J. ESWARA PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is against the Order of the learned single judge allowing writ petition No. 5744 of 1987 filed by the 7th respondent, whereby the Order of the 2nd respondent the special deputy commissioner, tumkur, dated 28-4-1977, and the Order of the 6th respondent land tribunal, were quashed. ( 2 ) THE brief facts are as follows: one Smt. Laxmidevamma, ancestor of the 7th respondent on 23-1-1909 gifted the land measuring 3 acres 13 guntas in amanikere, tumkur taluk, in favour of the 4th respondent deity Sri Lakshminarasimhaswamy temple and a gift deed was. executed by her agnate on 20-11-1916. The appellant, claiming occupancy rights under Section 6 (a) of the Karnataka (religious and charitable) inams abolition Act, 1955, applied to the second respondent for registration as an occupant, contending that he is a tenant in occupation of the land by virtue of panchsal (five years) gutha. The claim of the appellant was accepted and the 2nd respondent by an Order dated 28-4-1977 in annexure-g registered the appellant as an occupant, while rejecting the claim of the 4th respondent temple. The said Order was confirmed by the land tribunal. Certain persons claiming to be the dharmadarshis of the temple questioned the orders of respondents 2 and 6 in writ petition No. 41351 of 1982. The 7th respondent got herself impleaded as a party respondent 6 in the said writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed holding that the petitioners therein had failed to establish that they are the dharmadarshis of the temple and also on the ground that the impugned Order does not suffer from any infirmity. The 7th respondent thereafter called in question the Order of the learned single judge in writ appeal No. 499 of 1987. She later filed a memo for permission to withdraw the appeal as she has been advised to challenge the impugned orders in appropriate proceedings. Thereupon the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn on 10-4-1987. Thereafter the 7th respondent filed the present writ petition challenging the very same orders of respondents 2 and 6. ( 3 ) SRI Subbanna, learned counsel appearing for the appellant firstly contended that the matter is concluded by the earlier judgment in writ petition No. 41351 of 1982. Thereupon the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn on 10-4-1987. Thereafter the 7th respondent filed the present writ petition challenging the very same orders of respondents 2 and 6. ( 3 ) SRI Subbanna, learned counsel appearing for the appellant firstly contended that the matter is concluded by the earlier judgment in writ petition No. 41351 of 1982. Hence by virtue of the principles of res judicata the impugned orders which were upheld in the earlier writ petition cannot be challenged once again. He further submitted that even on merits, the learned single judge was in error in allowing the writ petition, as occupancy rights were rightly granted to the appellant as he was a lessee in occupation of the land in question even as on the date of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, which came into force on 2-10-1965. ( 4 ) SRI U. L. Narayana Rao, learned counsel for the 7th respondent on the other hand submitted that the judgment in writ petition No. 41351 of 1982 did not become final inasmuch as the appeal in writ appeal No. 499 of 1987 was dismissed as withdrawn in view of the memo filed by the 7th respondent and hence the impugnect orders are open to challenge in these proceedings. He further contends that the appellant had obtained the impugned orders by fraud and therefore, they were rightly quashed by the learned single judge. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant which goes to the root of the matter has to be gone into first. Writ petition no; 41351 of 1982 was a writ petition filed by persons claiming to be the dharmadarshis of the temple questioning the very same proceedings which are questioned in the present writ petition. The 7th respondent got herself impleaded in the writ petition as the 6th respondent. The learned judge dismissed the writ petition, not only on the ground that the petitioners therein failed to establish that they are the dharmadarshis of the temple but also on the ground that the impugned Order did not suffer from any infirmity. The finding on merits is as follows:"the land was an inam land endowed to the temple, a muzrai institution. . . . The evidence on record discloses that respondent 3 took this land on lease from the tahsildar and was raising crops. . . . . The finding on merits is as follows:"the land was an inam land endowed to the temple, a muzrai institution. . . . The evidence on record discloses that respondent 3 took this land on lease from the tahsildar and was raising crops. . . . . the finding recorded by the special deputy commissioner is a finding of fact and the Order does not suffer from any infirmity". the appellant was the 3rd respondent in that writ petition. The 7th respondent was a party to that writ petition as respondent 6 and hence clearly bound by the specific finding of the court, that the lands are inam lands; that the appellant took the land on lease from the tahsildar and was raising crops; and that, the finding of the special deputy commissioner is a finding of fact; and that, the Order does not suffer from any infirmity. ( 5 ) THOUGH the 7th respondent had rightly preferred an appeal against the judgment in writ petition No. 41351 of 1982 in writ appeal No. 499 of 1987, the same was not pressed but got dismissed as withdrawn. Sri Narayana Rao vehemently contended that the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn in terms of the memo dated 19-1-1987 filed on behalf of the 7th respondent clearly stating that she may be permitted to withdraw the appeal, as she has been advised to challenge the impugned orders in appropriate proceedings and therefore the Order in writ appeal No. 499 of 1987 should be construed as an Order granting permission to her to challenge the impugned orders in the instant writ petition and hence the question of applying the principles of res judicata does not arise. In the Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and another, it was held that:"if the writ petition is dismissed by a speaking Order either at the threshold or after contest, say, only on the ground of laches or the availability of an alternative remedy, then another remedy open in law either by way of suit or any other proceeding obviously will not be barred on the principles of res judicata. Of course, a 2nd writ petition on the same cause of action either filed in the same High Court or in another will not be maintainable because the dismissal of one petition will operate as a bar in the entertainment of another writ petition". the said judgment was quoted with approval, in Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Company Limited v. The Workmen and another. ( 6 ) IN Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and others, it was held that if a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the constitution is withdrawn, it cannot be a bar to a subsequent writ petition under Article 21 or 32 but the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be invoked once again as the remedy should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition, when he withdraws a writ petition, without permission to file a fresh writ petition. ( 7 ) IN the present case, the 7th respondent who was a party tothe earlier writ petition challenged the Order of the learned single judge in writ appeal which was subsequently withdrawn on the ground that she was advised to challenge the impugned Order in appropriate proceedings. While dismissing the appeal as withdrawn, the division bench did not grant leave to her to file a fresh writ petition. The impugned orders therefore became final by virtue of the Order in writ petition No. 41351 of 1982. Hence it is not open to her to file a fresh petition under Article 226 on the very same grounds raised by her in the writ appeal. The remedy of the 7th respondent is therefore clearly barred by the principles of res judicata and she cannot be permitted to urge the very same grounds and challenge the impugned orders, which have become final. The remedy of the 7th respondent is therefore clearly barred by the principles of res judicata and she cannot be permitted to urge the very same grounds and challenge the impugned orders, which have become final. ( 8 ) IN the view we have taken above, it is not necessary for us to go into the other contentions raised by the parties on the merits of their respective claims, except to notice that subsequent to the impugned Order made in the year 1977, the appellant having admittedly converted the land in question into several plots, has alienated the same to several persons long ago, making it a futile exercise on the part of the 7th respondent to agitate the matter which as become very stale. ( 9 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we allow the writ appeal and set a side the Order of the learned single judge. No Order as to costs. --- *** --- .