Judgment : The second defendant in O.S.No.2055 of 1992 on the file of the XII Assistant Judge, City Civil court, Madras, has filed this revision against the dismissal of I.A. No. 1851 of 1992, seeking leave to defend the above said suit filed under Order 37 of the civil Procedure Code. The said suit by the respondent-Bank is for the amount due under promissory note executed on 29. 1983 by both the first and second defendant, as copromissors. Though the suit promissory note is dated 29. 1983, the suit was fled only on or about 13. 1992. In order to save limitation, the plaint alleges that there was two acknowledgments of liability by the first defendant, one on 14. 1986 and another on 4. 1989. Admittedly, if those acknowledgments are true, the suit is within time. But the contention taken in the above said interlocutory application is that the said acknowledgments will not bind the second defendant. No doubt, learned counsel for the petitioner submit that the supporting affidavit mentions about the acknowledgments only as alleged acknowledgments, but the affidavit does not specifically say anywhere that the first defendant has not signed those acknowledgments. In other words, the truth of first defendant executing the said acknowledgment letters had not been denied specifically by the second defendant in his supporting affidavit to the above said Interlocutory application. All that is stated in the said affidavit is that the acknowledgment by first defendant will not bind the second defendant. 2. But along with the plaint while filing the suit promissory note, the plaintiff has also filed the letter of the same day, namely, 29. 1983 given by both the defendants 1 and 2. In fact, the said letter is part of the same document, containing the promissory note. That letter is addressed to the plaintiff-Bank in which inter alia both the defendants state as follows: “Further in the matter of making payments towards this debt or acknowledging this debt or any part thereof as and when called upon by the Bank to do so far the specific purpose of saving limitation. That letter is addressed to the plaintiff-Bank in which inter alia both the defendants state as follows: “Further in the matter of making payments towards this debt or acknowledging this debt or any part thereof as and when called upon by the Bank to do so far the specific purpose of saving limitation. I/we declare that the payment or acknowledgment made or given by any one or more of us shall be binding on all of us jointly and or severally and that the said payment and acknowledgment so made or given by one or more of us shall save limitation against, all of us jointly and or severally for the purpose of Law of Limitation”. .4. Yet the petitioner now contends that the acknowledgment by the first defendant on 14. 1986 and 4. 1989 will not save limitation for the suit. This is the main point taken in the affidavit filed in support of the Interlocutory Application. But in view of the above said letter dated 29. 1983 the acknowledgment will bind the second defendant also. No doubt, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the above said letter is against what is contained in Section 20(2) of the Limitation Act which runs as follows:- “Nothing in the said sections renders one or several joint contractors, partners, executors or mortgagees chargeable by reason only of a written acknowledgment signed by, or of a payment made by, or by the agent of any other of others of them” According to the counsel, in the face of Section 20(2), the above said letter dated 29. 1983 will be of no avail. I am unable to agree. There is no prohibition for parties contracting otherwise. Section 20(2) does not say so. That apart, even Section 20(2) uses the expression “by reason only of a written acknowledgment”, but in the present case, apart from the said acknowledgment there is also the above said letter dated 29. 1983 whereby the second defendant has also undertaken that any acknowledgment made by first defendant would bind him also. In this connection, it may also be noted that even though the above said promissory note and the above said letter dated 29. 1983 have been filed along with the plaint, the affidavit in support of the Interlocutory Application does not say anything about the genuineness of the said letter. 5. In this connection, it may also be noted that even though the above said promissory note and the above said letter dated 29. 1983 have been filed along with the plaint, the affidavit in support of the Interlocutory Application does not say anything about the genuineness of the said letter. 5. The supporting affidavit only says that the second defendant was also a surety and not a co-promissor, but in the face of the above said promissory note executed by both the defendants 1 and 2 what is now stated in the affidavit cannot be accepted even prima facie . The promissory note specifically says that both the defendants 1 and 2 have jointly and severally promised to pay to the plaintiff Bank, the sum due under the promissory note. Further, even in the above said letter dated 29. 1983 it is stated that the acknowledgment by one would bind the other jointly and severally. All this apart, even when the suit notice was given on 22. 1992 to both the defendants 1 and 2, admittedly there was no reply. In the above circumstances, it cannot be held that there is a triable issue. .6. Nodoubt, the learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the decision reported in Tavaramma v. Ramanjaneya Merchantile Co., (AIR 1977 Andhra Pradesh, 205) wherein no doubt it was held, relaying on Section 20(2) of the Limitation Act, that one of several joint contractors as promissors to a promissory note cannot be made liable by reason only of an acknowledgment of payment signed by one of them. But in that case, there was no undertaking similar to the undertaking given in the present Case by the above said letter dated 29. 1983. Therefore, that decision will have no application in the present case. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decision reported in Ramalingam v. Basuvalingam ( 1991 (I) MLJ 307 ). But that decision only lays down the law on the subject regarding granting of leave. On the prepositions of law laid down there, there is no quarrel. But in view of he undertaking given in the above said letter dated 29. 1983 by the second defendant, I am unable to see any triable issue and there is no reason to differ from the decision arrived at by the court below. 7. On the prepositions of law laid down there, there is no quarrel. But in view of he undertaking given in the above said letter dated 29. 1983 by the second defendant, I am unable to see any triable issue and there is no reason to differ from the decision arrived at by the court below. 7. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is not admitted and is dismissed. No costs.