G. C. BHARUKA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Writ Petition is directed against the assessment order dated 16. 5. 1995 made against the petitioner for the assessment period 1991-92 and the consequential demand notice which have been filed at Annexures D and E respectively to the Writ Petition. ( 2 ) PETITIONER is a partnership firm carrying on business of manufacturing and sale of Agarbatties. It is registered under the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter called 'the act' ). Subsequent to service of notice issued against the Petitioner under Section 12 (3) of the Act for the assessment year 1991-92, an order of assessment dated 30. 11. 1994 was passed against it determining its tax liability at Rs. 45,81,592. 00. Consequently the firm was served with a demand notice at Annexure-B requiring it to pay Rs. 7,19,111. 00 being over and above the admitted tax paid by him along with a copy of the assessment order. Against the said assessment order, Petitioner preferred an appeal before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Mysore, which was numbered as KST. AP. 402/1994-1995. One of the contentions raised before the appellate authority was that since the communicating copy of the assessment order had not been signed by the assessing authority, the assessment as made is illegal. The appellate authority called for the original assessment records and found that the original assessment order has duly been signed by the assessing authority but only the communicating copy thereof, may be due to inadvertance, did not bear the signature of the said authority. Still the appellate authority proceeded to declare the assessment order at Annexure-A as nullity by assigning the following reasons: "under no stretch of imagination, an order served on the appellant which does not bear the signature of the assessing authority can be construed as a legal order, whatever the circumstantial evidence be. In view of this, it is held that the order dated 30. 11. 1994 is a nullity. " faced with the said appellate order the assessing authority drew up a fresh order of assessment dated 16. 5. 1995 purporting to act under Section 12 (3) of the Act (Annexure-D) which is in verbatim the same as the earlier assessment order at Annexure-A and has served the same by signing and putting his seal on each page of it along with the demand notice. 5. 1995 purporting to act under Section 12 (3) of the Act (Annexure-D) which is in verbatim the same as the earlier assessment order at Annexure-A and has served the same by signing and putting his seal on each page of it along with the demand notice. The said order and the demand notice are at Annexures D and E to the Writ Petition. ( 3 ) MR. Vasan, learned Counsel for the petitioner assails the second assessment order and the demand notice on the ground that the same have been passed without service of any notice on the petitioner as mandatorily required under Section 12 (3) of the Act. On the other hand, Mr. Nazeer, learned Counsel for the respondent assessing authority has submitted that the order of the appellate authority at Annexure-C is itself an illegal order and therefore, even if the second order is found to have been passed in violation of the prescribed procedure, it should not be disturbed, because that will amount to upholding the appellate order which is per se illegal. He alternatively submitted that both the appellate order and the second assessment order being illegal be quashed by this Court and the appellate authority be directed to dispose of the appeal filed before him by the petitioner afresh. ( 4 ) TO appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to refer some of the provisions of the Act and the Karnataka Sales Tax Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules' ). Section 12 (3) of the Act reads thus: "if no return is submitted by the dealer under sub-section (1) before the date prescribed or specified in that behalf, or if the return submitted by him appears to the assessing authority to be incorrect or incomplete, the assessing authority shall assess the dealer to the best of his judgment, recording the reasons for such assessment: provided that before taking action under this sub-section the dealer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of the return submitted by him. " on a reading of the said provision it can hardly be disputed that before proceeding to make a best judgment assessment under the above said provision, it is incumbent upon the assessing authority to grant a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the dealer in respect of correctness and completeness of the return submitted by him. " on a reading of the said provision it can hardly be disputed that before proceeding to make a best judgment assessment under the above said provision, it is incumbent upon the assessing authority to grant a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the dealer in respect of correctness and completeness of the return submitted by him. Any breach of this mandatory provision will necessarily render the assessment order a nullity. ( 5 ) IN the present case, admittedly the original assessment order at Annexure-A had been duly passed on due compliance of the said mandatory requirement. But the plea taken before the appellate authority was that the communicating copy of the assessment order did not bear the signature of the assessing authority and therefore the assessment as a whole was a nullity. ( 6 ) TO examine the sustainability of the objection as taken above, it is necessary to refer to Rules 20 and 22 (1) of the Rules, which run as under: "20. Adjustment after final assessment.- After making the final assessment under Sub-rule (2) or (3) of Rule 18, the Assessing Authority shall examine whether any and if so, what amount is due from the dealer towards it after deducting any tax already paid in advance under Section 12-B or sub-section (3) of Section 25-B and the amount of tax, if any, paid under Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 18. If any amount is found to be due from the dealer towards the final assessment, the assessing Authority shall serve upon the dealer a notice in Form 6 and the dealer shall pay the sum demanded within the time and in the manner specified in the notice. If the tax due on the final assessment is lower than the tax already paid it shall serve upon the dealer a notice in Form 7 along with a refund payment order in Form 24 or a refund adjustment order in Form 25 or both, as the case may be. If the final assessment is exactly equal to the tax already paid the assessing authority shall inform the dealer what the final assessment is and that no further amount is due from him towards it: provided that the excess tax refundable to the dealer may be adjusted towards other amount, if any, due by him under the Act. " "22. If the final assessment is exactly equal to the tax already paid the assessing authority shall inform the dealer what the final assessment is and that no further amount is due from him towards it: provided that the excess tax refundable to the dealer may be adjusted towards other amount, if any, due by him under the Act. " "22. Determination of turnover.- (1) If in any case the Assessing Authority determines the turnover at a figure different from that shown in a return submitted under the provisions of these rules, it shall record its reasons briefly in writing and shall furnish the assessee with a copy of such record. Nothing contained in this Rule shall affect the validity of any assessment duly made. ( 7 ) FROM a reading of the said Rule 20 it will be found that on completion of the assessment if it is found by the assessing authority that any amount is due from the dealer, then he has to serve a notice in Form 6, This has duly been complied with in the present case as is evident from annexure-B. Rule 22 provides that if the dealer is subjected to assessment at a figure higher than that disclosed by him in the return, then, a copy of the reasoned order to the said effect, which is commonly called 'the assessment order', has to be furnished to the assessee, But at the same time the said Rule clearly prescribes that non-compliance of the said requirement will not affect the validity of the assessment 'duly made'. ( 8 ) IN the backdrop of the admitted facts of the present case and the law as noticed above, it needs to be ascertained whether the appellate authority has correctly concluded that since the communicating copy of the assessment order did not bear the signature of the assessing authority, it renders the entire assessment a nullity. The answer to this question, in my opinion, does not need much elaboration. ( 9 ) THE appellate authority had found as a matter of fact that the original assessment order as obtaining in the records had been duly signed by the assessing authority. The demand notice communicated to the petitioner was also duly signed. It was only the communicating copy of the assessment order which lacked the signature. ( 9 ) THE appellate authority had found as a matter of fact that the original assessment order as obtaining in the records had been duly signed by the assessing authority. The demand notice communicated to the petitioner was also duly signed. It was only the communicating copy of the assessment order which lacked the signature. There is nothing either under the Act or the Rules which requires that the communicating copy of the assessment order should contain the seal or signature of the assessing authority. If the appellate authority had any doubt about the authenticity thereof he was competent enough either to direct the dealer to file for a certified copy of the order or to verify the correctness of the same by calling for the original records, as has been done in the present case. I fail to understand that as to how the appellate authority in exercise of the his wisdom could have declared the assessment itself as a nullity for the reason that the communicating copy did not contain the signature. The said authority did not even glance through the provisions contained in Rule 22 which specifically declares that "nothing contained in this Rule shall affect the validity of any assessment duly made. " i really fail to comprehend that an officer of the rank of Joint Commissioner who is supposed to be quite experienced and versed with the provisions of the statute under which he is functioning, can commit such serious error in exercise of his jurisdiction. The legality of the order like the one at Annexure-C by no means could have been sustained if it would have been challenged before this Court. ( 10 ) MR. Vasan, appearing for the petitioner in order to support the appellate order at Annexure-C placed reliance on three reported Cases, namely GOPAL RAI SHRI RAM vs. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, UP. 35 STC 474 (All), NANJAPPA AND ANR. v. THE assistant COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, I CIRCLE, MANDYA, AND ANOTHER 48 stc 1 68 and ELECTRO MECHANICAL CORPORATION vs STATE OF KARNATAKA 1974 (1) KLJ 337. In my opinion, none of these three Cases have any bearing on the question involved herein. ( 11 ) IN the Case of Gopal Rai Shri Ram's case, the Sales Tax Officer who had proposed to pass an assessment order and had made a draft of it, and before finalisation thereof, was transferred. In my opinion, none of these three Cases have any bearing on the question involved herein. ( 11 ) IN the Case of Gopal Rai Shri Ram's case, the Sales Tax Officer who had proposed to pass an assessment order and had made a draft of it, and before finalisation thereof, was transferred. Accordingly, his successor then completed the assessment proceedings by passing a final assessment order as required under Section 7 of the UP. Sales Tax Rules, 1948. On the question whether the assessment order passed by the successor was valid or not, the Allahabad High court took a view that the earlier order was just in the form of draft and had not attained any finality, and therefore there was nothing illegal on the part of the successor to complete the assessment. It was in this connection observed that an order cannot become final unless it is signed by the officer in token of its being pronounced or delivered as a final assessment order. In the present case, there is no such situation. As noticed above, in the case of the petitioner the original assessment order had admittedly been signed and the consequential demand notice in the statutory form along with a copy of the order had been served on the petitioner. Therefore, the finality of making the assessment against the petitioner cannot be brought under dispute. ( 12 ) IN the case of Nanjappa and Another (supra) what has been held by this Court is that no demand notice can be issued unless the assessments are completed. In my opinion, this Case also has no bearing on the question involved in the present case, because, there is no dispute that the demand notice was served on the petitioner only on completion of assessment against him. ( 13 ) IN the case of Electro Mechanical Corporation (supra) it was held that the period of limitation for filing an appeal against an order of assessment as provided under Section 20 (2) of the Act was to commence from the date of service of the said order. This Decision too, in my opinion, does not have much bearing on the issue at hand. In the appeal filed by the petitioner no question of limitation was involved. This Decision too, in my opinion, does not have much bearing on the issue at hand. In the appeal filed by the petitioner no question of limitation was involved. His appeal was treated to be well within time by computing the period of limitation from the date of communication of the assessment order (Annexure-A ). ( 14 ) COMING now to the question as to whether this Court under the discretionary Writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, should necessarily interfere with the illegal assessment order like Annexure-D, thereby giving illegal sanction to another illegal order namely that of the appellate authority (Annexure-C), or in its discretion should quash both the orders. ( 15 ) IN the case of GADDE VENKATESHWARA RAO vs. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA pradesh AND OTHERS AIR1966 SC 828 , [1966 ]2 SCR172 , the supreme Court has held thus: "the result of the discussion may be stated thus: The Primary Health Centre was not permanently located at Dharmajigudem. The representatives of the said village did not comply with the necessary conditions for such location. The Panchayat Samithi finally cancelled its earlier resolutions which they were entitled to do and passed a resolution for locating the primary Health Centre permanently at Lingapalem. Both the orders of the Government, namely, the order dated March 7, 1962, and that dated April 18, 1963, were not legally passed: the former, because it was made without giving notice to the Panchayat Samithi, and the latter, because the Government had no power under Section 72 of the Act to review an order made under Section 62 of the Act and also because it did not give notice to the representatives of dharmajigudem village. In those circumstances, was it a case for the High Court to interfere in its discretion and quash the order of the Government dated April 18, 1963? If the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order - it would have given the Health centre to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat Samith. The High court, therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power in the circumstances of the case. " ( 16 ) AGAIN in MOHAMMAD SWALLEH AND ORS. The High court, therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power in the circumstances of the case. " ( 16 ) AGAIN in MOHAMMAD SWALLEH AND ORS. v. THIRD ADDITIONAL DISTRICT judge, MEERUT AND ANOTHER 1988 (1) SCC 4 : Para 7, it has been held thus: "it was contended before the High Court that no appeal lay from the decision of the Prescribed authority to the District Judge. The High Court accepted this contention. The High Court finally held that though the appeal laid (sic no appeal lay) before the District Judge, the order of the prescribed Authority was invalid and was rightly set aside by the District Judge. On that ground the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge. It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintainable before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the same could not be set aside. But the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case justice has been done though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had a point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution then no exception can be taken. As mentioned hereinbefore, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed authority has been set aside, no objection can be taken. " ( 17 ) SIMILAR view has been taken in the cases of ABDUL MAJID AND OTHERS vs. THE state TRANSPORT APPELLATE AUTHORITY, BIHAR AND OTHERS AIR 196 Patna 333 and JAGAN SINGH vs. STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, RAJASTHAN and ANOTHER AIR1980 Raj 1 Recently a Bench of Patna High court in the case of NAYA DAWAKHANA vs. STATE OF BIHAR 1990 (2) PLJR 616 : para-54, has held thus "the ratio of the aforementioned decisions is neither in doubt nor in dispute. In the aforementioned decisions, it has been held by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court that the issuance of writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. Such a writ may not be issued if substantial justice has been done to the parties if in the event upon quashing of one illegal order it is found that the same would give rise to another illegality, the High Court in its discretion may quash both the orders. " This Judgment on appeal has been duly affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of medimpex (INDIA) PVT. LTD. vs. DRUG CONTROLLER-CUM-CHIEF LICENCING authority 1989supp (2) SCC 665. ( 18 ) COMING back to the present case, as discussed above, in my considered opinion, neither the appellate order at Annexure-C nor the subsequent assessment order dated 16. 5. 1995 (Annexure-D) and the consequential demand notice at Annexure-E can be said to be in accordance with law. Therefore all the three are hereby quashed. The appellate authority namely the Joint Commissioner concerned is directed to take up the appeal on merits and dispose of the same in accordance with law. Writ Petition thus stands disposed of in terms indicated above. No order as to costs.