales Manager, North Eastern Coal Fields, Coal India Ltd, Guwahati informed the petitioners that in spite of repeated advices the petitioner could not improve the work. The poor progress of the work of loading and unloading had adversely affected the transportation of coal to the destination places. If such situation was allowed to prevail the respondent Coal India would be lagging far behind their target and, therefore, it was decided by the authority to engage an outside agency for employment of additional labour at the steel siding. If such situation was allowed to prevail the respondent Coal India would be lagging far behind their target and, therefore, it was decided by the authority to engage an outside agency for employment of additional labour at the steel siding. As per clause 7 of the work order for smooth operation in the transshipment siding, it was decided to allot the dumping area in Line No.7 (BG) to the new agency and accordingly BG Wagons placed at Line No.6 and proportionate MG Wagons would be handled by the petitioners. 12. From various correspondences it reveals that the works of loading and unloading by the petitioners were satisfactory till the month of April and, thereafter, progress of the works deteriorated because of the failure of the petitioners to carry out the works in right earnest by engaging proper labour. This had adversely affected the business of the respondent company. As per cluase 7 of the work order, in case the contractors, namely, the petitioners failed to complete the above contract work timely, the security deposit would be forfeited and the respondent North Eastern Coal Fields also reserved the right to engage any outside agency for transshipment of coal and excess amount for this would be recovered from the contractors. As the authorities found that the works were not satisfactory, the authorities enforced clause 7 and engaged a third agency, namely, M/s Shyam Sundar Agarwal. This basically relates to enforcement of one of the terms of the contract. It is well settled that a judicial review against the implementation of the term or terms of a contract is not available. 13. In M/s Radhakrishna Agarwal & others vs. State of Bihar & others, reported in (1977) 3 SCC 457 , the Supreme Court relying on its earlier decision in Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd vs. State West Bengal, (1975) 1 SCC 70 , held thus : "It is thus clear that the Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd.'s case (supra) involved discrimination at the very threshold or at the time of entry into the field of consideration of persons with whom the Government could contract at all. At this stage, no doubt, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers. At this stage, no doubt, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers. But, after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Article 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in the confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract." However, in the later decision the position of the Government in contractual matters has been explained in a different way. In Mahabir Auto Stores & others vs. Indian Oil Corporation & others, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 752 , the Apex Court held thus : "... The State acts in its executive power under Article 298 of the Constitution in entering or not entering in contracts with individual parties. Article 14 of the Constitution would be applicable to those exercises of power ... ... decision of the State public authority under Article 298 of the Constitution, is an administrative decision and can be impeached on the ground that the decision is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on any of the grounds available in public law field... ... in cases where the instrumentality of the State enters the contractual field, it should be governed by the incidence of the contract... ... Even though the right of the citizens are in the nature of contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering or not entering into a contract, are subject to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and non-discrimination in the type of the transactions and nature of the dealing... ... Every action of the State executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason. ... ... ... Every action of the State executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason. ... ... whatever be the activity of the public authority, in such monopoly or semi-monopoly dealings, it should meet the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. If a governmental action even in the matters of entering or not entering into contracts, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, the same would be unreasonable." Similar view was also expressed by the Apex Court in Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 . The Supreme Court in that case also held that even after the concluded contract if the Government acted arbitrarily and in violation of the provision of Article 14, the judicial review was applicable In yet another decision of the Apex Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner & others vs. Issac Peter &. others, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 104 , the Apex Court has cleared the position. In the said case the Supreme Court observed thus : "... ... In short, the duty to act fairly is sought to be imported into the contract to modify and alter its terms and to create an obligation upon the State which is not there in the contract. We must confess, we are not aware of any such doctrine of fairness or reasonableness ... ... Doctrine of fairness or the duty to act fairly and reasonably is a doctrine developed in the administrative law field to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice where the action is administrative in nature. Just as principles of natural justice ensure fair decision where the function is quasi judicial, the doctrine of fairness is evolved to ensure fair action where the function is administrative. But it can certainly not be invoked to amend, alter or vary the express terms of the contract between the parties. This is so. even if the contract is governed by statutory provisions, ie where it is a statutory contract - or rather more so. It is one thing to say that a contract - every contract - must be construed reasonably having regard to its language. But this is not what the licensees say .. .." 14. This is so. even if the contract is governed by statutory provisions, ie where it is a statutory contract - or rather more so. It is one thing to say that a contract - every contract - must be construed reasonably having regard to its language. But this is not what the licensees say .. .." 14. The decision of the Apex Court cited above make it clear that in a contract, be that statutory or otherwise. State must not act in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. In appropriate cases where it is seen that the action of the authority is arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair and it involves some public element, judicial review is possible. But it does not mean that in an application under Article 226 the Court has power to vary the terms and conditions of contract nor the Court has power to pass any order for implementation of the terms of the contract. 15. Again in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 the Supreme Court held that the State decision or action must be in consonance with Article 14. Only the decision making process and not the decision itself is reviewed as Court does not sit as an appellate Court while exercising the power of review. In the said decision the Supreme Court further held that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However. there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. In the said case it was further held thus : "... Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to kept in view accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down." 15A. This Court also in Doloo Tea Co. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down." 15A. This Court also in Doloo Tea Co. (India) Limited vs. The Eastern Food Products (P) Ltd, (1995) 2 GLR 66 [1995 (2) GLJ 466], following the decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular (supra) held that judicial review would be applicable to the exercise of contractual powers by the Government body in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. Judicial review is permissible only to the extent of decision making process. 16. Taking into consideration all the decisions cited above, it is abundantly clear that in a contractual matter the Court does not have the power for judicial review to correct the decision. If the decision making process itself is bad contrary to the established norms in that case judicial review is possible. However, in a contratual matter the Court cannot either vary the terms of the contract or to enforce the contract. 17. Keeping in mind all the principles laid down by the Apex Court and followed by this Court it is to be seen whether in the present facts and circumstances of the case the petitioners are entitled to judicial review. 18. Here the facts available before this Court it is seen that as per the terms of the work order, in case of failure to carry out the works in accordance with the terms of the work order the authority had right to invoke clause 7 of the work order and allow a third party to work. The case of the respondents in the present cases is that the petitioners totally failed to carry out the work order as contemplated. In fact from the month of April, 1995 progress of the work virtually slowed down and came to almost negligible and the authority apprehended that if such state of affairs is allowed to continue then the Coal India Ltd would not be able to fulfil the commitments given to various parties. As in spite of repeated reminders the progress of work did not improve, the respondent authority inducted the third person and allowed to carry out the work and a particular place of work was given. By this, however, the works of the petitioners were not reduced. As in spite of repeated reminders the progress of work did not improve, the respondent authority inducted the third person and allowed to carry out the work and a particular place of work was given. By this, however, the works of the petitioners were not reduced. Therefore, it cannot be said that the action of respondents in invoking the power under clause 7 can be said to be arbitrary and unreasonable. It is true, by reducing the time from one month to ten days as referred to above may cause inconvenience. But that cannot be the subject matter of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court may come to other finding on merit. But as held by the Apex Court, there can be no judicial review on the merit of the case and more so it is entirely in the domain of contract entered into by and between the petitioners and the respondents. In an application under Article 226, in my opinion, such decision cannot be interfered. 19. Regarding the malafide action of the respondents as submitted by Mr. AK Bhattacharyya, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Civil Rule No.2779 of 1995,1 do not find any sufficient and cogent material to come to a finding that the action of the respondents were actuated by malafide motive. Malafides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. Administrative action must be said to be done in good faith if it is done honestly. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. The determination of a plea of malafide involves two questions, viz (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power. The action taken must be proved to have been made malafide for such considerations. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that the action has been taken malafide for any such consideration or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, such actions must be struck down. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that the action has been taken malafide for any such consideration or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, such actions must be struck down. But in the instant case, except some vague assertions, I do not find any material to come to a findings that there was malafide intentions on the part of the respondents in taking the impugned action, therefore, in my opinion, the allegation of malafide fails. 20. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, the action of the respondents do not call for any interference. In view of the above, the petitions fail. Accordingly, the Civil Rules are dismissed. 21. However, in the facts and circumstances of the cases I make no order as to costs.