M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD appellant's learned Advocate. ( 2 ) THIS appeal was argued on an earlier occasion and was fixed for further arguments today. The appellant's learned advocate has submitted that the disputed structure as far as the present appeal is concerned is a small temple which admittedly was constructed several years back. There has been some past litigation in this regard, but that was by some other persons and not by the present appellants who are as of now looking after the temple. His basic submission is that the area is alleged to have been acquired several years back, but that the possession of the same was never taken over and in this regard, he submits that even if some acquisition proceedings were commenced, that they have not reached the stage of finality and that the appellants are entitled to protection insofar as they were never dispossessed from the property in question. He elaborates on his submission because, he has referred to the provisions of the Land acquisition Act and the scheme thereof and it is his contention that there are different stages to the acquisition the last of which is that the possession be taken over and the compensation be paid and it is his submission that even if the authorities contend that all stages have been completed, but the physical situation demonstrates that the possession was never taken over, that the rights do subsist vis-a-vis the aspect of possession and that therefore, there can be no demolition except through due process of law. ( 3 ) AS far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, since the issue is pleaded in a large number of similar proceedings, it is very necessary that the correct legal position be clarified. The party who approaches the Court praying for an injunction against a public authority in respect of a piece of land or a structure thereon is required, as of necessity, to demonstrate that the party concerned either has a clear title to that site or the structure or more importantly that the party has rights in respect thereof, which require to be safeguarded or protected. Where the action on the part of the authorities such as a notice of demolition or a threat of demolition or taking over possession is sought to be resisted, it is condition precedent before a Court intervenes in such a matter that the aforesaid situation be demonstrated. It is insufficient if a mere averment is made because, the Court will have to be prima facie satisfied on the basis of the material produced before it that a relief is warranted. The Supreme Court has come down heavily on subordinate Courts that have been mechanically passing orders in cases of this type and impeding public works, roads, dams, parks or other public welfare measures from interfering into on the basis of injunction orders. It is, therefore, all the more incumbent in the light of recent decisions of the Supreme Court that all Courts subordinate to the Apex Court which necessarily includes the High Courts and the Trial Courts follow the directions that have been issued. ( 4 ) IT is in this light that the aforesaid contention will have to be examined. What is overlooked in the course of this argument is that when a public authority has put forward the plea that certain lands have been acquired, the law presumes and the law proceeds on the footing that the action is legal. That is because there is a legal presumption of legality in respect of such acts and it must, therefore, be demonstrated that the acquisition in question has either been challenged or that it has been set aside. In the absence thereof, the Court has to proceed on the presumption of legality and has to apply the rule of finality. It is certainly not open in the light of the aforesaid position for a party to pray for time by questioning the validity of acquisition that has become final years earlier. This practice that is at present prevalent in this city, will, therefore, have to be strictly discontinued. ( 5 ) ON the facts of the present case, therefore, applying this principle, it is not open to anybody at this point of time to go behind the acquisition that has been completed. This practice that is at present prevalent in this city, will, therefore, have to be strictly discontinued. ( 5 ) ON the facts of the present case, therefore, applying this principle, it is not open to anybody at this point of time to go behind the acquisition that has been completed. The argument that possession was not taken over to my mind, does not make any difference whatsoever because at the highest, it is a procedural default on the part of the concerned executing officers which does not affect the validity of the acquisition and more importantly, the total extinction of all rights in respect of the land and any structures that stood therefor. ( 6 ) THE scheme of the Land Acquisition Act clearly stipulates that on the notification under Section 6 being issued, that the acquired property vests in the acquiring authority free from all encumbrances and that pre-supposes the fact that if there are any structures thereon, that these have also vested. It is true, as pointed out by the appellant's learned Advocate that a formal taking over of possession is one of the formalities that accompanies the process of acquisition, but there are unfortunately instances when the officers may be remiss or more importantly, where the officers acting in collusion with persons who are on the site and despite making an inventory of having taken over possession, for reasons that are not difficult to understand, do not physically remove them. The important aspect of the matter is that this will not confer any new rights nor will it extend continue or revival any rights even if those persons possessed rights prior to the acquisition. This is the correct and clear position in law which will have to be applied. ( 7 ) IN the present instance, the position is that quite apart from the finality of the acquisition, that an earlier writ petition was filed and an earlier suit was filed in respect of this very structure both of which were dismissed. The appellant's learned advocate submits that those proceedings were instituted by some other parties and not by the present appellants. That to my mind, will not make any difference, because the principle of res judicata will operate insofar as the issue vis-a-vis that structure has been finally determined. The appellant's learned advocate submits that those proceedings were instituted by some other parties and not by the present appellants. That to my mind, will not make any difference, because the principle of res judicata will operate insofar as the issue vis-a-vis that structure has been finally determined. ( 8 ) THE second argument canvassed by the appellant's learned Advocate is in relation to Section 321 of the Karnataka municipal Corporations Act, 1976 under which the action is contemplated. He relies in particular on Section 321 (l) (i) (a) which reads as follows:"321. Demolition or alteration of. xxx xxx xxx: (1) xxx xxx xxx (i) xxx xxx xxx (a) has been commenced without obtaining his permission or where an appeal or reference has been made to the standing committee, in contravention of any order passed by the standing committee; or" ( 9 ) THE learned Advocate draws my attention to the wording of this section which starts with the words "has been commenced" and on an analogy, he draws my attention to the wording of the opening clause of sub-sections (b) and (c) which also read "is being carried on". The learned Advocate submits that the jurisdiction to act would arise only in a situation whereby a fresh breach is brought to the notice of the Corporation or the B. D. A. insofar as the Act contemplates a situation "in praesenti". He does not dispute the fact that if a breach of the provisions is taking place, that the authority can neither stop it nor can it undo the breach by demolishing whatever is sought to be put up. His argument is to the effect that if a structure has long been in existence, that this section will have no application because, the structure in question has already come up and that the work in question has not been "commenced" nor is being "carried on". He demonstrates from the facts of the present case that the structure is admittedly several years' old and that the jurisdiction of the authorities, according to him, commences only after the point of the acquisition and under these circumstances, it is his submission that no action is warranted under Section 321. He demonstrates from the facts of the present case that the structure is admittedly several years' old and that the jurisdiction of the authorities, according to him, commences only after the point of the acquisition and under these circumstances, it is his submission that no action is warranted under Section 321. ( 10 ) IN my considered view, the submission is misconceived for the reason that undoubtedly the Section 321 contemplates situation of present breach, but it would be an absurdity to hold that if the party by whatever means and at whatever point of time has put up a structure, that comes within the category of illegal or unauthorised structure, that merely because it is old or it has already been completed, that the authorities are powerless. Sub-clause (a) to the section envisages a situation whereby, at the point of commencement of the construction the structure in question ought to have been authorised and should pass the test of legality. It does not matter at what point of time the construction of the structure has taken place, because the law does contemplate a situation whereby a structure is suddenly put up and may have been in existence for a period of time either because it has not come to the notice of the authorities or for a variety of other reasons. In such a situation, it would be unthinkable to interpret sub-section (a) to mean that because the commencement was at some earlier point of time, that the authorities are helpless to act. The section has got to be interpreted correctly, rationally and reasonably and the only manner in which the intent of the legislature can be given effect to would be by holding that the action would still be valid regardless of the point of time when the work was commenced unless it is demonstrated by the party who has constructed it or who is in possession thereof or who claims to defend the action that the commencement of the work passed legal scrutiny. The only exception perhaps would be in those of the cases whereby after a careful consideration, the authority may have passed a valid order whereunder, in exercise of powers under the relevant acts, the commencement even if irregular or unauthorised has been regularised wholly or in part. The only exception perhaps would be in those of the cases whereby after a careful consideration, the authority may have passed a valid order whereunder, in exercise of powers under the relevant acts, the commencement even if irregular or unauthorised has been regularised wholly or in part. That exceptional category of cases would not come within the ambit of Section 321 (l) (i) (a) for the reason that if the authority has regularised the structure, there would be no question of any action. ( 11 ) AS far as the present case is concerned, the learned trial Judge has come to the conclusion that the record does not justify the grant of any relief to the plaintiffs. I have carefully reconsidered that record as also the submissions canvassed by the appellant's learned Advocate. I am conscious of the fact that this is a first appeal, but to my mind, the essence of the appellate procedure requires that it must be first demonstrated that the order passed by the Trial Court wholly or in part is erroneous and that therefore, in exercise of the appellate powers, that order requires either rectification, revision or modification wholly or in part. In a case such as the present one where the trial Court has refused the grant of reliefs on very valid and cogent grounds all of which in my considered view are unimpeachable, it is all the more incumbent at the appellate stage that it be demonstrated conclusively that there is a patent error in that judgment which requires rectification at the appellate stage. In the absence of such error being demonstrated, even if this be a first appeal, there is no provision of law under which this Court is obliged to entertain it. Having regard to the aforesaid position, the appeal fails and stands disposed of. --- *** --- .